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FOREWORD
They oame to think that human geography and history 
were really quite different subjects, not different 
approaches to the same problem...
— Carl Sauer 
“Foreword to Historical Geography"
(1941, 4)
I preface this dissertation with a few comments about my 
intentions in writing it and begin with a note especially for 
historians and geographers. Of historical geography, J.B. Mitchell 
wrote in 1954: "Some feel that it is an unsound attempt by
geographers to explain history, and think that the historical 
geographer is most certainly trespassing and probably should be 
prosecuted." The work of historical geographers has since 
contributed much toward vindicating their species of scholarship, 
but confusion still attaches to the subject. Because, ideally, a 
doctoral thesis should represent its author’s competence and 
attainments in that course of study which he has followed and 
aspires to practice, the question of disciplinary concordance is of 
no small account. This study of piracy begins as a historical 
geography and ends as a history of geography. Its content and 
method are essentially geographical, but many of its sources and much 
of its inspiration were historical. As its author, I have often felt 
a mild scholarly identity crisis of the sort a child born out of 
wedlock might experience. Consider an allegorical elaboration of 
the predicament:
iii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
A comely peasant woman (let us call her G) has borne the 
Illegitimate son of a distinguished nobleman (let us call him H). 
The code of Academia forbids their marriage or any formal 
acknowledgment of the parentage, though one wonders what their 
future might have been together had they slipped away to another 
realm The mother carefully nurtures the boy and raises him with 
grace and discipline, but she never mentions the father. Perhaps 
her silence owes to propriety, perhaps to spite, or perhaps to a 
sense of protectiveness for herself and her child. Meanwhile, the 
son becomes a man. Me has assumed his mother's customs, her 
mannerisms— and her name— yet he knows he does not quite belong. 
People comment: But isn ’t young G quite the ringer for B? 
Eventually his paternity becomes clear to him. Oiriosity about the 
father haunts him. Perhaps, secretly, he begins to emulate him. 
Mow alike are they? If they were to pass in the street, what would 
be their reaction? Would their eyes embrace, at on ay momentarily, 
in tender recognition of that part in one which is replicated in the 
other? Or would they sooner, abruptly be averted as G and H  hurry, 
self-consciously, along their respective paths?
Thus, though I am no historian, I acknowledge my debt to that 
discipline. Some fine histories about piracy in Spanish America and 
elsewhere have already been written and were used extensively for the 
present compilation, but it is not my intention to offer yet 
another. Rather, it is my hope that this geographical analysis will 
complement the work of historians while constituting in itself a 
particular application of geography toward a better understanding of
iv
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
piracy. As Richard Hartshorne pointed out in concurrence with 
Alfred Hettner, to study the past dynamics of a region (in this 
case, the development of piracy in colonial Spanish America), the 
geographer may depend largely, even wholly, upon the historical 
record (1961, 185). Recalling the ideas of Immanuel Kant and Ralph 
Brown, he further contended that despite such reliance upon 
historical materials, and indeed in some measure upon historical 
methods, "to check and interpret the historical records of 
geographical material requires the knowledge and abilities of the 
trained geographer...[whose] production— the ultimate test— is 
essentially different in character from that which any historian 
could or would have produced" (187).
I have included what I deemed sufficient historical 
background for ‘•he reader and have respected chronological sequence 
whenever that seemed purposeful, but the overriding structure of the 
work is ohorological. The double-entendre of Pirates' Wale in the 
title reflects a diohotomous approach within the text. First, I 
have sought to retrace the long-vanished trail of those rovers to 
ascertain where they went and why they went there. My goal has not 
only been to make overall spatial sense of the pirates' locations 
and movements, but also to reconstruct particular places associated 
with them in as life-like a picture as possible, occasionally with 
the aid of contemporary maps and engravings. In this respect, the 
centerpiece of the present work emerged as a full chapter on 
Tortuga— a tiny, nearly forgotten island— but in many respects the 
fulcrum of piracy in Spanish America.
v
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To quote Carl Sauer once again, "The first step in
reconstruction of past stages...is mastery of its written documents. 
The discovery of contemporaneous maps is the first thing hoped for, 
but rarely realized" (1941, 13). In this last respect, I was
fortunate. Originally, my 6ole consideration had been to sort out
spatially the rovings of the pirates, but as my research progressed, 
I began to realize that they left more than just a fascinating trail 
for geographical scrutiny. Through their voyages and marches over 
remote seas and terrain, pirates took active part in the discovery 
and exploration of the New World. Furthermore, they left valuable, 
tangible chronicles and charts to convey their findings to
posterity. My second objective then became to salute, long after 
their demise, the contributions of the pirates toward increased 
geographical awareness. I doubt that many of these ruffians would 
have called themselves geographers (although a few did formally 
study the subject), and I wonder if many of my colleagues would care 
to welcome them (even posthumously) into the same profession. But I 
cannot resist labeling them as such while celebrating their 
geographical legacy— journals, maps, and place names— in happy 
compliance with Mitchell's enjoinder that "the study of the progress 
of geographical discovery and the growth of geographical knowledge 
must always be an essential part of the historical geographer's 
field" (1954, 15). Although I would certainly classify this second 
avenue of research as history of geography rather than historical 
geography per se, I would also argue that reviewing past perceptions 
of places enhances reconstruction of the places themselves.
vi
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My final comment here concerns the popular image of pirates. 
Perhaps no other group of adventurers has been romanticized to such 
an extreme. The boundary between fact and fiction is often blurred 
in this area of research, and I have endeavored to base my 
conclusions only on fact. I must admit, however, that it was the 
fanciful portrayal of piracy which first attracted me to the 
subject, and it is not without regret if 1 detract from that 
illusion. So, with hats off to Defoe, Stevenson, and Walt Disney, I 
trust that the reader will decide, as I have, that the spectacle of 
the truth rivals that of the romance.
vii
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ABSTRACT
This geographical study of piracy in Spanish America spans 
from 1536, the beginning date of sustained piratical activity there, 
to the near dispersion of pirate forces by 1718. It identifies and 
relates the operations of sixteenth-century corsairs such as Francis 
Drake, seventeenth-century buccaneers such as Henry Morgan, and 
eighteenth-century freebooters such as ‘Blackbeard*. Regional 
coverage focuses on Middle America with an occasional foray into the 
South Sea. The principal national agents considered are English, 
French, Dutch, and Spanish.
The study begins by deriving a working definition of pirates 
and examining precedent spatial approaches by Henry Mainwaring, 
Ellen Semple, and Derwent Whittlesey. The remainder divides 
essentially into three parts.
The firs t addresses those physical, situational, and 
geopolitical factors which influenced the spatial development of 
piracy in Spanish America. That pattern is described in terms of 
pirate routes as they evolved in the Caribbean and Pacific; major 
targeted Spanish entrepots such as Havana, Cartagena, Panami, Porto 
Bello, Vera Cruz, and Acapulco; pirate refuges and rendezvous such 
as Juan FernAndez, the Bay Islands, and the GalApagos; and buccaneer 
strongholds including Providence Island, Curacao, Tortuga, Port 
Royal (Jamaica), and New Providence (Bahamas). The pirates' 
interaction with the natural environment, especially along pirate 
coasts defined by turtling grounds, careening sites, and logwood
xiii
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stands are considered as are the Spaniards* implementations of 
convoy routes, fortifications, and changes in settlement.
Secondly, detailed historical reconstruction of Tortuga, north 
of Hispaniola— the region's premier pirate stronghold— occupies the 
focal position of this -work. Herein described are Tortuga’s history 
as a pirate base and its most infamous buccaneers, its physical site
and situation, and the cultural climate which generated the
piratical Brethren of the Coast.
The third component evaluates the contributions of pirates
themselves to the advancement of geographical knowledge. A 
comparison of their charts and journals exemplifies pirates* 
participation in the discovery and exploration of the New World. 
Particular emphasis on maps by William Dampier, Basil Ringrose, 
Lionel Wafer, Ambrose Cowley, and Alexandre Exquemelin highlights 
the cartographic achievements of the buccaneers.
xiv
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Chapter 1
AN ANCIENT PROFESSION REACHES THE NEW WORLD
PIRACT. ji. Commerce without its folly-sTaddles. 
just as God made it.
— Aabroae Bieroe
The Devil's Dictionary 
(1942 [1906])
1
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Preliminary Discussion
Piracy is an age-old occupation* which has been practiced in 
many parts of the world. To write a comprehensive geography of the 
subject, covering all of its global manifestations throughout 
history, would require many years of research. Such a compendium 
would no doubt yield fascinating comparisons for analysis, but would 
exceed by far the scope of this study. The ensuing work centers on 
the Caribbean, historically the scene of intense cultural 
interchange and conflict in which piracy played an early and crucial 
role Most of those places to be considered lie within the region 
of Middle America, an area defined by West and Augelli (1976, xiv) 
to include modern-day Mexico, Central America, and the West Indies 
(Antilles and Bahamas). The term Spanish America8 is nevertheless 
employed in the title for two reasons. First, it allows for an 
occasional pursuit of the pirates into South American waters. More 
importantly, it focuses attention on the Spanish Americans, if their 
mother country's claim to sovereignty in the New World bore any 
credence, as the victims of piracy; and that relationship assumes 
critical significance both for defining pirates and, consequently, 
for choosing the historical starting point of this study.
By the seventeenth century, the Caribbean was rapidly becoming 
the most complex arena of international rivalry in the New World, 
and the national diversity of the pirates reflected the intricacy of 
that struggle. Ideally, an objective, comprehensive treatment of 
piracy in the region would address the actions and national 
viewpoints associated not only with the Spanish defenders, but also
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
with pirates of Portuguese, Basque, French, Flemish, Dutch, Danish. 
Brandenburger, English. Scottish, Irish, Welsh, Colonial North 
American, and even Spanish origins. The roles of native-Indian and 
imported-Afrioan peoples, exploited both as precious commodities and 
as important combative allies by either side, would also demand 
careful consideration. Further complicating the picture would be 
the recognition that the national allegiance of the pirates, if any, 
was often transitory and always self-serving.
The scope of the present attempt and therefore its 
objectivity, to some extent, have necessarily been restricted by the 
time, resources, and linguistic capabilities at the disposal of the 
author. Within those constraints, I have endeavored to remain as 
unbiased as possible in methodology of research and presentation, 
while recognizing that the national and linguistio composition of my 
sources has no doubt fundamentally affected the flavor and content 
of my study. For native Anglophones, inoluding Americans, it is 
difficult to resist identifying at the very outset with the British 
pirates. That tendency, as Paul Hoffman has pointed out, emerges at 
the deepest cultural level and has prejudiced even scholarly 
applications (1980, 1-2). I have represented the actions of Spain 
and her three most suooessful piratical oontenders: Franoe, England, 
and Holland. To do so I have consulted both primary and secondary 
records concerning each of these groups either in their respective 
languages or through translations. Nevertheless, I have relied 
heavily, especially for manuscript material, upon English sources 
and must consequently acknowledge a potential for bias in my work.
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Determining exactly which historical figures or groups of 
people qualify as having been pirates poses a complex question. The 
meaning of the word pirate, which entails legal, moral, and cultural 
dimensions, is further complicated by association of the term with 
numerous synonyms, each with a particular connotation and 
application. My use of the word pirate in conjunction with various 
related expressions incorporates ideas from previous authors and 
derives from certain assumptions. One could begin by consulting 
dietionary-definitions of pirate3 and find that its widest, most 
common usage denotes a maritime-based robber who, whether on water 
or land, forcefully and illegally extracts the property of others. 
Were that the sole criterion, one might well argue that a historical 
geography of piracy in Spanish America should open with the 
piratical aggressions of the Spaniards against the Native Americans. 
Here I have bowed to European historical convention, however, and 
presume that the Spanish acquisition of New World territories was an 
act of conquest, not piracy.
If we recognize, at least for the moment, Spain's assertion of 
sovereignty west of the Tordesillas Line,* then the story of piracy 
in Spanish America begins with the arrival of those first European 
vessels that orossed the line to plunder Spanish wealth. The 
Portuguese, it is true, were the first to challenge Spain's monopoly 
of trade with her own colonies. Portuguese interlopers visited 
Hispaniola as early as 1514 (Hoffman 1980, 27), and continued a 
busy, yet peaceful, contraband traffic in Spanish American waters 
thereafter. These were smugglers, however, rather than pirates, 
albeit that distinction at times becomes a hazy one. The English
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5
also attempted at least one early incursion, the entry of a single 
ship at Santo Domingo in the year 1527,® which, though probably 
instigated at least in part for military reconnaissance, proved more 
an unsuccessful overture to trade than a prelude to piracy.® The 
English, moreover, did not return to the We6t Indies until 1563, 
when John Hawkins approached Hispaniola in yet another attempt to 
initiate commerce.
The first deliberate, belligerent attempts to divest the 
Spaniards of their riches in the New World began with attacks from 
France. Ships from that and other nations had already begun 
intercepting the return of Spanish vessels, particularly in the 
Atlantic Triangle which connects the Azores and Canaries with the 
Strait of Gibraltar, by the early sixteenth century. Cruising off 
the Azores in 1523, French-owned vessels7 captured two galleons 
richly laden with Mexican treasures sent by Cort6s to apprise the 
Spanish Crown of its American bonanza (Newton 1933, 48). The cargo 
of gold, jewels, and exotio finery no doubt encouraged the French to 
strike closer to the source. In 1528, French raiders plundered and 
set fire to San Germ&n, a Spanish settlement on the west coast of 
Puerto Rico (Andrews 1978, 65). That isolated foray constituted a 
relatively minor incident, but in 1536, the French renewed their 
assaults with unprecedented, sustained vigor (Hoffman 1980, 20). It 
is therefore from this point, when piracy grappled firmly onto 
Spanish American sea lanes, that the current analysis should begin. 
Those early French raids, however, like many of the successive 
aggressions which I will term piratical, though perpetrated by 
private oonoerns rather than royal navies, occurred nevertheless
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
during periods of intermittent warfare with Spain. Should they then 
be treated as acts of piracy or of patriotism? The answer
necessitates a return to the matter of definition.
Even lexicographic entries appear to reflect differing 
cultural perspectives on the subject. The Spanish definition of 
pi rat a in the Diooionario de la Lengua Espafola provides the most 
general description with the fewest qualifications: "ladron qua anda 
robando por el oar "(1984, 1067— translation: thief who comes
robbing by sea). By contrast, a British entry from The Oxford 
English Dictionary introduces an interesting stipulation by defining 
piracy as "The practice or crime of robbery and depredation on the 
sea or navigable rivers, etc., or by descent from the sea upon the 
coast, by persons not holding a commission from an 
established civilized state" (1961, 900— emphasis added).
Considerable ambiguity arises from this definition. When, for 
example, is piracy a mere practice instead of a crime? and what 
constitutes a civilized state? The most important departure from 
the Spanish interpretation of piracy, however, hinges on the issue 
of the commission.
State-operated navies large enough to ensure national security 
did not develop in Europe until the eighteenth century, so royal 
commissions had long been granted for private mariners to attack and 
plunder designated enemies. Such individuals or their vessels were 
called privateers;® and official state documents, or letters of 
marque,® were issued to sanction (and supposedly regulate) their 
activities. Even during peacetime, such letters were commonly 
awarded to merchants as compensation for losses suffered from
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
foreign attacks at sea. These merchants would then outfit armed
vessels to take prizes from the guilty nation and recoup the value
of the lost goods. This arrangement, perhaps reasonable enough, was
bound to degenerate for several reasons. Above all, there was no
enforoeable restriction against excess and abuse. In the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, privateering became a profitable business
venture in Europe; members of the gentry would invest large sums in
outfitting such expeditions, the crews for which were retained under
the agreement of "no prey: no pay"*® (Gosse 1950, 343). By the
latter seventeenth century, letters of marque against Spain's
shipping and possessions in the West Indies were circulated and
carried out so indiscriminately that any distinction between pirate
and privateer beoame virtually eclipsed.** Colonial governors, who
might issue commissions for a price, *® certainly looked after their
own share of the booty. Moreover, such credentials could also be
inherited, borrowed, stolen, forged, or outdated by several years
(Williams 1961, 125). Although it is true that for centuries the
French, English, and Dutch privateers proved indispensable to their
countries during wars with Spain, in peacetime they were reluctant
to cease their operations (Williams 1961, 89; Gosse 1924, 10).*® An
account by William Dampier describes the various means by whioh his
fellow adventurers obtained letters of marque:
It hath been usual for many Years past, for the Governour of 
P. Guavres to send blank Commissions to Sea by many of his 
Captains, with Orders to dispose of them to whom they saw 
convenient... Captain Davis accepted of one, having before 
only an old Commission, whioh fell to him by Inheritance at 
the decease of Capt. Cook', who took it from Captain 
Tristian, together with his Bark... (1927, 136).
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Should then privateers, including the sixteenth-oentury sea
dogs among whom Franois Drake remains certainly the mo6t revered, be
classified as pirates? Spaniards and Spanish Americans, both then
and now, would answer an unequivocal yes (Gosse 1924, 15).
According to Irene Wright, prolific translator of official Spanish
documents relating early English voyages to Spanish America,
to be ‘revenged for injury'..., to humiliate their enemies, 
to insult Catholicism..., and, while so doing, to enrich 
themselves and their principals, was the very different 
purpose of the men who came after Hawkins, of whom Franois 
Drake was but one among many of his sort. To the Spaniards 
they were ' thieves by sea,' ... to whom before the last
quarter of the 16th century had ended they applied generally 
the word "pirate," with no more and no less justice than 
usually attends its application to oonmeroe destroyers 
(1932, xvii).
Colombian historian Donaldo Bossa Herazo recently remarked that 
Francis Drake was no more than "a common pirate, “ a viewpoint 
apparently still shared by his fellow oartagrenos toward all 
privateers who attacked their city (quoted and reported by McDowell 
1989, 501). Privateer or pirate, a man would hang from the same 
Spanish rope if caught. The real value of the oonmission was that 
it protected the bearer from prosecution by his own government or by 
neutrals; above all, it legitimized the sale of stolen cargo in port 
(Barbour 1911, 531). French and British historians** have likewise 
lumped pirate and privateer together in the same piratical bag; 
here, I follow their precedents.
It is not, however, my intention to pass legal or ethical 
judgment on privateers— or even pirates for that matter. As Philip 
Means pointed out, both their personal motives and the degree to 
which their mother countries sanctioned their activities varied
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tremendously, not only among persons and groups, but also within the 
sea careers of individuals (1935, 54-55). Franois Drake, Henry
Morgan, William Dampier, Bartholomew Sharp, and Woodec Rogers are 
but a few examples of many who, over the course of more than two 
centuries, straddled the line between piracy and patriotism. Some 
attained royal reward, and a few even accepted government 
assignments to arrest their former cohorts. Neither do I render 
moralistic or political support for Spain’s proprietary claims in 
the New World, which were certainly questionable on many grounds. 
Rather, for the sake of argument only have I assumed legitimacy of 
Spanish ownership to provide a working definition for piracy and a 
focus of inquiry. Hence, my discussion of piracy in Spanish America 
shall address both uncondoned and state-oonmissioned acts of marine- 
based, forceful extraction of Spanish property by private parties. 
With that guideline and the foregoing limitations of scope in mind, 
only the olarifioation of certain terms associated with piracy 
remains to be made.
Although cognates for pirate exist In Spanish, English, 
French, and Dutch, these are often euphemistically supplanted in 
the literature by various, more-or-less synonymous expressions. 
Like privateer (whioh I will attach throughout only to commissioned 
individuals), some of these can convey special meanings, so their 
use in the subsequent text is explained as follows:
Corsair: As defined in  The Oxford English Dictionary, this 
word refers primarily to the Barbary pirates of the Mediterranean 
Sea, but can also be used more generally to mean pirate, privateer, 
or vessel thereof (1961, 1025; of. Gosse 1981, 71). In French and
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Spanish, however, its cognates18 evoke eesentially the same meaning 
that privateer holds in English. Following the precedents of Means 
(1935) and Hoffman (1980), I will use corsair to denote all the 
French, English, and Dutch raiders, commissioned or not, who 
threatened Spanish possessions during the sixteenth oentury. Also 
relevant to this period is the term sea dog, usually used in 
conjunction with the Elizabethan oorsairs.
Buooaneer. The evolution of this term, various forms of 
which exist in French, English, Spanish, and Dutch, in itself 
constitutes an interesting study in cultural exchange. The original 
buccaneers were hunters rather than pirates, a motley mix of French, 
English, and Dutch drifters who began congregating on the remote 
shores of northern Hispaniola during the early seventeenth oentury. 
By adopting a kind of Caribbean-Indian grill, or boa oso, for 
preserving meat, these hunters became known as bouosniers among 
the French, or buccaneers in English.18 Eventually they turned to 
piratery, and as their ranks swelled, the term was applied at large 
to the swarm of primarily French, English, and Dutch sea raiders 
operating in Spanish America. Many were at least nominally 
commissioned, and their attaoks were generally confined to Spanish 
targets. Although the French, in particular, have tended to 
identify boucanier only with the hunters described above,18 its 
cognates in English and Spanish,18 have become more synonomous with 
pirate. Incorporating guidelines set forth by Gosse (1981), I will 
use buooaneer specifically in reference to seventeenth-century^ 
pirates whose operations, which frequently included overland 
assaults, were principally directed against Spanish possessions in
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the Americas. It should be noted that, while many of the later 
buooaneer-reoruits never practiced the art of the toucan, it was 
common to vary oruising life with cattle hunting (Burney 1891, 50- 
51). The phrase Brethren or the Coast (Fr&res do la C6te in 
French), indicative of a certain internal social cohesion which 
developed among members of this international fringe group, is 
associated exclusively with the buccaneers (Gosse 1981; Kemp and 
Lloyd 1960). The Dutch, it is worth mentioning, also assumed a 
cognate, tookanicr, but the term of preference in that language has 
been xaa-roowar, literally equivalent to sea rower2* (Kemp and 
Lloyd 1960. 3).
Freebooter. In English, this is perhaps the word most 
broadly interchangeable with pirate. Like its Dutch progenitor, 
vrijbuiter, it has long denoted one who literally makes free with 
booty— a pirate— in the least restricted sense of the word. The 
French version, fldbustjcr, which apparently derived from 
unsuccessful pronunciation of the English, has generally meant the 
equivalent of buooaneer in the piratical sense used above.22 From 
French, it was eventually adapted by the Spaniards, as filibustcro, 
which was finally rendered back into English as filibuster.23 
These last two usually desoribe American adventurers of a more 
recent era, men like William Walker, who actively promoted military 
attempts to overthrow Latin American governments during the 
nineteenth oentury. The original term freebooter finds a useful 
place in the present study, however, for it best describes the kind 
of pirate still menacing Spanish American waters well after the 
dispersal of the buccaneers. These were the infamous pirates of the
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eighteenth century— Blaokbeard, Bartholomew Roberts, and the like—  
who unlike their buooaneer predecessors carried neither the 
commission nor the tacit approval of any government.® Though 
Spanish wealth remained a significant target, these freebooting 
maverioks considered the ships® of any nation equally suitable 
prey. At least one author has applied the name picaroon® 
exclusively to the eighteenth-oentury freebooters of Spanish America 
(Hill 1971).
Still other terms and phrases are associated with piracy. 
Particularly euphemistic expressions connect its practitioners with 
the sweet trade, or being at the seas, or going on the 
aooount (Mitchell 1976, 14). But the three principal labels
discussed above— oorsair, buooaneer, and freebooter— retain 
particular significance in the present study for two reasons. In 
sequenoe, they embody an important qualitative transition® in 
Spanish American piracy from arguably borderline legitimacy to 
undeniably flagrant criminality. Moreover, each encapsulates one of 
three historical intervals which conveniently divide the period 
under study. Generalizations about spatial continuity and 
differentiation can then be made with respect to corsairs of the 
latter sixteenth oentury, buccaneers of the seventeenth oentury, and 
freebooters of the early eighteenth oentury in the so-called Golden 
Age of Piracy.®
Neither piracy nor the spatial patterns associated with it 
abruptly disappeared from Spanish America by 1718, the historical 
endpoint of this study. Events in that year, however, did signal a 
marked suppression of piratery in the region thereafter. We will
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examine those historical developments, but first the necessity of 
reviewing precedent geographical analyses of piracy removes us to a 
much earlier cradle of the crime, the narrow ee&e of Europe, 
particularly in the Mediterranean Basin.
Geographers* Views on Piracy
Several geographers have found occasion to mention piracy 
within the context of their regional studies; likewise have most 
historians of piracy referred frequently to places attaching to 
their subject. What is conspicuously lacking in the literature, 
however, is a thorough geographical examination of piracy. In the 
course of the present research, I have found only three works whioh 
would qualify as geographical treatises wherein the emphasis hinges 
on such spatial factors as site, situation, environmental
interaction, patterns, and regions. All three focus on the
Mediterranean, but these are nevertheless valuable to the present 
study because they suggest principles for wider application and
provide models with whioh to compare developments in Spanish
America. The first work, a short expose on the piracy of his day, 
was written not by a professional geographer, but rather by the 
oorsair-turned-oourtier. Sir Henry Mainwaring, in 1617. Three 
hundred years later, Ellen Churchill Semple published an article 
whioh provided the first analysis of piracy that I have found by an 
academic geographer. In 1939, Derwent Whittlesey followed suit with
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a short description of pirate coasts in a text on political
geography. Dispensing with most of the regional particularities 
detailed within them, we shall examine each of these works and 
transfer as many concepts as prove useful to our own concern with 
Spanish America. For the location of key plaoe names mentioned, 
however, the reader should refer to the following map of 
Mediterranean piracy (Map 1).
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Mainwaring’s Discourse on Piraoy
Henry Mainwaring, an English captain who operated chiefly in 
the Hediterranean Sea and off the Atlantic coasts of Europe, sailed 
as a pirate in the early seventeenth oentury. In 1614 he ventured 
to the shores of Newfoundland, where he raided the fishing fleet for 
men, food, and supplies (Gosse 1924, 202), but that was the extent 
of his rowings in the New World. Eventually he obtained both pardon 
and knighthood from James I, to whom he dedicated, in 1618, a 
manuscript copy of a discourse headed "Of the Beginnings, Practices, 
and Suppression of the Pirates."^ This document may have 
encouraged James to launch a squadron, commanded by Mainwaring 
himself, in an attempt to squelch piraoy on the Barbary Coast (202). 
The expedition proved a failure, but the same strategy of sending a 
thief to catch thieves was repeated by later English monarohs as a 
means of suppressing piraoy in the Caribbean.®® Hainvaring’s 
treatise is divided into five parts. The first describes generally 
those conditions at the time whioh encouraged piraoy in and around 
British waters. The second considers reasons why individual seamen 
turned to piratery. The third very briefly describes the methods by 
whioh pirate vessels gave chase and overtook their prey. The fourth 
relates in detail the daily needs and activities of pirates. The 
fifth, in summation, suggests those steps deemed necessary for the 
king to extinguish piraoy. Aside from relaying many particularities 
of places and people enoountered in hi6 former career, none directly 
pertaining to Spanish America, Mainwaring attempted to analyze 
piraoy in the context of its geographical milieu. In the first part 
he explained how the placement and configuration of the British
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Isles encouraged piracy among his countrymen, allowing them remote 
havens from whioh to fit out, observe shipping, and strike— then 
back to which they could recoil with relative impunity. Mainwaring 
underscored the importance of Ireland, for example, in terns of site 
and situation:
...it may well be called the Nursery and Storehouse of the 
Pirates, in regard of the general good entertainment they 
receive there; supply of victuals and men whioh oontinually 
repair thither out of England to meet with Pirates. As also, 
for that they have as good or rather better intelligence 
where your Majesty's Ships are, than contrariwise they shall 
have of the Pirates. In regard of the benefit the Country 
receives by the one, and the prejudice, or incumber as they 
count it, of the other. Unto whioh must also be added the 
oonvenienoy of the place, being that the South, the West, 
and the North Coasts, are so full of places and Harbours 
without command, that a Pirate being of any reasonable 
force, may do what he listeth (1922, 15-16).
Such labyrinthine coasts as comprise not only the western margin of
Ireland, but also of Scotland, Wales, and Cornwall, characterize
many other notorious pirate haunts farther abroad. These remote
havens not only afforded refuge to pirates, but also allowed looals
(at exaggerated rates of exohange) to provision them clandestinely
with stores, food, and ammunition (17). Indeed, pirates traded and
smuggled as often as they robbed and could not have functioned
without the help of indigenous populations who were, if not also
sympathetic, at least business minded.
It is the fourth part of the treatise, for whioh Mainwaring 
apologized if seeming "somewhat tedious to your Highness" (25), that 
contains morsels of information of the very type relished by 
geographers. Here the old corsair recounted the ordinary pursuits 
whioh shaped pirate life: "Where and at what times they used to be 
where they must water, ballast, wood, trim their ships, and sell
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their goods" (13). What makes this section interesting is that it 
exposes ho* suoh an extraordinary lifestyle in fact demanded so much 
attention to mundane exertions. Without naming all of the places 
(mostly Hediterranean) recorded here, it will prove instructive to 
examine the types of activities described in selected locations, ho* 
these related to the physical environment, and ho* they influenced 
the spatial character of piraoy. These same types of relationships 
*ill later apply to Spanish America as veil.
In the Mediterranean, as in the Caribbean, the complex
arrangement of straits, islands, capes, harbors, vinds, and currents
resulted in a relatively constricted and predictable netvork of
shipping routes. As sea predators, pirates vere thus aided by the
region'6 maritime physiography in trapping their mercantile
quarry;3* as mariners themselves, hovever, they also paid heed to
the natural demands of the sea. The general circulation of vinds
and currents in the Mediterranean is counterolookvise. Yessels
entering through the Strait of Gibraltar kept close to the North
African coast, vhile those plying vestvard sailed along the
"Christian" (European) side (26). According to Mainwaring,
At Tetuan, the first town on the Barbary side going in, a 
Pirate may water well, have good refreshing, buy store of 
povder... and sell their goods veil which is quickly landed 
and dispatched by reason of the Boats of the town, but here 
is no command but to ride upon their guard;32 they ride also 
in foul ground33 and must perforce put to Sea if the 
Levant34 come here...
At Formentera by I visa33 is water, wood, and ballast, 
but nothing else, being no inhabitants. They must shift 
Roads as the winds are either Easterly or Westerly, which 
they must do by putting through betwixt the Islands wherein 
the best of the channel is 3 fathom water (26-7).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
19
Within the above passage are mentioned some important place 
characteristics of concern to pirates, namely, the physical and 
military safety of harbors; local wind direction and channel depth; 
availability of food, fresh water, wood for fuel and nautical uses; 
and convenient markets in whioh to sell stolen cargoes or barter for 
ammunition and other necessaries. When unable to steal or trade for 
victuals, or when forced to hide out in some remote island, the 
pirates were accustomed to living off the land. Mainwaring spoke of 
foraging in the Canaries for "young hawks and pigeons” (36), as well 
as goats (37), and of lying low "at Desertas by the Madeiras... [to] 
water and perohanoe get some Beeves there" (36).
Yet another constant concern was careening, or cleaning the 
hull of the ship, whioh was, as Mainwaring put it, "a mighty 
inoonvenienoe to Pirates" (31). While undergoing suoh maintenance, 
their vessels, half-hoisted out of the water, remained extremely 
vulnerable both to foul weather and ohanoe encounters with enemies. 
Henoe the pirates sought harbors protected either by their seclusion 
or by allied guns for careening. Mainwaring cited Porto Farina, 
nestled in the Gulf of Tunis, as providing "very good watering, and 
a good place to careen in, being Land-looked" (29).
Pirates did not simply rove about on the open sea hoping to 
fall upon unsuspecting prey. Either they targeted minor, 
unfortified ports suoh as Velez Malaga, J&vea, Alicante, or Cullera 
on the coast of Spain, where prizes might easily be taken at anchor 
(30), or they positioned themselves in the road of heavier shipping, 
usually near some constricted passageway (called "choke points" in 
modern military jargon) defined by capes, straits, and islands.
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Some strategic ambush points mentioned by Mainwaring included; off 
capes de Gata and de Palos, overlooking aooess to Gibraltar and 
shipping from Malaga and Cartagena along the southeast coast of 
Spain; San Pietro, an islet off the southwest coast of Sardinia; 
Cape Passero, commanding the channel between Sioily and and Malta; 
in the Strait of Otranto, intercepting Venetian traffic between the 
Adriatic and Ionian Sea6; and off the eastern tip of Crete or any 
number of the Greek islands (26-8).
The pirates migrated seasonally between hunting waters in 
response to the cyclical shifting of winds and ocean commerce. 
Mainwaring thus described the pirates' movements on the Atlantic 
side of Gibraltar:
Without the Straits for the most part, all Pirates do 
resort to the coast of Spain and Portugal for purchase, and 
there according to the times of the year do lie off of one 
place or other; from the middest of February to the last of 
March, they commonly lie South and South-south-west of Cape 
St. Maries,36 some 20 or 30 leagues off, for Indies men 
outward bound. And generally February, March, April, and 
May, they keep the coast of Spain, in whioh months those 
that look for Straits men homeward bound, lie 20 leagues off 
Cape St. Vincent west...
From the middest of May, till the middest of August, 
they are seldom on the coast, as well for that, in those 
fair seasons, the Spanish and Flemish men of war do more 
diligently keep the Seas than in winter weather; and these 
times they commonly spend amongst the South or West 
Islands,3̂  and from thence...to the Bank of Newfoundland 
(31-3).
Lastly, Mainwaring described a type of place essential to the 
long-term establishment of piraoy in any region: the pirate
stronghold. During his career, two such bases ensconced on the 
Barbary Coast dominated the Mediterranean scene: “there is not any 
place for Pirates to resort to, but only Algiers and Tunis, where
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they may be fitted with all manner of provisions and to ride safely 
from the Christian forces" (25). Algiers offered a protective inner
harbor and a commanding oitadel of over 200 guns (29, 29n). Its
influence extended direotly through the subsidiary ports of B6ne and 
Bougie (27). Tuni6 (as ancient Carthage before) had always pressed 
hard its piratical thumb on the Sicilian Channel,38 that commercial 
lifeline threading through the slender waist of the Mediterranean. 
Its harbor, not fully warranted by its oastle, was nonetheless 
easily safeguarded by one or two warships. Tripoli afforded a third 
fortified haven on the Barbary Coast, but its entrance channel and 
inhabitants apparently proved too dangerous even for pirates (29). 
Pirate ports supplied not only protection, but also men, provisions,
and amiminition to outfit ships. In addition, they provided markets
for plundered goods and various recreational diversions on which to 
spend the gains. More importantly, these strongholds constituted 
established regional forces, powerful nexuses vhioh exerted 
influence far beyond their ovn ramparts. Mainwaring stressed 
repeatedly how letters from Algiers or Tunis would guarantee safe 
reception of the pirates by looals, even as far away as Rhodes and 
Cyprus (28-29). He even advised King James to maintain good 
relations with those cities because, in the case of renewed war 
between England and Spain, there would be “no place for our 
Merchants that trade that way to relieve themselves in any distress 
betwixt Sioily and Gibraltar so convenient as those places" (31). 
Now let us turn from the first-hand observations of the pirate to 
notes made by a famous academic geographer three centuries later.
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Semple's Analysis of Pirate Coasts
At the height of World War I, in 1916, Ellen Churchill Semple 
published her article, "Pirate Coasts of the Mediterranean Sea" in 
The Geographical Feviev. She introduced her observations with an 
interesting and timely comparison:
It is a significant parallel that the German and 
Austrian submarines, the commerce destroyers of the present 
war, frequent the same hunting-grounds in the Mediterranean 
as the ancient and mediaeval corsairs. They have been 
operating in...the broad avenue leading to the Gibraltar 
gate; along the marine highway between Spain and the 
Balearic Isles...; in and about the Sicilian Strait, where 
converge all lines of traffic between the eastern and the 
western basins; in the Strait of Otranto and the long 
Adriatic lane; [and] in Cretan waters...
Although Semple concentrated on ancient developments, beginning with
the Cretans, Greeks, Phoenicians, and Etruscans, many of the spatial
manifestations of piracy she described were still enacted, as
related above, by Mainwaring's contemporaries.39 Nevertheless, from
her conclusions we can add to our inventory of geographic elements
which have characterized piracy. One basic effect she discussed was
the location of settlements, both by pirates and, as a response, by
their victims.
Pirates favored “promontories...and utilized them as pirate
strongholds from whioh to conduct their depredations" (Semple 1916,
136). Islands, particularly small, mountainous ones, also attracted
pirate settlements. Corsica, in Semple's view, exemplified "all the
physical qualifications for chronic piracy":
[I]ts rugged relief, poor soil, indented coastline, and 
location on marine trade routes..., [compounded by its] 
small geographical area, limited population, and political 
dismemberment, due to its physical dismemberment, all 
combined to weaken the island and make it a ready prey... 
(146).
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Those molested by pirates sought similar outposts as a first 
defense; thus in ancient times was the promontory of Soilla 
fortified to prevent Etrusoan depredations near the Strait of 
Messina, and the island of Elba was militarily oooupied to thwart 
piraoy in the Tyrrhenian Sea (146). To safeguard their oommerioal 
and residential settlements, however, beleaguered coastal folk 
retreated inland, especially in times of intense looting. Fear of 
piratical raids compelled coastal settlers of ancient Greece to 
looate cities suoh as Mycenae, Argos, and Athens up to ten miles 
inland. Likewise before had the Minoans placed Cnossos and, 
afterwards, even the Etruscans, who initially "either avoided the 
coast or merely built fortifications there as defenses against 
pirates," placed Pisa (136). In periods of increased maritime 
commerce, when powerful navies were able to suppress piraoy, coastal 
traders sought more direct access to the sea. Settlements sprang up 
on the outer ooastal fringe, often functioning as port outlets for 
centers already established inland. Henoe evolved "twin oities, 
port and capital, such as Rome and Ostia..., Athens and the 
Piraeus"— the latter pair connected by long walls (137). But when 
naval control waned and pirates renewed their vigor, exposed ooastal 
populations withdrew once more from the sea; "[t]hus the southern 
littoral of Italy, whioh was the site of flourishing seaboard 
settlements during the period of Greek oolonial expansion, became 
wellnigh depopulated during the Middle Ages, owing to the oentury- 
long attacks of... pirates” (137).
Perhaps Semple's largest contribution to a geographioal 
understanding of piraoy lay in her descriptive analysis, indicated
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by the article's title, of "pirate coasts." Mainwaring, we noted, 
had suggested that the physioal configuration of the Irish coast 
predisposed its inhabitants to sea robbery. Semple, arguing from a 
characteristically deterministic stance, contended more forcefully 
that the physioal geography of certain Mediterranean ooastal regions 
"condemned" these to become "natural breeding places for corsairs" 
(138). Aooording to Semple, several factors of the environment 
converged to create the pirate coast. It typically evolved along a 
shoreline where mountains plunged abruptly into the sea. Suoh a 
rugged, broken interface between land and water afforded few 
agricultural opportunities and precluded concentrated populations or 
effective centralized government. Everything oonspired to turn the 
inhabitants of suoh a coast seaward. The forested mountain slopes 
provided timber, especially straight-boled conifers, for ship 
building. Though the locals might attempt to derive a legitimate 
subsistence from fishing, the slightest population pressure could 
overtax their precarious food supply and drive them to illegal 
maritime pursuits farther afield. This incentive toward piraoy was 
exacerbated on islands, suoh as Corsica, where land was the most 
limited. It also prevailed, however, on continental coasts whioh 
were effectively out off by the mountains from the hinterland, or 
where the hinterland remained unproductive because of aridity. Both 
these conditions applied in the case of the Barbary Coast, blocked 
from the Saharan interior by the Atlas Mountains. Such irregular 
coasts further encouraged piracy, as already noted, by providing a 
confusion of secluded inlets and channels for evasion, as well a6 
isolated, fortifiable headlands from which to spot prizes (138-41).
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Semple likened the robber mentality of these coastal denizens 
to that of various mountain, steppe, and desert tribes who augmented 
their meager existence by pillaging neighboring agricultural 
communities. She further pointed to examples of just suoh peoples 
who, upon expanding their influence to the sea, quiokly swapped “the 
desert camel and the steppe pony for the swift-moving ship" (138).
Pirate coasts had to lie, of course, within striking distance
of lucrative trade lanes (141), preferably in reach of an important
ohoke point. Combining all of the above geographic criteria with
the historical record, Semple was able to identify several pirate
ooasts in the Mediterranean realm. These included most of ooastal
Asia Minor, many of the Aegean islands, Crete, the Caucasus coast of
the Blaok Sea, the Dalmatian coast of the Adriatic, the Barbary
Coast of North Africa, the Balearic Islands, and Corsica (139).
Among all these she singled out Cilicia, on the southern coast of
Asia Minor, as the pirates' "acropolis":
Nature had equipped it with every physioal facility for the 
trade— timber, harbors, signal stations, coast fortresses, 
impregnable mountain retreats. Moreover, its location, 
remote and inaccessible from the weak Seleuoid capital, had 
placed it beyond reach of the arm of authority... (143).
For all her characteristic emphasis on natural parameters, 
Semple did temper a deterministic view with recognition of oertain 
social factors whioh oould override the physioal milieu. The 
Lebanon, she explained, though possessing "all the geographic 
conditions for a pirate coast," never became one as long as 
legitimate trade with Damascus and Mesopotamia proved more lucrative 
than piraoy (140). Moreover, strong regional maritime powers, suoh 
as evolved under the Delian League of Greece or Pompey's Roman navy.
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oould suppress piratical outbreaks, at least for a time. Finally, 
of course, the success of pirates depended on patterns set by wind- 
driven sailing technology: "what whipped them," Semple concluded 
(detenninist to the last), "was steam navigation. Their rugged 
coasts oould not breed mechanics and engineers” (151).
Whittlesey's Comments on Piracy and Maritime Strategy
Writing in the foreshadow of World War II, Derwent Whittlesey 
included a subsequent geographical treatment of piracy in his 
landmark text on political geography, The Earth and the State 
(1939). In the chapter entitled "The Mediterranean Realm," he 
included, without really adding anything new, what constitutes only 
a brief synopsis of Sample's ideas*® about pirate coasts (241).** 
From the same volume, however, what will enlarge on the present 
discussion are Whittlesey's remarks concerning maritime strategy. 
His analysis of "islands as springboards" (59-65) holds particular 
relevance to the geography of piraoy.
So far we have considered the utility of islands in terms of 
their defensibility, relative isolation, and strategic relationship 
to choke points. Islands provided pirates with hideouts, lookouts, 
and retreats, but as such aided only sporadic, static belligerence. 
When piratical tendencies were harnassed to serve a larger menace—  
and pirates did form the vanguard of French, English, and Dutch 
penetration into colonial Spanish America— then islands assumed a 
more active and threatening role, described by Whittlesey ae 
"springboards":
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Islands figure far more conspicuously then either their size 
or their resources appear to warrant. Their qualities of 
unity, isolation, and strategic location lend them this 
political significance. Islands fringing the coasts of 
continents in process of being broaohed, make ideal advance 
bases for expanding political power (59-60).
Furthermore:
A far more intimate relation of island to mainland 
persists between islands close to shore...and the hinter­
land. At the outset suoh islands can be utilized as natural 
defense points. They are small enough to be easily conquered 
and effectively controlled by little groups of invading 
mariners... Once firmly ensconced in fortified positions on 
the island, the interlopers make it a base of operations 
against the mainland, and a haven in case of forced 
retreat... If it lies in a river mouth or near the mainland 
shore it shelters a belt of calm waters in whioh the 
ships...can safely anchor, and across whioh forces attacking 
the mainland can easily make their way (60).
Whittlesey then went on to classify such offshore islands, and it is
noteworthy that he reckoned "rooky outliers"— the very type favored
by pirates— as "least common and most prized" (61).
We have examined three spatial appraisals of piracy which 
focused on the Mediterrean experience and have extracted such 
elements and relationships as might prove generioally explanatory to 
a geography of piracy. The next task is to use this conceptual 
framework in developing a new model to describe the Spanish American 
experience.
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Notes
* An eminent authority on the subject, Philip Gosse, even contended 
(no doubt with tongue in cheek) that “piracy must surely be the 
third oldest profession in the world" (1924, 11). Dr. Gosse,
coincidentally a physician like some of the buccaneer-authors he 
studied, reckoned the art of healing as the world's second oldest 
profession.
2 The term Spanish America appears infrequently in geographies and 
gazetteers as a regional designation. De Sola (1975, 530) defined 
it as the "Spanish-speaking countries of the Americas" which include 
"every country once ruled by Spain from Mexico in the north to Chile 
in the south with the exception of British Honduras, Jamaica, 
Guyana, the Haitian section of Hispaniola, French Guiana, and 
Brazil." My own use of the term is similar, though in the context 
of the historical starting point of this study, I exclude only that 
territory recognized by Spain as rightfully Portuguese. In other 
words, I use Spanish America to encompass colonial Middle and South 
America, with the exception of Portuguese-held Brazil. One might 
well argue that, whether based on modern linguistic distribution or 
historical settlement, regional discussion of Spanish America ought 
to include places of Spanish settlement in North America (e.g. parts 
of Florida and California). Some of these areas were certainly 
subject to piraoy but are not included in this study.
3 Definitions from The Oxford English Dictionary and the Diooionario 
de la lengua EspaSola are quoted later in this chapter.
4 Drawn by Pope Alexander VI, the Line was accepted under treaty by 
Spain and Portugal in 1494 to divide between them ownership in the 
New World. Located 370 leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands, the 
Papal Line fell at about 50 degrees west longitude, setting off a 
large section of modern Brazil.
3 The commander of this vessel may have been John Put, sent by Henry 
VIII in 1527 to seek a northwest passage to the orient (Newton 1933, 
49); but Spanish accounts of the English ship whioh visited Santo 
Domingo that same year include no mention its captain's name (Wright 
1929).
6 The Spaniards at Santo Domingo, faced with the novel and 
unprecedented English intrusion, reacted with suspicion and 
hostility; but in none of the related Spanish documents translated 
by Wright (1929, 29-59) are the Englishmen labeled as pirates.
 ̂Commanded by Jean Fleury, the fleet was owned by Jean d'Ango of 
Dieppe (Newton 1933, 48).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
29
3 The word privateer came into colloquial use in mid-seventeenth 
century England as a shorter expression for private man-of-war. In 
The Oxford English Dictionary (1961, 1389) it is defined as "An 
armed vessel [or commander/crew member thereof] owned and officered 
by private persons, and holding a commission from the government, 
called * letters of marque*, authorizing the owners to use it against 
a hostile nation, and especially in the capture of merchant 
shipping".
9 The earliest recorded issue of a letter of marque in England was 
in the year 1293 (Gosse 1950, 341n).
A variant on the motto was "no purchase, no pay" (see, for 
example, Winston 1969).
According to William Dampier, most of the French commissions 
issued in his day were mere licenses to hunt game on Hispaniola, but 
these were used as "a pretense for a general ravage in any part of 
America, by Sea or Land" (1927, 137). Gosse related similar abuse 
of an officiously florid Danish document sold by the governor of St. 
Thomas (1924, 10).
Governor Modyford of Jamaica, for example, frequently sold 
commissions for twenty pounds apiece (Williams 1961, 125).
13 With the accession of James 1 to the throne, England ended its 
long naval warfare against Spain. Peace brought unemployment to 
thousands of discharged sailors who consequently turned pirate. 
Privateers also continued their maraudings under wartime letters of 
marque despite a royal decree of June 1603 ordering them to desist. 
Within ten years their combined numbers had multiplied tenfold 
(Williams 1961, 89).
** Although a titular distinction has often been maintained, 
especially by contemporary chroniclers, modern historians of piraoy 
have tended to place both in the same class of sea felon. Compare, 
for example, Besson (1928), La Villestreux (1930), Masefield (1922), 
Gosse (1924), and Means (1935).
13 In Spanish, pirata; French, pirate-, Dutch, piraat.
In the Grand Larousse de la langue frangaise (1973, 998), for 
example, oorsaire primarily denotes an armed vessel, or 
captain/crewman thereof, officially authorized by the government to 
cruise against and capture the merchant shipping of an enemy in time 
of var. Likewise, in the Diooionario de la Lengua EspaSol (1984, 
387), cor sari o, refers to ships, captains, or crewmen licensed by 
their own governments to go roving.
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According to Kemp and Lloyd, the word buooaneer does not appear 
in English documents produced before the end of the seventeenth 
century (I960, 2). Among English colonists from Nevis and St. 
Christopher, they were known in the 1630s as "Cow Killers" and 
feared for their savagery (Harlow 1925, 16).
18 As indicated in the Grand Larousse, even modern use of boucanier 
specifies primarily the former vild-beef hunters of the Antilles who 
preserved their meat with smoking. Secondary use of the word to 
mean pirate results from "confusion” with flibastiar (1973, 474). 
According to Exquemelin, who lived among both the pirates and 
hunters of Hispaniola, the French attached the name boucanier only 
to hunters of wild bulls (1972, 45; 1967, 35). I will follow this 
convention by reserving the French term boucanier to distinguish any 
specific reference to hunters, as opposed to discussion of the 
piratical buccaneers. Use of the word flibustier is discussed later 
in this chapter.
19 Bucanero is defined in the Diccionario de la lengua EspaSol as 
"Pirata que en los siglos XVII y XVIII se entregaba a saqueo de las 
posesiones espaSoles de ultraoaf' (1984 , 218).
20 Although Gosse included eighteenth-century pirates in his 
definition of buccaneer, he stated in the same article that the 
buccaneers disbanded after the siege of Cartagena in 1697 (1981, 74- 
5). In a definitive history of the buccaneers, Clarence Haring had 
previously suggested that "With the capture of Cartagena in 1697 the 
history of the buccaneers may be said to end" (1910, 266).
21 First written in Dutch, the original title of Exquemelin's 
Buccaneers of America, was De Aoericaensabe Zee-Boovers (1678). The 
modern Dutch spelling is zeerover.
22 Flibustier, according to the Grand Zarousse, denotes " Aux JVI16 
et XVIII6 s., aventurier appartenant A une association de pirates de 
la iner des Antilles, dont 1'aotivitC Ctait dirigie surtout centre 
les possessions espagnoles " (1973, 1984). This meaning is identical 
with that of bucanero in Spanish or buccaneer in English. The 
adoption of the word by Frenchmen on Tortuga to distinguish pirates 
from hunters (boucaniers) is described in the 1686 French edition of 
Exquemelin (see 1967, 35). Burney explained this interesting
linguistic crossover by pointing out that on Tortuga, while most of 
the original hunters were French, the majority of the men cruising 
against the Spaniards were English (Burney 1891, 51). Newton
perpetuated the notion that the French called their buccaneer- 
pirates flibustiers "because they were accustomed to use light craft 
like the Dutch 'fly-boats' in their attacks upon the Spanish
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vessels" (1933, 169), but that view is not widely shared. Burney 
had previously discounted the idea for two reasons: “First, the word 
'flyboat' is only an English translation of the Dutch word 
'fluyt’...Secondly, it would not very readily occur to anyone to 
purchase Dutch fluyts, or flyboats, for chasing vessels" (1891, 50). 
Charlevoix had addressed the derivation of flibustier in his history 
of 1733 and concurred with the origin from freebooter (tom.3, 8-9).
23 A peculiarly American application of filibuster describes the 
delivery of a prolonged oration to obstruct legislative proceedings. 
This attachment of the piratical to the political is perhaps not too 
surprising; Ambrose Bierce defined corsair as "a politician of the 
seas"! (1942, 57).
24 As defined in Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the 
English Language, a freebooter "goes about plundering without the 
authority of national warfare"— let alone an official commission 
(1981, 905).
28 These pirates further differed from the buccaneers of the 
previous century in that they relied mostly on ship-to-ship combat, 
rather than land maneuvers.
28 Picaroon derives from the Spanish picsaro, meaning rogue. In 
English, its general association with piracy is quite old; however 
Richard Hill, in his book entitled The Picaroons, stated that 
"Freebootering— or, as foreigners mis-pronounce it, filibustering—  
at this period.. .became not so much the bold hazard of the Buooaneer 
as the piracy of the Picaroon.... In 1700 we arrive at the incidents 
of the Picaroon period" (1971, 10).
27 Rolando Velasquez similarly considered the qualitative and 
historical connotations of Spanish terminology in "Bucaneros, 
Piratas, Filibusteros; su Diferenoiaoidn y Transioiones " (1956).
22 See, for example, Hugh Rankin's The Golden Age of Piracy (1969). 
The phrase has also been used by Lloyd (in Johnson 1962, 9), Botting 
(1978, 21), and Lee (1974, 3).
29 There are at least ten manuscript copies of Hainwarings 
discourse. For a complete bibliography, consult the introduction to 
the Navy Records Society publication of the one dedicated to James I 
(edited by G.E. Manwaring and W.G. Perrin, 1922); this is the 
version used here.
3£) Most notably employed to this end were the ex-buccaneer Henry 
Morgan, who instigated the crown's first serious efforts to curb his 
former cohorts, and the ex-privateer Woodes Rogers, who cleaned out
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the last nest of pirates by the close of the period under study. 
Bartholomew Sharp also was dispatched with a naval commission to 
intercept buccaneers, but he quickly turned again to roving himself.
See Ellen Churchill Semple1s concurrence in note 39, below.
33 By whioh was meant that there was no friendly fort to protect 
them while at anchor.
33 i.e. dangerously shallow and rocky coastal waters.
34 A levanter (or Levantine) is a strong easterly Mediterranean 
wind. Blowing counter to the normal North African current, such an 
occurence could have grounded them.
33 Of the Balearic Islands.
33 Cape Santa Maria.
39 Canaries and Azores.
38 Variously called the Strait of Sicily (Sicilian Strait) or the 
Tunisian Channel.
39 Semple also emphasized the coastal physiography of the 
Mediterranean as responsible for recurrent waves of piracy whenever 
a dominant maritime power was lacking in the region:
The stable factors tending constantly to produce this 
phenomenon are to be found in the geographic conditions 
obtaining in the Mediterranean. Owing to the configuration 
of the basin, traffic was compressed into certain narrow 
trade routes. These threaded their way between island and 
peninsula, entered sub-basins by the only possible gateway 
of the strait... Thus traffic was restricted to fixed lines 
in a way impossible on the open ocean.
The sea hunter, therefore, knew various points where he 
was sure to bag his game (1916, 135).
40 In 1931, Semple had consolidated her articles about the 
Mediterranean in her last book, The Geography of the Mediterranean 
Region: Its Relation to Ancient History, published by Henry Holt, 
New York.
4* For the sake of completeness and comparison, I have included 
Whittlesey's passage about pirate coasts below:
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Where ranges of mountains parallel to the coast have 
been partly drovned, the coastal waters form labyrinths of 
inlets and canals among peninsulas and islands. These waters 
may be shallow or deep, but their aooess to the hinterland 
is difficult. The mountain flank, exposed to the sea, bears 
forests, including conifers, and these, aside from 
fisheries, are the only resource upon which the inhabitants 
can rely. With ample wood for shipbuilding and dependent on 
fishing for a livelihood, the people of such coasts have 
from time immemorial been proficient in the arts of 
navigation, and have undertaken to supplement their meager 
resources by raiding the shipping of more favored folk. 
Classic corsair coasts are Dalmatia.... Barbary, and two 
faces of Anatolia— most of the north coast, and on the 
south, Rugged Cilicia. Denizens of these coasts have 
recurrently damaged the shipping of maritime states so 
heavily as to force them, rivals though they were, to 
organize into political leagues powerful enough to cope with 
privateering. Such leagues have characterized Mediterranean 
politics from Minoan times to the 19th century, when the 
national state superseded the traditional city-state as the 
dominant form of political organization. Either alone or 
with allies, ancient Rhodes and Athens, medieval Venice and 
Genoa, modern France and Britain have by turns undertaken 
the extirpation of Mediterranean pirates, but until a 
generation ago, only Rome succeeded. Today pirate coasts 
have lost their advantages. Lacking iron and coal, their 
inhabitants cannot build or run steel steamships. Even if 
they had modern fighting ships, many of the hideouts would 
be too shallow to accommodate them. Merchantmen, relatively 
independent of winds and currents, can avoid many pirate 
lairs and can often outsail marauders, while fast warships 
can track them down (1939, 141).
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Chapter 2
PATTERNS OF PRET IN SPANISH AMERICA
Trade it nay help, society extend.Bat lares the Pirate, and corrupts the friend
— Alexander Pope 
Moral Essays (Ep. Ill L. 29)
34
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Figure 1: Late Fifteenth-Century Carrack-Protoype 
of the First Spanish Treasure Ships
(from Peterson 1975)
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Hap 3: Caribbean Core of Piracy in Spanish America, 
Sixteenth to Eighteenth Century
The New Scene of an Old Crime
Although Hispaniola lay over four thousand miles1 from the
Pillars of Hercules, piracy in the New World was in other respects
not so far removed from its earlier, Mediterranean manifestation.
In a highly generalized sense, one could almost envision the
Caribbean-Gulf enclosed by the Americas as a mirror image of the
tri-continental seas engulfed by the Old World. Eastern oceanic
access to the Caribbean terminated in the expansive Gulf of Mexico,
while the western entrance, to the Mediterranean threaded ultimately
to the commodious Black Sea. In describing the pirate coasts of the
Mediterranean, Ellen Churchill Semple suggested a direct parallel to
our present concern with Spanish America:
The pirate was the robber of the sea highways; and the 
highways of the Mediterranean were well defined and well 
traveled. The Oriental commerce in slaves and luxuries 
yielded such rich plunder to the freebooters, as it passed 
through Cretan waters between the Peloponnesus and 
Cyrenaioa, that the pirates called this 'the golden sea.'
Just such geographically determined routes attracted the 
buooaneers of the American Mediterranean in the seventeenth 
century, as they swarmed out of their hiding places in the 
Antilles, to seize the gold and silver freight of the 
homebound Spanish caravels or the useful cargoes of the 
outbound ships. Here Jamaica, owing to its location, played 
the part of Crete as an advantageous piratical base; for it 
commanded several marine passages into the Caribbean Sea and 
was within striking distance of the Spanish treasure ships 
as they left the Isthmus of Panama and the Mexican ports 
(1916, 135).
It is indeed tempting to pair key places in the 'American 
Mediterranean' with strategic counterparts in the Old World. Thus 
has Tortuga been likened to Malta (Thrower 1980, 136), and the Bay 
of Samana's Is la Levantado been dubbed the "Gibraltar of the 
Buooaneers” (Verrill 1923, 195). But Spanish American piracy was no
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mere reenactment of the Mediterranean stage; and although we will 
find ample opportunity to apply the observations of Mainwaring, 
Semple, and Whittlesey to a new regional setting, it is important to 
bear in mind fundamental geographical differences which 
distinguished piracy in the New World.
To begin with, although the interior Mediterranean was riddled 
with numerous ohoke points, ooeanio aooess to that sea was through a 
single strait; Gibraltar's dominance contributed greatly to the rise 
of the Barbary pirates as the leading menace to maritime commerce by 
Mainwaring'8 day. The multi-insular shield of the Gulf and 
Caribbean, by contrast, could be broached from the Atlantic through 
several portals, though some were far more important than others. 
Moreover, the relatively narrow Central American land bridge, so 
readily traversable at the Isthmus of Panama, encouraged overland 
extension of piratical ventures into a vast new ocean and coasts 
ripe with vulnerable pickings. American piracy thus developed a 
strong amphibious nature that culminated in the complex sea-and-land 
maneuvers of the buooaneers. In addition, the latitudinal shift 
from subtropical Mediterranean waters to tropioal American seas 
meant a substantial difference in seasonality, living conditions, 
and sailing patterns. Finally, American piracy burst into a new 
historic era and geographic realm. Unlike the slow evolutionary 
processes by which Sample explained the development of Old World 
piracy, the American species sprang to life from a mature 
transplant, blossoming after a mere century into the widespread but 
ephemeral depredations of the buccaneers, and withering within a 
comparable span into near extinction. In this respeot, even should
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we accept Semple's determinsitio premises, we mast recognize piracy 
in Spanish America, though clearly interactive with the physical 
environment, more as a product of society than of nature. The utter 
devastation of the region* s native population consequent to the 
Spanish Conquest left a completely new arena for European 
exploitation. While piracy in the Old World lingered amid 
population pressures, long-established territorial powers, and 
familiar hunting grounds, piracy in Spanish America emerged as part 
of a colonial scramble for relatively unsettled lands and uncharted 
waters. The product was fundamentally different. Nevertheless, 
with these important qualifications in mind, we will find that many 
of the same geographic exigencies of commerce and commerce 
destroyers which typified the Mediterranean experience provoked a 
similar response in Spanish America.
In this ohapter we will survey geographic conditions which 
influenced Spanish American piracy during our period of study. Many 
of the same categorical relationships identified by Mainwaring, 
Semple, and Whittlesey will contribute to the framework of analysis. 
These include the effects of the region's maritime configuration, 
its winds, currents, and strategic choke points; the establishment 
of Spanish trade routes and the consequent deployment of pirates; 
the identification of Spanish coastal targets and the emergence of 
American-based pirate strongholds; the interaction of pirates with 
the natural environment while acquiring provisions, maintaining 
their vessels, and pursuing alternate modes of employment; and the 
subsequent location of pirate coasts and refuges. Later, in the 
larger context of the region's historical geography, we can evaluate
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the spatial effect of piracy on colonization efforts both by the 
defending Spaniards and their ingressing competitors. The extent of 
the region and period under study demands fairly broad treatment at 
this level, but the information is specifically organized to satisfy 
two principal objectives. The first is to provide a spatiotemporal 
frame of reference for understanding piracy in Spanish America. The 
second, by virtue of comparison with previous geographical studies 
of the Mediterranean experience, is to extract from a new setting 
any underlying geographical principles which could point toward a 
more holistic explanation of piracy. In the subsequent chapter, 
much more refined application of pertinent historical and 
geographical details will focus on the piratical evolution of 
Tortuga.
Invitation to Piracy
Semple and Whittlesey showed that submarines of the First and 
Second World Wars responded to maritime configurations with a 
spatial strategy reminiscent of ancient piratical circuits. 
Likewise, modern geopolitical concerns in the Gulf-Caribbean hinge 
upon many of the same physical and situational factors which 
influenced piracy in colonial Spanish America. The Antillean 
archipelago has been described by geopolitical analysts as “a 
curving fence with five main gates: the Straits of Florida, the 
Windward Passage, the Mona Passage, the Anegada Passage, and the 
Galleon's Passage north of Trinidad" (Anderson 1984, 4; cf. West and
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Augelli 1976, 123-25). To these outer gateways can be added the Old 
Bahama and Providence Channels as well as a dozen other navigable 
water gaps whioh punctuate the Bahamas and Lesser Antilles, 
including the St. Luoia Channel and the Guadeloupe, Dominion, 
Martinique, and St. Vincent Passages. Interior sea lanes converge 
most notably at the Yuoat&n Channel. Under the scenario of modern 
conventional warfare in the region, these maritime constrictions 
pose essentially the same strategic vulnerability now as they did in 
the days of sail, long before the Panama Canal. To complete the 
list of choke points in colonial Middle America, however, two 
critical trans-isthmian routes must be added. One was the overland 
mule-trail and riverine routes whioh connected Nombre de Dios/Porto 
Bello with PanamA and the Pacific. The other was the Rio San Juan, 
or Desaguadero, whioh threaded its way to the Caribbean from Lake 
Nicaragua and Granada. Map 3 indicates the locations of all these 
strategic bottlenecks. Their effect, in oonoert with prevailing 
winds and currents, manifested itself first in the establishment of 
a predictable Spanish commercial network, and consequently in the 
tactics and logistics of the region's pirates.
Three maritime lifelines evolved to connect the treasure and 
products of Spain's colonies with the mother country in Europe.^ 
The general routes of all three are shown on Map 2; more detailed 
information about the two Caribbean circuits appears on Map 3. From 
the western fringe of Spanish America, the most perilous voyage 
spanned the vast Pacific expanse in an 18,000-nautical-mile course 
joining the wealth of the Orient to that of New Spain. This was the 
famous Manila galleons track. Its American terminus lay at
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Acapulco, "a town that existed only for trade” on the Pacific coast 
of New Spain (Lyon 1990, 30). From its heavily fortified harbor, 
the naos de la China, or 'China Ships', plied their way due west 
laden with Mexican silver to exchange for Asian goods. Even under 
steady propulsion from the North Equatorial Current and the 
Northeast Trades, the outward journey might last half a year, with 
only a stop at the Ladrones (Guam and the Mariana Islands) to vary 
the monotony en route to the Philippines. Returning from Manila,
the galleons stood first to the northeast, attaining a latitude of 
about forty degrees before steering eastward. Swept by the Kuroshio 
Current and the Prevailing Westerlies, the China Ships then plotted 
a straight course for Cape Mendocino, whenoe the California Current 
carried them back to Aoapuloo. Silks, spices, ivory, porcelain, and 
jade were just a few of the Oriental wares whioh entered New Spain 
in this manner. Transported along the ‘China Road' via mule teams 
to the Mexican capital and thence to Vera Cruz (San Juan de Ulda), 
these exotic goods eventually reached Spain with the Mexican silver 
fleet (8-14).
Ever since Cavendish's successful South Sea cruise (1586-88), 
the fabulous wealth of the Manila galleons sporadically lured 
marauders to the Pacific coast of New Spain, but the relative 
inaccessibility of the South Sea constrained most of Spain's 
piratical foes to the Atlantia side of the Americas. There the 
Gulf-Caribbean network connected ultimately with Seville via the 
trade routes established by the galaonee (or galleons) and the flota 
(Mexican treasure fleet).3 The galeones served Tierra Firme and the 
Spanish Main,* where Porto Bello and Cartagena emerged as the
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principal ports of call. The convoy typically consisted of five to 
eight men-of-war, each bearing forty to fifty guns; several smaller, 
faster boats called pa Caches ; and a fleet of merchantmen, varying 
in number from year to year. Under a general's command, the 
galleons left Seville between January and Haroh, cruising south and 
westward with the Canary and North Equatorial Currents and backed by 
the Northeast Trades. If they sailed in consort with the Mexico- 
bound ships, the combined fleets typically entered the Caribbean 
through the Dominica Passage or a neighboring channel, diverging 
afterwards toward their respective destinations. If the galleons 
sailed alone, they might enter through the passage whioh bears their 
name, sighting Tobago on the inbound stretch. At this point 
individual pataohes and merchantmen could detach from the main 
convoy to call at Margarita, CumanA, Caracas, Maracaibo, and Santa 
Marta. These vessels would later rejoin the galeones at Cartagena, 
the principal entrepdt for the Spanish Main. Its warehouses awaited 
the annual visitation stocked with indigo, tobaooo, and oaoao from 
the Venezuelan ooast; pearls from Margarita and Panoheria; and 
emeralds from New Granada. Haring related that goods arrived even 
from as far as Guatemala, whose merchants were reluotant to route 
valuables direotly to Havana through the pirate-infested YucatAn 
Channel (1910, 14-16). Porto Bello superseded Nombre de Dios as the 
Caribbean terminus of the Peruvian-Panama trade before the olose of 
the sixteenth century,5 and it vas here that the galleons came next. 
When notified of their arrival in the Indes, the Viceroy of Peru 
ordered the Armada of the South Sea to esoort shipments up the 
Pacific ooast from as far as Chile and Charoas.® Silver flowed from
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the mines at Potosi, and the Navio del Qro carried gold from Quito 
and surrounding districts to join the convoy at Paita. From there 
the Pacific treasure ships voyaged in consort to Panama, where the 
overland trek began toward the galleons waiting on the Caribbean 
side. From Panama to Porto Bello there were two established routes. 
The shortest led directly overland via mule trains, or reouas, 
through jungles, 6wamp6, mountains, and unspanned rivers. This path 
was the more expensive option, traversable only during the dry 
season. Alternatively, goods oould be hauled overland as far as 
Venta Cruz and then transported in boats down the Rio Chagres to the 
Caribbean vithin easy reach of Porto Bello (17). The magnitude of 
the annual fair at Porto Bello, when the galleons arrived from 
Cartagena to meet the Panama shipment, easily eclipsed the marts at 
Cartagena and Vera Cruz. As an entrepdt, Porto Bello commanded the 
focus not only of Tierra Firme, its immediate hinterland, but of the 
whole interior Spanish-South American trade (Loosely 1933, 317). It 
was here that the English priest, Thomas Gage, witnessed “heaps of 
silver wedges... like heaps of stones in the street" (1928, 368). 
The precious metals and other Peruvian commodities would be 
exchanged for Spanish manufactured goods, especially fabrics, oils, 
spices, wines, paper, glassware, and iron products (Loosley 1933, 
323-24). All this commercial zeal unfolded amidst such 
overcrowding, elevated prices, and rampant disease that Gage dubbed 
the town "not Porto bello, but Porto malo " (1928, 369). From here 
the ga leones oould continue direotly to Havana, their last port of 
call, but by the mid-seventeenth century the Spaniards considered 
that route's proximity to buccaneer bases at Providence Island and
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the Miskito Shore far too dangerous. Instead, they found it safer 
first to double back to Cartagena with the eastward coastal eddy and 
then to make for the Yuoat&n Channel. From Havana, provided they 
ever reached it, the galeones oould return to Spain via the Old 
Bahama Channel or the Straits of Florida. Often they waited to 
rendezvous with the Mexican convoy for the homeward voyage (Haring 
1910, 19-20).
The third maritime artery in Spain's colonial empire was the 
flota for Vera Cruz, or Mexican treasure fleet. This convoy also 
included a few warships and several merchantmen and often crossed 
the Atlantic in consort with the galeones. Upon entering the 
Caribbean, usually via Dominioa or Guadeloupe, the flota veered 
northeast to skirt the Greater Antilles. En route to the Yuoat&n 
Channel and the Gulf beyond, individual merchantmen dropped off to 
call at San Juan, Santo Domingo, Santiago de Cuba, Trujillo, and 
Puerto Caballos. The destination for the main body of the flota was 
Vera Cruz, the major port of Mexico. Through this port flowed 
silver from New Spain and the oriental treasures hauled overland 
from Acapulco. Like the galeones, the flota made its final 
rendezvous at Havana? before returning to Spain.
Such was the ocean-borne mercantile network whioh connected 
Spanish America with the mother country. Just as the winds and 
currents of the Pacific determined the general route of the Manila 
galleons, so too did the natural circulation of air and water in the 
Gulf-Caribbean ordain the usual pattern of Spanish trade via the 
Atlantic. The Northeast Trades with the Canary and North Equatorial 
Currents facilitated the outbound leg. The voyage from Spain via
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the Canaries, through the Lesser-Antillean portals down to the
Spanish Main, and thenoe to Tierra Firme or beyond was a relatively
straightforward matter. Getting back out, as historian Paul Hoffman
has noted, was entirely more complicated:
Within the Caribbean, the position of the Antilles and the 
fact that the prevailing trade winds were from the northeast 
meant that a shipmaster wishing to sail from the north ooast 
of South America (the Spanish Main) far enough north to 
oatoh the prevailing westerlies that would take him to the 
Azores and so to Andulusia had two options: either he oould 
try to beat eastwards against the trade winds (or tempt fate 
during the periods of variable winds when the trade winds 
were slack) or make use of the Mona Passage or the Windward 
Passage, or he oould reach across the face of the trade 
winds to use the YucatAn Channel and Florida Straits. Onoe 
on the northern side of the Antilles, the winds were more 
favorable for his voyage, although the difficulties of 
navigating the Bahamas and the Bahama Channel diminished the 
benefit thus gained. Sailing for Europe from the Antilles 
was somewhat easier than from the Main, but even so many 
skippers preferred to run westward (downwind with the trade 
winds) to use either the Windward Passage or the Yuoat&n 
Channel rather than try to beat northeast from northern 
Puerto Rico or eastwards to and through the Mona Passage.
In the Gulf of Mexioo, prevailing northwesterly winds foroed 
ships [i.e. the flota] to sail in a great arc from the ooast 
of New Spain to near the mouths of the Mississippi River and 
then southeast for the Florida Straits. In short, it was 
easy to get into the Caribbean, but hard to get out (1980,
5-6).
Though initially plied with some frequency by homeward-bound 
merchants and retained thereafter as important local shipping 
routes, the Mona and Windward passages lost much of their 
significance as strategic bottlenecks for major fleet movements as 
the Spanish convoy system expanded and developed. By the close of 
the sixteenth century, treasure fleets traversed the Caribbean with 
the primary objective of reaching Cartagena or Vera Cruz. The 
homeward voyage, via Havana, required passage through the Yucatan 
Channel and the Straits of Florida; these became the most crucial
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choke points, all the more tempting to pirates because the ships 
which negotiated them carried silver and gold (Andrews 1978, 3).
The physioal geography of Spanish America— the pattern of 
winds and currents, the placement of deep-water harbors, and the 
strategic location of various choke points— together set the basic 
spatial framework of maritime activity, not just for the Spaniards, 
but for their piratical contenders as veil. Consequently, the early 
corsairs, who also launched their voyages from European ports, 
operated essentially within the same maritime constraints as their 
prey. Moreover, for Spaniard and corsair alike, the seasonal rhythm 
of the elements conspired to channel hostilities temporally as well 
as spatially. The Caribbean's autumnal hurricane season, coupled 
with the tempestuous Atlantic winters, generally compelled the 
galeones and flota to embark from Spain in the early spring and late 
summer, respectively. Should the galeones not leave Havana by mid- 
September, they might overwinter there and sail home with the flota 
the following spring. Vera Cruz, by the same token, often served as 
winter quarters for the Mexican fleet. The earliest oorsairs, no 
less immune to the perils of hibernal seas, but lacking any friendly 
port in the New World, also made for Europe no later than the fall 
(Haring 1910, 14-21; Hoffman 1980, 6-7).
Nature may have provided a complicated set for piracy's debut 
in the New World, but society choreographed its profane movements 
across Spanish America with an artistio folly that only humans oould 
provide. The social, or political geography of the great tri- 
oenturial performance commenced with a broad papal gesture taping 
off the eastern edge of the stage. Suoh was the famed Tordesillas
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Line, that majestic stroke of unexplored longitude by vhioh Pope 
Alexander VI, in 1494, made proprietors of the Spaniards— and 
pirates of anyone else— vho dared voyage beyond it.® This bit of 
global geometry engraved not just an arbitrary meridian (near 50* 
vest longitude), but a formal invitation to vould-be trespassers. 
The French monarch, Francis I, formulated his celebrated reply by 
1526, vhen he declared "The sun shines on me a6 veil as on others. 
I should be very happy to see the clause in Adam's vill vhioh 
excluded me from my share vhen the vorld vas being divided" 
(Williams 1963, 207). Within a decade, Frenoh corsairs vere
contesting Spain's acquisition of American riches vith more than 
courtly banter. By 1536, the Spanish Crovn found itself oonmitted 
to the hopeless task of defending the larger portion of an entire 
hemisphere against piratical transgression. The depredations of the 
Frenoh oorsairs only multiplied over the ensuing deoades until 
finally, in 1559, the Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis brought a glimner 
of peace. But the prize of the Americas proved too valuable to be 
settled by diplomacy, and the agreement, as Sir Alan Burns pointed 
out, actually served to conventionalize piracy in the region for 
years to come:
In the discussions that led up to the signing of this 
treaty, the French insisted on their right to send ships to 
the West Indies; to this the Spanish oould not agree and the 
difficulty vas overcome by an oral agreement, limiting the 
application of the peace treaty to that part of the vorld 
vhioh lay north of the Tropio of Canoer and east of the 
prime meridian, at that time generally recognised as the 
meridian of the most vesterly of the Azores Islands. These 
vere the ' lines of amity' beyond vhioh peace vas not 
expected— or realised, and this agreement had considerable 
influence on international relations during the next half- 
century.®
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...There was indeed 'no peace beyond the line', and it 
was taken for granted there would be hostilities in the 
Caribbean area no matter how friendly international 
relations might be in Europe. Acts of violence 'beyond the 
line' were not regarded as acts of war, and atrocities which 
would have been condemned in the comparatively chivalrous 
warfare which still existed in Europe were scarcely noticed 
when they oourred in America (1954, 140-41).
These basic linear boundaries, drawn not in response to any
exigencies of nature, but rather as concessions to purely human
greed, essentially defined the theater of Spanish American piracy.
The Frenoh and Spaniards provided the initial dramatis personas; all
that remained to complete the oast of players was the appearance of
the English and the [>itoh.
Battle Beyond the Line
Temporally, we can conceptualize piracy in Spanish America in 
three broad phases, beginning with the corsairs in the early 
sixteenth century, culminating with the buccaneers by the latter 
seventeenth century, and declining with the freebooters, or 
picaroons, within the first few decades of the eighteenth century. 
Spatially, we can organize our understanding of these maraudings 
according to those geographic themes already identified by scholars 
of the Mediterranean experience, viz. favorite routes, lurking 
places, and coastal targets of the pirates; site and situation of 
their established strongholds; spatial exigencies posed by the 
distribution of vital resources and environments; and ‘pirate 
coasts', or areas of chronic piratical activity.
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Corsairs
Not surprisingly, raiding patterns of the sixteenth-century 
corsairs corresponded closely to the growth and flow of Spanish 
American trade. For two very logical reasons the early pirates 
clung doggedly to those lifelines of Spanish mercantilism whioh 
threaded Gulf and Caribbean waters. Obviously these vere the lanes 
through vhioh the wealth moved; outbound vessels from Spain brought 
manufactured items, wine, and ammunition while caravels and galleons 
returned laden with hides, cacao, sugar, cochineal, indigo— and 
highly coveted cargoes of silver and gold. Horeover, the European- 
based corsairs in their long-range operations depended on the 
region's winds, currents, seasons, and choke points to nearly the 
same degree as did their more cumbersome quarry.
The earliest Frenoh raids in Spanish America targeted places 
where Spanish American wealth, settlement, and commerce vere first 
concentrated— the Greater Antilles. Havana suffered most during 
this initial phase. Ransomed by a lone Frenchman in 1536,*** this 
all-important nexus of Spanish shipping would be pillaged again and 
again— even more brutally by Jaoques de Sores in 1555. Though their 
maraudings occasionally led to the Main, the henchmen of Jean d'Ango 
and their like focused mostly on the towns and shipping of Cuba, 
Hispaniola, and Puerto Rico. The pirate-infested waters of the Mona 
Passage, Yucatan Channel, Florida Straits, and the Bahamas proved 
particularly dangerous fcr Spanish merchants, and only the
relatively well fortified Antillean ports of Santo Domingo and San 
Juan (Puerto Rioo) remained unscathed by Frenoh corsairs (Burns 
1954, 139-40; Ashdown 1979, 10; Hoffman 1980, 24-25).
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Neither the Spanish Crown nor its American subjects stood idly 
in the midst of such aggressions, and two defensive measures emerged 
from the first round of corsair incidents whioh profoundly 
influenoed the spatial character of the region's piracy. One 
obvious Spanish response was the construction or improvement of 
fortifications at key ports. Gonzalo FernAndez de Oviedo, as warden 
of the fortress at Santo Domingo, had already conceived a 
comprehensive plan of defense works ranging from Dominica (guarding 
the usual Caribbean entry of Spanish merchants and corsairs alike) 
to Bermuda and the Strait of Magellan. His suggestions would have 
incurred enormous expense and therefore went mostly unheeded, but 
unprecedented losses after 1536 renewed attention to the need for 
protective structures. New bulwarks reinforced Santo Domingo and 
San Juan, while initial constructions at Santiago de Cuba and Havana 
proceeded under the direction of Hernando de Soto. Fortifications 
consumed the largest share of royal defense monies up to 1548 
(Hoffmann 1980, 51-59). These and other early defensive measures 
for a time helped discourage French raiding in the Antilles, and 
after 1538 the focus of piracy shifted overseas for a few years, 
back to the Atlantic Triangle (13, 25).11 Growing treasure centers 
on the Main, however, ripening prizes like Cartagena and Santa 
Marta, remained unfortified and terribly vulnerable to attack (55). 
The second defensive posture assumed by Spain was the implementation 
of the convoy system. Even as early as 1513, the Casa de 
Contrataci6n at Seville had seen fit to assign two caravels to 
protect the Cuban ooast, and by 1521 guarda costas were patrolling 
strategic waters in the Caribbean (Barbour 1911, 531). Initially,
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Spanish merchantmen oould voyage singly to the New World, but losses 
in the Atlantic Triangle and later in the Caribbean made clear the 
need for more protective taotios. As early as 1526, ships plying 
the American trade were ordered to sail in flotillas of at least 
ten, assembling at Seville for the outward voyage and at Santo 
Domingo for the return. Armed escorts at first conducted 
merchantmen only through the Atlantic Triangle, but events after 
1536 demonstrated the sheer vulnerability of the American sector. 
Full convoy service between Seville and the Caribbean did not 
commence until 1542-43 (Hoffman 1980, 27-31). Originally a single 
treasure fleet engaged the Indies trade, but with the opening of the 
great silver mines at Potosi, a special convoy system was instigated 
for Cartagena and Nombre de Dios in 1557.
A royal oedula in 1561 made the fleet system mandatory. The 
Casa de ContrataciCn strictly regulated all shipping such that it 
passed via convoy between Seville and designated assembly points in 
Spanish America (Santo Domingo originally, then Cartagena, Nombre de 
Dios— later Porto Bello, Vera Cruz, and Havana). No merchantman 
oould legally sail alone or deviate from the established network. 
Thus evolved the Atlantic convoy system of the Mexican flota and 
Panama galeones already described (Haring 1910, 12-14). The fleet 
system indeed reduced risk to individual ships, and no convoy was 
completely lost to pirates until the Dutch admiral Piet Heyn 
captured the entire silver fleet at Matanzas Bay, near Havana, in 
1628 (Burns 1954, 139-40). The unpredictable whims of the sea,
however, frequently unravelled tight sailing formations, and the 
pirate quickly adopted the tactic of preying on stragglers, much as
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a wolf singles out the weakest animal in a herd. The convoy system 
may well have been the logical response to maritime robbery, but 
ultimately it encouraged the very piracy it was designed to 
suppress. Bulky Spanish vessels were easily outmaneuvered, in part 
owing to their unwieldy construction, but also because merchants, so 
constrained by limited sailings, were compelled to burden them 
beyond safe capacity. Above all, however, the convoy system 
virtually eliminated guess work for pirates. Though the Spaniards 
took oertain pains to vary and oonoeal the precise schedules and 
itineraries of annual convoys, their routes were essentially fixed 
in time and space by winds, currents, seasons, choke points, and 
strictly limited ports of call. The price for such protection, in 
short, was predictability.
By the mid-sixteenth century, Frenoh corsairs vere again 
roving the Caribbean with renewed vigor. Thanks in part to 
increased land defenses, merchantmen afloat suffered greater losses 
than the coastal settlements, but some of the new fortifications, 
particularly on Cuba, proved woefully inadequate. In the Antilles, 
the ports of Havana, Santiago de Cuba, and Yaguana^ easily 
succumbed to the depredations of Francois le Clero (known as ‘Peg 
Leg'— or Pie de Palo by the Spaniards) and Jacques de Sores. 
Piratical infestation of the Mona and Windward Passages had prompted 
Santo Domingo to send out patrols to clear those waters, but the 
corsairs simply directed more attention to the poorly defended 
Spanish Main and hitherto unmolested ooast of Central America. Both 
Cartagena and Santa Marta buckled under Frenoh attacks in 1543-44 
(the latter sacked again by le Clero in 1554), as did the pearling
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center of Cubagua (an islet near Margarita, the larger island itself 
raided by pirates in 1561) and settlements on the neighboring ooast 
of Venezuela (Burns 1954, 114, 140; Hoffman 1980, 55, 63-67; Watson 
1979, 30).
In the latter sixteenth century, the corsairs struck ever 
westward along the Main, to the Central American isthmus and into 
the Gulf of Mexico. Nombre de Dios, Trujillo, Puerto Caballos,
Campeche, and San Juan de Uliia (Vera Cruz) numbered among the
principal towns brought into the fray after 1561 (Hoffman 1980,
114). The year 1562 brought yet another national contender to 
Spanish America in the person of John Hawkins, first among Queen 
Elizabeth's sea dogs to champion English interests in the region. 
More slave trader than pirate, his initial attempts to break the 
Spanish trade monopoly in Hispaniola continued till the end of the 
decade with expeditions farther abroad to Margarita, Rio de la 
Hacha, Santa Marta, and Cartagena. In the latter of these trading 
voyages he was accompanied by a young prot£g6 named Francis Drake 
(Burns 1954, 141-52). Though illegal, trade with foreigners was
often welcomed by Spanish colonists because the strict mercantilism 
and saturated markets of their mother country left them desperately 
short of slaves and manufactured items. Consequently it was not at 
all uncommon for corsairs to attempt commerce as a preliminary means 
of profit. Gold, silver, and pearls sometimes changed hands without 
bloodshed, but covhides, in particular, found a thriving market with 
interlopers.
By the latter seventeenth century, corsair trade flourished in 
the circum-Caribbean wherever cattle were raised. Such areas
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spanned the Main from Cumana to Santa Marta and throughout the 
Greater Antilles— at least in those districts sufficiently remote 
from the watchful eyes of administrative officials. Along less 
developed coasts, particularly those of Central America and the 
Gulf, the corsair was far more likely to exchange grapeshot for 
whatever he wanted. Moreover, even where mutually desirable, trade 
with interlopers remained entirely illegal and potentially dangerous 
for all parties involved. Corsair-traders, particularly the Frenoh 
and English (in sharp contrast to their Portuguese competitors) were 
generally prepared to baok up trade with brute foroe or even 
supplement it with rank pillage. In addition, oorsairs often used 
illicit trading stops to gain intelligence about fleet movements and 
tempting cargoes for more violent pursuits elsewhere (Hoffman 1980, 
114-18). The Spaniards, who had ample reason to distrust and 
repulse suoh overtures, therefore sent Hawkins and Drake paoking 
from San Juan de UlUa with a vengeance in 1568. When the English 
sea dogs returned to Spanish America, they would do so more single- 
mindedly as pirates, leaving trade mostly to the Frenoh and Dutch 
(Andrews 1978, 134).
Francis Drake ranked chief among that choleric breed of 
Elizabethan mariners who scoured the Indies till the century's end 
for the sake of profit, patriotism, and Protestantism. His name 
rightfully occupies a promininent place in the annals of piracy, net 
just for the enormity of his exploits and the longevity of his 
career, but for the innovativeness of his piratical campaigns which 
set the standard of pillage for a century to come. During the three 
years following his ignominious retreat from San Juan de UlUa, Drake
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made two reconnaissance voyages to the Darien coast of Panama, 
possibly befriending local runaway slaves and familiarizing himself 
with the coast. Upon choosing a suitably clandestine base, which he 
named Port Pheasant on account of similar fowl abounding there, he 
sailed for England to outfit an attack against Nombre de Dios, then 
the Caribbean terminus of the cross-Panama treasure train. In 1572 
he returned to Port Pheasant with two ships and seventy-three men. 
After assembling three 6mall pinnaces to ply the shallows, the 
corsairs advanced to the Isle of Pines, where they suooeeded in 
capturing two small Spanish vessels. In the pre-dawn hours of July 
29th, Drake led about seventy men in a surprise attack on Nombre de 
Dios. After the initial pandemonium, however, the Spaniards lost 
little time regrouping and forced the invaders back to their boats.
The pirates retreated to liok their wounds on a nearby island, being
then advised by an escaped slave that the Panama shipment was due 
within a few months to cross the Isthmus. Drake determined to
attack the treasure train overland, but in the meantime availed
himself of a few prizes off Cartagena (Burns 1954, 152-53; Williams 
1975, 86-92).
By the end of the year, Drake's force was more than halved, 
and it was at this point that the English activated a critical
alliance. By the latter 1560s it was becoming usual on the Panama 
ooast for common (generally Protestant) enemies of Spain to pool 
resources. French corsairs had long announced their presence, and 
were now occasionly joined by the English and the newly arrived 
Dutch in their forays against the Spaniards. The key allies for
Drake were not Europeans, however, but a group of escaped African
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slaves, known as ciaarronesNumerous and fiercely anti-Spanish, 
renegade Negroes were well acquainted with the local geography and 
the operations of their former masters (Andrews 1978, 136-39). The 
oimarrones served Drake as informants, guides, and fellow 
oombattants, formidable allies by virtue of their number and 
bellicosity. With eighteen of his own crew and twenty-five 
oimarrones, Drake set out to capture the treasure-laden mule train 
as it left PanamA. En route, from atop the high backbone of the 
Isthmus, Drake oaught his first sight of the Pacific Ocean. His 
careful plan to ambush the treasure train near a way station called 
Casa de Cruces was foiled, however, by an ill-timed assault sparked 
by the drunken cupidity of one of his own men. Thus warned, the 
main body of treasure porters escaped with the goods, and Drake 
returned to the coast empty handed for all his trouble. He then 
reverted for a time to coastal harassment, taking prizes from 
Spanish shipping along the Main.
The bedraggled Englishmen eventually had the good fortune to 
meet up with a party of French corsairs led by Guillaume le Testu of 
Le Havre,15 Huguenot and Norman like many of his piratical 
compatriots. Finally, in April of 1573, with aid from the French 
and again from the ciaarrones, Drake penetrated once more into the 
jungle near Nombre de Dios and succeeded in overtaking a mule train 
richly laden with gold and silver plate. Le Testu was killed in the 
campaign, and Drake returned to England less two brothers and with 
only a fraction of his original crew; but the voyage, so to speak, 
had been made (Burns 1954, 154-56; Andrews 1978, 140).
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Figure 2: Sir Franois Drake— Aroh-Pirate of
Spanish America
(Engraved by Thomas de Leu from a portrait 
by Joseph Rabel. Reprinted in Nuttall 1914)
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It was not Drake, but John Oxenham, a comrade-in-arms from the 
Panama campaign, who returned to cross the Isthmus and become the 
first pirate to smite the Spaniards in the great South Sea. Now 
captain of his own ship (though uncommissioned, as Drake had been), 
Oxenham weighed anohor from Plymouth in April of 1576. Like Drake 
before him, he carried disassembled pinnaces for olose work and 
shallow waters, for the pirates knew well the value of small craft 
equipped with oars and sails.^ Upon reaching the coast of 
Cartagena, Oxenham retired to a secluded inlet somewhere to the west 
of that oity to set up the pinnaoes. With these he managed to take 
a couple of prizes from coastal traffic before making camp on the 
Darien coast and negotiating with the local oimarrones for 
assistance. Crossing the Isthmus at the head of some fifty 
Englishmen and about ten oimarrones, Oxenham constructed a forty- 
five foot pinnace of native oedar with which to enter, completely 
unannounced, the Bay of Panama on the Pacific side.
Bursting first upon the Pearl Islands in February of 1577, the 
marauders evidently derived as much pleasure from smashing up 
Catholic artifacts and intimidating friars as they did from 
divesting the luckless inhabitants of their valuables. Next 
sighting Panama itself, the pirates oould surmise from maneuvers 
there that the oity was fully alerted to their presence. Not so the 
inbound ships, however; these continued to arrive oblivious, 
unarmed, and richly laden with treasures from Peru. A barque from 
Guayaquil, yielding a good store of gold, provisions, and gunpowder, 
made easy plunder. With this booty the pirates were content 
(especially now that Panamanian waters were getting a bit too hot
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for good luck) to strike back across the Isthmus. The infuriated 
Spaniards followed in vigorous pursuit, and Oxenham's party was 
eventually cut off from both coasts. Even the booty, which the 
corsairs had endeavored to hide by burying, was fully recovered by 
the Spaniards. Eighteen of the Englishmen, including their leader, 
were taken prisoners and transported to Lima, where Oxenham and his 
officers were hanged in November of 1580 (Wright, ed. 1932, xlix- 
lxiii, 109-14, 117-22).
Meanwhile, in 1577, Francis Drake in the Golden Hind *̂  had 
sailed again from Plymouth to become the next captain after Magellan 
to circumnavigate the Earth*®. This momentous expedition opened a 
new chapter in Spanish American piracy; for by following Magellan's 
trail to the Paoifio, Drake decidedly brought the ‘sweet trade' to 
those vulnerable shores he had only been able to covet from the 
heights of Panama— and which Oxenham had merely singed before he 
himself was snuffed out.
Striking the Spaniards first at Valparaiso, Drake wended his 
way northward, taking valuable prizes from Arioa and Callao, the 
maritime outlet for Lima.*® The most lucrative oatch was the 
Cacafuego,20 bound for PanamA laden with gold and silver, which he 
overtook near Cape San Francisco. Past the Golfo Du Ice, off the 
coast of modern Costa Pica, Drake chanced upon a prize of a 
different sort. The English had just made the Isla del Cafio, 
thereafter a favorite resort of pirates because of its plentiful 
fresh water, wood, fish, turtle, wild hogs, and coconuts.2* 
Opposite the tiny island, the Hind was careening in a small bay (now 
named for the ship's captain) when some of Drake's crew in a pinnace
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overtook a barque bound from the Gulf of Nicoya for Panama. Aside 
from its ordinary cargo of maize, lumber, sarsaparilla, and honey, 
the barque carried two pilots of the Manila track who possessed 
detailed charts and rutters of the little-known Paoifio route. 
Drake, after sacking the minor Mexican port of Guatuloo^ and 
exploring awhile along the Californian coast, set westward across 
the Pacific with his newly acquired Spanish charts. He ultimately 
returned to Plymouth in 1580; and the following year Queen Elizabeth 
knighted her pirate-explorer aboard the same vessel which had girded 
the Earth and left terrorized Spaniards in its wake (Andrews 1967, 
62-81; Gerhard 1960, 64-66).
A massive force of ships and men assembled under Drake in 1585 
to wound Spanish America systematically at its Caribbean heart. 
England and Spain were as yet not officially at war, but Elizabeth 
offered a free rein to privateers and financiers willing to risk 
lives or capital to advance the cause of England (and enrich 
themselves) at Spain's expense. Sir Francis now operated more 
legitimately as the queen's admiral, though his formal commission by 
no means authorized the extent of depredations to come. The true 
objectives of the sea dogs became evident enough. Most desirable 
was the capture of the treasure fleet, but Drake's swarm missed the 
return of the Mexican flota by more than a fortnight, and the 
inbound Panama galleons as well, if only by a few days. Secondarily 
targeted were those Caribbean ports where Spanish wealth and power 
were concentrated. Finally, some consideration was made to 
supplanting Spanish monopoly of the region with a permanent English 
base.
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With over a score of ships and about 2300 men, including 
Martin Frobisher as vioe-admiral, the fleet struck first at Bayona 
and Vigo, on the coast of Spain itself, and again at Santiago in the 
Portuguese Cape Verdes. These preliminary forays yielded provisions 
but nothing more, except that the Santiago encounter exposed Drake's 
men to a deadly fever which killed two or three hundred before they 
even reached the Indies. The corsair fleet made landfall at 
Dominica, refreshed there and at St. Kitts, then proceeded toward 
the first Caribbean target— Santo Domingo. Hispaniola'a capital, 
before its dominance was usurped by ports established on the Main, 
had certainly seen more splendid days as the premier seat of Spanish 
power and commerce in the New World. The oity itself was taken 
without much struggle on New Year's Day, 1586; and though the town 
was vigorously ransacked, the pirates found none of the expected 
abundance which had driven them to the task. In fact, the town's 
former opulence seemed only to mock its violators, who encountered 
considerable difficulty burning down onoe-prosperous houses built 
soundly of stone. Eventually, the corsairs' excesses induced the 
unfortunate inhabitants to raise 25,000 ducats^ to ransom their 
oity, and the invaders sailed away with only a fraction of the 
wealth they had imagined would be theirs (Andrews 1967, 96-104;
Burns 1954, 158-59).
Drake's fleet struck next at Cartagena, already Spain's 
booming entrep6t for the Indies trade. Though only marginally 
fortified, Cartagena's geographic site in itself provided a 
formidable first defense. The seaport could be reached only 
circuitously from the Caribbean, first through the shallow entrance

















>£ C A V I L I X  I T f U C t 'D
Ca r t a g e n e
fttm
Hap 4: French Invasion of Cartagena, 1697
(from De Pointis 1698. reprinted in Haring 1910)
65
of the Bocagrande into Cartagena Bay, thence into a lagoonal recess 
to the south of the oity, and finally through a narrow opening to 
the inner harbor (blocked by a metal chain and guarded by a fort—  
see Map 4). Drake's force anchored near the Bocagrande and marched 
against the town along the adjoining mile-long spit, known as the 
Caleta (or Bocagrande Peninsula), which forms the northern enclosure 
of Cartagena Bay. Though the townspeople had been warned of Drake'6 
imminent arrival for weeks, their preparations proved ineffectual 
and Cartagena suocumbed to the pirates after only a minor battle. 
Drake's men at once set in to plunder, occupy, and exact ransom for 
the town to the tune of 107,000 duoats— a much better return than 
the Santo Domingo affair but still far short of their expectations. 
Drake and his officers considered holding onto the town as a 
permanent base, but sickness and low morale took gradual toll of 
their men until they were compelled to quit the Main and any grand 
design Drake may have fostered for pushing on to Panama. On the way 
out of the Caribbean, Drake's fleet lingered awhile off the coast of 
Cuba, evidently weighing the chances of taking Havana or 
intercepting the treasure oonvoy, but exiting in the end along the 
Florida coast. The oorsair6 dealt a parting blow to the Spaniards 
by razing their fort and settlement at St. Augustin, then returned 
home in July of 1586 (Andrews 1967, 104-8; McDowell 1989, 502-3).
Domestic concerns in Europe, not the least of which included 
the Spanish Armada of 1588, kept Drake out of the New World for 
nearly a decade. In his absence, however, other corsairs emulated 
his taotios on both coasts of the Americas. In 1586, George 
Clifford, Third Earl of Cumberland,®* embarked on the first of many
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voyages against the Spaniards in the Caribbean (Gosse 1924, 95).
That same year Thomas Cavendish captained the Desire and two other 
ships through the Strait of Magellan to harass shipping and 
settlements on the Pacific side. Like Drake before him, Cavendish 
pillaged the coast of Peru, captured a pilot for the Manila route, 
and raided Guatuloo as he cruised northward. Despite Drake's 
demonstration of force along these shores in the previous decade, 
virtually the entire Pacific trade from Panama northward— including 
the main port of Aoapuloo and the returning China ships— remained 
utterly vulnerable. Cavendish oould hit repeatedly along the ooast 
of New Spain and afterwards lay in wait to snare a Manila galleon. 
Off Cape San Luoas, the tip of the Baja California Peninsula, he 
sighted his luokless prey— the Santa Ana—  seaworn from a four 
months' voyage and overloaded with passengers and rich cargoes. The 
Spanish orew fought bravely enough, but their vessel was no match 
for the Englishman's firepower. The portion of booty in gold coin 
alone was worth 122,000 pesos. Victorious and satiated, the Desire 
proceeded westward across the Pacific, returning finally to Plymouth 
in September of 1588 (Gerhard 1960, 81-94). The pirate Cavendish 
became the world's third circumnavigator and, like Drake before him, 
was honored with knighthood. Of his American adventure the oorsair 
recounted, "I made great spoils. I burnt and sunk nineteen ships, 
both great and small. All the villages and towns that I landed at, 
I burnt and spoiled” (in Mitohell 1976, 48).
By 1589, corsair attacks in the West Indies were so numerous 
that Spanish authorities ordered the homebound treasure oonvoy to 
remain in Havana. In 1592, Christopher Newport, better known for
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his later efforts to settle Virginia, led a privateer squadron 
through the Caribbean, sacking towns in Hispaniola and raiding 
Puerto Caballos and Trujillo on the Honduran coast (Burns 1954, 160- 
61; Andrews 1959, 219-23). The poorly defended expanse of beach 
from Trujillo to Puerto Caballos only beckoned to pirates25, and 
Captain William Parker, in league with a French corsair named 
Jeremias Raymond, launched a series of raids there beginning in 1594 
(Andrews 1959, 308-25).
The year 1595 heralded the return of Francis Drake to American 
waters, this time in league with his old comrade and mentor, John 
Hawkins. The expedition began impressively enough, with twenty- 
seven ships and about 2500 men. The golden prize of PanamA, having 
thus far escaped the the rapacious clutches of the Elizabethans, no 
doubt invoked their assemblage, but last-minute intelligence of a 
crippled galleon at San Juan de Puerto Rico— with treasure worth 
two-and-a-half million ducats— was too tempting to ignore. The 
English warships sailed in August; unknowingly, five enemy frigates 
under Pedro Tello, dispatched by the Spanish Crown to rescue the 
stranded treasure, practically followed in their wake. En route, as 
might have been expected, the corsairs' joint command 60on 
degenerated into a bitter quarrel. Drake, against all Hawkins' 
protestations, insisted on a preliminary raid against Las Palmas in 
the Canaries. The attack was repulsed and nothing gained from the 
encounter, save the opportunity to restock with fresh water. 
Precious time was lost, however, and the Spanish frigates were 
closing the gap.
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By October's end, the English fleet anchored off Guadeloupe, 
where one of the smaller vessels was sighted and captured by Pedro 
Tello. Thus apprised of the pirate fleet and its objective, the 
Spanish commander proceeded to forewarn San Juan and take part in 
its defense. Though the city's fortifications stood in a sorry 
state, the few days of preparation afforded by Tello's arrival
proved sufficient to repulse the English. Hawkins, who had fallen 
gravely ill en route, died at the outset of the siege. Drake and 
his officers, determining they could not take the oity without 
unacceptable losses, withdrew for the Kain, where raids against Rio 
de la Haoha and Santa Marta yielded a few pearls but little more. 
Cartagena, by now on full alert, was bypassed in favor of the 
isthmian treasure ports. Nombre de Dios, already in decline as its 
functions transferred to Porto Bello, fell to the invaders at onoe. 
From there Drake sent upwards of six hundred men under the command 
of Sir Thomas Baskerville to march overland against Panama. The 
Spaniards, however, having set up ambuscades along the most
strategic passes, fired heavily upon the pirates, eventually forcing 
them back. Drake's expedition was finished. He had lost the
element of surprise at every step.
In a last-ditch effort for plunder, the oorsairs sailed 
westward for Nicaragua, possibly with the intent of taking Granada. 
Adverse weather conspired to deter the fleet, however, while raging 
dysentery immobilized the crews. Drake, broken and delirious, 
succumbed himself to the disease on January 28, 1596. Within a
league of Porto Bello, off the coast of his first great victory 
against the Spaniards, the arch-pirate's body was placed in a lead
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coffin and committed to the sea. Baskerville assumed command, 
captured and burned Porto Bello, then sailed with the remnants of 
the fleet for England (Andrews 1967, 158-79; Burns 1954, 161-62; 
Corbett 1925, 198-209).
The demise of Drake and Hawkins rid Spanish America of its two 
most celebrated plunderers, but the age of the sea dogs was not yet 
done. Sir Walter Raleigh, whose name recalls more the oolonizer 
than the corsair, had sailed in 1595 for Guiana26 in search of the 
fabled oity of El Dorado. Though he never found it, he and his 
later associates27 did manage to loot Spanish settlements on the 
island of Trinidad, at San TomA on the Rio Orinoco, at CumanA, 
Cartagena, Rio de la Haoha, and Santa Marta along the Main. In 
1596, a small fleet under Sir Anthony Shirley touched first at 
Dominica and proceeded to sack Santa Marta. In February of the next 
year, Shirley's fleet targeted the utterly defenseless island of 
Jamaica, where Villa de la Vega (or Santiago de la Vega— later 
Spanish Town) fell to the pirate torch. Its impoverished citizens 
reluctantly parted with beeves and cassava to rid themselves of the 
intruders. Shirley now met up with William Parker, and in consort 
they stood for the letter's favorite hunting grounds in the Gulf of 
Honduras. After an unsuccessful stab at Trujillo, the rovers 
managed to take Puerto Caballos before parting company. Shirley 
returned to England, while Parker captured Campeche along with 
valuable logwood and silver (Burns 1954, 169-71; Wright 1922). That 
unfortunate town was doomed to a century of relentless pillaging 
(Von Winning 1950).
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The last of the great Elizabethan privateering voyages, most 
notable because it succeeded— at least briefly— where even Drake had 
failed, was George Clifford's capture of San Juan de Puerto Rioo in 
1598. This was the Earl of Cumberland's final expedition to the 
West Indies, with twenty ships outfitted at his own expense. Little 
booty was to be found in San Juan, however, and the English 
determination to hold the port as a permanent base soon withered in 
the grip of yellow fever (Haring 1910, 41; Burns 1954, 171).
Nevertheless, Cumberland's stroke meant that by the end of the 
sixteenth century corsairs had plundered all of the major ports of 
the Caribbean (not to mention numerous minor ones): Havana, Nombre 
de Dios, Santo Domingo, Cartagena, Porto Bello, and now San Juan.
Philip II died that same year, and France made peace with 
Spain by the Treaty of Vervins. The death of Philip's lifelong 
Tudor adversary, former patroness of Drake and the English seadogs, 
followed in 1603. A year later England, too, was at peaoe with 
Spain, though enmity persisted ‘beyond the line' (Burns 1954, 171- 
72). The turn of the century thus in some ways marked the olose of 
a distinctive corsair era, but it also capped the foundation for 
continued piratery in Spanish America under a new guise. By now, 
the region's oorridors of piracy were well defined.
The basio pattern of pillage initiated by Drake, Oxenham, 
Cavendish, and their contemporaries left a "monotonous record of 
raids on Spanish towns," from the Caribbean to the Pacific, "to be 
continued by the buccaneers in the next century" (Burns 1954, 172). 
The utility of small craft and overland assaults, so characteristic 
of later buccaneering, had also been successfully demonstrated by
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the corsairs. The piratical campaigns of the sixteenth-century,
though never successful in smashing Spanish hegemony in the New 
World, left little doubt as to its vulnerability. The names of 
Drake and Cavendish, even a century after those adventurers’ deaths,
resounded a symbolic jingle in the minds of buccaneer and Spaniard
alike.28 The old sea dogs bequeathed a tradition of spirit,
taotio6, and experience to a new generation of pirates who would 
surpass even their spectacular example.
A Hew Breed
Calendrioal progression from one century to the next did not 
signal a halt to corsair voyages or tactics— these were to continue. 
It was not until 1628 that Piet Heyn, admiral for the Dutch West 
India Company, finally realized what corsairs before him had only 
aspired to do: capture an entire Spanish treasure fleet. Assembling 
in the Netherlands with more than thirty ships, some of nearly a 
thousand tons burden, the fleet boasted 679 bronze and iron cannon, 
2300 seamen, and 1000 soldiers. It was a formidable strike force, 
but Heyn was taking no chances. Two years before he had watched 
impotently as the combined treasure fleets floated grandly past him 
in the Caribbean. In the admiral’s estimation, the Mexican flota 
remained most vulnerable of the two convoys, and he considered three 
strategies for overpowering it. He could attack the fleet a6 it lay 
in port on either side of its Gulf-Caribbean transit; but Vera Cruz 
was protected by the fortress at San Juan de Ultia, while Havana lay 
snug under the guns of the Morro Castle.
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The safest option, though perhaps not the surest, was to 
engage the flota en route as it passed Cape San Antonio. Heyn 
started across the Atlantio in May, taking every precaution to 
conceal his movements. In July he sighted St. Vincent and, after 
stopping briefly there and at Blanquilla for water and fresh goat 
meat, stood directly for the Isle of Pines. Round Cape San Antonio, 
Heyn positioned his fleet near the western approach to the Straits 
of Florida, between Dry Tortugas and the avenue to Havana. Despite 
Heyn's clandestine efforts, the Spaniards on the Main, at least, had 
learned of his presence in the Caribbean and delayed departure of 
the Tierra Firme galleons from Cartagena. Moreover, as the Dutch 
fleet endeavored to maintain position against the prevailing winds 
and current, it was driven deeper into the Straits until Heyn's 
ships came within sight of the Morro itself. The commander of the 
Mexican flota, however. General Juan de Benavides, had already left 
Vera Cruz late in July and remained completely oblivious to the 
Dutoh presence. Over twenty ships began the passage, four of them 
galleons loaded with treasure and the rest crammed full with 
passengers, luggage, provisions, logwood, hides, and various other 
oargoes. The enemy fleets crossed during the night.
On the morning of September 8, 1628, Benavides realized to his 
horror that he had overshot his destination and sailed into the 
olutohes of the enemy. Unable to reach safe harbor in Havana 
without engaging the Dutoh, he made instead for the closer Bay of 
Matanzas, about fifty miles east of the capital. Heyn, anticipating 
his opponent' s quandary, dispatohed a fast squadron to out the 
Spaniards off at Matanzas while he continued to press with the main
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fleet from the Havana side. With no recourse, Benavides entered the 
bay in hope of unloading or sinking at least some of the galleons, 
while behind him the Dutch stoppered the bottle from either side. 
Panic and confusion quickly unravelled every effort at Spanish 
resistance, and Heyn's victory was soon complete. The Dutoh made 
off with the four treasure galleons plus twelve smaller prizes, and 
Piet Heyn returned to Holland a national hero, with 11,500,000 
guilders worth of booty in tow (Goslinga 1971, 180-95).
Such European-based attacks continued well into the oentury of 
the buccaneers, culminating perhaps with the three-year marathon 
cruise of Captain William Jackson, a transitional pirate who 
combined the spirit and tactics of Drake with the Caribbean-based 
resources of the buccaneers. Cruising in a small barque, Jaokson 
had gained privateering experienoe in the West Indies as early as 
1638. The following year he attacked, among other places, the Rio 
San Juan (or Desaguadero), a vulnerable bottleneck for maritime 
commerce between the Caribbean and the Nicaraguan interior. Such 
raiding yielded rich cargoes of money, plate, indigo, and sugar; but 
even these ill-gotten proceeds were not enough to satisfy his 
creditors in England. Hence Jaokson, now in oonmand of three small 
warships, sailed again from England in 1642 to wreak even greater 
havoc in the Spanish Caribbean. His first attempts at the pearl 
fisheries of Margarita and at small towns along the Main proved 
fruitless. Everywhere he met resistance, and when his men did 
manage to take a place they found it stripped of all valuables.
On into the Gulf of Venezuela, Jaokson's men descended on the 
prosperous town of Maracaibo,® again only to encounter stiff
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resistance and, afterwards, houses emptied of all but perhaps some 
sugar, hides, tobacco, and sack wine. A month's occupation, coupled 
with threats and burning, finally induced the beleaguered Spaniards 
to deliver 10,000 pieces of eight3® and thereby salvage their town 
from total destruction. Spring found the marauders, disillusioned 
and hungry, heading for remote Cape Tiburon at the southwestern tip 
of Hispaniola to nurse their misfortunes and gather victuals. 
There, perhaps inspired by Anthony Shirley's previous success, they 
determined to try their luck at Jamaica. Standing westward, first 
for the tiny islet of Navassa3* (where they overtook a small frigate 
laden with ebony wood), they reached what is now Kingston Harbour by 
late March of 1643. Jamaica's only settlement of any consequence, 
Santiago de la Vega remained poorly defended forty-six years after 
Shirley's raid. After a short skirmish with the militia, Jaokson's 
pirates took possession of the town, at that time consisting of four 
to five hundred houses, five or six ohapels, and a Franciscan 
monastery. Its residents were already gone; forewarned at least a 
week in advance of their city's fate, they had fled to the hills 
with their dearest possessions. Jaokson negotiated the town's ransom 
while twenty-three of his own men, tempted by the island's pleasant 
and fertile surroundings, defected during the night to the Spanish 
camps.32 The displaced Spaniards eventually despaired of their 
exile, for evidently they met the invaders' demands for 200 oattle, 
10,000 pounds of cassava, and 17,000 pieces of eight33 (Harlow, ed. 
[Jackson] 1923, 1-19).
Persistent in hi6 search for greater booty, Jaokson removed to 
the Gulf of Honduras where it was rumored that a large quantity of
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plate was due for shipment. The English squadron, which now
included various Spanish prizes, dropped anchor at Roatan, the 
largest of the Bay Islands (22). Pirates were no strangers to these 
parts. French corsairs, who had menaced the Bay since 1536, were 
followed by the English, beginning in 1564, and eventually by the 
Dutch. Because it was so poorly fortified, yet harbored the 
Spaniards' only ports between Porto Bello and Campeohe, the Honduran 
coast provided an easy and sometimes lucrative hunting ground.®4 
The Bay Islands were especially attractive to pirates. Small and 
remote enough to elicit little more than occasional interference 
from the Spaniards on the mainland, these islands offered ingressing 
pirates a superb oartnage where water and, thanks to the native 
population, fresh victuals and small oraft were readily obtainable 
(Davidson 1974, 40-42). When Jaokson reached the Bay Islands in 
June of 1643, he fully expected a warm reception from the resident 
Indians, proven allies of the Dutch and English pirates. At both 
RoatAn and neighboring Guanaja, however, Jackson's men found the 
Indians' ''Plantaoons & Houses desolate, &, therefore, Imagined, as 
the truth afterwards appeared, that ye Spanyards had given them a 
visitt, & had carried them of from hence" (Harlow, ed. [Jaokson] 
1923, 22).33 After a week's refreshment in the Bay Islands, the 
pirates struck at T r u j i l l o , hoping to intercept the rumored plate 
shipment. No such treasure was to be found, only "divers Chistes of 
Sugar, Tobacco, Sarsa Pari11a, & some small quantitie of plate" 
(24). Trujillo, to be sure, had been pillaged so mercilessly by 
French, English, and Dutoh pirates that by the time Jackson's men 
came, they "found it in a very poor & ruinous condition; so that ye
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Riches which were formerly brought from Guatimall, Corriago, & other 
wealthy Townes in ye Continent, to this place, are since transported 
by caravans to Portes of more strength & Security" (25).
Cruising southward along the Miskito Shore, where they 
provisioned with maize and turtle meat, the little fleet made 
rendezvous at the isle of Escudo de Veraguas^ off the north coast 
of Panama. When a brief pillaging expedition to the interior 
produced nothing of value, they stood again for the Main. Told, the 
’Garden of Cartagena’, fell quiokly to the marauders after only a 
show of resistance:
In this Towne we founde an unexpected supply of all our 
wants. Good store of Plate, Jewells, Lynen, Sack, Sugar, 
Come, Plantaines, Goates, Hoggs, Poultry, & ye like good 
Pillage, & necessary provisions, with which wee recreated 
and refreshed ourselves, 4 days space; & in that time sent 
out divers parties to force ye Enemy to come to some 
composition, for their Towne; but, all in Vaine, for they 
were either soe stubborne, or timmorous, that they would 
not, or durst not, looke upon us, in regard whereof wee 
fired their houses, being very stately buildings, about 300 
in number; but exempted 3 faire Churches from the fury of 
these flames; & soe departed hence, leaving them to ooudle
their Crosses in du6t & ashes (29-30).
And so, on to Jamaica and then to Cuba for maintenance and
repairs, the pirate fleet was careening in the string of cays off
Cuba’s southern flank by February's end in 1644. Here, for want of 
pitch and tar, they caulked their hulls with the fat of seals before 
setting westward for Cape Catoche. Small prizes and towns in the 
Gulf of Mexico proved easy pickings for cochineal, logwood, hides, 
tallow, and even a bit of plate. Jackson, apparently convinced that 
he had gained as much on the account as he was likely to, resolved 
at last "to put a period to this Voyage, whioh most men had long 
expected, & now earnestly wished for” (30-34).
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William Jaokson has been described as one who rekindled "the 
spirit of the old Elizabethan adventurers" (Burns 1954, 227),
"emulated the exploits of Sir Francis Drake" (Haring 1910, 50), and 
"By so doing...largely contributed to the decision of Cromwell to 
continue the Elizabethan tradition of reprisals against Spain; and 
to embark upon an enterprise, the object of which was the 
substitution for a Catholic and Spanish empire, of one that was 
English and Protestant" (Harlow, ed. 1923, v). His actions, as we 
have seen, lend ample support for such comparisons, but a 
fundamental geographic difference distinguished Jackson's voyages 
from those of his corsair-predeoessors. By the end of the sixteenth 
century, though not entirely for lack of trying, not one of Spain's 
European rivals had succeeded in establishing a permanent base west 
of the Tordesillas Line.3** By the time Jaokson arrived on the 
scene, that situation had changed completely. Certain of the Lesser 
Antilles provided initial toe holds for Spain's European contenders. 
With so huge a realm to colonize and defend, the Spaniards were hard 
put to safeguard numerous tiny islands which offered little or no 
mineral wealth.
England was the first to sieze such crumbs from the colonial 
table by occupying St. Christopher in 1623 and Barbados not long 
after. Together, these islands provided Jaokson about a thousand 
fresh recruits for his Caribbean campaign of 1642-45. It was an 
advantage Drake had never enjoyed. True, like his predecessor, 
Jaokson staged his celebrated assault from Plymouth, whither he 
ultimately returned; but many of his recruits stayed in the 
Caribbean, reclaiming their homes on St. Christopher and Barbados.
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Moreover, Jackson himself had based his earlier voyages from 
Providence Island (Santa Catalina), colonized by the Puritans in 
1629 and the resort of Dutoh and English pirates even before that 
(Parsons 1964, 21). The island had been recovered by the Spaniards 
before Jackson’s famous voyage (he cruised, in fact, under a 
commission from the Providence Company to redress its losses there); 
but for over a decade it had provided a key privateering base for 
expeditions to the ooast of Central America, enabling the English to 
develop a critical alliance with the Indians there. Jaokson, while 
skirting the Miskito Shore from the Bay Islands to the Rio San Juan, 
could rely heavily upon these native allies for food, refuge, and 
information— yet another crucial development sinoe Drake's time. It 
was mostly the appearance of such bases and pirate outposts by the 
early seventeenth century— rather than any historically convenient 
centurial division— which distinguished the piracies of the 
buccaneers from those of the corsairs. For this reason the 
depredations of Jaokson and his Puritan backers, though clearly 
demonstrative of a revived or continued Elizabethan tradition 
against Catholicism and Spanish monopoly in the New World (Newton 
1933, 172; Harlow, ed. 1923, xiv), fall arguably within the
historical realm of the buccaneers. It was moreover, partly 
Jackson's successful demonstration at Jamaica which eventually 
encouraged the establishment there, under Cromwell's directive, of 
the most important English buccaneering stronghold in Spanish 
America.
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Buccaneers
In addition to the establishment of pirate bases in the very
heart of Spain' 8 American empire, the seventeenth century brought
other changes which heralded a new era of piracy. One of these was
a new sense of identity whioh was emerging among the pirates
themselves. Drake had managed to maintain a strong sense of
obedienoe and discipline among his men, doubtlessly resorting at
times to extreme measures. By the end of hi6 era, authoritarian
hold over the pirates was significantly crippled:
During the long piratical orgy of the Spanish War, seasoned 
mariners were in a strong position. Knowing that they were 
in steep demand, they became less and less inclined to put 
up with harsh discipline. Richard Hawkins [1560-1622, son of 
Sir John] described them as ' like to a stiff-necked horse 
which, taking the bridle between his teeth, forceth his 
rider to do what him list.' By the 1590s it was normal 
practice to consult the crew in any important matter, and 
they often compelled a captain to change the course and 
objectives of a voyage (Mitchell 1976, 50).
This democratic trend only intensified among the buccaneers, whose
captains they typically elected from the ranks but were prepared to
desert or depose upon the slightest altercation. Much of the
buccaneers' individualism can be directly attributed to the pioneer
spirit which necessarily accompanied total abandonment to a new
geographic milieu:
American buccaneers...unlike the European pirates who 
preferred to return to Europe at the end of a raid, remained 
in place to further terrorize the Spanish colonists. They 
differed from the European pirates in another fundamental 
way. These men were separating themselves from their own 
societies for longer and longer periods. Unlike the men who 
went home after a raid they remained behind in small 
communities and lived off the land. As time went by they 
would be increasingly out of the control of their home 
governments and more and more independent (Ritchie 1986b,
5).
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Figure 3: Examples of Buccaneer Prize Teasels—  
Corvette, Barque, and Brigantine
(from Haring 1910)
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Figure 4: Henry Morgan— Port Royal’s Pirate Laureate
(Originally printed in the 1684 edition of Exquemelin)
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The buccaneers etched deeper but also extended the scope of 
depredations already established by the corsairs. John Davis and
others ventured up the Rio San Juan deep into the Nicaraguan
interior to plunder Granada for the first time in 1665, and
continued to pillage as far as Le6n and Realejo on the Pacific 
(Gerhard 1960, 137 and 138n; Williams 1976, 51). Two years later, 
L'Olonnais of Tortuga repeated Jackson*s success at Maracaibo, 
marauding even further to Gibraltar as well. Henry Morgan, who 
headed buccaneer sorties from Jamaica's Port Royal, captured Puerto 
Principe39 and again Porto Bello, then finally consummated the 
lustful intent of generations by sacking Panama in 1671. Morgan 
emerged as the undisputed leader of the buccaneers, the model
pirate-turned-knight of his own century much as Drake had been 
before. Clarence Haring calculated that from the English takeover 
of Jamaica in 1655 to the end of Morgan's active piracies in 1671, a 
space of just sixteen years, the buccaneers "sacked eighteen cities, 
four town6 and more than thirty-five villages— Cumana once, 
Cumanagote twice, Maracaibo and Gibraltar twice, Rio de la Hacha 
five times, Santa Marta three times, Tolu eight times, Porto Bello 
once, Chagre twice, Panama once, Santa Catalina twice, Granada in 
Nicaragua twice, Campeache three times, St. Jago de Cuba once, and 
other towns and villages in Cuba and Hispaniola for thirty leagues 
inland innumerable times" (1910, 267).
In 1680, after yet another sacking of Porto Bello, John Cox 
led a second band of buccaneers across Panama. Among the ranks were 
Bartholomew Sharp, Basil Ringrose, William Dampier, William Dick, 
and Lionel Wafer— all of whom left journals to posterity.40 These
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men carried French commissions from Petit-Goave in western 
Hispaniola, by then the most important haven remaining to
buccaneers, and crossed the Isthmus with the aid of Darien's Cuna
Indians. Following basically the same strategy pioneered by Oxenham 
and Morgan, the pirates crept into the Pacific with crudely hewn
canoes,** but these they soon exchanged for larger, more seaworthy 
prizes in the Bay of Panama. In those ships, which by a series of 
desertions fell ultimately to Bartholomew Sharp's command, many of 
the buccaneers continued roving in the South Sea for a space of two 
years. Using the uninhabited islands of Juan FernAndez, as well as 
the isias Plata, Gorgona, and Coiba as bases of refuge, Sharp's men 
struck all along the Pacific coast of South and Central America from 
Coquimbo to the Gulf of Niooya. The various journals concerning 
this expedition*^ underscore how only minimal booty and sustained 
hardships attended most of the buccaneers' raids. Their landed
assaults— against Pueblo Nuevo (opposite the Isla de Coiba), Paita, 
Hilo, Arica, Huasco, La Serena, and Coquimbo— all ended 
disasterously, yielding nothing but occasional provisions. By 
contrast, some of the prizes obtained at sea proved rather valuable, 
particularly one taken between Cape San Franoiso and Cape Pas6ao.
This unfortunate Spanish bottom, bound out of Callao for 
PanamA, was the Santo Rosario, "a merchant ship of great bulk, as 
most of your Spanish vessels are, and very deeply laden"— with a 
most welcome cargo indeed (Ringrose 1987, 433-34). Aside from its 
goodly store of fruit, oil, and several hundred jars of wine and 
brandy (MS Cox 1682, NMM Gos/4, f. 52), the Rosario filled each 
man's pocket with 94 pieces of eight in ready money and carried, at
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least to young Basil Ringrose" s mind, "the finest woman I have seen
in the South Sea"^ (MS Ringrose [1682], BL SI. 3820, f. 106;
Ringrose 1987, 433-34). Yet another unexpected bonus was the ship’s
“great book full of 6ea-oharts and maps, containing a very accurate
and exact description of all the ports, soundings, creeks, rivers,
capes, and coasts belonging to the South Sea, and all the
navigations usually performed by the Spaniards in that ocean" (Dick
1987, 278). The Rosario with her passengers, after being relieved
by Sharp's men of anything which bespoke value, was allowed to sail
away less all but her foremast. Actually she was still laden with
more treasure than the buccaneers could have imagined, and William
Dick later recounted with sarcastic bitterness what might qualify as
the most ironic episode in the history of piracy:
In this ship [the Rosario], besides the lading above- 
mentioned, we found also almost 700 pigs of plate, but we 
took them to be some other metal, especially tin: and under 
this mistake they were slighted by us all, especially the 
Captian and seamen, who by no persuasions used by some few, 
who were for having them rummaged, could not be induced to 
take them into our ship, as we did most of the other things.
Thus we left them on board the Rosario.. .being very glad we 
had got such good belly-timber out of her and thinking 
little what quantity of rich metal we left behind. It 
should seem this plate was not yet thoroughly refined and 
fitted for to coin; and this was the occasion that deceived 
us all. One only pig of plate, out of the whole number of 
almost 700, we took into our ship, thinking to make bullets 
of it; and to this effect, or what else our seamen pleased, 
the greatest part of it was melted or squandered away. 
Afterwards, when we arrived at Antigua, we gave the 
remaining part of it, which was yet about one-third thereof, 
unto a Bristol man, who knew presently what it was (though 
he dissembled with us), brought it to England, and sold it 
there for seventy-five-pound sterling, as he confessed 
himself afterwards to some of our men. Thus we parted with 
the richest booty we had gotten in the whole voyage, through 
our own ignorance and laziness (1987, 277-78).”
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For Bartholomew Sharp it was not silver, but the captured Spanish
charts which later proved most valuable, as only these saved him
from the pirate's noose awaiting him in England. Sharp and his 
buccaneers returned to the Caribbean, at any rate, in a remarkable 
feat of navigation which brought them round Cape Horn to Antigua; 
but perhaps we had better leave them in the middle of the South 
Atlantic, late in December of 1682, with an entry from John Cox's 
log which proves that even slighted, bloodthirsty buccaneers could 
retain the yuletide spirit:
25th Sunday. 14 Le: East in Lat: by observn d/21:m/l wynd at 
E faire wr
When we tooke ye 2 Barkes at Nicoya we had a Little Sucking 
pigg in one of them, w°h we keep on board for our Christmast 
dayes dinner, w°h was now growne to be a very good Hogg: So
we killed it for Dinner, but our men thinking it not enough 
for dinner, they bought a Spanill Dogg of our Quarter
master, for 40 ps 8/8 & killed him So ye Hogg and the Dogg
made us a feast for Christmas daye, & w^h SOme wyne we had 
left, made our Selves merry, for we had eat nothing yfc had 
Blood in it Sence our departure from ye Duke of Yorkes
Island------------------------------ East: 730 Leagus
(MS 1682, BL SI.49, f.61).
By 1683, Vera Cruz remained the only major Gulf-Caribbean 
treasure port yet to be thoroughly pillaged;*5 but that year saw it 
flamboyantly ransacked in concert by Dutch, French, and English 
buccaneers under Laurens de Graff, Nicholas Van Horn,*6 and the 
Sieur de Granmont. Sailing out of Petit-Goave with a French 
commission (Charlevoix 1733, tom.3, 175-76), the pirate fleet
consisted of at least seven vessels ranging from eight to fifty 
guns, as well as some lighter craft. The buccaneers themselves 
numbered a thousand men or more, mostly Dutch (176; ([Lynch] 1684,
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115-16). A concise but detailed account of the raid was penned
shortly afterwards by Sir Thomas Lynch, the zealously anti-piratical
governor of Jamaica who lost no time apprising the authorities in
England of the buccaneers' latest excesses. The most salient bits
of his report follow:
On the 8. day of May, they came on the Coast of la Vera 
Cruz, and lay by; there the Men that were to land, were put 
on Board Yanchy and Christian,^ and then stood off.
On the 9. these two Ships stood in, and in the Night the 
Spaniards in the Castle and on Shoar, made fire to Pilot 
them in, supposing them to be two of their Flota;4® so they 
came to an Anchor, and landed before one a Clock in the 
Morning, about two Miles from the Town, seven hundred and 
four men.
Van Horn had the Main Body, as General, & was to attack 
the Plaga or chief part of the Town, where they expected the 
Court of Guard, but found only four Men: Laurence commanded 
the Forlorn,^ and with it attempted the two Forts, the one 
of twelve, the other of eight Guns, both close Forts, but 
they found them open, and the Centinel asleep; so with the 
loss of one man killed by the Spaniards, and three by a 
mistake of the French, by break of day they had made 
themselves Masters of the Forts and Town; and had they, as 
Laurence advised, sent at the same time but two Canoes and 
fifty Men, they had without a doubt surprized the Castle, 
which stands upon a Rook in the Sea,®® three quarters of a 
Mile from the Town, and has in it seventy guns mounted.
But the Pyrates thinking it more safe and profitable to 
plunder the Town: set Guards at the Streets ends, and sent 
Parties to break open the Houses, where they found every 
body as quiet, as in their Graves, and for three days they 
continued breaking of Houses, plundering them, and dragging 
the miserable Inhabitants to the Cathedral, and though at 
this time they got abundance of Jewels, Plate, etc. and
about three hundred and fifty Bags of Cochenelle51.. .yet 
were they not satisfied, but put the considerable people to 
ransome, and threatned to burn the Cathedral and Prisoners 
in it, which were five thousand and seven hundred, if they 
did not immediately discover all they had; so that the 
fourth day they got more them the other three; and had 
seventy thousand pieces of Eight for the Governour Don Luis 
de Cordova's Ransome, which Spurre found hid amongst Grass 
in a Stable ([Lynch) 1684, 115-19; of. MS Lynch 1683, NMM 
Gos/6).
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The incoming Spanish flota, including twelve formidable vessels, 
remained safely at bay while all this looting and terrorism 
continued unchecked. The fleet's presence nevertheless had enough 
of a sobering effect on the ruffians to force them offshore to a cay 
known, by virtue of its ruined Indian temple, as Los Saorifioios. 
There they resumed their extortion and division of spoils. Each 
share, of whioh there were about 1200, oame to eight hundred pieoes- 
of-eight worth of plate and ready money. Human booty, in the form 
of about a thousand Negro and mulatto slaves, added significantly to 
the value of the take. Van Horn, as oo-admiral, demanded eighty 
shares for himself and the use of his two ships, much to the outrage 
of de Graff. The two leaders oame to blows, but soon disengaged, 
with Van Horn suffering no more than a out on the wrist. It wa6 bad 
enough to attract gangrene, however, and the doomed buooaneer wa6 
heaved overboard after a fortnight. Granmont as his lieutenant 
assumed command of the Dutchman's ship and returned to Petit-Goave, 
while Laurens de Graff and the remainder of the fleet made first for 
Jamaica, and then for Guantanamo on the south side of Cuba ([Lynch] 
1684, 118-20; of. MS Lynoh 1683, NMMGos/6).
The following years witnessed an unplanned reunion of 
buccaneers in the South Sea. Dampier and Wafer, commanded by former 
comrades John Cook and Edward Davis, together with newcomer Ambrose 
Cowley (yet another pirate-ohronioler)— all in the Batchelor's 
Delight— entered the Pacific round Cape Horn in March of 1684. 
Meanwhile John Eaton in the Nicholas, briefly in consort with 
Ringrose and Charles Swan (formerly under Henry Morgan) in the 
Cygnet, had just navigated the Strait of Magellan. In the Pacific,
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the two vessels first mentioned joined forces; again remote Juan 
FernAndez and now the GalApagos Islands served as bases of refuge 
and attack. Six months' marauding as far north as the Gulf of 
Fonseca produced nothing of value, so Eaton in the Nicholas, now 
joined by Cowley^ as ship's master, sailed off across the Pacific 
in search of Asian plunder. Swan in the Cygnet had actually
embarked on this cruise to the South Sea in the hope of establishing 
regular English trade there, but the Spaniards, he soon discovered, 
would have none of it. It was quite by chance that in August of 
1684 he encountered a party of buccaneers led by Peter Harris. 
The new arrivals, having crossed the Isthmus with a successful raid 
against Santa Maria, now wished to go cruising in the South Sea. 
Swan's crew, aroused by the jingle of gold in the others' pockets,
at this point coerced their captain into ‘going on the account'
afterall. Making rendezvous with the Batchelor's Delight at the 
Isla de la Plata in October, a now formidable little pirate squadron 
determined to set the trap for the Lima treasure fleet on its
approach to Panama. Yet another corps of buccaneers crossed the 
Isthmus In February of 1685, bringing an additional 280 French and 
English pirates under Francois Grogniet. These were followed in 
Maroh by a contingent of 180 Englishmen led by Captain Townley, and 
again in April by an additional 264 French buccaneers (the latter 
included Raveneau de Lussan, who later published a journal of his 
piracies). Truly, as Dampier observed, "the Isthmus of Darien was 
now become a common Road for Privateers to pass between the North 
and South-Seas at their Pleasure" (1927, 140). Ten vessels and
nearly a thousand men now lay ready to greet the Lima fleet as it
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hove into the Bay of Panama at the end of May. Despite all their 
preparations, the buccaneers soon found themselves outmaneuvered by 
the Spanish fleet, which managed during the night to gain their 
windward. Now the fourteen Spanish vessels made full use of their 
firepower, peppering their would-be captors with several direct 
hits. The retreating buccaneers, severely battered and berating 
each other'6 incompetence, oould only glower as the victorious Lima 
fleet and its supposed treasure withdrew to the safety of Panama's 
harbor (Kemp and Lloyd 1960, 85-113; Gerhard 1960, 154-61).
The survivors retired to the Isla de Coiba to recuperate, 
provision, and fashion new canoes from the island's tall trees. No 
longer too pleased with each other's company, most of the French 
buooaneers stayed with Grogniet while the English majority sailed 
north for a raid against Reale jo and Le6n. The former (known by the 
buccaneers as Rio Lexa) offered little more than a small estuarine 
anchorage from which one oould journey overland to such towns as 
Viejo and Le6n, or on to Granada. Smoking fumes from El Viejo,®* 
tallest in the chain of volcanoes looming ominously behind the 
little port, made Reale jo an easy harbor to sight; and five small 
islands in its sheltered waters facilitated careening (Dampier 1927, 
150-52; Raveneau de Lussan 1930, 100). Le6n, about twenty miles to 
the southeast, presented a more prosperous provincial center which 
the ex-priest Thomas Gage had described, nearly forty year6 
previously, as an American paradise. Now William Dampier paused in 
the course of his pillaging to note its advantageous geographic site 
and fine residences (though lack of a treasury):
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The Houses of Leon are not high built, but strong and large, 
with Gardens about them. The Walls are Stone, and the 
Covering of Pan-tile: There are three Churches and a
Cathedral... Indeed if we consider the Advantage of its 
Situation, we may find it surpassing most Places for Health 
and Pleasure in America, for the Country is of a sandy Soil, 
which soon drinks up all the Rain that falls... It is 
inoompassed with Savannahs; so that they have the benefit of 
the Breezes coming from any quarter; all which makes it a 
very healthy Place. It is a place of no great Trade, and 
therefore not rich in Money. Their Wealth lies in their 
Pastures, and Cattle, and Plantations of Sugar (1927, 154).
The English buccaneers proceeded to burn both towns when neither
plunder nor ransom rewarded their efforts, and then returned to
their boats. Shortly afterwards, Grogniet's Frenchmen arrived for
another round of pillage, only to encounter smoldering devastation
and a growing muster of Spanish opposition (155; Raveneau de Lussan
1930, 100-102).
Again the marauding bands went separate ways. Davis and 
Harris headed south, while Swan (now joined by Dampier) and Townley 
ventured up to the Mexican coast to reoonnoiter the situation at 
Acapulco. Despite its distinction as the the only major entrepdt 
for Spanish treasure shipments on the Pacific coast of New Spain, 
primarily as the American terminus of the Manila trade and moreover 
(with the closure of Guatulco) as an outlet for Peruvian commerce, 
Acapulco alone, of the six Middle American treasure ports,managed 
to evade capture by pirates. Part of the city's good fortune owed, 
no doubt, to its remote and relatively inaccessible position, far 
from the hub of Caribbean oonfliot. More significant, however, was 
the fact that for most of the year Acapulco offered nothing of 
sufficient value to warrant attack by pirates. True, with the 
arrival of the Manila galleons, usually between November and 
January, the port sprang to life with all the accoutrements of the
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lucrative Philippine trade,®* at least until the departure of the
China ships by early spring; but for the remainder of the year:
Acapulco was deserted except for a small permanent 
population of Negroes, mulattoes, and Chinese (there were no 
Indians). It was a dirty, unattractive village, a hodgepodge 
of wood and mud huts with thatched roofs, hot and swarming 
with vermin and troublesome gnats, and a perfect breeding 
place for all sorts of tropical disease (Gerhard 1960, 39- 
41).
Drake and Cavendish, we recall, made no effort to mole6t Aoapuloo,
knowing full well that no treasure awaited there when the Manila
galleon was not in port. The Spaniards, in fact, made no effort to
fortify the harbor until 1614, when news arrived that a Dutch
pirate, Joris van Speilbergen, was bound in that direction. Their
preparations evidently proved sufficient to deter the Dutch from
landing, and afterwards construction began in earnest on the five-
pointed Castillo de San Diego. The main fortress was equipped with
up to fifty cannon, and a smaller redoubt later secured the harbor
from the other side (42-45). Nt/W, on a November night in 1685,
Townley's buccaneers stealthily entered Aoapuloo's harbor in oanoes
to ascertain the strength of a Lima merchantman:
beoause they would not be heard, they hal'd in their Oars, 
and paddled as softly as if they had been seeking Manatee.
They paddled up close to the Castle; then struck over to the 
Town, and found the Ship riding between the Breast-work and 
the Fort, within about a hundred Yards of eaoh. When they 
had well viewed her, and considered the Danger of the 
Design, they thought it not possible to accomplish it; 
therefore they paddled softly back again, till they were out 
of command of the Forts, and then they went to Land, and 
fell in among a company of Spanish Soldiers.. .who 
immediately fired at them, but did them no damage, only made 
them retire farther from the Shore. They... afterwards... 
returned aboard again, being tired, hungry and sorry for 
their Disappointment (Dampier 1927, 172).
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Swan's crew had suffered enough disappointment in these
waters, so the Cygnet sailed north along the Mexican coast with the 
intent to cross the Pacific. Ringrose was killed in a bloody 
skirmish not far from Mazatl&n, and Swan died on Mindanao soon after 
reaching the Philippines. Dampier would return to England in 1691 
to complete the first of three voyages round the world. Davis 
continued roving the South Sea for over a year, striking again from 
Juan Fernandez and the Galapagos to pillage the coast of Peru, and 
lending his frigate to protect Grogniet's forces in the Gulf of 
Guayaquil. Eventually he departed round Cape Horn in the 
Batchelor's Delight (with Lionel Wafer still on board) and may first 
have discovered Easter Island (’Davis Land') en route (Kemp and
Lloyd 1960, 114-27; Joyce ed. [Wafer] 1934, 125n-126n).
Townley's buccaneers and the Frenchmen under Grogniet 
(including Raveneau de Lussan) crossed paths again in March of 1686 
and decided to renew their alliance for another assault on
Nicaragua. This time their target was Granada. Its position at the 
head of Lake Nicaragua made Granada an important trade center; for 
here lay the inland terminus of a 220-mile-long waterway connecting 
western Nicaragua to the Caribbean Sea. From the city’s productive 
hinterland oame indigo, cochineal, tobacco, dyewood, maize, poultry, 
and naval stores. By the 1590s, its fortuitous site had made
Granada far more prosperous than Le6n, the provincial capital, while 
its relative distance from the sea had spared it from corsairs. The 
merchant ships which threaded Granada's riverine lifeline, however, 
particularly where the Rio San Juan emptied into the Caribbean, had
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long been subject to intense piracy. By the latter sixteenth 
century, corsairs were venturing upriver as far as Lake Nicaragua.
In 1602, when such piratical incursions appeared to threaten 
Granada itself, the Spanish Crown authorized the establishment of a 
garrison at San Carlos, where the river issued from the east side of 
the lake, and another fort called Santa Cruz to command the El 
Diablo rapids. Pirates nevertheless persisted in hovering about the 
river's mouth, especially during the 1630s, when buccaneers 
maintained a base at nearby Providence Island (Williams 1976, 48-51; 
Gage 1928, 371; MacLeod 1984, 164). It was not until 1665, however, 
that a band of buccaneers ascended the San Juan in canoes and took 
the citizens of Granada completely by surprise.37 Consequently, a 
second wooden fort soon defended San Carlos, but by 1670 its rotten 
timbers and sparse militia oould not withstand a new influx of 
buccaneers who sacked Granada for a second time. Finally, in 1675, 
though Granada had already declined in population and importance, 
the moated Castillo de la Immaoulada Conoepcidn, built soundly of 
brick and stone over the strategic Santa Cruz site, effectively 
secured the river from pirates (Williams 1976, 51-53; of. Floyd
1967, 32-35). Unfortunately for the citizens of Granada, when
Townley and Grogniet oame to loot their city in April of 1686, they 
approached not via the San Juan River, but overland from the South 
Sea.
At Reale jo the buccaneer bands once more parted company. 
Townley's men (now joined by Raveneau de Lussan) sailed south, first 
for Coiba, and then into the Bay of Panama, where they infested 
Taboga and the Pearl Islands while harassing local traffic. Townley
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himself died in a bloody encounter with two Spanish ships sent out 
to engage him, but his crew succeeded in capturing both vessels. 
Here ensued one of the grislier pirate customs. Finding their 
demands for ransom money and the release of five captured buccaneers 
unmet, Townley's desperados sent twenty Spanish heads to the 
president of Panama to assure him of their earnest intent. Their 
missing comrades and ten thousand pieces of eight soon materialized. 
Now the command fell to a French captain named le Picard, and the 
pirates eventually removed from the Pearl Islands to Coiba. After 
further molesting the battered ooasts of Central America, they 
finally rejoined Grogniet in the Gulf of Niooya (Gerhard 1960, 179- 
85).
The marauders could expect nothing more from the chain of
smoking villages which now stretched from Amapala to Panama, so
Guayaquil became their next agreed-upon target. Here was a grand
town (on the ooast of modern Ecuador) which too long had enjoyed a
respite from buccaneers' flames. Guayaquil had been razed by Dutoh
pirates in 1624 (Gerhard 1960, 127-28), but so far none of the South
Sea raiders of the 1680s had dared anything more than a feint or
reconnaisance of its strength. Sharp and his gang certainly had
their sights set on it, and among them Basil Ringrose had noted the
reasons for their intrigue:
[T]he city of Guayaquil, being a very rich place, [is] the 
embarcadero, or sea-port, to the great city of Quito. To 
this place likewise many of the merchants of Lima do usually 
send the money they design for Old Spain in barks, and by 
that means save the custom that otherwise they would pay to 
the King by carrying it on board the fleet. Hither comes 
much gold from Ouito, and very good and strong broadcloth, 
together with images for the use of the churches, and 
several other things of considerable value. But more
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especially coco-nut,®® whereof chocolate is made, which is 
supposed here to be the best in the whole universe. The 
town of Guayaquil consists of about 150 great houses, and 
twice as many little ones (1987, 357).
Ringrose, we have seen, never lived to plunder the town he 
described, but by February of 1687, Grogniet and le Picard were well 
under way with over three hundred French and English buccaneers 
hell-bent on smashing open its gates (Gerhard 1960, 185). Among 
them was the French pirate Raveneau de Lussan, who recorded the 
events (1930, 204-28). In April they entered the Gulf of Guayaquil 
and secreted themselves on La Puna, an insular shield which provided 
a calm road for larger ships at the mouth of the Guayas River. Here 
they managed to evade the island's elaborate network of lookouts 
while obtaining prisoners to apprise them of the city's layout and 
defenses. During the night they drifted as far upriver as the 
incoming tide would carry them, purposely avoiding the splash of 
telltale oars. Despite these precautions, their nocturnal landing 
was betrayed by a light from one of their own sentries who could not 
resist a pipeful. Their attack at dawn thereupon met with prolonged 
and vigorous resistance, but eventually they surmounted the city's 
defenses and took possession of Guayaquil. The French Catholics 
among them proceeded to the cathedral to sing Te Deum while the 
rest continued rounding up prisoners and whatever valuables had not 
been spirited off by the fleeing citizenry. Silver was found 
plentifully enough, and one of the more noteworthy objects recovered 
was a sixty-eight pound gilded eagle encrusted with rubies and 
emeralds— a holy ornament from some tabernacle. After a few days of 
rape**® and ransacking, the buccaneers selected five hundred
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influential hostages, including the governor, and returned to Puna 
to await the negotiated ransom and provisions. Guayaquil they left 
partially burnt and strewn with over nine hundred corpses. Grogniet 
himself died from wounds sustained in the battle. The Spanish 
authorities stalled for time, releasing only the promised victuals 
and several thousand pieces of eight while amassing for a counter 
attack. On Puna, a month of carousing kept the pirates occupied, 
but they soon tired of the Spaniards' delays and "were forced to 
apply...the customary rigorous measures"— i.e. having Spanish 
prisoners "throw dice to see which men would lose their heads" 
(214). The Spaniards eventually released eighty sacks of flour and 
gold worth forty-two thousand pieces of eight. Satisfied with this 
amount, the buccaneers released all but the most important prisoners 
and quit the island of Puna. Only with considerable difficulty did 
they escape two Spanish squadrons which had been dispatched during 
the negotiations to bottle them up in the Gulf of Guayaquil. By 
June the pirates were oaulking their boats on the iBla de la Plata; 
afterwards they concentrated on dividing great sums of spoil.
Still further coastal raiding, most notably against 
Tehuantepec on the shores of New Spain, finally brought le Picard 
and his 280 remaining buccaneers to Am&pala Bay in the Gulf of 
Fonseca. From there, in January of 1688, they resolved to march 
overland and return to Caribbean shores via the Segovia River. 
After two months' crossing, most of them indeed reached Cape Gracias 
a Dios (Gerhard 1960, 185-87; Raveneau de Lussan 1930). Thus
ended®® a long series of brutal, poorly coordinated, and, for the
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majority of its participants, unprofitable buccaneer enterprises on 
the Pacific coasts of Spanish America.
As the French, English, and Dutch governments strove to 
develop and legitimize their colonial footings in the New World, the 
buccaneers who had so long advanced their national interests were 
increasingly outliving their usefulness. Efforts were made to woo 
them to more conventional colonial pursuits, such as planting, but 
many of the coastal fraternity preferred to remain on the account. 
After Morgan's retirement from the seas in 1671, the English 
authorities prosecuted pirates more vigorously, though the French 
governors of Tortuga and Saint-Domingue encouraged them for several 
years longer. Still one last oall to arms would muster the 
buooaneers on a grand soale before the Brotherhood of the Coast 
fully disintegrated. It began as a joint operation with the regular 
French navy, and the objective was Cartagena. The fleets made 
rendezvous at Petit-Goave in March of 1697. There the buccaneer- 
governor of French Hispaniola, Jean-Baptiste du Casse, had gathered 
1100 local recruits, including 650 fljJbustiers whom he commanded 
himself. Led by Jean-Bernard Desjeans, Baron de Pointis, the troops 
from Franoe numbered 4000, half sailors and half landsmen. 
Together, the fleets boasted nine royal frigates and seven buooaneer 
ships, along with several smaller vessels61 (Haring 1910, 262-67). 
It was the largest invasion foroe yet seen in the Indies, but it 
faced a formidable task. Cartagena's labyrinthio entrance via a 
double lagoon, as we have already noted, provided a natural first 
defense (see Map 4). Sinoe Drake's suooess in 1586, moreover, the
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city had become not only the richest, but also the most extensively 
(though not effectively) fortified Spanish stronghold in the Indies:
The mouth of the harbour, called Boca Chioa, was 
defended by a fort with 4 bastions and 33 guns; but the guns 
were badly mounted on flimsy carriages of oedar, and were 
manned by only 15 soldiers. Inside the harbour was another 
fort called Santa Cruz, well built with 4 bastions and a 
moat, but provided with only a few iron guns and without a 
garrison. Two other forts formed part of the exterior works 
of the town, but they had neither garrison nor guns. The 
city itself was surrounded by solid walls of stone, with 12 
bastions and 84 brass cannon, to man which there was a 
company of 40 soldiers. Such was the war footing on which 
the Spanish Government maintained the 'Key of the Indies' 
(264n).
The fleet reached Cartagena on April 13 and, as a landing on 
the rugged north shore proved quite impossible, proceeded to enter 
Cartagena Bay through the Booachioa.*2 De Pointis had no affinity 
whatsoever for the buccaneers or their consorts, and repeatedly 
demonstrated prejudice for preserving his own troops. Thus it was a 
company of eighty Negroes*2 who first landed to assault the fort at 
Booaohica, which a day later was captured with the blood of 
buccaneers. Again, it was the buccaneers who the following day 
captured the high ground a mile to the east of the city. Upon this 
hill stood the church Nuestra Sefiora de la Poupa, commanding all 
landward approaches to the city. De Pointis pursued this strategy 
to forestall the inhabitants from absconding to the interior with 
their treasure (Burney 1891, 360-62). Early in May, after over a 
fortnight of spirited resistance, Cartagena capitulated and opened 
its gates to plundering. The value of the booty was staggering, 
perhaps as much as twenty million sterling, though the buccaneers 
and their governor-oaptain received only 40,000 crowns to divide 
amongst themselves— a sum far short of their expected due. De
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Pointis thereupon withdrew from the city in a hasty departure for 
France, while the buccaneers, who would not be so easily cheated for 
their efforts, re-entered the ravaged city for a second round of 
looting (Haring 1910, 265-66). It was indeed a grim ordeal for the 
city which "was attacked more often and more disasterously than any 
other important place in Spanish America” (Burns 1954, 114n).
With the French reduction of Cartagena oame also the Peace of 
Ryswiok, whereby Spain finally acknowledged the rights of her last 
piratical contender to colonize in the West Indies. Thus the year 
1697, with the close of the oentury so near at hand, has been 
recognized by leading historians of piracy as the end of the 
buccaneering era (Haring 1910, 266; Gosse 1946, 174). Of course, as 
with the corsairs, a few piracies marked by the distinctive 
buccaneer flair sputtered well into the next oentury, particularly 
those commissioned during the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-
1714). One such expedition in 1702, chronicled afterwards by
Nathaniel Davis, targeted Tolti and the Cana gold mines of Darien 
(Davis in Joyce, ed. 1934) Davis' companions, including Captain 
Christian of Vera Cruz fame, sailed in July aboard four armed sloops 
with commissions from Jamaica. Foroing their way into Tol\i they 
discovered, as so often was the case, that most of the city's
inhabitants had already fled with their valuables, leaving "not...so 
much as a Silver Candlestick in their Churches, which was very
mortifying" (155). There was nothing to do but spike the guns, burn 
the place, and move on. Cruising southwest they fell in with some 
French pirat66 who habitually haunted these coasts, then anchored at 
Golden Island in the San Bias archipelago off Darien.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
100
In this chain the Isle of Pines, La Sound's Key, and Golden 
Island had long served as buccaneer rendezvous with fiercely anti- 
Spanish Indians for raids to the interior and the Paoifio. This 
alliance had been well established even before Coxon and Sharp's 
arrival in 1680; of the present gang. Captain Christian had lived a 
long time with the natives of Darien. It was the rainy season when 
the buccaneers and their Cuna companions landed in the Gulf of 
UrabA, marching off across swollen rivers and swamps toward the 
forested mountains of the interior. Their objective was Cafia, a 
gold-mining settlement near the very town of Santa Maria which Peter 
Harris' band had sacked on the way to the South Sea. Again, by the 
time the buccaneers secured the village, the Spaniards had already
made off with most of whatever treasure lay in store. Not to be
deprived of their due, the pirates tortured their Spanish hosts to 
discover the location of any hidden caches, while forcing twenty- 
four captured Negroes to dig more gold. Fifty pounds of freshly
mined gold was thus procured before the buooaneers fired the town
and headed back to their boats (152-65).**
The unquenchable William Dampier returned to Spanish American 
waters three times, the last in 1708 to begin his third 
circumnavigation at the age of fifty-six. On this oooasion he 
served as South Sea pilot for Captain Woodes Rogers, who in the 
course of his three-year privateering voyage round the world with 
the Duke and Duchess managed to sack Guayaquil and capture a Manila 
galleon worth over £800,000 (Rogers 1928; Lloyd 1966, 123-49;
Williams 1961, 158). Other notable privateering voyages included 
those of Shelvooke and Clipperton in 1718, but for the most part
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these Mere isolated ventures launched from Europe, not buccaneering 
forays as defined here (see Kemp and Lloyd 1960; Shelvocke 1928). 
Here we have glimpsed only the highlights of the buccaneers’ 
movements, but in the following chapter we will take closer notice 
of their operations and peculiar lifestyle as these evolved from 
their base on Tortuga.
Freebooters
The eighteenth-century successors of the buccaneers, though 
inflicting only a brief reign of terror on the high seas, swept 
piracy in Spanish America to a dramatic finish and branded in the 
public mind the swashbuckling image of pirates which persists to 
this day. These were undisputed freebooters, Aosta's humni 
generis,65 the likes of Blackbeard and Bartholomew Roberts, whose 
household notoriety owed to excesses of single-minded cruelty and 
greed. True outlaws working the fringe of a closing maritime 
frontier, these pirates owed allegiance to none but themselves and 
preyed upon the shipping of any nation, whether Spanish, English, 
French or Dutch. Consequently, unlike their buccaneer forebears, 
they enjoyed no cloak of legitimacy from any government (though many 
a colonial governor colluded in trafficking their spoils) and were 
therefore doomed to swift eradication. Many of them, it is true, 
had begun their piratical careers as privateersmen during the War of 
the Spanish Succession. In the Lesser Antilles, French flibustaers 
had marauded under commissions throughout the war, at the height of
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which Martinique alone served as base to twelve or thirteen hundred 
(Haring 1910, 211-12). With the Treaty of Utrecht, however, and the 
establishment of a new balance of power among European nations by 
1714, their sea roving continued unabated. It proved, as the 
Reverend Cotton Mather had observed, that "the privateering stroke 
so easily degenerates into the piratical" (Williams 1961, 149). So 
began the reckless flourish known as the 'Golden Age of Piracy', a 
decade or so of rank hoodlumism set loose on the open sea under the 
japing countenance of the Jolly Roger.66
The post-war freebooters inherited from the buccaneers a 
oertain sense of fraternity bred from common contempt for the sooial 
order and a democratic approach to regulating life aboard ship; but 
they differed from them fundamentally, aside from the question of 
commissions or even tacit state patronage, in several respects. To 
begin with, though two or more of their vessels might temporarily 
voyage in consort, the freebooters essentially operated as lone 
wolves. Neither did they enjoy the olout and protection onoe 
afforded by the great buccaneer fleets, nor could they operate in 
league with regular naval forces. With insufficient man- or 
firepower to launch coastal assaults, these pirates returned to pure 
sea robbery, typically involving ship-to-ship oombat replete with 
grappling irons, grenades, stink bombs, and all-or-nothing boarding 
assaults. Every hand needed to be an experienced mariner— no room 
for the likes of intrepid but inexperienced landsmen who had swelled 
the ranks of the buccaneers. Moreover, while ready in a pinch to 
live off the land, the freebooters were neither hunters nor 
planters, woodcutters nor colonists ashore; their ties to the land
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remained minimal. Aside from a brief occupation of New Providence 
in the Bahamas, the Anglo-American rovers, at least, could claim no 
pirate stronghold in which to muster, retire, refit, and 
conveniently dispose of their booty. Like all pirates, this new 
breed concentrated their efforts on the region's major shipping 
lanes, especially near choke points. Because they were relatively 
footloose and oould pursue merchantmen of any nation, their 
movements were less predictable than those of their piratical 
predecessors, and they were difficult to catch. By the same token, 
they faced more enemies in pursuit; and their individual successes, 
though sometimes spectacular, were generally short lived and of 
little import to the greater geopolitical dynamics of the region.
Spatially, the freebooting Golden Age culminated an explosion 
of piracy from its Caribbean cradle to a full-fledged global system. 
Earlier, the corsairs and buccaneers had extended their depredations 
from the Greater Antillean heart of Spanish America, westward and 
southward to the Gulf of Mexico and along the Spanish Main. As 
these shores oame under the effective colonial control of the four 
great European powers, freebooters sought refuge in the smaller, 
peripheral islands of the oiroum-Caribbean realm. From Trinidad to 
the Bahamas they darted from one remote cove to the next in swift 
sloops and other elusive shallow-draft vessels, intercepting as many 
merchants as possible in between, and hoping to evade oumbrous-but- 
deadly men-of-war. Yet Caribbean waters, though vital to the 
commerce of many nations, provided neither the richest nor the 
easiest pickings; and by the turn of the oentury, various factors 
had converged to lure the attention of pirates elsewhere. The
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growing intolerance of colonial governments, the vigilance of
regular navies and guardacostas, the diminishment of Spain's
American gold and silver shipments, and the partial paralysis of
maritime oommeroe effected by the pirates themselves— all oonspired
to extend the rovers' range abroad. As early as 1696, the Surveyor-
General of the Customs in New England, Edward Randolph, advised the
English Crown of emerging patterns of raid and refuge in a
memorandum reminsioent of Mainwaring's earlier disoourse on piracy:
About 20 Years ago. King Charles the Second was pleased to 
send me to New England to Enquire into their Trade and 
Commerce. I observed that they fitted out Vessels of 60 or 
70 Tuns a peece, very well mand whom they calld privateers,
& Sent them without Comission to the Spanish We6t Indies, 
where they comitted all Acts of violence...& brought home 
great quantities of Silver in Coins & Bullion... I have 
heard of no Pyracies done these Severall Years in those 
places for the Pyrates have found out, a more profitable & 
less hazardous Voyage to the Red Sea, where they take from 
the Moors all they have, without Resistance, & bring it to 
Some one of the Plantations on the Continent of America or 
Islands adjacent where they are received & harbourd and from 
whence allso they fit out their Vessells to the Same Place 
(printed in Gosse 1946, 320).
Randolph went on to list the chief resorts of pirates in the
Americas, namely the Bahama Islands, South Carolina, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, and Boston, and further recommended that piracy oould
be suppressed should "his Majesty be pleased to send a first Rate
ffrigott under the Comand of a sober person, well acquainted with
the Bahama Islands & other plaoes, where the Pyrates usually resort,
with a Comissisn to Grant pardons to all such, who will give
Security to settle quietly in the Plantations'* (321). His advice
was finally heeded twenty-two years later.
Piratical oonneotions between the North American colonies and 
the Caribbean realm were nothing new. The Carolines and the Bahamas
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
105
shared the sane proprietors. New England's ties to the region dated 
back to the Puritans' earliest efforts to colonize Providence Island 
and Tortuga, and New York (formerly New Amsterdam) had long welcomed 
Dutch buccaneers to its port (Haring 1910, 271; Jameson 1923, 9-14). 
By the date of Randolph's report, long after Tortuga and Port Royal, 
Jamaica had been closed to buccaneers, North American colonies from 
the Carolinas to New England served as havens for pirates and 
markets for their goods. At this time infamous sea rovers, the 
likes of Thomas Tew, Henry Every (or Avery) and William Kidd, 
engaged a far-flung, lively freebooting circuit known as the 'Pirate 
Round' (Mitchell 1976, 101-22). Trans-hemispheric diffusion of the 
sweet trade supplied financiers in New York and New England with 
lucrative spoils from the vulnerable Arab-Indian traffic connecting 
Jiddah, Mocha, and Bombay. Intermediate cruises along the African 
coast, where the Guinea slave trade provided a constant lure and 
remote Madagascar offered perfect asylum, then back to the old 
hunting grounds of the West Indies, served to punctuate the Pirate 
Round. Historically and geographically, the advent of the Round 
marked a reversal of the east-to-west corsair forays whioh had 
brought piracy to the New World almost two centuries before. Kidd 
prowled about the Leeward Islands, while Tew and Every resorted to 
New Providence in the Bahamas; but the real fortunes of these
pirates, fleeting though they were, owed to plunder from the Indian 
Ocean and the Red Sea. Even that most raffish brood whioh heralded 
piracy'8 Golden Age (roughly 1716 to 1726)^ performed most of it6
mischief either in the Old World or along the Atlantic coast of
North America. Thus the focus of piracy removed from Spanish
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America, and the most celebrated exploits of the day find no place 
within the scope of our study. However, some of this period’s most 
notorious sea bandits did launch their careers from Spanish
America'8 waters, and quite a few of them ended their days on its 
soil— or rather dangling a few feet above it.
Most of our knowledge of these picaroons comes from Captain
Charles Johnson's Genera 1 History of the Robberies and Murders of
the most notorious Pyrates, first published in 1724 and accepted by
modern authorities as the work of none other than Daniel Defoe.
Though doubtlessly embellished to suit the romantio tastes of the
reading public, this account appears factual enough as far as the
pirates' movements are concerned and is widely accepted by
historians as an honest portrayal of their deeds. In it, we are
informed by ‘Captain Johnson’ that
the Pirates generally shift their rovings according to the 
season of the year. In the summer they cruise mostly along 
the coast of the Continent of [North] America, but the 
winters there being a little too cold for them, they follow 
the Sun and go towards the Islands at the approach of cold 
weather. Every man who has used the West India trade knows 
this to be true; therefore, since we are so well acquainted 
with all their motions, I cannot see why our men-of-war, 
under a proper regulation may not go to the Southward,
instead of lying up all the winter useless (Johnson [Defoe?]
1962, 20).
The number of freebooters scouring the seas at this time was 
indeed formidable. Historian Marcus Rediker has estimated that 
among the Anglo-American pirates alone as many as 2400 cruised
between 1716 and 1718 (1987, 256). In Spanish American waters, the 
isle of New Providence in the Bahamas emerged as their principal 
base, serving perhaps upwards of a thousand picaroons.®* Here a 
Captain Henry Jennings, having in 1716 slipped into the piratical
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mold while relieving Spanish salvage workers of 350,000 pieces of 
eight reclaimed from wrecks off Florida, established a school of 
piracy whose founding practitioners included Charles Vane and 
‘Calico Jack' Rackham, Anne Bonney and Mary Read, Edward England, 
Howel Davis, Thomas Anstis, John Auger, Charles Bellamy, Thomas 
Burgess, Oliver La Bouohe, Benjamin Hornigold, and the latter's 
lieutenant, Edward Teaoh (or Thatoh)— better known as 'Blackboard' 
(Albury 1975, 59-65; Rediker 1987, 268; Johnson [Defoe?] 1962, 150, 
200-232).
In July of 1716, Governor Spotswood of Virginia warned: “A 
nest of pirates are endeavoring to establish themselves in New 
Providence, and by the additions they expect and will probably 
receive, of loosely disordered people from the Bay of Campeaohy, 
Jamaica and other parts, may prove dangerous to the British 
commerce, if not timely suppressed" (in Williams 1961, 150). King 
George had even better cause for vigorous response if we are to 
believe, as one confidant to James II 's dethroned widow claimed, 
that the pirates of New Providence "did with one heart and voice 
proclaim James III for their King" (Craton 1962, 100). In effeot, 
what the Hanoverian monarch finally authorized was the very measure 
suggested by Edward Randolph over two decades earlier. In 1717 the 
King commanded Governor Bennett of Bermuda to grant pardons to the 
freebooters of New Providence should they willingly retire from the 
business and remove to his colony. Only a handful of the outlaws, 
their headmaster Jennings notably among them, took advantage of the 
initial offer (Oldmixon 1966; Craton 1962, 100). The following
year, however, the "sober person" envisioned by Randolph arrived in
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the body of Woodes Rogers, himself a celebrated (but penniless) ex­
privateer, now entrusted with the governership of the Bahamas and a 
royal directive to clean out the islands' piratical nest once and 
for all.
The newly appointed governor, baoked by five warships and a 
company of footsoldiers, repeated the King's overture of clemency 
when he took possession of New Providence in the summer of 1718. 
This time the pirates’ response proved more encouraging. Six 
captains and hundreds of crewmen submitted to the terms of the 
pardon, among them Burgess and Hornigold, who later even aided 
Rogers' efforts in apprehending and prosecuting those still at 
large. That December the public hanging of John Auger and seven of 
his crew in the shadow of their former stronghold provided a 
symbolic precursor to the end of piracy in the region; several 
hundred freebooters remained abroad, or had escaped Rogers' 
blockade, or soon reverted to their old way of life after having 
accepted the King's pardon. Nevertheless, the arrival of Woodes 
Rogers deprived the pirates of their only remaining bastion in the 
Spanish American realm and presaged an end to their era in the New 
World (Craton 1962, 101-9; Williams 1961, 158-60; Johnson [Defoe?] 
1962, 200-232).
Of those freebooters still menacing the Caribbean after the 
suppression of New Providence, none earned greater notoriety than 
Blackbeard, christened Edward Teach or Thatch. Of his earlier 
exploits we know very little, except that he was a Bristol man 
serving aboard Jamaican privateers during Queen Anne's War, &e the 
War of the Spanish Succession was generally called in America (Lee
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1974, 3-8). In this capacity "he had often distinguished himself for
his uncommon boldness and personal courage, [but] he was never
raised to any command till he went a-pirating" (Johnson [Defoe?]
1962, 38). In these respects Teach was perhaps representative of
pirate commanders in his day, most of whom hailed from the lowest
classes of bustling seaports, found little opportunity for
advancement as ordinary seamen in the orthodox naval or mercantile
regime, and consequently maintained a “hatred of subservience and
the failure to achieve success" (Burg 1977, 44-47). What
distiguished Blackboard from his cohorts was a great sense of
macabre theatrics which ensured loyalty from his men and struck fear
into his victims:
Captain Teach.. .assumed the cognomen of Blaok-beard, from 
that large quantity of hair which, like a frightful meteor, 
covered his whole face and frightened America more than any 
comet that has appeared there a long time.
This beard was black, which he suffered to grow of an 
extravagant length; as to breadth, it came up to his eyes.
He was accustomed to twist it with ribbons, in small tails, 
after the manner of our Ramillies wigs, and turn them about
his ears. In time of action he wore a sling over his
shoulders, with three brace of pistols, hanging in holsters, 
like bandoliers; and stuck lighted matches under his hat, 
which, appearing on each side of his face, his eyes 
naturally looking fierce and wild, made him altogether such 
a figure that imagination cannot form an idea of a Fury from 
Hell to look more frightful (Johnson [Defoe?] 1962, 51-52).
Blackboard's satanio appearance supposedly betrayed an equally
demonic character, that of a despotic brigand chief who reputedly
shot his own men just to keep them in line (51), or otherwise
bullied them into submission and respect:
For being one day at sea, and a little flushed with drink,
Come, says he, Jet us make a hell of our own, and try hoir 
longr are can hear It. Accordingly he, with two or three 
others, went down into the hold, and closing up all the 
hatches, filled several pots full of brimstone and other
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until they were almost suffocated, when some of the men 
cried out for air. At length, he opened the hatches, not a 
little pleased that he held out the longest (52).
Whether or not suoh stories constituted mere folklore or the
fanciful constructions of Daniel Defoe, Blackboard must indeed have
earned some measure of his fearsome reputation, and it certainly
facilitated his career:
The Blackbeard legend ensured that no prize offered 
resistance, and this was presumably accepted by his crew as 
offsetting his lethally freakish whims... Official 
statements by the officers of merchantmen held up and rifled 
by Blackbeard show that he did not physically ill-treat 
prisoners, however much he may have blustered and blasphemed 
(Mitchell 1976, 92).
Edward Teach apparently began his piratical career with 
Jennings and Hornigold when they raided the Spanish-plate salvage 
operation off Florida in 1716 (Woodbury 1951, 84). The following 
year he sailed from New Providence under Hornigold and took a Havana 
sloop laden with nothing but flour. Shortly afterwards a Bermudian 
prize furnished a few gallons of wine, while a Madeira ship bound to 
South Carolina yielded a much richer cargo. After careening on the 
Virginia coast, the pirate duo returned to the West Indies and 
captured a French Guineaman headed for Martinique. At this point 
Teach assumed command of the valuable French prize, mounted it with 
forty guns, and renamed it the Queen Anne's Pevenge. He then broke 
consort with Hornigold, who returned to New Providence to make his 
peace with the new governor. Off St. Vincent, Captain Teach 
plundered a sizeable British merchantman and afterwards emerged 
unscathed from a tangle with a Barbadian man-of-war. Standing next 
for the Central American coast, he met up with the unfortunate Major 
Stede Bonnet, a Barbados estate holder who supposedly embraced
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piracy to escape his nagging wife. Though feigning to befriend the 
landlubbing gentleman. Teach effectively relieved ham of his 
captaincy and commandeered his vessel.
At Turneffe, an island group off the coast of modern Belize, 
the pirates replenished with fresh water and captured a Jamaican 
sloop. After a week's resort in these islands, Blackbeard and his 
entourage made for the Gulf of Honduras, where they suooessfully 
plundered a Boston merchantman and four smaller vessels. Calling 
next at Trujillo, Grand Cayman, and Havana, Blackbeard finally 
steered from Spanish American waters for the Carolines and Virginia. 
After wreaking much havoc upon these coasts, he was apprehended and 
beheaded at Ooraooke Inlet by Lieutenant Maynard late in November of 
1718 (Johnson [Defoe?] 1962, 38-50, 62). So perhaps this year,
marking both the arrival of Woodes Rogers and the muoh publicized 
death of Blackbeard, provides the most fitting historical endpoint 
for our study. Other famous pirates would continue roving in the 
Caribbean and elsewhere for some years to come, but the likes of 
Charles Vane, Jack Rackham, and perhaps the most successful of the 
bunoh— Bartholomew Roberts— soon met with similar dissolution. At 
any rate, pirates by this time had by and large removed from Spanish 
America, so let U 6  oast a keener geographical eye toward various 
places where they left their mark.
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Figure 5: Edvard Teaoh— alias ’Blackbeard*
(Eighteenth-oentury engraving 
reprinted in Mitchell 1976)
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Pirate Haunts and Strongholds
113
In the course of two centuries few were the islands and coasts 
of Spanish America where pirates failed to call. Certain places, 
however, the names of which appear over and over again in the 
chronicles of piracy, furnished corsairs, buccaneers, and 
freebooters strategic territorial footholds during the long battle 
waged 'beyond the line'. In our geographical resumA of the region's 
piracy, pictorially represented by Maps 2 and 3, we can group such 
places into three categories. The first comprised small, usually 
remote islands and archipelagos which served as refuges teeming with 
fruits, fish, turtle, game, wood, and water. Some of these islands 
became favorite spots for careening, making rendezvous, dividing the 
spoils, or marooning prisoners and dissenters. The second,
reminiscent of the "pirate coasts" described by Semple and 
Whittlesey, consisted of swampy, economically limited, serpentine 
shorelines which created perfect hideouts along the Caribbean and 
Gulf coasts from the Rio San Juan to the Bay of Campeche. Here 
pirates retreated not only for safety and provisions in the course 
of their raiding, but also between voyages to out logwood for the 
lucrative dye trade. The third kind of place, representing the
pinnacle of pirate success, was the fortified port, typically
securing a small island stronghold. Relatively few pirate bastions 
emerged, and these flourished as such only briefly before being
subsumed by more legitimate colonial enterprises of the French, 
English, and Dutch. All piratical haunts owed their locations not 
to serendipity, but to the same positional criteria which appear to
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have shaped piracy everywhere: site and situation with respect to 
maritime physiography, natural resources, and the lines of commerce.
Island Refuges and Rendezvous
The Antilles. Small islands indeed figured conspicuously in
the development of the region's piracy. Too rugged, remote, or
otherwise limited in resources to invite permanent colonization or
garrisons on the part of the Spaniards, many nevertheless afforded
refreshment enough and safe cover to itinerant raiders. Those which
lay within easy striking distance of lucrative trade routes and
settlements proved particularly useful to pirates. In all of
Spanish America, perhaps no archipelago occupied more strategic a
position than the Bahama Islands, posing as they did a veritable
gauntlet of piratical snares ready to snap up the treasure-laden
galeones and flota on their homeward stretch from Havana:
...to avoid the bars of the Carolinas, some convoys turned 
eastward at Great Isaac Rock north of Bimini and sailed 
directly to the deep waters of the Atlantic between the 
islands of Eleuthera and Abaoo (i.e. through the Northeast 
Providence Channel]. They travelled in convoy for safety and 
all lights were doused by night to escape attention of 
privateers who swarmed the northern Bahamas. Needless to say 
the channels are littered with wreaks of ships which never 
made the passage to the open Atlantic (Barratt 1972, 52-55).
French corsairs infested these islands from the outset, and later
buccaneers made themselves equally at home. It is perhaps ironic
that the Bahamian island so long attributed as Columbus’s initial
landfall, and thus as Spain's first territorial claim in the New
World, should also bear the name of tfatling— a British buccaneer
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(Lynam 1948, 244)^. In addition to convenient placement, the
largely untenanted maze formed by the Bahamas suited the clandestine 
needs of pirates extremely well. The archipelago includes, in 
addition to thousands of desolate smaller cays, several hundred 
islands and islets; but of these only twenty or so foster permanent 
settlements even today (National Geographic Society 1987). Like 
many of the Lesser Antilles, the Bahama Islands remained virtually 
ignored by the Spaniards until eventually expropriated by a rival 
colonial power. England’s Charles I finally laid his country’s 
claim to the islands by officially granting them to Sir Robert Heath 
in 1629 (Barratt 1972, 52). Various colonization efforts ensued, 
but the Bahamas remained by and large a retreat for Anglo-American 
freebooters until Woodes Rogers cleared out their New Providence den 
in 1718.
Athwart Cuba, the Isle of Pines,the Cayman Islands, and the 
myriad of cays which subtend the Antillean giant’s southern coast 
provided suitable rendezvous for pirate attacks against Cuba and the 
ever-busy Yucatan Channel. Likewise islands nestled in the many
coastal recesses of Hispaniola, from Gonave in the western Ciil-de-
Sac to the Isla Levantado in the Bay of Samana, made for splendid 
pirate refuges. Centrally located between the pirate strongholds of 
Tortuga and Port Royal, the lie A Vache on the south side of
Hispaniola emerged as the principal rendezvous point for combined 
English-French buccaneer expeditions (see Nap 5). As its name
indicates, this island and the adjacent mainland also furnished a 
dependable supply of viands by virtue of feral cattle herds.
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Hap 6: The San Dias Archipelago— Rendezvous for Buccaneers 
On the Darien Coast of Panama
(Drafted by William Hack, 1699, reprinted 1710 and in Kapp 1971b)
Hap 7: Cowley's Chart of the Galapagos Islands
(from his journal, first published by 
William Hack in 1699, reprinted 1729)
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Hap 8: Isle of Juan Fern&ndez— Principal South Sea 
Outpost of the Buccaneers, from Sharp's 
Journal after a Draft by Ringrose
(MS Sharp/Haok [1680-82] BL SI.46.a)
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In the western Caribbean, the Bay Islands in the Gulf of 
Honduras offered fresh provisions (water, turtle, hogs), wood, 
Indian oanoes, and good striking access to Puerto Caballos and 
Trujillo, the principal terminals for the Spanish Honduran trade. 
For large pirate fleets the protected, commodious south ooast of 
Roat&n proved most conducive for careening and making rendezvous, 
while smaller, more vulnerable buccaneer squadrons preferred 
Guanaja's leeward lagoon with multiple escape routes between its 
protective reefs and cays. French corsairs, we recall, had begun 
resorting to the islands as early as 1536, and by the time of 
Jackson's cruise English buccaneers were well accustomed to calling 
there. Though Puritans from Providence Company founded a short­
lived colony on Roat&n in 1638, roving buccaneers apparently 
eschewed any attempt at permanent settlement,*^ constructing instead 
only temporary camps convenient for cutting logwood, hunting game, 
launching raids, or maintaining their vessels (Davidson 1974, 40- 
53).
Changing Seas. For harassing Spaniards along the Isthmus of 
Panama and the Main, pirates usually resorted to the San Bias 
Archipelago to refresh, rendezvous, and arrange with the Darien 
Indians for allied raids to the interior or the Paoifio (see Map 6). 
Once across, South Sea raiders from Oxenham onward typically 
launched their assaults from the Pearl Islands in the Bay of Panama, 
or from the islas Coiba and Cafio further up the ooast. Those 
approaching or exiting the Pacific through the Straits, or round 
Cape Horn via Drake's Passage, might call at the Falkland Islands on 
the Atlantic side. The first English interloper to reach this
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remote southeasterly group was John Davis in the Desire, perhaps 
more renowned historically for his attempts to discover the 
Northwest Passage. Davis reached the Falklands quite by accident in 
1592 when a storm drove him from Thomas Cavendish's fleet as the 
latter was making for the Strait of Magellan (Boyson 1924, 21-22).
Two years later Richard Hawkins, son of Sir John, paused there 
just long enough to name the islands for himself and observe the 
"goodly champion country...[with] great rivers of fresh water" 
(Birtles 1983, 43). In 1600 the Dutchman Sebald de Weert, thwarted 
from a South Sea plundering expedition by tempestuous conditions in 
the Straits, noted the islands (that afterwards bore Jhis name) and 
their many penguins which, for want of a sloop or other small boat, 
his famished Hollanders were unable to snare (Boyson 1924, 24-25). 
The English buccaneers Cowley and Deunpier attempted to refresh there 
before shooting the Straits in 1684, but finding neither safe 
anchorage nor fresh water, determined to move on. John Strong's 
privateering expedition of 1690 encountered better providence among 
the Falklands. His men dined heartily on penguins, seals, geese, 
and ducks, took aboard good quantities of fresh water, but regarded 
with certain dismay the islands' lack of wood. It was Strong who 
first attached the name "Fawkland" to the sound which separates the 
two largest islands (30-32). From 1698 to 1712 the Falklands 
provided a convenient stopping point for French interlopers from St. 
Malo bound for the South Sea. In memory of that notorious 
corsairs, these sailors renamed the islands the Malouines, later 
transmuted by the Spaniards to Malvinas. It was the British 
privateer Woodes Rogers who, in the course of his plundering
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circumnavigation of 1708-1711, cruised by the islands and extended
the label of "Falkland" to denote the entire group (32-35). The 
Falkland Islands proved perhaps too remote, forbidding, or barren 
(particularly of much needed wood supply) to attract pirates to any 
greater extent; in fact, among the realm's many refuges they played 
a rather elusive part throughout the Age of Exploration.73
The Pacific. In the great South Sea, on the Pacific side of 
Spanish America, various haunts offered anohorage and asylum to the 
pirates who plundered settlements and shipping from Aoapuloo to 
Valdivia. The isle of Gorgona made a convenient halfway 6top 
between Panami and Guayaquil. Bartholomew Sharp's gang, after 
crossing the Isthmus in 1680, resorted there on the advice of a 
Spanish prisoner and spent several days careening and gathering 
victuals. The Spaniards, it seemed, shunned the island because of 
its perpetual rainfall, but buooaneers could tolerate a good soaking 
if it meant they oould attend their needs without molestation.
Basil Ringrose took this opportunity to sketch a chart of Gorgona 
and otherwise note its geographic attributes:
The mainland to windward of this island is very low and 
full of rivers. All along the coast it rains most
desperately... We anchored on the South side of the island, 
at the mouth of a very fine river. There belong to this 
island about thirty rivers and rivulets, which all fall from 
the rocks on the several sides of the island. The whole 
circumference thereof is about three-leagues-and-a-half, 
being all high and mountainous land, excepting only that 
side where we oast anohor. Here therefore we moored our ship 
in the depth of eighteen or twenty fathom water, and began
to unrig the vessel. But we were four or five days' space
before we could get our sails dry so as to be able to take 
them from the yards, there falling a shower of rain almost 
every hour of the day and night...
Our choice and best provisions here were Indian
conies.74 monkeys, snakes, oysters, conohs. periwinkles.7®
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and a few small turtle, with some other sorts of good fish 
(Ringrose 1987, 341-43).
Closer to Guayaquil 6tood the Isla de la Plata, by tradition 
so named from Francis Drake's visit and subsequent division of 
spoils among his men, each of whom received a quantity of silver 
plate.7* Sharp's English buccaneers, in fact, preferred to call the 
place Drake’s Isle and likewise retreated there to refit their 
ships, oatoh turtle, hunt wild goats, and gamble away their ill- 
gotten shares (350-53; Dick 1987, 273). Swan, Davi6, and Harris 
rendezvoused at the Isle of Plate before attempting to snare the 
Lima fleet (Kemp and Lloyd 1960, 109); and Picard's men fled there 
with the spoils of Guayaquil to caulk up their leaky ships (Raveneau 
de Lussan 1930, 226).
Two outlying groups in the Pacific beckoned to seaworn 
buccaneers as much for their bounty a6 for their solitude. One was 
the Galapagos Islands, straddling the equator about nine hundred 
miles due west of Quito. Sharp's crew had been heading there when 
contrary winds forced them instead to put in for Gorgona (Dick 1987,
269), and indeed the islands' position in the doldrums generally 
rendered them too tedious a voyage even for their Spanish 
proprietors (Ringrose 1987, 353). Cowley, Wafer, and Dampier
reached them under John Cook and Edward Davis with the Batchelor's 
Delight in 1684, hoping to lie low while the clamor aroused by their 
South Sea invasion died away. Cowley expressed amazement at the 
number and size of sea and land turtles, "6ome of which weighed at 
least 200 Pound weight, which are excellent good Food" (in Hack 
1699a, 9). He otherwise amused himself, as one of the first
Englishmen to visit these islands, by whimsically naming them after
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
124
the British royalty, his fellow buccaneers, and of course himself 
(see Map 7):
...between York and Albemarle's Island lieth a small one, 
which my Fancy led me to call Cowley's enchanted Island; for 
we having had a sight of it upon several Points of the 
Compass, it appear'd always in as many different forms, 
sometimes like a ruined Fortification; upon another Point, 
like a great City, &c (10).
The Islas Galapagos offered fine sandy harbors for anchoring and
careening, refreshing air, sweet water, salt, wood, and a delectable
variety of fresh meat for the taking. In addition to several
species of turtle (from which the archipelago got its name— galApago
means tortoise in Spanish), the islands teemed with fish, edible
birds, and plump iguanas: "The Guanoes here are fat and large as any
that I ever saw; they are so tame, that a Man may knock down twenty
in an Hour's Time with a Club" (Dampier 1927, 76). Knowing he would
return to this strange and beautiful sanctuary within the course of
his South Sea maraudings. Captain Davis also directed his men to
deposit in reserve several hundred sacks of flour which they had
seized from a Spanish prize off the coast of Peru (82).
Another island cluster, nearly five hundred miles west of 
Santiago and perhaps even more paradisiacal to scurvy-ridden rovers 
clawing their way past the ravages of Tierra del Fuego— or headed 
that way after an arduous South Sea cruise— was the remote Juan 
Fernandez group. Although these islands owed their name to their 
Spanish discoverer, it was as a sanctuary for Spain's enemies that 
they became famous. Of all the refuges so far mentioned, this last 
figures most prominently in the lore of piracy. Fernandez reached 
them in 1563 and stayed only long enough to introduce a herd of
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goats which thrived on the steep volcanic slopes and completely 
reverted to the wild. Three small islands compose the entire
archipelago. The largest and closest to the Chilean coast, hence
known by the Spaniards as Isla Mas h Tierra, rises abruptly from the 
sea to a summit of three thousand feet. Despite its imposing 
fagade, it offered sufficient anohorages, a temperate climate, and 
an abundance of fresh provisions to interlopers (see Map 8). This 
most aooessible and habitable of the three islands, by itself called 
Juan Fernandez (or 'John Fernando') by the buccaneers who frequented 
it, later acquired, for reasons we shall see, the name Rbbinson 
Crusoe as well. Just off its southwest point lies the tiny islet of 
Santa Clara, and a hundred miles westward rises the precipitous and 
uninviting Isla Mas Afuera, now known also as the Isla Alejandro 
Selkirk; but these remained useless even to pirates.
Sharp and his gang, licking their wounds after a disasterous 
attempt on Coquimbo, straggled in to Juan Fernandez on Christmas Day 
in 1680. On first approach the island appeared completely desolate 
and inaooesible, and the holiday was observed with no more flourish 
than a triple volley of cannon fire as the seaworn buccaneers probed 
for safe riding and a good spot to land. From the ship's initial 
anchorage on the barren and blustery south side, scouting parties in 
canoes paddled round the east end to discover more hospitable 
conditions. From this new road the pirates oould safely land and 
gather in all the necessities: goat meat, wood, and fresh water. 
Good-sized fish and lobster proved likewise plentiful, and the men 
found themselves hard put to bring their boats ashore amidst the 
teeming herds of seals and sea lions.^ Here, however, the
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buccaneers fell Into discord. Sharp and some others favored 
returning home via Cape Horn at once, but the majority held out for 
more plundering and even elected a new captain, John Watling, to 
lead them on. The pirates barely finished careening at Juan 
FernAndez before three Spanish men-of-war chased them off, causing 
them to leave behind a Miskito Indian named William (Ringrose 1987, 
393-400). He was the first in a series of marooned men who made 
distant Juan FernAndez their solitary home.
Captains Eaton and DaviB were the next to visit this new
pirate outpost when they oommenoed their South Sea maraudings in
1684. On board the Batchelor "s Delight veterans from Sharp's
expedition, including Dampier and Wafer, were eager to seek out
William after a separation of more than three years. Dampier
described a poignant reunion:
He saw our Ship the Day before we oame to an Anchor, and did 
believe we were English, and therefore kill'd three 
Goats...and dressed them with Cabbage [palm], to treat us 
when we came ashore... And when we landed, a Moskito Indian, 
named Robin, first leap't ashore, and running to his Brother 
Moskito Han, bracing him, fell flat with his face on the 
Ground at Robin's feet, and was by him taken up also. We 
stood with pleasure to behold the surprize, and tenderness, 
and solemnity of this Interview (1927, 67).
Davis' men used the island twice in the course of their South Sea
campaign. On their second visit, heading home via Cape Horn late in
1687, they found their little hideaway somewhat changed: "The
Spaniards had set Dogs ashore at John Fernando's al6o, to destroy
the Goats there, that we might fail of Provision.’7® Nevertheless, 
three or four of the men, "unwilling to return out of these Seas as 
poor as they oame," eleoted to remain behind and fend for themselves 
until some other pirate band should arrive.
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We gave them a small Canoa, a Porridge-pot, Axes, Macheats,
Maiz, and other Necessaries. I heard since that they planted 
some of the Maiz, and tam'd some of the Goats, and liv'd on 
Fish and Fowls... I heard also that these Men were taken by 
a Privateer-Vessel [John Strong's Welfare in 1690]...; and 
that one of them is since come to England (Wafer 1934, 126- 
27).
Soon after the outbreak of Queen Anne's War, William Dampier 
commanded the St. George on his third visit to Juan FernAndez in 
1704. He sailed in oonsort with Thomas Stradling of the Cinque 
Ports. As always, the island provided safe harbor for heeling and 
refitting the ships as well as welcome refreshment after the trauma 
of Cape Horn. Goats were still to be had in plenty, "and a Joint of 
one of them roasted, with about half a Foot of our Cabbage boiled” 
supplied the oustomary feast (Funnell 1729, 14). After a fruitless 
orui6e along the mainland, only the Cinque Ports returned to Juan 
FernAndez, so unseaworthy that Stradling's mate, Alexander Selkirk, 
insisted he would rather remain alone than chance another voyage 
with a leaky ship and an inept commander. He was duly granted his 
request, convinced that some privateer or another was sure to come 
along soon enough (Kemp and Lloyd 1960, 149). Over four years
later, Captains Woodes Rogers and Edward Cooke finally did. On 
board was the omnipresent William Dampier, relegated in the twilight 
of his checkered career to the rank of pilot for the South Sea.
When the Duke and Duchess reached Juan FernAndez on a February 
evening in 1709, a blazing fire on shore aroused considerable alarm. 
Even Dampier, who certainly had witnessed many strange events in two 
previous voyages around the world, must have been amazed to discover 
the agent responsible. Rogers, in his journal, described the 
remarkable encounter which followed:
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Immediately our pinnace returned from the shore...with a man 
cloth'd in goat-skins, who look’d wilder than the first 
owners of them. He had been on the island four years and 
four months.... His name was Alexander Selkirk, a Scotchman, 
who had been master of the 'Cinque Ports,' a ship that came 
here last with Capt. Dampier, who told me this was the best 
man in her; so I immediately agreed with him to be mate on 
board our ship.
'Twas he made the fire last night when he saw our ships, 
which he judg'd to be English. During his stay here he had 
seen several ships pass, but only two oame to anchor, 
which...he found to be Spanish...and chose to risque dying 
alone in the Hand, rather than fall into the hands of the 
Spaniards in these parts, lest they murder, or make a slave 
of him in the mine6...
He diverted and provided for himself as well as he 
could; but for the first eight months had much ado to bear 
up against melancholy, and the terror of being alone in such 
a desolate place. He built two huts with piemento trees, 
cover'd them with long grass, and lin'd them with the skins 
of goats which he killed with his gun as he wanted, so long 
as his powder lasted, which was but a pound, and that being 
near spent, he got fire by rubbing two sticks of piemento 
wood together on his knees. ...Crawfish, which are there as 
large as lobsters and very good...he sometimes boiled, and 
at others broiled as he did his goat's flesh, of which he 
made very good broth, for they are not so rank as ours; he 
kept an account of 500 that he killed while there, and 
caught as many more, which he marked on the ear and let go.
When his powder fail'd he took them by speed of foot; for 
his way of living, and continued exercise of walking and 
running, clear'd him of all gross humours, so that he run 
with wonderful swiftness thro the woods, and up the rocks 
and hills, as we perceiv'd when we employ'd him to catch 
goats for us. ...He was at first much pester'd with cats and 
rats, that bred in great numbers from some of each species 
which had got ashore from ships that put in there to wood 
and water. The rats knaw'd his feet and clothes while 
asleep, which obliged him to cherish cats with goats flesh; 
by which many of them became so tame that they would lie 
about him in hundreds, and soon deliver'd him from the rats.
He likewise tam'd some kids, and to divert himself would 
now and then sing and dance with them and his cats; so that 
by the care of Providence, and vigour of his youth, being 
now about 30 years old, he came at last to conquer all the 
inconveniences of his solitiude and to be very easy (1894, 
57-62).
Selkirk's story provided the raw stuff for the now legendary 
Pobinson Cruso#{** and though Defoe'6 fictional mariner tenanted a 
deserted isle off the Rio Orinoco in the Atlantic, it is the
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buccaneers' Pacific retreat that now bears his name. Selkirk might 
have been disappointed to see his own namesake bestowed on Tierra 
Mas Afuera, the craggy, distant sister-island where even pirates 
never ventured to call. Juan FernAndez remained a viable outpost 
for French80 as well as English privateers for several years to 
come.8* Clipper ton and Shelvocke used it in the course of their 
maraudings, the former depositing yet another pair of self-sentenoed 
exiles there in 1719. Though the British never actually annexed the 
Islas Juan FernAndez as they did the Falklands, plans were 
repeatedly made to do so (Kemp and Lloyd 1960, 46, 209). The remote 
island sanctuary, crucial as a temporary base for piratery against 
the Spanish American mainland, owes its lasting fame to the 
picturesque maroonings which took place there.
All the above refuges and outposts, by virtue of physical site 
and strategic situation, fulfilled certain geographic requisites 
imposed by the exigencies of maritime robbery. Their proximity to 
towns and shipping lanes had to be close enough to make strikes and 
retreats possible, yet so remote and sufficiently desolate as to 
discourage Spanish detection or sustained punitive measures. With a 
few notable exceptions on the Atlantic side, most of those places 
described remained nominally Spanish until independence. The 
buccaneers and their sponsoring nations failed to possess them as 
permanent bases or strongholds for the very reasons the Spaniards 
never effectively colonized them: they were too small, too isolated, 
or too limited in economic potential, despite their unquestionable 
strategic value but especially given the strained human and capital 
resources of the colonial powers, to elicit any further
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development.83 Nevertheless, to attract even transitory attention 
from pirates and interlopers, these places had to offer more than 
just safety and locational convenience. They had to supply good 
anchorage, fresh water, wood for fuel and nautical repairs, food, 
and beaches adequate for careening. Because the last two criteria, 
in particular, struck such a unique geographical chord in the piracy 
of Spanish America, they merit explanation in greater detail.
CarSnagcs. A perpetual ohore for maintaining all wooden 
hulls was the process of careening. Weeds and fungus, barnacles and 
other marine animals clinging to the sides and bottoms of ships not 
only reduced their speed, but also corrupted their planking. In 
tropical American waters the most serious pests were teredo worms, 
prolific soft-shelled mollusks which burrowed into the wood itself 
and could honeycomb a hull over an extended voyage, and mackerel- 
sized suckfish,8* a dozen of which could supposedly turn a lugger 
into a laggard. Careening involved beaching the ship, unloading her 
stores and remounting her guns ashore on makeshift earthworks, then 
heeling her over on one side to permit breaming, i.e. drying, 
burning, and scraping off the marine growth (see Figure 6). 
Planking riddled with teredo-worms had to be replaced, the hull 
reoaulked with pitch and coated overall with tallow (sometimes mixed 
with sulphur) to waterproof the wood and discourage fouling. This 
process was long and involved, all the worse because it rendered the 
crew utterly vulnerable to attack without any hope of escape. The 
perfect careening spot, or car6nage, therefore needed to be secluded 
and defensible, preferably with a harbor deep enough to accommodate 
a small pirate vessel but too shallow to admit a bulky man-of-war.
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Figure 6: Careening— Heeling and Breaming a Ship
(from Botting 1978)
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Also the beach and tidal pattern of a cardnage had to be conducive 
to grounding, heeling, and refloating the ship. Finally, such a 
place required wood for firing the hull and patching the plank work, 
as well as a good supply of pitch, tallow, or some other animal 
grease (seal, sea-lion, or turtle fat) for the protective coating. 
Not every carnage could meet all these demands, and the most 
favorable locales were highly valued by pirates. The Caribbean 
abounded more than most seas with suitable hideaways for the job; 
French privateers operating off Guinea even periodically crossed the 
Atlantic to clean and refit at St. Lucia. Careening, as onerous a 
task as it was, had to be faithfully repeated every two to four 
months; for speed was the essence of the chase (Botting 1978, 57; 
Mitchell 1976, 55n; Thrower 1980, 136-37; Ritchie 1986a, 10).
Tart ling Grounds. Of the local foods which sustained 
pirates in Spanish America one could easily compile a full volume. 
Dampier, perhaps better than any of his contemporaries, maintained a 
detailed account of every plant, fish, reptile, bird, or mammal 
worth eating and recommended the gustatory advantages of each. The 
buccaneers owed their very beginning to Hispaniola's free-running 
herds of swine and cattle. On rugged Juan FernAndez they hunted and 
consumed with equal zeal the caprine descendants of bygone Spanish 
husbandry. But throughout tropical America, particularly on those 
seoluded coasts untouohed by ganaderla, the most convenient and 
dependable food supply, and indeed a meat much relished by pirates, 
was the sea turtle. Yarious species of turtle abounded in these 
waters— hawk6bills, leatherbaoks, ridleys, loggerheads— but the one 
most highly prized for its sweet, succulent flesh and copious fat
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was Chelonia mydas, the green turtle. These creatures were so
named, according to Dampier, "because their shell is greener than 
any other" {1927, 79), though Sir Hans Sloane asserted they “were 
call'd green Turtle from their Fats being of that colour" (1707, 
xvii).
Be that a6 it may, they were thoroughly hunted by pirates and 
everyone else in the region unto near extinotion, largely because 
the female was reckoned the tastiest, "best when with Egg" (xvii), 
and was most readily captured while in that delicate condition. 
Though widely consumed, as Dr. Sloane further observed, by "the
poorer sort" from all walks of life, the green turtle made an
especially suitable foodstuff for sea rovers; it was, quite truly, 
"a perfect staple for pirates" (Botting 1978, 44). John Hawkins 
oonsidered its meat “much like veal" (in Parsons 1962, 25), while 
Dampier esteemed it "extraordinary sweet" (1927, 79). The mild 
flesh was highly nutritious— and abundant— with body weights
occasionally exceeding three hundred pounds. The fat, too, yielded 
large quantities of oil useful for cooking, or, "instead of Butter, 
to eat with Doughboys or Dumplinc" (92).
Exquemelin, the buooaneer-ohronioler of Tortuga, concurred 
with these gastronomioal pronouncements but mentioned one unpleasant 
side effect: "This fat is so penetrating that when you have eaten 
nothing but turtle flesh for three or four weeks, your shirt becomes 
so greasy from sweat you can squeeze the oil out and your limbs are 
weighed down with it" (1972, 60). The fat even served admirably to 
caulk a leaky hull (Parsons 1962, 23). Green turtles, above all, 
were easy to catch, especially when the females came ashore to lay.
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Figure 7: Turning a Sea Turtle
(Originally engraved for Du Tertre 1667 
and reproduced in Labat. Reprinted in 
Bridenbaugh and Bridenbaugh, 1972)
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Then great numbers of them could be turned upon their backs and 
rendered immoblile (see Figure 7), as Exquemelin explained:
No special implements are carried for catching the green 
turtles (the only kind good to eat) but when these creatures 
come on shore every night to lay their eggs, they can be 
levered over by two men with a hand-spike. Once laid on 
their backs, the turtles cannot budge. When many ships lie 
waiting to load, the beach is divided so that the men from 
each 6hip have a certain stretch of land to clear. In the 
length of 500 paces as many as a hundred turtles may be 
turned upside down (1972, 61).
Otherwise, turtles could be netted or harpooned as they swam 
to the surface, the latter a technique in which the Hiskito Indians 
greatly excelled.85 Although "Captain Sharp.. .showed himself very 
ingenious in striking them" (Ringrose 1987, 353), the buccaneers,
according to Dampier, usually relied directly upon native talent:
"JfosJtlto Indians, who always bear Arms amongst the Privateers,
...are much valued by them for striking Fi6h, and Turtle or
Tortoise, and Manatee or Sea-Cow.. .for one or two of them in a ship 
will maintain 100 men" (1927, 11-15). The Miskito named William, 
first lone occupant of Juan FernAndez, was probably such a 
conscript. Most importantly, unlike meat on the hoof, turtles 
stored aboard ship could survive for weeks without food or any 
attention, save keeping them flipped helpless on their backs 
(Woodbury 1951, 109-10). Finally, because their feeding and laying 
habits were seasonally and spatially predictable (Dampier was keenly 
observant of these patterns), green turtles provided a dependable
and generous food supply worthy of influencing the very course of a 
raid.
George Woodbury onoe asserted, "The green turtle of the West 
Indies, perhaps as much or even more than any other native factor.
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was responsible for the concentration of piratical activity in this 
part of the world" (1951, 106). He may well have been right. Even 
a cursory index of the feeding and breeding grounds of CheJonia 
mydas, both present and extinct, reads like a gazetteer of piracy in 
Spanish America (see Parsons 1962, 23-39 and endleaf map). In the 
Caribbean were the Bahamas, Cuba’s South Cays, Mona, the Isle of 
Aves, Dominica, Cubagua, Trinidad, Curasao, the Isla Mujeres, 
Cockscomb Coast, Bay Islands, Miskito Shore, and Tortuguero Beach 
(the only sizeable nesting ground remaining in the region) just 
south of the Rio San Juan. Also prominent were the Cayman Islands, 
once the green turtles’ most prolific breeding spot in all the 
Americas, but now devoid of the species. Henry Morgan, the great 
buccaneer-turned-politico, considered the turtle-fisheries of the 
Caymans, as well as those of his former rendezvous, the lie A Vaohe, 
of utmost importance to the colonial interests of England and France 
(Sloane 1707, lxxxvii). In the Gulf of Mexico turtles were found at 
the logwood enclave of Laguna de T6rminos, where Dampier had "heard 
of a monstrous Green turtle once taken...that was four foot deep 
from the back to the belly, and the belly six foot broad” (1927, 
79), and also at Dry Tortugas, where Hawkins may have been the first 
Englishman in America to eat of their flesh (Parsons 1962, 25). In 
the South Sea they teemed along the Isla de la Plata, the Gal&pagoB, 
Coiba, Cabo Blanco (Niooya Peninsula), the Islas TrAs Marias, Cabo 
Corrientes, and, far to the west, at Clipperton Island (named for 
the privateer). The geographical correspondence of green turtles 
and piracy is indeed striking, and it was by no means coincidental. 
Dampier explained it quite simply: "when we careen our Ships, we
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choose commonly such Places where there is plenty of Turtle" (1927, 
15-16). Perhaps it was fitting, or rather ironic, that the fateful 
shoal which scuttled Spanish America should be called Tortuga.
Buooaneer-Logvood Coasts
Philip Gosse, that enthusiastic connoisseur of all things
piratical, remarked that "a pirate was not a pirate from the cradle 
to the gallows" (1924, 9). He was referring to those who began 
their careers as honest seamen, but his statement applies equally 
well to buccaneers who punctuated decidedly sanguinary pursuits with 
the more-or-less peaceful occupation of cutting logwood for the 
European dye industry. To the Spaniards (when they were not
actually abetting the contraband trade) it was just another form of 
trespassing and theft, and the authorities did not treat kindly 
those interlopers whom they periodically set out to apprehend.®® 
Prior to the invention of synthetic dyes in the nineteenth century, 
coloring agents for textiles, ink, and leather had to be derived
from natural, usually organic materials. In Mesoamerica, the 
aboriginal civilizations had long extracted a beautiful scarlet
stain, called cochineal, from certain scale insects which infested 
the prickly-pear cactus (Donkin 1977). Along with this native 
industry the Spaniards adopted the cultivation of indigo, a crop 
which yielded a rich and steadfast blue. A third source, consisting 
of variously tinted heartwoods from divers species of local trees, 
completed the pigmentary triumverate of Spanish America (West and
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Augelli 1976, 274-75). Pirates became well acquainted with the 
value of these colorful cargoes and happily confiscated them from 
Spanish merchantmen.
The buccaneers never personally engaged in the tedious 
cultivation of indigo or cochineal, but they did on occasion commit 
themselves to felling dyewood. It was not an easy or pleasant task; 
it required hard relentless labor in swampy and pestilent environs. 
It was however lucrative,®"* somewhat adventurous, and an immediate 
extraction of Spain's American assets which demanded minimal 
temporal or spatial attachment. It was, in short, a perfect 
expression of their modus operand* and independent lifestyle. Dye- 
yielding trees occured naturally in various parts of the region. 
South American brazilwood gave its name to the Portuguese sector of 
that continent, and thickets of dyewood were likewise harvested in 
the Antilles.
Along the Gulf and Caribbean coasts, from the Bay of Campeche 
to the Bio San Juan, grew the most prolific and remunerative stands 
of logwood, or Haematoxylon caapeohianunr, and this, in part, is what 
attracted the buccaneers. Crushed and boiled in water, the 
heartwood of this short, crooked tree yielded a splendid basic 
fixing dye which additives eventually rendered from yellow to red to 
black. The Spaniards had been cutting the stuff since the mid- 
sixteenth century, but most of the swamps and low forests in which 
it thrived remained quite vulnerable to poaching, especially by the 
British. In England the purloined logwood fetched up to £110 per 
ton, though the cutters themselves received considerably less 
(Horwich and Lyon 1990, 49; Wilson 1936, 1-8; Craig 1969, 54).
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The buccaneers concentrated their logwood and ancillary
snuggling operations along three coastal strips (see Map 3). The
southernmost, running from the Rio San Juan to eastern Honduras,
became known after its Indian inhabitants88 as the Miskito Shore
(also Mosquitia or the Mosquito Coast). This may have been the
first area of English settlement but certainly remained least
profitable in terms of logwood exploitation. Fronting the Gulf of
Honduras to the west was the the Cockscomb Coast, where buooaneer-
woodsmen roughly established the territory of former British
Honduras (or modern Belize). Clear round the Yucatdn Peninsula they
set up camps along the Bay of Campeche, especially in the Laguna de
T6rminos. These places, unlike any of the pirate haunts yet
described, were no mere temporary resorts. Neither were they the
established strongholds yet to be discussed. The encampments were
makeshift and the population transient, but the sustained presence
of buccaneers and their countrymen in these parts qualified them as
rudimentary settlements, the effects of which remaiu today. More
than logwood accounted for the pirates' magnetism to these shores;
coastal morphology also played a part:
The offshore waters of each of these coastal areas are shoal 
and strewn with coral reefs and cays. Moreover, the
coastline is frayed with hundreds of small mangrove-bordered 
tidal inlets. Such conditions made for difficult navigation 
but afforded ideal hideouts for pirates and smugglers (West 
and Augelli 1976, 292).
Here, as the very name 'Cockscomb' suggests,88 were the New World
versions of the labyrinthine, continental pirate coasts classified
by Semple and Whittlesey. Here no isolating, unproductive mountain
backdrop discouraged legitimate colonization or authoritarian
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control, but a swampy and tropical hinterland effected much the same 
result.
Misti to Shore. By the early 1630s, English traders from the
new and short-lived colony at Providence Island (about 150 miles due
east of central Mosquitia) established their first station for trade
with the Indians at Cape Gracias a Dios. Similar enclaves soon
sprang up farther down the coast. Bluefields, named for a Dutch
privateer in the employ of the English,90 developed most appreciably
of all these settlements by virtue of its relatively good harbor
(see Map 9)— a rare geographic asset in these parts (Floyd 1967, 18-
21). As English interests turned from illegal trade to piracy, the
Miskito Indians joined ranks with the buccaneers. English and Dutch
privateers relied on Miskito allies as much for supplying
intelligence and combative vigor as for the procurement of fresh
victuals. These aboriginal tribes, later mixed with African and
European blood, played the same crucial role in maintaining Spain's
enemies in Mosquitia as the oiaarrones and Darien Indians did in
Panama. English buccaneers in particular were keenly aware of their
debt, as Dampier himself was quick to acknowledge:
[I ] t is very rare to find Privateers destitute of one or 
more of them, when the Commander, or most of the Men are 
English; but they do not love the French, and the Spaniards 
they hate mortally. When they come among the Privateers,
they get the U6e of Guns, and prove very good Marks-Men:
They behave themselves very bold in fight, and never seem to 
flinch nor hold back...
The Moskito 's are in general very civil and kind to the
English, of whom they receive a great deal of Respect, both
when they are aboard their ships, and also ashore... We 
always humour them, letting them go any whither as they 
will, and return to their Country in any vessel bound that 
way, if they please (1927, 16-17).

































When buccaneer raids against the Honduran ports moved the 
Spaniards to destroy the fledgling English bases on Providence 
Island and Roatan in 1641-42, the inaccessible settlements of the 
Miskito Shore— where woodcutting®* and smuggling developed into a 
profitable alternative— remained festering and unchecked, an endemic 
pool of piratical pathogen biding its time till the next outbreak 
(Floyd 1967, 23-25). Later, with the English takeover of Jamaica in 
1655, woodcutters and buccaneers flourished in even greater numbers 
along the Cockscomb and Campeche coasts to the north.
Cooksoomb Coast. The earliest appearance of logwood- 
buccaneering settlements on the Cockscomb Coast (modern Belize) 
remains somewhat obscure. This area, to be sure, is one of those in 
pirate scholarship where legend, conjecture, and documented fact 
have become hopelessly confused. According to E.O.Winzerling, 
although "the Cooksoomb Coast...was never settled by the 
Elizabethans," it may have served as a refuge for corsairs, 
beginning with Captain Andrew Barker's men, as early as 1576 (1946, 
24-25). Within twenty years, he asserted, Captain William Parker 
"knew of the logwood growing in the lower reaches of the Belize 
River... and used the... Cockscomb Coast regularly as a base for 
operating against the Spaniards" (26-27; of. Caiger 1951, 20).
Parker, at any rate, apparently was the first Englishman to mention 
the use and value of logwood, “good to dye withall," incident to his 
raid against Campeche in 1597 (in Dobson 1973, 47). After 1627 the 
Dutch privateer Cornelius Jol®̂  operated likewise as "a regular 
visitor" to the coast and even left his name to Jol's Hole in the 
Turneffe Islands (Winzerling 1946, 29-30). Various authors have
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attributed the first smuggling stations and consequent logwood 
settlements here, like the initial enclaves of Mosquitia. to Puritan 
colonization from Providence Island in the 1630s.^
Popular and scholarly tradition has it that Belize was founded 
by and named for a British buccaneer named Wallice, Wallace, or 
Willis.94 Bancroft identified this legendary figure as one Peter 
Wallace, a Scottish buccaneer supposed to have settled at the mouth 
of the Belize River with eighty refugee woodcutters from Campeche in 
the latter seventeenth century (1886, 624). Others have attempted 
to connect the founder with a certain Willis of Tortuga, mentioned 
by Charlevoix, and that would date his arrival at about 1641 (Dobson 
1973, 51; cf. Charlevoix 1733, tom. 3, 13-15). A Guatemalan
historian named Asturias, however, believed Wallace was a corsair 
lieutenant under Raleigh who settled on the Cooksoomb Coast as early 
as 1617 (Burdon 1931, 3). These theories and others were compiled 
in the Archives and doubtlessly perpetuated by Burdon, who himself 
cautiously recommended "that no definite Settlement was ever 
deliberately founded. Occupation presumably came into being 
gradually, from individual Buccaneers, first seeking refuge and 
later staying long enough to out and ship the [log]wood" (1931, 3).
In fact there is no proof that the first European settlers of 
the coast were buccaneers, though the possiblity remains a distinct 
one. From the 1670s onward, several famous pirate captains are 
known or believed to have cut logwood along the Gulf of Honduras, 
among them John Coxon, Bartholomew Sharp, Captain Yankey, Nicholas 
Van Horn, Edward Low, and possibly even Edward Teach, alias 
Blackbeard (Joseph 1980, 74-76). In aggregate, the mostly British
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frontiersmen from the Cockscomb Coast northward— smugglers, 
woodcutters, and pirates— came to be known as Baymen (after the Bay 
of Honduras) and like their brethren in Mosquitia found success only 
through the help of indigenous allies and blaok slaves (We6t and 
Augelli 1976, 293-94). The Baymen, in any event, established
initial coastal footholds at the mouth of the Belize River, at Stann 
Creek, and at Point Placentia (Parsons 1954, 8). The tendency of 
logwood stands to grow along stream channels only encouraged inland 
penetration.
Lagunm d» Tfrminoa. It might seem peculiar that buooaneer-
woodsmen flourished a6 long as they did on the very doorstep of
Campeche, a prominent Spanish settlement on the Gulf coast of the
Yucatan Peninsula. That vulnerable port, we must remember, suffered
difficulties enough just defending its own harbor. ®̂ The illicit
logwood cutters were prepared, moreover, depending on the strength
of opposition, to defend or forsake their livelihood at a moment's
call. Sir Hans Sloane, colonial physician and confidant to the
buccaneers, recapitulated the situation:
Several Persons who used the Logwood Trade... inform'd me, 
that at about fifteen Leagues from the Town of Campeche, are 
two Creeks, the Eastern and Northern, in which last they cut 
Logwood. This is call'd the Logwood-River, the Inhabitants 
live in Hut6 on each side of thi6 narrow Creek, near Two 
hundred English, and are ready on the appearance of any 
Enemy to hinder their landing by firing on them on each 
side, every one having his Firelock and other Arms ready...
The English, who have lived there many years. Cut and Sell 
it to the Sloops for about Three Pound per Tun, for which 
the Sloops bring them Cloathing, Victuals, Rum, Sugar, &o...
The Spaniards who are offended by this settlement equipp’d 
some Periaguas and Hulks against them; but before they were 
ready they were burnt by the English... The English have a 
place stronger than their Huts...and when a Strength muoh 
greater than theirs comes against them, they retire to the 
Woods (1707, lxxxii-lxxxiii).
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Dr. Sloane was describing the Laguna de Tdrminos, of all the 
logwood enclaves the one most closely associated with historical 
pirates. Parker and possibly other corsairs of hi6 time, though 
unlikely to have out or settled there themselves, were well aware of 
the looal product and of its value.^ English buooaneers from 
Jamaica were raiding Spanish operations near Campeche at least by 
1662. Initially, the pickings were easy. Vast stockpiles of 
rubiginous heartwood, already felled and sectioned by Indian labor, 
lay waiting for shipment— as completely unguarded as Porto Bello's 
silver wedges in days of yore.
By 1669 the buooaneers found themselves obliged to dig in and 
cut the stuff themselves, first at Loggerhead Key, at adjacent Cape 
Catoche, and on Cozumel, but later within the productive Laguna de 
T6rminos itself (MS 1672, BL Eg.2395, f.482; Joseph 1974, 22-24). 
The swampy shoreline of this inlet was protected by a compound 
island at the mouth of the lagoon, and this the buooaneers ohose as 
their principal base. The eastern portion they oalled Port Royal in 
honor of their Jamaican stronghold, the western end Trist Island, a 
name bespeaking importance as their primary rendezvous^ (see 
Dampier's chart— Map 10) The entire area was completely dissected 
by creeks in which logwood flourished, merging to the west with 
Tabasco via the Isle of Beef. As that last-named place suggests, 
the area abounded not only with logwood, but also with feral cattle. 
Hunting these provided meat, hides, and a lifestyle which harkened 
back to the buccaneers' origins on Hispaniola. Various piratical 
luminaries are known to have frequented these grounds. Captain John 
Coxon (or Coxen) of Porto Bello fame, a decade before his successful
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engagement against that city and subsequent crossing of Darien, was
to be found chopping away in the swamps of Yucatan and Cozumel.
With him was Captain William Coxen, perhaps literally a brother of
the coast, and together they "used the Trade of Logwood for about 2
years & A Halfe" (MS 1672, BL Eg.2395, f.481). John Coxon's long
and variegated career (fl. 1660s-1689) always brought him back to
the logwood oamps of YuoatAn and the Gulf of Honduras, and his
exploits are closely linked with early British settlement on these
coasts (Joseph 1974, 25-27; 1980, 76-79). More renowned in this
connection, having sojourned twice among the buccaneer-woodsmen
(1675-76) and later writing about it, was the ever-viatio William
Dampier. His entertaining Voyages to Campeaohy remains the most
comprehensive, colorful aooount of the Laguna de TArminos and its
raucous denizens, dregs of the buccaneering society who tenaciously
clung to a vanishing way of life:
Privateers who had hitherto lived upon plundering the 
Spaniards, were put to their shifts; for they had prodigally 
spent whatever they got, and now wanting Subsistanoe, were 
forced to go to Petit Guavas, where the Privateer-Trade
still continued, or into the Bay for Logwood- The more
Industrious sort of them came hither, yet even 
thece... thought it a dry Business to toil at Cutting Wood.
They were good Marks-Men, and so took more delight in 
Hunting; but neither of those Employments affected them so 
much as Privateering; therefore they often made Sallies out 
in small Parties among the nearest Indian Towns; where they 
plundered and brought away the Indian Women to serve them at 
their Huts, and sent their Husbands to be sold at Jamaica', 
besides they had not forgot their old Drinking-bouts, and 
would still spende 30 or 407. at a sitting aboard the Ships 
that came hither from Jamaica-, carousing and firing of Guns 
three or four Days together (1729, Vol.II, 53-54).
Even this outlet for piratical aggressions was bound to close.
Economics, political opposition, and Spanish military retaliation
eventually converged sufficiently to oust the loggers from the
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Yucat&n once and for all. Interlopers ended up felling more than 
just logwood; by breaking the Spanish monopoly on the product they 
also cut its European market prioe— drastically— from £110 per ton 
before 1660 to just £16 by 1717— and even more so after the period 
under study. Nevertheless, an average cutter in the eighteenth 
century could probably count on over £50 profit a year; but neither 
British nor Spanish politicians could agree, even among themselves, 
to a policy of international settlement and exploitation of the 
logwood stands. By 1716, in the Laguna de T6rminos at any rate, the 
Spaniards olinohed the matter with a military strike that replaced 
British encampments on the isle of Trist with a permanent Spanish 
garrison and effective control over the entire lagoon (Joseph 1974, 
34-48; 1980, 71).
The degree to which piracy and the logwood trade overlapped or 
complemented one another has possibly been exaggerated in the 
literature. It would indeed be inadvisable to think of every 
logwood cutter as a part-time buooaneer or even a reformed one. The 
rigorous but potentially remunerative life of the Bayman must have 
appealed to a broad spectrum of colonial laborers and entrepreneurs: 
ex-planters, freed or escaped bondsmen, sailors, religious 
mavericks, adventurers of every sort. That pirates worked and lived 
among this throng is beyond question, and the survival of places 
bearing pirates' names indicates they played a significant role in 
the discovery and settlement of these coasts.
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Pirate Bastions
Finally we turn to piratical establishments where the mean6 
and motives of settlement are more easily ascertained. These were 
pirate strongholds, or fortified bases, a half dozen of which held 
sway in the Caribbean, and none at all in the Paoifio. Ramparts and 
redoubts were the most obvious, though not the only distinguishing 
characteristics of such places. Like any pirate haunt, they had to 
be strategically located for maximum striking capability. Pirate 
strongholds, however, were settlements of permanent intent and as 
such had to be tenable as well. Fortifications alone oould not 
guarantee their survival. A friendly or neutral hinterland was also 
necessary to provide sustenance, personnel, a market for captured 
goods, a buffer, at times even a refuge. True, every stronghold was 
an island, but only in the most literal sense.
Islands were naturally the easiest territories to capture and 
maintain. Without broader political affiliations, however— and 
these had to derive from the colonial will of England, Holland, and 
France— the buccaneer bastions could never have arisen. The ability 
to grant commissions was ultimately what gave the pirate stronghold 
its power, purpose, and prestige. Finally, because all such bases 
were established as ports, they had to possess good harbors, docking 
facilities, and the kinds of recreational opportunities which have 
always attracted sailors. Pirate bastions, we have noted, were a 
geographical trademark of the buooaneers. The corsairs never 
succeeded in founding any, though at least one base survived well 
into piracy's golden years as a topographic monument to the 
picaroons. Arguably the first and most formative pirate stronghold
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in Spanish America was Tortuga, that harmless-looking island perched 
jauntily, like a tiny cocked hat, atop western Hispaniola. From
this diminuitive rock buccaneers of mixed nationalies launched
decisive raids against the Spaniards for half a century. But the 
story of Tortuga, its successor Petit-Goave, and the eventual
incorporation of both into French colonial Saint-Domingue is the 
subject of our next chapter. Presently we will examine the onetime 
capitals of British, Dutch, and and Anglo-American pirates.
Providence Island. The very geologic structure of 
Providence Island, "an imposing volcanic plug towering 1,100 feet 
above the sea," invokes the image of an insular fortress (Parsons
1954, 7). Moreover its strategic situation— 150 miles east of the
Miskito Shore, 290 miles north-northwest of Porto Bello, and 430 
miles southwest of Port Royal— was for oertain purposes unmatohable 
in the Caribbean. Of all the pirate strongholds it offered the best 
striking capability against the cross-Panama trade and any traffic 
through the Rio San Juan. The Spaniards even learned to re-route 
the Havana-bound galeones well clear of Providence Island. Finally 
it provided the springboard for English settlement of the Miskito 
Shore, the Bay Islands, and the Cooksoomb Coast. Because other 
basic facts of geography worked against the place, however, its 
crucial and eventful career as a pirate bastion was relatively 
brief. To the Spaniards it was known, since 1527 at any rate, as 
the Isla Santa Catalina (8), but its economic potential remained too 
slight to warrant further notice. Dutch privateers apparently were 
the first to resort there on a regular basis, but they made no 
effort to establish a permanent base (Burns 1954, 206). For the
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company of English Puritans who decided to colonize it in 1629, the 
locational choice was "almost foolhardy...in the very ]aws of the 
Spaniards"; but to the pirate-minded Earl of Warwick, chief promoter 
of the influential Providence Island Company, the 6trategem of the 
move outweighed its riskiness (Newton 1933, 172-73).
The physical site of the island base was fundamentally sound. 
Fresh water and timber were plentiful, and suitable harbors 
punctuated the indented shorelines of the eastern and southern 
coasts. Natural security was likewise admirable, particularly for 
safeguarding the commodious but sometimes windy Catalina Harbor to 
the northwest. A system of reefs and cays circumscribed harbor 
approach to a highly defensible channel, and an unassailable 
northern proruption provided ultimate refuge in time of siege. The 
Dutch pirate Bluefields (actually Blauvelt), already an habitue of 
Providence when the English arrived in 1629, suggested a plan for 
the island's defense. Those "places fortified by ye Buokaneers,” as 
well as the canal created later̂ ® to insulate the bulwarks from the 
mainland, can be noted on a chart from Captain Joseph Speer's West- 
Jndia Pilot of 1772 (Map 11). The combination of natural and man- 
made defenses indeed staved off a Spanish assault in 1635 (Buckholtz 
1987), an event identified by Newton as sparking an irrevooable 
"change in the character of Providence from an experiment in Puritan 
colonisation to a privateering stronghold” (1933, 175-76). Captain 
Nathaniel Butler emerged as the colonial governor and pirate 
chieftan after 1638, consummating his raids in the Gulf of Honduras 
with the capture of Trujillo in 1639. To ransom their homes the 
luckless citizens of that town disbursed bullion and indigo to the
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tune of 16,000 pieces of eight (181). The Governor of Providence 
served as a legitimizing agent for English as well as Dutch 
privateers by issuing letters of marque and reprisal. William 
Jackson, we recall, began his highly successful career under such a 
commission.
The Spaniards, understandably, were much concerned about these 
developments and resolved to squelch these pirates in their own
nest. In 1640 a punitive force of a thousand soldiers arrived in a 
flotilla of warships from Cartagena, but even these could not
dislodge the buccaneers from their rocky citadel. It remained the 
task of Don Francisco Diaz de Pimienta, commander of the galeones, 
to effectively pacify the defiant brood after his arrival at 
Cartagena in 1641. Even then it took two thousand men, nine 
warships, and the aid of a renegade Moorish pirate to navigate the 
island's hazardous channel. Almost the entire population of
Providence— over 400 men, women, and children— became his prisoners, 
but Pimienta treated them humanely (Newton 1933, 190-91).
The Spaniards continued to occupy the island, if only to keep 
it out of enemy hands, for a critical and nearly continuous period 
of almost thirty years (Rowland 1935). Though it never reverted to 
the full status of stronghold after that hiatus from piracy, the 
buccaneers were far from done with it. Mansvelt (Mansveldt or 
Mansfield), possibly like Blauvelt a Dutch refugee from
Providence," had recaptured the island only briefly during a 
campaign of 1666. It remained up to his prot6g6 Henry Morgan to 
wrest the place decisively from Spanish control in 1670. That year, 
on Christmas Eve, Morgan and nearly two thousand buccaneers regained
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the place without a shot, and from this former bastion he launched 
the celebrated assault which would secure his fame and fortune. His 
intention may not have been to restore Providence Island as an 
English pirate capital, for by this date Port Royal had already 
assumed that role. Certainly he repossessed it as a halfway station 
and as a source of informants for a more immediate purpose: reducing 
San Lorenzo de Chagres for the ultimate objective of sacking PanamA. 
In fact, before weighing anchor from Providence in January of 1671, 
he took pains to demolish the fortifications and spike the guns. 
Providence Island, he determined, would not be left as a stronghold 
for either side (Earle 1981, 11-26, 183-86).
Providence was suited in many respects to become a buccaneer 
bastion par excellence. Its site was unsurpassable, its strategic 
situation unique. It was, however, a piratical incursion which 
proved too far ahead of its time, and the wonder is that it lasted 
as long as it did. Spain's colonial competitors matched her 
expansion in the Caribbean realm move for move. The Antilles 
provided the original focus of settlement, and exploitation 
continued westward and southward toward Central America and along 
the Main. The founding of Providence Island was a brilliant and 
daring stroke into the western frontier, but its English exeoutors 
left themselves overly isolated and utterly vulnerable to reprisal. 
No stronghold in and of itself i6 truly seoure. When Spanish 
opposition reached critical mass in 1641, there was nowhere to run, 
nowhere to hide, and no one to succour the colonists of Providence 
Island. The olosest English settlements were in the Lesser 
Antilles, clear on the other side of the Caribbean and fully
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preoccupied with their own survival. The Providence Islanders of 
the 1630s, in fact, owed their brief but influential heyday to the 
diversion of Spanish forces by Dutch privateers, who were busily 
building their own base over 800 miles to the east (Newton 1933, 
173).
Curasao. Historians, it seems, have been reluctant to
describe the earliest ingres6ions of the Dutch as acts of piracy.
The Netherlands, indeed, was the last of Spain's three most powerful
contenders to join in the colonial scramble. It may be true, as
Cornelius Goslinga claimed, that the Hollanders' initial attraction
to Spanish America was for its salt pans rather than its pieces of
eight (1979, 20). Moreover, perhaps consistent with their national
image, the Dutch restricted their piracy to an efficient minimum,
forsaking it at the earliest opportunity for more stable and
profitable enterprises, such as smuggling, and ultimately for
legitimate planting and trade. Certainly by the end of the era,
even the English 'Capcain Johnson' was compelled to admit that
during the long Peace I have not so much as heard of a Dutch 
Pirate. It is not that I take them to be honester than their 
neighbors, but when we account for it it will perhaps be a 
reproach to ourselves for our want of industry. The reason I 
take to be that after a war, when the Dutch ships are laid 
up, they have a fishery where their seamen find immediate 
business and as comfortable bread as they had before 
(Johnson [Defoe?] 1962, 17-18).
Be that as it may, the Dutch contributed their share of pirates as
we have already seen, and their principal base in the Caribbean
became the island of Curacao.
In contrast to Providence Island, Curacao was of more 
appreciable size, poised directly over the heart of the Spanish
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Main, and already occupied by Spaniards and Indians when a Dutch 
expeditionary force evicted them in 1634.*°® Salt to sustain 
Holland's booming herring industry indeed encouraged the Dutch West 
India Company to seize Curasao and the two smaller islands, Bonaire 
and Aruba, flanking it on either side. With hefty fortifications 
and a garrison stationed on the central island, the natural salt 
pans of all three could be mined for a handsome profit. More 
significant to Dutch interests, however, was the acquisition of “a 
sally-port 'tending to the detriment of Spain and the relief of the 
Republic'" (Hartog 1968, 82). Pie de Palo Jol arrived in 1635 to 
secure the island and inaugurate its service a6 a privateering 
stronghold. Boldly positioned in the path of busy traffic along the 
Main, Curacao soon emerged as the center of Dutch colonial power in 
the Caribbean (Newton 1933, 166-67; Goslinga 1971, 234, 265-70).
One can easily appreciate the consternation caused the 
Spaniards by the establishment of a Dutch stronghold in the very 
track of the Tierra Firme gale ones. In 1642 the Governor of 
neighboring Venezuela, Ruy FernAndez de Fuenmayor, resolved to 
eradicate the threat. Eight years earlier, when Dutch privateers 
began lining their nest on Curacao, Fuenmayor had led a victorious 
punitive strike against the fledgling buooaneer base on Tortuga. 
Now he arrived on Bonaire fully intent on repeating his success. A 
spy wa6 sent to Curacao to reoonnoiter the main island's defenses. 
Though his purpose was obvious, the man found gracious reception 
from Governor Peter Stuyvestant (then still in possession of both 
legs), who ceremoniously toasted the greatne66 of Spain and 
afterwards permitted his visitor a leisurely tour of Curacao's
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defense works. After receiving the spy's discouraging report. 
Fuenmayor aborted the attack (Goslinga 1979, 27-28). The
fortification of Curasao's two principal harbors, the bays of St. 
Anna and St. Barbara on the island’s southeast side (see Map 12), 
was indeed an impressive feat of military engineering. Securing 
this coast was a triad of massive fortresses, the kingpin an 
expansion from an earlier redoubt on the point oommanding St. Anna 
Bay. This wa6 the beginning of Fort Amsterdam, completed in 1648. 
Under the protection of its walls emerged a distinctly Dutch 
colonial imprint on the Spanish American landscape— the snug, steep- 
gabled, tile-covered houses of Willemstad (Hartog 1968, 71-72, 134- 
136; Goslinga 1985, 495-496).
The strategic value of Curacao as a Dutch naval base wa6 only
surpassed by its commercial vantage as a slave depot after the Peace
of Westphalia was declared in 1648.101 When Dampier and his cronies
came hoping to unload a cargo of stolen sugar in 1681, the Dutch
governor politely refused their entry. Unwilling to endanger
profitable trade with the Spaniards by trucking openly with English
buccaneers, he offered instead to deal surreptitiously by way of St.
Thomas, where the Danish governor blatantly courted pirates and
privateers. Dampier was prompted by this occasion to explain
Curacao's remarkable transformation from stronghold to slave mart:
[T]he Dutch have a very good Town, and a very strong Fort. 
Ships bound in thither must be sure to keep close to the 
Harbour's Mouth, and have a Hasar or Rope ready to send one 
end ashore to the Fort: for there is no Anchoring at the 
entrance of the Harbour, and the Current always sets to the 
Westward. But being got in, it is a very secure Port for 
Ships, either to careen, or lye safe... [Curacao] 
is...esteemed...for its Situation for the Trade with the 
Spaniard. Formerly the Harbour was never without Ships from
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Cartagene and Portabell, that did use to buy of the Dutch 
1000 or 1500 Negroes at once, besides great quantities of 
European Commodities; but of late that Trade has fallen into 
the Hands of the English at Jamaica. . . (1927, 41).
In 1655, of oourse, the English had won in Jamaica the most
formidable trophy yet collared by Spain's colonial rivals. Its
powerful capital, like those of Curasao and Saint-Domingue, spent
its youth as a piratical tour de force.
Port Royal, Jamaica. "It is to the Bucaniers," wrote Edward 
Long in 1774, "that we owe the possession of Jamaica at this hour" 
(1970, 300). Buccaneers may or may not have assisted in the 1655 
oonquest of Jamaica by which Penn and Venables managed to salvage a 
shred of success from Oliver Cromwell's ambitious 'Western 
Design*Certainly the nascent colony could not have survived 
thereafter without the military support of the buccaneers. Many of 
these— French, Dutch, as well as English— came from Tortuga; and 
some had learned their trade at Providence or Curasao. Among the 
old guard were Blauvelt and Mansvelt, the latter destined to beoome 
the first admiral of Jamaica's privateers. Others were new 
recruits, ex-soldiers from the original British expeditionary force 
or militia picked up iff the Lesser Antilles en route. The Welshman 
Henry Morgan, Mansvelt's eventual successor and Jamaica's pirate 
laureate, probably began his West Indian oareer among the latter 
group. Entire books have been devoted to Morgan and his pirate 
fiefdom at Port Royal; our soope regrettably permits only passing 
acquaintance with this notorious stronghold.
On the southern coast of Jamaica the deep and spacious harbor 
of Port Royal, now known as Kingston Harbour, was ideally suited 
(save for one grave geologic fault) to beoome a privateering and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
161
commercial capital. Pirates, we recall, were no strangers to the 
place; Shirley and Jackson must have remarked upon its potential 
when they raided its shoreline in 1597 and 1643, respectively. 
Writing five years after its ultimate capture, Jamaica's future 
governor, Thomas Lynch, advised his English superiors of their 
recent boon:
In ye South iG Port Cagway [later Port Royal] a harbour 
infinitely secure convenyent & capatious, landlockt by a 
Point of Land that runs 12 myles SW from ye Maine of ye 
Island, having ye great River that comes by Los Angelos & St 
Jago running into itt, & many Springs about itt where Shipps 
doe comonly water, & convenyently wood. The Harbour is 34 or 
5 Leagues crosse in one place, & every where good anchor 
ground, & soe deepe that a Ship of a thousand tun may lay 
her sydes to ye Shoare of the Poynt, & Load & unload with 
planks afloate (MS 1660, BL Harl. 3361, f.39).
When the English took possession of the harbor in 1655, two Spanish
towns of inconsiderable size already occupied its north side, the
Jamaican main. The larger Santiago de la Vega (already twice
plundered by Shirley and Jackson) had been founded up the Rio Cobre
and eventually assumed many of the English colony's administrative
functions under the name of Spanish Town. Where the river emptied
into the bay, the Spaniards had likewise established rudimentary
port facilities in a place they called Caguaya (or Cagua). Here the
English built Passage Fort and also maintained a small settlement.
Enclosing the harbor to the south, the long sandspit known as the
Palisadoes was what ultimately rendered these waters secure from
enemies as well as the elements (see Map 13). The tip of this sandy
protrusion was at that time detached, forming what the Spaniards had
called the Cayo de Carena— or Careening Cay— and it was here that
Penn and Venable's men constructed the initial fortress commanding
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entrance to the harbor. These defense works, at first merely a 
round stone tower in the midst of a rectangular platform of mounted 
cannon, eventually transformed into the imposing Fort Charles. In 
the shadow of this bastion sprouted a bustling seaport. Cagway was 
the name adopted by its first inhabitants, an Anglicized imitation 
of Cagua across the harbor channel. After the Restoration the 
thriving town assumed a new title, one which became synonymous with 
British power in the Caribbean and the depraved excesses of its 
buccaneer guardians. This was Port Royal (Pawson and Buisseret 
1975, 1-8; MS Lynch 1660, BL Harl. 3361. ff.40-41; Cundall 1915, 45- 
47).
The grand fleet which had captured Jamaica was not long to 
protect it. By 1656 fewer than ten of the original thirty warships 
remained; the rest had already sprung leaks or returned to England. 
Edward D'Oyley, Jamaica's first governor, found no recourse but an 
unorthodox alliance with buccaneers for the protection of the 
colony. These ruffians of mixed nationality were already re­
establishing their stronghold at Tortuga; but with the founding of 
Port Royal, D'Oyley could offer a superior natural harbor with 
growing defenses and repair facilities, all Jamaica's bounty for 
dependable victualling, readier access to the Spanish Main, English 
commissions, entertainment in port, and most importantly, a 
lucrative and steady market for plunder. He and the colony would in 
turn benefit from naval protection and, incidentally, a healthy cut 
from the spoils. It was a perfect arrangement, and Port Royal soon 
flourished thanks to the buccaneers. Christopher Myng6, commander 
of the remaining English navy, set an inspiring example with
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successful raids against Campeche, Cumana, Puerto Caballos, and 
Santiago de Cuba. Spanish pieces of eight began flowing in the 
streets of Port Royal, and with the arrival of Governor Thomas 
Modyford in 1664, the buccaneers really came into their own. 
Morgan succeeded Mansvelt at the conn of an all-privateer fleet; 
their exploits, which we have already noted and will treat again in 
the following chapter, set new records of piracy in the Caribbean. 
Partly under Morgan's direction, the harbor's defense network 
gradually expanded until Port Royal was completely surrounded by 
forts, breastworks, and over one hundred guns. As a buccaneering 
stronghold, Port Royal reached its zenith with Morgan's sack of 
Panama in 1671. After he donned the cloak of respectability, even 
rising to beoome Jamaica's knighted Lieutenant Governor in 1674, 
lesser 6ortie6 continued with Sir Henry's nod of approval. Under 
subsequent governorships in the 1680s, particularly that of Thomas 
Lynch, buccaneers found Port Royal's harbor no longer so welcoming—  
and Gallow's Point no longer an empty threat. Some went back to
French masters at Petit-Goave, some to the Carolines, others to
Campeaohy and the Bay to out logwood. A few even followed the
example of their ex-chieftan and sensibly retired (Pawson and
Buisseret 1975, 20-39).
Certainly by 1680 Port Royal had, like Curacao before it, 
diverted its energies from piracy to ultimately more profitable 
ventures in planting, slaving, and trade. Jamaica offered a fertile 
and expansive hinterland where sugar provided the new source of 
wealth. Port Royal continued to prosper as a seaport and naval base 
and, save for hulking stone-walled reminders of its militant
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beginnings, probably appeared "very like an English shire town, 
perched on the end of a tropical spit" (Pawson and Buisseret 1975, 
97). It is as such, not as the unbridled buccaneer lair of popular 
imagination, that we must envision it on a sultry June morning in 
1692: massive Fort Charles and busy High Street; Fishers' Row and 
the King's House; The Sign of the Mermaid and The Sign of Bacchus; 
The Black Dogg and The Blue Anchor; Waterman's Wharf and Smith's 
Alley; St. Paul's Church and John Starr's brothel; the Jewish 
synagogue, Ouaker meeting house, Catholic ohapel; the prisons and 
the cemetery; 1500 homes crowded with 6500 people— all suddenly torn 
asunder by a violent earth tremor which plunged most of the town and 
a third of its populace to an early grave beneath the sea (Link 
1960; Pawson and Buisseret 1975, 81-124 and App.12).
Today only fragments of Port Royal's past remain on dry land. 
Fort Charles stands rebuilt from its ruined walls, and marine 
aroheologists have recovered intriguing mementos of the town's 
former prosperity. Onion-shaped flasks still dark with residual 
brandy, Chinese porcelain, brass slave collars, ornately carved clay 
pipes, pewter tankards, a gold pocket watch, turtle pens or 
'crawles', a long-barreled musket, ships' caulking tools and, of 
course, Spanish pieces of eight— all evoke the spirit of a bygone 
age (Marx 1968 and 1973; Link 1960). It is, afterall, in those days 
of "rum and roguery," when more upright citizens could complain of 
"a tavern to every ten residents," that one prefers to picture old 
Port Royal (Black 1970, 17-18). Perhaps then, we had better leave 
the onoe proud stronghold not at its nadir, half-swallowed by the
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sea, but rather as the buccaneers' mecca which Exquemelin visited
when piracy was near its riotous peak:
Captain Rock [Roche Brasiliano] sailed for Jamaica with [a 
Spanish] prize, and lorded it there with his mates until all 
was gone. For that is the way with these buccaneers—  
whenever they have got hold of something, they don't keep it 
for long. They are busy dicing, whoring and drinking so long 
as they have anything to spend. Some of them will get 
through a good two or three thousand pieces of eight in a
day— and next day not have a shirt to their back. I have
seen a man in Jamaica give 500 pieces of eight to a whore,
just to see her naked. Yes, and many other impieties.
My own master often used to buy a butt of wine and set 
it in the middle of the street with the barrel-head knocked 
in, and stand barring the way. Every passer-by had to drink 
with him, or he'd have shot them dead...(1972, 68).
So let us follow the unruly scions of these buccaneers back to where
we began, to the Bahama Islands and the last of the pirate
strongholds.
New Prowidence. It is perhaps fitting that the pirates' 
final strategic holdout in Spanish America should recall the name of 
one of their first. The island now called New Providence, situated 
in the middle of the Bahamas, was once named Fernandina in homage to 
Columbus' royal patron. Like Old Providence (Santa Catalina), the 
new version had colonial connections with the Bermudas, first 
settled by English adventurers in 1612.^  It was not until 1666, 
however, that Captain William Sayle took refuge with some followers 
on the Bahamian island during a storm, initially bequeathing to it 
his own name. When similar circumstances delivered him there a 
second time, he thought better to acknowledge his good fortune, or 
rather his Creator's apparent benevolence, and renamed the island 
Providence. 'New' was later attached to distinguish the place from
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its piratical forerunner (Oldmixon 1966, 11-12; Lucas 1905, 78,
Burns 1954, 358).
These early years of New Providence were mostly a matter of 
colonial intrigue, nominally governed under the same proprietorship 
as the Carolinas and no doubt seasoned with a good measure of 
privateering against the Spaniards. After 1677, however, the 
indulgent policies of Governor Robert Clarke soon amplified the 
colonists’ reputation for "living a lewd, licentious Sort of Life” 
(Oldmixon 1966, 12), and hastened their rapid degeneration, at least 
in Thomas Lynch's opinion, to a mere "nest of robbers" (in Burns 
1954 , 360). Some of the "robbers" were doubtlessly fugitives from 
that governor's rigid anti-piratioal campaign on Jamaica. The 
Spaniards, in any event, did not remain tolerant for long and 
crushed the growing nuissance with a double punitive strike in 1684. 
Those who filtered back over the next several years established a 
decidedly piratical fraternity with little in the way of structured 
government. After Dutch/Anglo-French hostilities reached the 
Caribbean in 1691, their numbers were strengthened by English and 
possibly Dutch refugees from Petit-Goave (Craton 1962-78-79; Burns 
1954, 361-62, 397-99).
New Providence's career as a freebooter's stronghold really 
begins in 1695. John Oldmixon, who began recording the history of 
the island thirteen years later, described a rather symbolic 
architectural alteration by that date, one which combined with 
various natural assets made New Providence a distinctly attractive 
pirate port:
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By this Time the Town of Providence was grown so 
considerable, that it was honoured with the Name of Nassau; 
and before Mr. Trott 's Government expired there were 160 
Houses. . .
The Harbour of Nassau is formed by Nog-Jsland, which 
belongs to Mr. Trott. It runs along parallel to it five 
Miles in Length, lying East and West. At the Entrance of the 
Harbour is a Bar, over which no Ship of 500 Ton can pass, 
but within the Bar, the Navy Royal of England might safely 
ride.
In the Town of Nassau there was a Church in Mr. Trott‘s 
Time, and he began a Fort in the Middle of it, which with 
his House made a Square. This Fort was mounted with 28 Guns 
and some Demi-Culvers.
There never was a Man of War at Providence, unless Avery 
the Pirate's Ship may be reckoned one, for it carried 46 
Guns, and coming at a Time when the Inhabitants were in an 
ill State of Defence it was to no Purpose for them to stand 
out against him. But by the Character we have had of the 
People of Providence, we cannot think that Pirate, who was 
very rich, was unwelcome to them (1966, 18;.
When Henry Every reached Nassau with the Fancy in 1696, 
coffers brimming after a profitable cruise against the Great Mogul 
in the Indian Ocean, he in fact encountered little difficulty 
converting the town, its harbor, and its governor to suit his own 
needs (18-19; Lynam 1948, 244). Henceforth, save for a few setbacks 
from meddlesome English governors and vengeful Spaniards, New 
Providence continued to serve the Roundsmen and, later, those most 
notorious picaroons of the Golden Age— Vane, Rackham, England, 
Davis, 'Blackbeard' and their associates— till Woodes Rogers 
permanently cleared out their pirates' den in 1718. Most of the 
island's subsequent history indeed only vindicated the Bahamas' 
colonial motto: EXPULSIS PIRATIS RESTITUTA COMMERCIA.104
The piratical fraternity of New Providence, like that of 
Madagascar, has often been painted (one might say with decidedly 
romantic license) as a near-utopian, ultra-democratic or anarchistic 
haven: a brutish yet noble 'Pirate Republic’ (Woodbury 1951, 70-87;
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Albury 1975, 60; Williams 1961, 150-51; Mitchell 1976, 84-85).
There is an element of truth to this myth, but the reality of the 
pirates’ settlement was probably closer to Woodbury’s "marine hobo 
jungle...no oity of homes...[rather] a plaoe of temporary sojourn 
and refreshment for a literally floating population" (1951, 73).
Another, more sordid reconstruction comes perhaps even closer to the 
mark:
Nassau was a shanty town of driftwood and palm fronds and 
old sails draped over spars to make tents. It was said that 
when the wind blew from the land you could smell New 
Providence before you sighted it. Every other hovel was a 
grog shop or a brothel with Negro and mulatto prostitutes. 
Favourite drinks were rumfustian (a mixture of beer, gin and 
sherry, heavily spiced)...and the general atmosphere 
resembled that of Hogarth's Gin Lane in a balmy climate, or 
of a resurrected and even sleazier Port Royal (Mitchell 
1976, 84).
It might appear to be stretching a point to append New Providence to 
our list of pirate bastions. Certainly it was strategically 
located, perhaps better so than any of its predecessors for 
intercepting Europe-bound cargoes in the Florida Straits and 
Providence Channels. It also abounded with turtle, fish, wood, and 
fresh water. Its harbor was commodious and suitable for careening, 
large enough to hold five hundred sloops but too shallow to admit 
enemy warships of any great burden; moreover, the positioning of Hog 
Island provided two possible routes of escape. Recreational 
diversions, such as there were, probably suited the needs and tastes 
of Nassau’s seafaring population well enough. New Providence, 
however, especially after degenerating into a freebooter's sanctuary 
without any colonial sanction or support, remained poorly fortified 
and devoid of a viable population. Two punitive forces, a joint
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French-Spanish raid in 1703 followed by another Spanish strike in 
1706, had little trouble demolishing Trott‘s pitiful church-fortress 
and depopulating the colony. When Woodes Rogers reached Nassau in 
1718, its resident pirates had but a single nine pounder to defend 
the entire shore (Craton 1962, 93; Johnson [Defoe?] 1962, 200;
Woodbury 1951, 71-72). All that withstanding, the unquestionable 
impact of New Providence as a breeding lair and resort for nefarious 
pirates plaoes it in the same category as the buooaneer strongholds, 
though not in the same league. In the next chapter we will 
scrutinize in historical and geographical detail the greatest island 
fortress of them all.
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* In this study all distances are reckoned in statute miles unless 
otherwise specified.
2 Explained here and displayed on Maps 2 and 3 as they had evolved 
by the close of the sixteenth century. Hoffman (1980) has recounted 
developments from 1535 which culminated in the full-fledged convoy 
network; some of these tactical responses are considered later in 
this chapter.
3 Such has been the terminology employed by various authors to 
differentiate the two treasure fleets bound either for Cartagena- 
Porto Bello or Vera Cruz. The former has been distinguished simply 
as the galeones, or galleons (Haring 1910, Goslinga 1971, Ashdown 
1979); as the Panama Galleons (Lombardi and Lombardi 1983), or as 
the Tierra Firme fleet (Andrews 1967; Goslinga 1971). The term 
galleon specifically denotes a ship of the latter sixteenth century 
which replaced the clumsier carracks and caravels of earlier 
seaborne commerce (see Figure 1). Draft and the ability (or lack 
thereof) to ‘point' were important aspects of ship design which 
affected the range and maneuverability of sailing vessels; such 
strategic consequences of Spanish naval architecture have been 
discussed by Hoffman (1980). The single term flota (Spanish for 
fleet) has often been used to specify the convoy bound for Vera Cruz 
(Haring 1910; Goslinga 1971; Ashdown 1979); it has been modified by 
various authors as Mexican Flota (Andrews 1967, Lombardi and 
Lombardi 1983), silver fleet, or plate fleet.
4 The term ‘Spanish Main' (short for main Ja/id) is sometimes used 
rather loosely to encompass virtually all Spanish possessions in the 
circum-Caribbean realm, including the sea itself. My own use of 
that term (or simply ‘the Main'), in concurrence with Burns (1954), 
Ashdown (1979), and Hoffman (1980), describes only the north coast 
of South America, from the delta of the Rio Orinoco to the Isthmus 
of Panama. Tierra Firm (or Terra Firma) has sometimes been used 
interchangeably with Spanish Main (Burns 1954, 723; Andrews 1967, 
99) but more usually specifically refers to the isthmian province of 
Porto Bello and Panama (Hoffman 1980).
5 Haring mentioned the abandonment of Nombre de Dios by royal 
decree, on account of its poor harbor and unhealthy climate, in 1584 
(1910, 17n). According to Loosley, however, the port was not moved 
from there to Porto Bello until 1597 (1933. 316).
* The tempestuous seas off Cape Horn, though braved by many a daring 
pirate, proved so risky for regular colonial commerce that virtually 
all trade south of the Spanish Main flowed through Panama. True, the 
eastern, Argentine coast of Charcas faced the South Atlantic, but 
those waters remained so long under Portuguese control that despite
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
its eastern outlet this corner of the Spanish American empire 
shipped its products first to the Caribbean and thence to Spain 
(Jones 1963, 18).
7 From 1581 onwards, Havana remained the obligatory rendezvous for 
all ships returning to Spain (Hoffman 1980, 210).
8 The Treaty of Tordesillas (June 7, 1494) ammended an earlier papal 
donation which divided the New World between Portugal and Spain. 
The original boundary, set the previous year at one hundred leagues 
west of the Cape Verdes and Azores, provoked serious objections on 
the part of the Portuguese, and the line was moved further west. 
The Pope's new partition decreed that a
straight line be determined and drawn north and south, from 
the Arctic to the Antarctic pole...at a distance of three 
hundred and seventy leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands.
And all lands, both islands and mainlands found and
discovered already, or to be found and discovered hereafter, 
by the said King of Portugal and by his vessels on this side 
of the line and bound and determined above, toward the east, 
in either north or south latitude...shall belong to...the 
said King of Portugal and his successors. And all other 
lands, both islands and mainlands...which have been 
discovered or shall be discovered by the said King and Queen 
of Castile, Aragon, etc., and by their vessels on the
western side of the said bound..., in either its north or 
south latitude, shall...remain in the possession of, and 
pertain forever to, the said King and Queen of Castile,
Leon, etc., and to their successors (Williams 1963, 204-5).
9 Burns went on to explain that a similar "secret clause"
characterized the Treaty of Vervins in 1598, and that the issue of 
peace in the Indies remained likewise avoided in the Treaty of
London in 1604 (1954, 141n).
10 The date of Havana’s first ransoming has been variously given as
1537 (Wright 1970, 216) and 1538 (Barbour 1911, 532).
11 The triangular maritime zone connecting Spain with the Azores and 
the Canary Islands.
*2 Yaguana occupied the site of modern Port-au-Prince.
Not to be confused with the Isle of Pines just south of Cuba,
also frequented by pirates. The archipelago in question, well east 
of Nombre de Dios, off the northern coast of Darien, served again as
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the rendezvous and base for a cross-Panama expedition led by the 
buccaneers Sharp, Coxon, et al. in 1680.
Singular cimmrdn. The adjectival form in Spanish generally 
conveys the same meaning as wild or feral. As a proper noun it
described not only fugitive African slaves in Panama, but also those 
hiding out in Jamaica. The latter remained active even after the 
English conquest of that island in 1655. In English, the name was 
sometimes rendered Cimaroon (see Williams 1975, 93) or Maroon (see 
Burns 1954, 153-54). A generic use of the latter eventually came to 
mean a person stranded (sometimes intentionally by pirates) on a 
remote shore.
15 Also spelled le TStu. This French pirate is perhaps best 
remembered as one of the most accomplished hydrographers of the 
period. His cartographic contributions are discussed in Chapter 4.
16 As Irene Wright aptly noted,
"the ‘pirate's ‘ real work was done by small light craft, 
equipped (in the case of the English, certainly) with oars 
as well as sails...[D]ocuments...furnish ample evidence that 
their speed, lesser size, and ability to row when the wind 
failed, completely discomfited...galleons, and even... 
frigates along the Main in 1569-71. The Spaniards were 
repeatedly out-sailed, out-rowed, and out-manoeuvred (1932, 
xxx).
17 Drake's ship was originally named the Pelican.
18 In 1519, the Portuguese Magellan (or MagalhSes) had sailed 
westward under Spanish patronage to reach Asia as Columbus had 
intended. Though killed in the Philippines, having once voyaged 
eastward to the Spice Islands (or Moluccas, in present-day 
Indonesia) on a previous expedition, he is considered the world's 
first circumnavigator. One of his ships, commanded by Juan Sebastian 
del Cano, indeed returned to Spain to complete the circuit in 1522 
(Jaimes and Martin 1972, 75).
19 Oxenham was at this time awaiting his fate in Lima, as Drake was 
presently informed by some Spanish prisoners. Although he may have 
attempted to effect Oxenham's ransom, he apparently could do nothing 
to save him. Drake's apprisal of the recent events at Panama, 
however, probably convinced him to forego raiding there (Andrews 
1967, 74-75).
Actually the Spanish sailors' disrespectful sobriquet for the 
Nuestra SeSora de la Concepcidn. a beautiful but cumbersome galleon
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both in name and design. Cacafuego translates quite literally as 
Shit-fire'! (Hamshere 1972, 13).
21 After Drake's visit to the Isla del Cafio in 1579, it served as 
refuge again for Cavendish in 1589; Sharp, Cox, and Ringrose in 
1681; Dampier and Funnell in 1704; and doubtless many others (MS Cox 
1682, NMM GOS/4, f. 44; Funnell 1729, 42-43; Ringrose 1987, 417-18). 
The small bay opposite, fed by the Rio Sierpe and enclosed by the
northwest point of the Peninsula de Osa (the Punta San Pedro— or
Punta Mala on some older charts), where Drake careened, was likewise 
used by Cavendish. In Sharp’s "South Sea Wagonner" (prepared by
William Hack), the bay is depicted as “Candishes Bay," where "Mr
Thomas Candish [Cavendish] came through the Straight of Magellan & 
arrived here in the year 1589" (MS Hack 1684, BL Sloane 44, ff. 49- 
50). On a modern map of Costa Rica, however, it is called "Bahia 
Drake"; a small village there also bears the name of its first 
piratical visitor. The Isla del Cafio is now a wildlife preserve 
(Costa Rica. FundaciOn de Parques Nacionale 1986).
22 With a small but fine natural harbor, Guatulco preceded Acapulco 
as the first Spanish port of any consequence on the Pacific coast of 
New Spain. Because an existing Indian trail connected Guatulco, via 
Oaxaca, to the Mexican capital, the Spaniards initially retained its 
site as the northern terminus for oceanic trade between New Spain 
and Peru. Guatulco flourished from about 1540 until Acapulco 
emerged as New Spain's principal Pacific outlet, thanks mostly to 
the Manila trade, by about 1574. By the time Drake (and afterwards 
Cavendish) sacked Guatulco, it had declined greatly in importance, 
though provincial trade with Peru and Central America continued 
(Gerhard 1960, 32-34).
22 a ducat was worth five shillings six pence (Burns 1954, 159).
2̂  The Earl of Cumberland, who, ”[a]fter taking his degree at 
Cambridge...migrated to Oxford for the purpose of studying 
geography" (Gosse 1924, 95) embodied the combination of pirate-
geographer discussed in Chapter 4.
22 Trujillo was 6aoked three times between 1560 and 1576 and several 
times thereafter. Though the governor of Honduras mounted four 
cannon there in 1575 and later augmented defenses with a redoubt and 
seventeen additional guns, the harbor proved too spacious to protect 
affordably. The population quickly dwindled. Puerto Caballos, hit 
five times between 1589 and 1603, likewise suffered economic 
decline. After Phillip II ordered the Honduras ships not to break 
consort with the Mexican flota until sighting the western tip of 
Cuba, Santo Tom&s de Castilla, nestled in the Bay of Amatique in the 
southwesternmost recess of the Gulf of Honduras, emerged as the 
first port of call (Floyd 1967, 14-15). By 1604 the Spaniards
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abandoned Puerto Caballos altogether; its former site is now 
occupied by Puerto Cortez (Davidson 1974, 42; Jones 1940, 26).
^  In Raleigh's day the name Guiana referred to a large portion of 
northeast South America, including the entire Orinoco River Basin 
(Burns 1954, 165).
27 These included Robert Dudley, Amyas Preston, Laurence Keymis, and 
George Somers of Bermuda fame (Burns 1954, 166-69).
The charts and journals of the seventeenth-century buccaneers are 
replete with aspirant references to the deeds of Drake and 
Cavendish. Basil Ringrose*s account of his own voyage in 1680 to 
the Isla de la Plata, an islet off modern Ecuador which supposedly 
served as Drake's depot for dividing his South Sea spoils, fairly 
brimmed with hyperbolic envy:
This island received its name from Sir Francis Drake and 
his famous actions, for here it is reported by tradition 
that he made the dividend, or sharing, of that quantity of 
plate which he took in the Armada of this sea, distributing 
it to each man in his company by whole bowls full. The 
Spaniards affirm to this day that he took at that time 
twelve-score tons of plate and sixteen bowls of coined money 
a man, his number then being 45 men in all— insomuch that 
they were forced to heave much of it overboard, because his 
ship could not carry it all. Hence was this island called 
by the Spaniards themselves the Isle of Plate, from this 
great dividend; and by us Drake's Isle (1987, 352).
Sharp and Funnell likewise commemorated Cavendish's exploits (see 
note 21 above). One suspects from their comments that the 
buccaneers derived satisfaction whenever their voyages touched in 
the wake of the old sea dogs. The Spaniards certainly had cause to 
remember El Draque no less vividly. His death was celebrated in the 
epic poem la Dragon tea by Lope de la Vega (Andrews 1967, 180).
29 Here, to follow the sound geographic advice of Jackson's 
anonymous pirate-chronicler, to gain a better appreciation of the 
place, "it will not bee impertinent to take a small Survey of ye 
situation & structure of Mericao,"
which stands close by ye River Side, upon an uneven ground, 
riseing higher, to the North part, & declineing towards ye 
South, where stands a strong Forte, Composed of lime & 
Stone, in form of a halfe Moone, over against which ye 
Shipps hither resorting do useally cast Ankor. It consisteth 
of 500 houses, at ye least, most of which are built of Stone 
& Timber, & covered with tyle, & flat Roof'd after ye
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Spanish Fashion. The rest are Thatched, consisting of thick 
mud walls, not any way inferior to ye other for strength.
The Streetes are very uniforme, being built as a straight 
Line, tending to ye Markett place, where standeth their 
Cheife Church called Ecolesia Iemelior... It is likewise 
fortified towards the waterside, with Barracados of Earth & 
Stakes fastned to ye Ground with hide oast over them, & 
Gunns mounted to make good ye Landing Places, & is reputed 
ye Cheife Magazine for the receipt of all Spanish 
Comodities, from henoe transported by ye River to ye remote 
Inland Townes & Villages...as, alsoe, for ye Comodities 
produced in these parts, which are shiped & Returned for 
Spaine. Wee found in ye Storehouses...some Sailes, Cables,
& Ankors, for our Shiping, &, in that Seller where ye Saoke 
lay, according to ye notes given us by a Prisoner, wee 
digged up 1,100 peices of Eight (Harlow, ed. [Jackson] 1923,
11).
30 For the value of a Spanish piece of eight, i.e. eight reales 
(four to the pound sterling), see note 54 in Chapter 3.
31 About forty miles west of Cape Tiburon, Navassa is now a U.S. 
possession.
33 Most of the deserters were eventually delivered up by the 
Spaniards for prosecution by their own countrymen.
33 Haring (1910, 50) and Newton (1914, 316) both gave the figure of 
7000 pieces of eight.
34 Before his celebrated voyage of 1628, Piet Heyn evidently 
considered an attack on the Honduras galleons a worthy alternative 
to capturing the Mexican flota (Goslinga, 1971, 180).
3* That indeed was the case. The Spaniards, alarmed by an attempt 
by English refugees from Providence Island to make a permanent base 
in the Bay Islands, had ousted not only them but, given the report 
of Jackson’s men, their Indian hosts as well in 1642 (Newton 1914, 
315). Upon Jackson’s sacking of Trujillo, however, 120 of these 
Indians were allowed to return to Roatin and Guanaja (Harlow, ed. 
[Jackson] 1923, 25).
^  A Spanish account of Jackson’s raid on Trujillo is to be found in 
the Archivo General de Indias, Seville (MS AGI Guatemala 44-July 
1643 [dated 1644]).
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^  Nearly fifty years before, from the same Isla Escudo, adverse 
weather and disease had forced a dying Francis Drake to abandon his 
last quest for plunder.
3® Rival nations certainly struggled for footholds in the Spanish 
domain during the sixteenth century, but to no avail. French 
Huguenots led by Jean Ribault and Ren6 de Laudonnidre attempted two 
colonies, one short-lived experiment on the Carolina coast in 1562, 
and another two years later in Florida. The second colony, had it 
been successful, would have provided French corsairs immediate 
access to Havana, as well as the lucrative shipping concentrated in 
the Yuoat&n Channel and Straits of Florida. It was however, 
mercilessly destroyed by Admiral Pedro Menendez de Aviles in 1565 
(Burns 1954, 150-51). The Spaniards themselves established San
Augustin to secure the Florida coast. In 1585 Sir Richard Grenville 
tried in vain to plant a colony at Roanoke on the Virginia coast, 
still well within range of the Spanish treasure routes, but this too 
failed despite infusions from Drake and Raleigh. Sir Walter's 
visionary schemes for colonizing Guiana likewise proved illusory. 
As mentioned already, any intentions by Drake and Cumberland to hold 
Cartagena or San Juan de Puerto Rico as permanent bases 
dematerialized quickly in the face of disease and Spanish 
opposition.
3* Now called CamagQey.
40 The geographic content of these and other pirate journals is 
discussed in Chapter 4. The short manuscript account in the British 
Library, attributed to Coxon, was likely written by someone else.
41 Dampier later described their mode of construction:
The manner of making a Canoa is , after cutting down a 
large long Tree, and squaring the uppermost side, and then 
turning it upon the flat side, to shape the opposite side 
for the bottom. Then again they turn her, and dig the 
inside; boring also three holes in the bottom, one before, 
one in the middle, and one abaft, thereby to gage the 
thickness of the bottom; for otherwise we might cut the 
bottom thinner than is convenient. We left the bottom 
commonly about three Inches thick, and the sides two Inches 
thick below, and one and a half at the top. One or both 
ends we sharpen to a point (1927, 151).
^  A complete list of these accounts, both printed and manuscript, 
can be found in Lloyd (1956, 301). The events conveyed therein are 
critically compared and summarized in Kemp and Lloyd's admirable 
volume of 1960.
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48 Assumedly the same young woman identified in Sharp’s journal: "a 
Lady of about 18 years of age her name was Dona Iowna Constanta" (MS 
Sharp, BL Sloane 46.b., f. 94). Nothing is mentioned of her fate.
44 John Cox rendered a similar account, except he estimated only 670 
pigs of silver (MS 1682, NMM Gos/4, f. 52). Based on William Dick's 
relation, if we assume that a full pig would have fetched three 
times £75, or £225, then all seven hundred of the crude silver bars 
would have been worth an astounding £157,500. In pieces of eight, 
based on a conversion rate of four to the pound (see note 54 in
Chapter 3), the value of the silver would have equaled 630,000
Spanish pieces of eight. Such an amount would seem absurdly high, 
easily double Morgan’s haul from the entire sacking of Panama 
itself; but even a fraction of that value, if the story is true, 
would suggest a magnificent buccaneering blunder.
4® Newton distinctly stated that prior to the 1683 attack ("a bolder 
enterprise than had ever yet been attempted by the buccaneers") Vera 
Cruz had remained the "unconquered port of Mexico" (1933, 325).
Kemp and Lloyd mentioned that the city had been sacked twice 
previously, first in 1659 and again in 1678, but gave no further
details or references (1960, 73).
48 A Dutch buccaneer, not to be confused with Jan Janszoon van 
Hoorn, an earlier Dutch commander who pillaged Trujillo and Campeche 
in 1633 (Goslinga 1971, 226-27).
49 Yanchey (sometimes spelled Yankey, Yankee, or Yankes) was the
Dutch captain of a sixteen-gun prize. Christian, also Dutch, 
commanded a patache of forty guns ([Lynch] 1684, 115). Both had 
been operating off the north coast of Panama in 1681 when Dampier 
(who identified them as Yankes and Tristian) returned across the 
Isthmus from Sharp's South Sea expedition. They formed part of a 
larger pirate squadron which continued with Dampier to range along 
the Miskito Coast (Dampier 1927. 27-33).
48 This was apparently a common error at night which worked much to 
the advantage of the pirates. Just prior to Piet Heyn’s famous coup 
off Matanzas, the Spaniards had not only failed to notice a Dutch 
spy ship among their own flota, but had even been led past the 
safety of Havana by unwittingly following the lights of the Dutch 
fleet! (Goslinga 1971, 186).
49 Or ‘Forlorn Hope’, as the English pirates usually referred to 
their exposed vanguard. Poignantly bleak in English, its derivation 
from the Dutch verloren hoop (or ‘lost troop’) and counterpart in 
French, les enfans-perdus (‘lost babes'), evoke even more tragically 
the period's genre of warfare. This 'Forlorn' was lucky.
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The offshore Castillo de San Juan de Ultia.
51 Cochineal, a valuable red dye derived from a scale insect.
52 Like the Earl of Cumberland, Cowley held a Master of Arts degree 
at Cambridge (Kemp and Lloyd 1960, 85). After leaving the coast of 
Central America, he proceeded to circumnavigate the world and later 
published his journal.
53 Nephew of another buccaneer named Peter Harris who was killed 
during Coxon's raid in the Bay of Panama (Kemp and Lloyd 1960, 41 
and 110. N.B. The authors incorrectly state that the elder Harris 
died while fighting under Morgan at Panama, though he may very well 
have taken part in that campaign).
54 Elevation 5839 feet.
i.e. Cartagena, Panama, Porto Bello, Havana, Vera Cruz, and 
Acapulco.
56 According to Gerhard, "The value of the cargo usually varied from 
200,000 to 1,000,000 pesos at Manila, worth two or three times that 
amount in New Spain and Peru. Contraband sometimes raised the final 
value to more than 10,000,000 pesos. The westbound cargo was almost 
exclusively silver" (1960, 38-39).
57 Apparently Granada's mayor had instituted a system of alarm
bells, but the citizens grew tired of his drills and induced the 
governor in Le6n to forbid any more bell ringing without his prior 
consent. His permission, needless to say, came too late in 1665
(Williams 1976, 50-51).
Cacao.
59 Raveneau de Lussan insisted, of course, that the buccaneers 
eschewed any violence toward Guayaquil's women: "when they came to 
know us...they felt very differently toward us, frequently giving
indications of a passion bordering at times on folly" (1930, 211;
cf. p. 217). One may reasonably suspect, however, that he was 
pluming his ego, assuaging his conscience, or concealing the true 
nature of his crimes. He did point out, believably enough, that the 
Spanish ladies held an initial terror for the buccaneers who, the 
padres had assured them, "were not formed like other 
mortals...and...ate women and little children" (1930, 211).
Except for a few straggling marauders who continued to pillage 
from the Tres Marias Islands of New Spain (Gerhard 1960. 188-94).
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^  Burney gave the figures somewhat differently: "700 flibustiers, 
170 soldiers from the garrison, and as many volunteer inhabitants 
and negroes as made up about 1200 men. The whole armament consisted 
of seven large ships and eleven frigates, besides store ships and 
smaller vessels; and, reckoning persons of all classes, 6000 men" 
(1891, 360).
62 Bocachica literally translates as ‘small mouth'. A larger 
opening, the Bocagrande, lay to the north and was used by Drake in 
1586. Since the 1640s, however, the Bocagrande had remained closed 
by a sandbar (McDowell 1989, 502).
62 Under the terms of this expedition, free Negroes were to receive 
the same shares as other men. The masters of killed slaves were to 
be reimbursed for their losses (Burney 1891, 358).
** Historian Burney considered the Davis expedition to be the 
endpoint of the buccaneers’ era (1891, 379). Though not a very 
momentous undertaking, it did bear their distinctive piratical 
trademark.
65 Enemy to all mankind.
The Jolly Roger, a black jack emblazoned with a white skull 
and/or various other reminders of mortality, was in fact widely used 
aboard pirate vessels of the early eighteenth century. Though 
primarily a device for striking fear into the hearts of victims, the 
pirate flag symbolized as well the fugacity of the profession and a 
sort of social statement, reminiscent of the buccaneers' coutume de 
Ja cote, which distinguished the freebooters from mainstream 
colonial society (Rediker 1987, 279-80; 1988, 165). The first pirate 
known to have raised the Jolly Roger was a Frenchman, Emanuel Wynne, 
who engaged a British man-of-war under its grisly charge off Jamaica 
in 1700. His banner consisted of "a sable ensign with cross-bones, 
a death's head and an hour-glass" (Mitchell 1976, 82), but several 
variations were adopted by later pirates. 'Calico Jack' Rackham 
sported a skull atop crossed sabres. Other captains, including 
Oueloh, Spriggs, and Teach (alias Blackboard) are said to have used 
a skeleton clutching an hour glass in one hand and a dart poised 
above a victim's bleeding heart in the other (Carr 1943, 132-33; 
Botting 1978, 48-49; Mitchell 1976, 82). Bartholomew Roberts
employed two flags; one depicted himself, cutlass in hand, feet 
balanced upon the skulls of a Barbadian and a Martinican (Pringle 
1953, 112; Botting 1978, 49). Apparently the black jack signified 
an offer of quarter to a vessel under attack, while a red or 
'bloody' banner informed its hapless crew that none could be 
expected. The origin of the term Jolly Roger is not clear. It may 
have derived from joJj rouge (or 'pretty red', as the French
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flibustiers might have called the red standard), or it may have 
alluded to the flag used by the Tamil pirate Ali Raja. Quite 
possibly, especially given the flag's motif and the pirates' 
rejection of prevailing social mores, it alluded to Old Roger, an 
eighteenth-century sobriquet for Satan (Mitchell 1976, 82). An
ancient symbol for mortality, the skull and orossbones, occasionally 
depicted with an hour glass, had long been used in captains' logs to 
mark the deaths of sailors. Freebooters most likely adopted this 
customary graphic as their professional trademark and augmented it 
with weapons and bleeding hearts to create “a triad of interlocking 
symbols— death, violence, limited time...[which] eloquently bespoke 
the pirates' own consciousness of themselves" (Rediker 1987, 279). 
In his article, "Pirate Flags," H.G. Carr mentioned that certain 
British submarines flew the Jolly Roger during World War II, an 
interesting observation given the parallels already noted between 
submarine and piratical warfare (1943, 134). The resurgence of such 
necro-symbology in our own time makes one wonder if the modern 
pirate has not exchanged the swift brigantine for a powerful Harley- 
Davidson.
^  1716 to 1726 are the inclusive dates used by Marcus Rediker to 
bracket his excellent study of this distinctive pirate era (1987 and
1988). Lloyd, in his introduction to Captain Johnson's Lives of the
Host Notorious Pirates, stated that "the decade following the War of 
the Spanish Succession [i.e. after 1714] saw the golden age of 
piracy" (Johnson [Defoe?] 1962, 9).
See note 79 below.
69 Estimates of New Providence’s pirate constituency during these 
years vary among historians. Karraker conjectured "a gathering of 
more than a thousand pirates" (1953, 176), while Williams claimed 
that "this ‘Pirate Rebublic' boasted a population of some 2,000 
desperate men" (1961, 150). Woodbury went so far as to suggest that 
the "roster of those who frequented New Providence at this time is 
the roster of piracy from 1716-1718" (1951, 81). A document
submitted to the British Board of Trade in 1717 stated that the 
combined crews of just five pirate captains there included 360 men 
(Craton 1962, 98), but the total pirate population must have been 
considerably larger. Based on the listing of about twenty New
Providence captains by 'Johnson', Albury estimated with the
assumption of seventy crewmen per commander that the combined number 
must have approached 1400 (1975, 65-67).
Lynam asserted that “the Island of the Holy Redeemer [San 
Salvador] was renamed...in memory of George Watling, a noted
buccaneer who had his temporary headquarters there" (1948, 244). 
Gosse previously had speculated that it was Captain John Watling,
one of the leaders in Sharp's South Sea venture, who left his name
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to island (1924, 313). The latter was killed in a retreat from 
Arica, on the Peruvian coast, in 1681. I have been unable to 
determine if John and George Watling were in fact the same person.
Watling Island, renamed San Salvador in 1926 because it was 
believed to have been thus christened during the 1492 voyage, may 
not have been the first landfall of Columbus afterall. A recent 
attempt by National Geographic's Joseph Judge to reenact the famous 
discovery suggests that Columbus' San Salvador may actually be 
Samana Cay, about 60 nautical miles southeast of Watling Island 
(Judge 1986, 566-77).
71 Now called the Isla de Juventud, or Isle of Youth.
72 Winzerling claimed that the buccaneer John Coxon settled on the 
south side of Roat&n at a small harbor now known as Coxon-Hole
(1946, 70). Davidson later pointed out, however, that no such place 
appeared on any map until 1843 (1974, 53). A draught compiled by 
Lieutenant Barnsely in 1742(a) shows a "Caulkett's Hole” on the 
southwest coast of Foat&n and a "Cockman's Creek" running to the 
mid-southern coast. As Davidson suggested, Coxon Hole may have 
derived from an earlier name such as one of these. Another "Map of 
the Island of Ratan" (1742b), anonymous but likely the work of
Barnsley, includes these same names in addition to a “Pyrats Cove" 
at the island's western tip. In any event, Davidson could uncover 
no evidence of extended habitation by Coxon or any other pirates; in 
fact, he contended, “The major significance of the buccaneers to the 
islands' landscape history from 1650 to 1741 was the prevention of 
permanent settlement" (1974, 53— emphasis added).
72 The cartographic history of the Falkland Islands is quite 
interesting and will be discussed further in Chapter 4.
74 Cony or coney strictly refers to the European rabbit. No true
member of the species was native to South America, but the
buccaneers applied the name ‘Indian Coney' to describe the rodent 
Dasyproata agouti (Joyce ed. [Wafer] 1934, 65, 65n).
75 Sea snails.
76 See note 28 above.
77 The buccaneers apparently declined to eat seal or sea-lion meat 
except as a last resort, though they did make use of the fat for 
cooking. Dampier mentioned that during Sharp’s visit to Juan 
Fernandez, the men had also fashioned dice from a sea lion's teeth 
(1927, 70). On a later voyage, William Fhnnell described the 
buccaneers' wantonly cruel treatment of these unlucky beasts:
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.. .when we wanted to kill one to make Oil, we used commonly 
to clap a Pistol just to his Mouth, as it stood open, and 
fire it down his Throat; but if we had a mind to have some 
Sport with him, which we called Lion-baiting; usually six, 
seven or eight, or more of us, would go with each a Half 
Pike in his Hand, and so prick him to death; which commonly 
would be a Sport for 2 or 3 Hours before we could conquer 
him (1729, 15-16).
78 Evidently the Spaniards' ploy had little effect. When Funnell 
arrived with Dampier in 1704, he found not wild dogs, but rather 
cats. The goats apparently remained as plentiful as ever (Funnell 
1729, 13).
78 Selkirk, perhaps via Robinson Crusoe, no doubt provided further 
inspiration for Stevenson's marooned character, Ben Gunn, in 
Treasure Island. John Moore, whose 1939 article first suggested 
that Defoe was the true author of Captain Johnson's Lives of the 
Host Notorious Pirates, pursued this interesting literary 
relationship further in "Defoe, Stevenson, and the Pirates" (1943).
80 Rival French privateers had chased away Dampier and Stradling in 
1704, and Funnell (aboard Dampier's St. George) recounted how in 
previous years French buccaneers had likewise based themselves at 
Juan Fernindez:
I have heard Captain Martin tell of some French Pirates who 
were in these Seas, that having been sometime cruizing up 
and down, and not meeting with a sufficient Booty, and being 
every where discovered by the Spaniards, ...concluded to 
come to the Island of Juan Fernando’s, they being 20 in 
number and there to lie 9 or 10 Months; which accordingly 
they did, and landed on the West-side of the Island, then 
drew their little Armadilla ashore, and in a small time 
brought the Goats to be so tame.. .that.. .many of them come 
of themselves to be milked; of which Milk they made good 
Butter and Cheese, not only just to supply their Wants 
whilst they were upon the Island, but also to serve them 
long after; and that...they launched their little Man of 
War, went upon the coast of Peru, and off the Bay of Arica 
met with a Spanish Ship and took her, in which was said to 
be two hundred thousand Pieces of Eight with about the value 
of half as much more in Gold double Doubloons (1729, 14).
81 Commodore George Anson, who captured a rich Manila galleon in 
1743, refreshed en route at Juan Fernandez (Lyon 1990, 25).
82 All of the maroonings on Juan Fernandez appear to have been 
either voluntary or accidental; elsewhere, however, such was not
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always the case. Prisoners, when not killed outright, posed real 
difficulties for their pirate captors. Kept aboard, they consumed 
already-scarce rations of food and water. Given boats, or landed 
within easy reach of civilization, they were sure to alarm the 
authorities and spoil the advantage of surprise. Moreover, in
sufficient numbers they constituted a potential threat to the safety
of crew and ship. The best solution, for those pirate leaders who 
retained a modicum of social conscience, was to maroon the 
unfortunates someplace where they could cause no mischief. As often 
as not the desolate spot offered little hope for timely rescue or 
prolonged sustenance. John Cockburn, captured off Jamaica by a one- 
handed freebooter named Henry Johnson, barely lived to relate his 
ordeal of being stranded, stark naked, on a barren isle in the Gulf 
of Honduras:
After we had been upon this island two hours, where we could 
perceive no possibility of subsistence, and inwardly 
lamenting our hard fate, .. .we saw the boat making towards 
us which had brought us thither; the sight of which raised 
different conjectures in our minds, supposing they had 
either relented, and were sending to fetch us back to the
ship, or else that they had resolved to dispatch us
immediately on the spot; but upon their approach we found 
ourselves both ways mistaken, for, presenting a naked man to 
us, whom they had brought under a strong guard, they told 
us, their business wa6 only to add one more to our number, 
and then throwing us some small pieces of beef, and some
biscuits, in a disdainful manner, which they said was more
than we deserved, they put off again (1817, 6-7).
The new arrival, as it turned out, was Johnson's gunner, banished by 
his superiors for contesting the division of spoil. Pirates, in
fact, never hesitated to maroon their own in punishment, as 
evidenced by the articles of the Revenge, John Philips commander:
If any man shall offer to run away, or keep any seoret from 
the company, he shall be marooned with one bottle of powder, 
one bottle of water, one small arm and shot.
If any man shall steal any thing in the oompany, or game, to
the value of a piece of eight, he shall be marroon'd or
shot.
If at any time we should meet another Marrooner (that is
pirate) that man shall sign his articles without the consent 
of our company, shall suffer such punishment as the captain 
and company shall think fit (in Williams 1961, 151).
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88 The Islas Juan Fernandez are a perfect example. Even Into the 
present century, "one of the principal exports of the Juan Ferndndez 
group was hummingbirds, hideously stuffed and mounted" (MacLiesh and 
Krieger, 1962, 120). Today the islands are home to a new breed of 
marooners— political prisoners from Chile.
8* Especially the one-to-two foot long remora, family Eoheneididae.
85 In addition, the Miskito Indians invented the ingenious method of 
catching sea turtles with live remora, or suckfish, tied to a line. 
The remora would attach themselves to a turtle’s belly just as they 
would to the bottom of a ship (Woodbury 1951, 107).
86 A Spanish cedula of 1672 authorized colonial governors to 
prosecute all unlicensed logwood traders as pirates (Wilson 1936, 
4). For an example of ill treatment given suoh interlopers, see 
Jonas Clough's account of his capture by Spaniards in 1679 (in
Thornton 1953, 31-38).
88 Though not quite worth its weight in gold, logwood was 
nevertheless compact, durable and "in the economic life of the
Caribbean area comparable to...a circulating medium of exchange." 
Spanish authorities rummaging for proof of illicit trade aboard 
British merchantmen searched for two items: logwood and pieces of 
eight (Wilson 1936, 8).
88 Strictly speaking, the aboriginal composition of Mosquitia ranged 
from the Sumus of Cape Gracias a Dios in the north to the Rama near 
Bluefields in the south. With the admixture of European and Negro 
blood after the 1630s, the Sumus surrounding the buccaneer 
settlement at Cape Gracias became known as Sambo-Miskitos (Floyd 
1967, 19-22). Among Englishmen, however, the entire Indian
population of this coast was and is commonly referred to as Miskito, 
Moskito, or Mosquito.
88 The coast appears to have taken its name from the interior 
Cockscomb (now Maya) Mountains, quite visible from the sea. That 
toponym describes perfectly well, however, the jagged shoreline of 
the eastern Yucatan, which is typical of a pirate coast.
80 Bluefields (or Blauvelt) led a varied and interesting career, the
known details of which appear in Chapter 3.
81 Although limited stands of logwood were formerly harvested in 
Mosquitia, mahogany emerged as the primary lumber export there and 
along the Cockscomb Coast (West and Augelli 1976, 294). Parsons 
categorically asserted that "On the Miskito Shore there was no 
logwood" (1954, 8), but Joseph maintained that "by 1675..-English
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buccaneers were taking up positions and felling trees...along the
Mosquito coast, past Cape Gracias a Dios, as far down as
«Bluefields»" (1974, 24).
92 After Piet Heyn, Jol was probably the most feared of the Dutch 
privateers operating in Spanish America. Because of his wooden leg 
the Spaniards knew him as Pie de Palo, not to be confused with the
earlier French corsair, Francois le Clerc, who bore the same
handicap and colorful sobriquet. For the details of Jol's dynamic 
career, see Goslinga's chapter (1971, 229-57).
93 Winzerling devoted a chapter to this effect (1946), and his 
assertions were more or less eohoed by Caiger (1951), Parsons (1964) 
and West and Augelli (1976, 293). Dobson, however, cautioned that 
such claims could not be substantiated from the records of the 
Providence Island Company (1973, 48-49).
94 Dobson amply illustrated, after the work of a Spanish historian, 
how the name Wallace or Willis might easily have been corrupted into 
the present Belize. He was also careful to point out that ‘Belize' 
might just as easily have derived from any of three Maya words: 
belakin— land towards the sea; balitza— land of the ItzA; or beliz—  
muddy waters (1973, 50-52).
955 Though not a crucial entrepot the magnitude of Veracruz, la Villa 
de San Franciso de Campeche posed the sole remaining target worth 
hitting on the Gulf coast. Corsair and buccaneer assaults there 
were frequent and merciless. The first sacking took place in 1597 
at the hands of William Parker. Later pirate attacks occurred under 
Cornelius Jol, Jan van Hoorn, Bartolom6 Portugu6s, Roche Rrasiliano, 
Lewis Scott, L'Olonnais, Laurens de Graff, and the Sieur de 
Grammont. Though fortifications for the harbor's defense were 
initiated in the early seventeenth century, these were not completed 
until 1704, by which time the dispersal of the buccaneers had 
rendered them a costly obsolescence (Von Winning 1950).
96 Even well into the seventeenth century such was not always the 
case. Dampier told of buccaneers who remained completely unaware of 
logwood's value. One such captain wasted much of his prize's cargo 
as firewood before he learned of its true worth (Dampier 1729, 
Vol.II, 47). Rayner Thrower's suggestion that logwood prizes tended 
to be discarded, however, is highly unlikely (see Thrower 1980, 69).
97 Though sometimes spelled TrJste, French for 'sad', the island 
most likely derived its name from tryst, or place of appointment. 
Today the entire barrier island is known as the Isla del Carmen. In 
Dampier's day it was the main anchorage for large ships; vessels of 
lesser draft could proceed through the bayous to One-Bush Key (1729, 
Vol.II, 17).
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99 Parsons noted this canal may have been the work of buccaneers, or 
it may have been constructed by the Spaniards after the 1641 
takeover (1964, 24). The rocky islet thus created became known as 
Santa Catalina, the former Spanish designation for all of 
Providencia.
99 This is sheer speculation on my part. My basis for this theory 
and the known details of Mansvelts’s career are treated further in 
Chapter 3.
The Curacao expedition was led by Joannes van Walbeeck and Pierre 
le Grand. I have found no correspondence, other than name, between 
this Pierre le Grand and the one of Dieppe, renowned as the first 
successful buccaneer of Tortuga (see Chapter 3).
191 The peace which ended the Thirty Years War and by which Spain 
finally recognized Dutch independence in the United Provinces.
*&2 Burney claimed, “In the conquest of Jamaica, the English were 
greatly assisted by the buccaneers" (1891, 62). Penn and Venables 
did pick up recruits from English-occupied Barbados, Montserrat, 
Nevis and St. Kitts, but the former occupations of these men remain 
unknown.
103 Captain Nathaniel Butler had governed Bermuda from 1619 to 1622 
before assuming the equivalent office on Old Providence in 1638. 
The first settler of New Providence, Captain William Sayle, had 
likewise held the governorship of Bermuda, intermittently, from 1641 
to 1662 (Lefroy 1981, xxxv-xxxvi). Sayle eventually became Governor 
of the Carolinas. Bermuda thus played a pivotal role in the early 
colonization efforts of the Providence Island Company and English 
settlement throughout the Americas. It also functioned prominently 
as a pirate stronghold, with great impact on piracy both in Anglo- 
and Spanish America. Regionally, the Bermudas lie beyond the 
geographical scope of our present study, but interested readers may 
refer to Wilkinson (1950) for his well-documented chapter on 
Bermudan piracy and privateering from 1689-1721.
Pirates Expelled Commerce Restored.
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Chapter 3
THE ACHILLES HEEL
Antes de La Tortuga 
no existieron, no pudieron exister. 
ni el buoanerisno ni el filibusterisno
— Manuel Arturo Pefia Battle 
La Is la de la Tortuga (1951)
187




Of all the pirates' strongholds in Spanish America, if any 
qualified as their "acropolis"1 it was the island-fortress of 
Tortuga, off the northern shore of Hispaniola. No other lair 
surpassed its combined qualities of rugged inaccessibility, lofty 
defenses, and isolation while offering safe harbor, fresh water, 
timber, hunting, and strategic command over important trade routes.
No buccaneer base survived with its tenacity; and no rovers' den, 
save maybe Port Royal, loomed as large in pirate lore for adventure, 
treachery, and excess. True, its Jamaican counterpart, perhaps 
owing to Port Royal's cataclysmic destruction by tremors so violent 
as to suggest Divine retribution, usurped for posterity much of the 
infamy which rightfully belonged to Tortuga. This small island was 
the nursery of buccaneers long before Jamaica was ever wrested from 
the Spaniards, and it prospered as their headquarters for years 
after Port Royal officially closed its gates to piracy.
According to the Spanish scholar Pefia Battle, the piratical 
network engendered by the buccaneers could never have evolved 
without Tortuga (1951, 123).2 That assessment may have been phrased 
too strongly, for the Spanish American bonanza was ripe for 
systematic plundering. Had Tortuga not emerged as the first pirate 
headquarters in the New World, some other rugged island surely would 
have. To say, however, that Tortuga facilitated the rise of the 
buccaneers, initially as an entrepbt for the hunters from 
Hispaniola, and thereafter as a fortified retreat when they turned
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pirate, is entirely correct. Moreover, during its piratical career, 
the island assumed center stage, both historically and 
geographically, of piracy in Spanish America. It is therefore quite 
fitting, as a miorooosmio application of our larger study, to 
examine Tortuga in detail as an archetypal pirate stronghold, both 
in its historical role as the nest of the buccaneers and as a 
geographical consequence of its physical attributes and strategic 
situation.
Early History as a Pirate Base
Christopher Columbus visited the island during the famous 
voyage of discovery. Here, it is known from a contemporary 
manuscript source, Columbus bestowed upon the island its present 
name,3 the Spanish for turtle, to commemorate catching a giant sea 
turtle there in 1492 (Parsons 1962, 37). The Spaniards made little 
effort to colonize the island. Perhaps its diminuitive size, like 
so many of the Lesser Antilles, they considered unworthy of 
consuming scarce manpower when larger, more tantalizing pearls still 
beckoned. But, as historian Pefia Battle pointed out,* it was their 
inattention to such "islas inUtiles " which ultimately corroded 
their American empire (1951, 107). In the century or so after 
Columbus' discovery, the Spaniards succeeded in introducing hogs and 
cattle to Tortuga and the northwest reaches of neighboring 
Hispaniola, but Spanish settlements failed to take root there.® By 
the beginning of the seventeenth century, these abandoned shores.
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teeming with feral pigs and cattle, attracted the first interlopers 
to molest the Spaniards from a foothold in their own domain, as co­
occupants of the New World. The early history of Tortuga as a 
buccaneer base is closely tied to that of other islands, namely: 
Hispaniola, the Antillean giant just to the south; St. Christopher
and Nevis, in the Leeward Islands to the east; and Providence
Island, well to the southwest, off the Miskito Shore. How elements 
from these diverse locales converged upon tiny Tortuga, striking out 
again to help dismantle Spain's hegemony in the Caribbean, provides 
a fascinating episode in the region's history.
By 1620 a remarkable blend of human flotsam had accumulated 
along the northern and western shores of Hispaniola. Dutch traders 
had become accustomed to exploiting the salt-pans at Cape St. 
Nicolas. French sailors had begun calling at the natural harbor
afforded by the island of Gonave, and English mariners had likewise
come to frequent Samana. Stragglers from all three nations—  
stranded, marooned, or shipwrecked crewmen; deserters; runaway bond 
servants and slaves; adventurers of all sorts— had collected on 
those coasts since their abandonment by the Spaniards (Newton 1933, 
168-71). There they coexisted more-or-less peacefully, wresting a 
savage subsistence from the land, mostly as hunters of the wild 
swine ana cattle introduced by Spanish settlers long before. These 
former sailors must have found little difficulty crossing the five- 
mile-wide channel between Hispaniola and Tortuga, for their hunting 
operations extended to the smaller island. Its southern coast they 
probably settled initially as a trading post where they exchanged 
hides, tallow, and cured meat for powder, shot, brandy, and other
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manufactured essentials supplied by passing interlopers, mostly 
Dutch (Newton 1933, 160-70; Haring 1910, 57-58).
We can picture the lifestyle of these earliest European 
hunters from descriptions of their heirs penned but a few decades 
later. According to French Jesuit chroniclers,® who worked among 
them from the mid-seventeenth century onwards, they eschewed 
permanent habitation, preferring to rendezvous wherever cattle and 
hogs were plentiful and to camp under the open sky. What rude, 
temporary structures they did erect were of Indian design, mere 
pole-frame sheds covered with leaves or skins (called ajoupm after 
the Indian term),"* which they used to protect hides and preserved 
meat from the rain until these could be bartered away to passing 
ships.
Their garb consisted of little more than a coarse-cloth shirt 
and pair of drawers, belted with a broad strip of undressed cowhide 
which secured three or four large knives and a pouch containing 
powder and shot. Often round the waist they also fastened a cloth 
sack in which to sleep at night for protection against biting 
insects. For a boot they simply allowed untreated skin from a cow 
or hog's leg to shrink to size round the foot, then bound it with 
sinewB or strips of leather. A peaked hat with a short, pointed 
brim topped off this grotesque outfit, the whole attire typically 
smeared black with old blood and grease from butchering. Completing 
this ensemble was their most important accessory, a long-barreled 
musket, the best of which were imported from Bordeaux or Nantes 
(Newton 1933, 170; Labat 1970, 175-76; Haring 1910, 68; Kemp and 
Lloyd 1960, 5; Besson 1929, 7-8).
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Figure 8: A Bouoaniejp— Huntsman Progenitor of the Buooaneer
(Engraving first published in the 1686 French edition of Exquemelin)
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Figure 9: A Bouaan, or Indian Smokehouse 
Adopted by the Boucaaxers
(Early eighteenth-century engraving, reprinted in Mitchell 1976)
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These were the men who first came to be known as boucaniers 
(see Figure 8), and they owed their name and their lore to the
Indians who preceded them. Most of the Indians who had inhabited 
Hispaniola® were quickly exterminated by the Spaniards. From
Alexandre Exquemelin, the pirate-surgeon who published a journal of 
his sojourn among the buccaneers from 1669 to 1674, we learn that 
along with the feral cattle, pigs, and horses which had overrun the 
island, there were also numerous wild dogs. These, he claimed, were 
descended from hounds imported by the Spaniards to track down 
rebellious Indians (1972, 40). He added that
Since that time, the Indians have been so terrified they 
dare not show themselves, and most of them have perished of 
hunger, having hidden themselves among the rocks out of
fear. I myself have seen caves in the mountains full of
human bones, which I would guess to be the bones of more 
than a hundred people; I have come across many such caves 
when hunting (1972, 40).
But one enduring Indian legacy which the European hunters adopted
was the art of the boucan,9 a wooden grill set in a small green-
thatched hut, used for slowly smoking and drying meat (see Figure
9). One of the best descriptions of the technique comes from the
charming narrative of the Jesuit missionary, P6re Labat. On a
voyage to Hispaniola in 1701 his ship stopped on the west coast to
barter with a company of hunters and exchanged, as in olden days,
powder, shot, cloth, and brandy for smoked meat and lard.
We arrived rather late at the hunter's bouoan. They had 
plenty of meat dried or being dried, and two or three pigs 
which they had killed that day, so we made a very hearty 
supper.
The meat is cured as follows. As soon as a pig is 
killed, it is cleaned and the meat cut into as long strips 
as possible. These strips, which are about one and a half 
inches thick, are then powdered with salt,1® and left for
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twenty-four hours. After this the salt is brushed off. and 
the strips are laid flat on shelves made of lathes in the 
boucan. This boucan is a little dome-shaped hut. or ajoupa 
made of leaves. A fire is lighted on the floor of the 
boucan. on which is thrown the skin and bones of the animal. 
These make a thick pungent smoke that penetrates the meat, 
which eventually becomes so dry that it is as hard as a 
board.**
The strips are then taken out and tied up in bundles of 
100 pounds each. In former days a bundle was worth three 
pieces of eight... (1970, 176-77).
Apparently the technique was not much changed from the time of
Exquemelin,12 who in addition mentioned that the hunters would
accumulate twenty or thirty hundred-weight of dried meat before
hauling it off to trade, and that a pound of boucanned meat could
fetch two pounds of tobacco (1970, 49).
The islands must indeed have fairly abounded with feral game
which the boucaniers slaughtered in great quantities (41).
Apparently the hunters specialized, tracking down either bulls for
hides or hogs for meat. After spending a year or more hunting in
the forests of Hispaniola, they would repair to Tortuga, which by
Exquemelin's time was a fully established port town— with all the
usual accoutrements:
When they arrive, they squander in a month all the money 
which has taken them a year or eighteen months to earn. They 
drink brandy like water, and will buy a whole cask of wine, 
broach it, and drink until there's not a drop left. Day and 
night they roam the town, keeping the feast of Bacchus so 
long as they can get drink for the money. The service of 
Venus13 is not forgotten, either. In fact, the tavern- 
keepers and whores make ready for the coming of the hunters 
... in the same way as their fellows in Amsterdam prepare for 
the arrival of the East India ships... Once their money is 
all spent and they've had all they can on credit, back they 
go to the woods again, where they remain for another year or 
eighteen months (45).
How long these hunting progenitors of the piratical 
buccaneers, if unprovoked, would have remained peaceful toward their
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Spanish 'hosts' is impossible to say. but in time the convergence of 
various events urged them to turn their sights upon members of their 
own species. Above all was the threat to their livelihood imposed 
by dwindling herds of wild swine and cattle. Their own hunting 
strategy was hardly conservatory; Exquemelin claimed that a single 
hunting party would sometimes shoot a hundred pigs in one morning, 
"only to take seven or eight of them, beoause in general they prefer 
to have sows" (49). He estimated that over the course of eighty-one 
years, 1500 swine had been killed every day. Moreover, the hunters 
had to compete with the packs of wild dogs which also roamed the 
island, devouring calves and piglets, and occasionally bringing down 
even large animals. Finally, the Spaniards, in an effort to stamp 
out a growing foreign presence which centered on the hunting trade, 
sought first to destroy their mainstay (39-41). Nor did they 
confine their lances to the wild herds, but turned upon the 
perceived poachers as well.14
By around 1630, Tortuga seems to have become an established 
trading settlement not only for the hunters, but also for 
planters,1® and, in increasing numbers, freebooters (fJiJbus tiers). 
The last of these, mostly English, enlarged their ranks with 
recruits from the AtftfcimfAn-hunters, mostly French. Thus by thi6 
stage their names16 and occupations had begun to overlap, and the 
buccaneer, to quote Haring, “combined in himself the occupations of 
cow-killing and cruising, varying the monotony of one by 
occassionally trying his hand at the other. In either case he lived 
at constant enmity with the Spaniards" (1910, 67). Late in 1630 or 
early in 1631, ̂  a Spanish force from Santo Domingo occupied the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
197
fledgling settlement at Tortuga and installed a small garrison 
manned with about 25 soldiers. Soon afterwards, however, in the 
face of opposition those unfortunates gladly dispossessed themselves 
of the isolated post (Charlevoix 1733, tom.3, 10; Haring 1910, 58). 
It is from about this time that the tiny entrepot rebounded, with 
infusions from St. Christopher and Providence Island— but not 
without further resistance from the Spaniards— to become a pirate 
stronghold.
While the buccaneers were establishing themselves on 
Hispaniola and Tortuga, the governments of France, England, and the 
Netherlands were scrambling . for official colonial footholds 
elsewhere in the Caribbean. The first English colony was St. Kitts 
(St. Christopher), settled in 1623 and partitioned two years later 
to accommodate the first regular French colonists. Barbados 
received its first English settlers in 1627, and both the Dutoh and 
English ingressed jointly upon Santa Cruz (St. Croix) by 1625. 
Within three years English colonists from St. Kitts spread out to 
Nevis and Barbuda and by 1632 reached Antigua and Montserrat, while 
in that same year the French occupied Dominica, and the Dutch took 
St. Eustatius (Lucas 1905, 47-51; Harlow, ed. 1923, xiii n). The 
nature of these colonies was fundamentally different from the little 
hornet's nest growing up unchecked on Tortuga. Sanctioned by their 
respective crowns, they served defined national and corporate ends, 
and their inhabitants were primarily interested in planting and 
trade. Tobacco provided the first cash crop, later supplanted by 
sugar.
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The Spaniards, in any event, must have regarded the rapidity 
and implied permanancy of these incremental incursions with rage and 
anxiety. In 1629, under orders to protect the annual fleet between 
Cartagena and Vera Cruz, a formidable armada sailed from Spain under 
the command of Don Federico de Toledo. He was ordered, as an 
ancillary maneuver on the outward voyage, to clear out the French 
and English squatters on St. Kitts and Nevis. With thirty-five 
galleons he easily subdued the new colonies, making prisoners of the 
settlers, destroying their crops, and burning their houses. Most of 
the French and about 300 of the English escaped to the interior or 
nearby islands, but nearly 700 English captives, though graciously 
spared,** were compelled to return to England (Newton 1933, 160). 
Most of those who had fled returned in short order to renew their 
pursuits on St. Kitts and Nevis, but a sizeable contingent of the 
escapees, presumably both French and English, made their way to 
Tortuga to join the buccaneers. These were later augmented by Dutch 
refugees, similarly ousted from Santa Cruz (Lucas 1905, 54-55;
Barskett 1972, 56-57; Haring 1910, 58).
Among certain colonists of St. Kitts and Nevis there appears 
to have been considerable interest in the little buccaneer 
settlement at Tortuga. In fact, the founding governor of Nevis, a 
mariner named Anthony Hilton, whose "acquaintance among the rovers 
of all nationalities was more extensive and peculiar than wa6 
fitting even in those days of laxity," organized the first attempt 
to colonize Tortuga (Newton 1914, 103). While petitioning in
England to secure his governership of Nevis, Hilton learned of 
Toledo's reduction of that colony. Already in financial straits
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with respect to his venture there, he returned to Nevis in 1630 only 
long enough to gather up a few followers, French and English, to 
seek their fortune at Tortuga (103). Apparently they favored the 
new abode, for they dispatched representatives to London to seek 
corporate backing for developing a plantation colony there. Support 
was readily secured from the Providence Company, a Puritan 
establishment bolstered by Henry and Robert Rich, the Earls, 
respectively, of Holland and Warwick. They already held colonial 
interests in the Bermudas, as well as a small island off the 
Nicaraguan coast which bore the company’s name; this Providence 
Island was developing at the same time as Tortuga into a lively base 
of operations for privateers. To include Tortuga, the Earl of 
Holland petitioned King Charles I to enlarge the northern limits of 
the company’s prior domain,̂ ® and a new grant was drawn up 
accordingly in June of 1631.
The Providence Company assumed the bulk of the cost to fortify 
Tortuga with a magazine and six guns, and Captain Hilton was 
appointed governor, with Christopher Wormeley his lieutenant (104- 
5). The colony at this time consisted of about 150 persons, and it 
was agreed that the Providence Company should receive twenty percent 
of all commodities produced there (Haring 1910, 59). To commemorate 
the new arrangement, the name of the island was officially changed 
to Association. The largest hoped-for profits would derive not from 
tobacco plantations, but from the harvest of logwood, which grew 
naturally in abundance, for sale to the European dye industry. 
Although some additional settlers arrived from England with the 
ordnance in the summer of 1631, it was decided to recruit most of
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the needed workers from other colonies, especially Nevis and St. 
Kitts. Few heeded the call. A planter by the name of Samuel Filby 
arrived with his entourage from St. Kitts in 1632, but the company 
found it impossible to entice sufficient numbers of workmen from the 
other islands to cut logwood. Meanwhile, Dutch and French 
interlopers were clearing large quantities of the wood, for which 
Governor Hilton extracted a personal oommission on the side. 
Hilton's suitability to govern the colony was seriously questioned 
by the Providence Company. Not only did he collaborate with rovers 
and rival woodcutters, but also, according to Filby's accusation, he 
confiscated the colony's entire tobacco crop for his own profit 
(Newton 1914, 152). Despite continuous squabbling among invested 
parties about the deteriorating state of affairs, a second magazine 
was installed in 1632, and the following year it was agreed to 
procure African slave labor from Dutch traders to cut the company's 
logwood (106-9).
By 1634 the colony at Tortuga remained "very poor and 
struggling" (Haring 1910, 60); and within the year, nearly all the 
emigrants from England succumbed to fever (Newton 1914, 152). But 
the buccaneers who used the island's harbor as a base for their 
rowings appear to have thrived well enough, stinging the Spaniards 
at Cuba, San Domingo, and Puerto Rico (192). The previous year, an 
English trading ship, Hunter, had turned privateer en route to 
Tortuga, bringing in two Spanish prizes captured in the Canary 
Islands. In Tortuga, one of these was converted to a man of war by 
the buccaneers, who cruised with it for additional Spanish prey in 
the Mona and Windward passages. Returning to Tortuga for fresh
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water and supplies, they made the island "a headquarters for their 
piratical enterprise" (153). Hilton continued his connivance with 
buccaneers and interlopers, but it was rumored that he intended to 
abandon the colony altogether for more lucrative pursuits. The 
colonists grew despondent, and the Providence Company had to offer 
them special incentives to dissuade them from "changing certain ways 
of profit already discovered for uncertain hopes suggested by fancy 
or persuasion" (Colonial State Papers, America & West Indies, 1574- 
1660, 174-75, quoted in Haring 1910, 60). Hilton died before he 
could be replaced and was succeeded by Wormeley, who likewise 
directed most of his energies toward exacting his personal 6hare of 
booty brought in by privateers. The incipient colony had regressed 
once again into little more than a pirate hold, and the Spanish 
authorities at Santo Domingo were once again determined to stamp it 
out (Newton 1914, 192, 192n).
In 1634 they got their chance. An Irish renegade from 
Tortuga, whom the Spaniards called Don Juan Morf (John Murphy?), had 
quit the colony in disgruntlement and gone over to Santo Domingo. 
Apparently he had quite an axe to grind, for he provided the 
Spaniards with the necessary intelligence to plan an attack on 
Tortuga, and he planned to take an active role. By the end of the 
year a force of 250 footsoldiers prepared to sail under the command 
of Don Buy Fernindez de Fuenmayor. The armadilla reached Tortuga in 
January of 1635; but upon attempting to penetrate the harbor, which 
afforded only a narrow channel of sufficient depth, all the ships 
were stranded upon offshore reefs. Their unfortunate entry allowed 
Governor Wormeley2* and several of his associates enough time to
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island’s inhabitants were left to fend for themselves. Meanwhile,
Fuenmayor had managed to land about thirty of his men in canoes and 
overtook the battery of six cannon with little difficulty. 
Afterwards, reinforced with 200 more soldiers from the ships, he 
advanced on the settlement. Before the invasion, the population of 
Tortuga had grown, at least by the Spanish account, to include six
hundred arms-bearing men, plus slaves, women, and children.^ The
first seventy or so captured were quickly put to the sword, but a 
few, more fortunate colonists, like Wormeley made their escape under 
sail. Fuenmayor’s troops occupied the island for about a month, 
razing houses, burning the tobacco plantations, and hunting down 
fugitives who had fled to the interior. Those who were caught and 
those who surrendered were summarily hanged (Haring 1910, 60-61;
Newton 1914, 192-93; Crouse 1940 82-83).
The Spanish massacre pretty much ended the brief tenure of
Tortuga, or Association, as an English colony. The Providence
Company made some efforts to re-establish control there, but these
proved futile. In 1635 the company appointed Nicholas Reskeimer (or 
Riskinner) as governor of Association. His party, including some 
survivors of the Spanish attack who had escaped to England on the 
William and Anne, arrived at the island in the Expectation that year 
with ”30 muskets, 10 pistols, 2 pieces of ordnance, 33 barrels of 
powder, shot and match, 30 swords, [and] a drum and flag" to defend 
the settlement against the Spaniards (Newton 1914, 211-12, 212n).
Reskeimer died of fever soon after his arrival, and the remaining 
eighty English settlers formed an interim council to await a new
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governor, who never arrived. They found themselves unable to 
subjugate the island's hundred-and-fifty Negroes. Many of these 
escaped to the interior or were captured and sold by the French, who 
had begun refrequenting the island for logwood and salt. By 1637, 
the English oolonists, having returned to hunting for a livelihood, 
abandoned Tortuga altogether and crossed the channel to try their 
luck on Hispaniola.23
Six years after its initial investment in the island, the 
Providence Company finally abandoned any attempt to develop a colony 
on Tortuga (Newton 1914, 213-16; Haring 1910, 62). Although the 
island's association with the Providence Company failed as a 
corporate venture, it provided a critical formative stage in 
Tortuga's evolution as a major pirate base. It had been, to quote 
Newton, "perhaps the strangest alliance that the islands have ever 
seen— an association between strict and godly Puritans... and the 
'cow-killers' or buccaneers of Hispaniola who were notorious for 
their licentious and bloodthirsty savagery" (1933, 168). But the 
Puritan colonists demonstrated, as had the Elizabethan corsairs 
before them, a remarkable penchant for combining piety and piracy 
with commensurate zeal. Privateering played an integral role in the 
commercial efforts of the Providence Company's oolonists, both 
around Tortuga and in the western Caribbean from their base on 
Providence Island. But more important than reinforcing a piratical 
bent at Tortuga, which had probably developed there to a 
considerable degree already, the incorporation of the island into 
the Puritan colonial network greatly expanded the operating range of 
Tortuga's buccaneers.
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As the Providence Company extended its influence in the 
•western Caribbean, through trade with the Indians and privateering 
exploits along the entire coast of Central America, exposure by 
association with the company to new places, native allies, and more 
vulnerable Spanish targets no doubt fueled the knowledge and 
ambitions of the buccaneers. Important contacts must have been made 
with men such as Blauvelt (Bluefields), the Dutch pirate who began 
as a shipwright on Providence Island, explored the recesses of the 
Miskito Shore, sailed to England in 1637 as mate of the Expectation 
to report his findings to the Providence Company (Newton 1914, 272- 
74), later maintained a trading and privateering outpost among the 
Indians at Cape Gracias a Dios, and may still have been sailing 
among the buccaneers of Tortuga and Jamaica as late as 1663 (Haring 
1910, 273).24 The stage was now set, in other words, for Tortuga to 
transform from a localized source of irritation to seat of regional 
threat. But first it would have to be fortified against further 
Spanish reprisal.
Adventurers of mixed nationalities inevitably filtered back to 
the deserted settlement; some returned from Hispaniola across the 
narrow channel, while others drifted in from islands more distant. 
Perhaps forty Frenchmen were holding the island when a fresh 
infusion of three hundred English arrived from Nevis and St. Kitts 
under the leadership of William Summers. Because the English 
outnumbered the French, the settlers selected as their chief a 
Captain Roger Floud, former sheriff on Providence Island. He soon 
proved most unpopular, however, and was replaced by a certain James, 
who bestowed upon himself the title of president. James wanted to
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restore the colony to the aegis of the Providence Company, but owing 
to his brutal treatment of the French contingent, he never got the 
opportunity to do so (Newton 1914, 280; Crou6e 1940. 84, Vaissifere, 
quoting de Poinoy, 1909, 375).
At least one disgruntled Frenchman had slipped away to St. 
Christopher to urge the French governor, G6n6ral de Poincy, to 
liberate his compatriots and seize Tortuga for France. The governor 
recognized a perfect opportunity not only to increase his country's 
holdings in the West Indies, but also to divest his own colony of an 
embarrassing number of Huguenots. These immigrants, had he strictly 
complied with the colony's charter, should never have been allowed 
there. Many of the French Protestants had arrived in the Indies 
after the capitulation of their last stronghold in France, La 
Rochelle, in 1628. Among St. Christopher's most prominent 
Huguenots, however, a Monsieur Le Vasseur2® had oome with the 
founding settlers in 1625 and made himself a valued, but overly 
visible advisor to the governor. Le Vasseur’s specialty was 
engineering fortresses, and it was he who agreed2® to head a force 
of Huguenots against Tortuga and, if successful, to become its new 
governor. In the spring of 1640, Le Vasseur and forty-nine others 
set out with the design of taking Tortuga, but their barque sailed 
first to Port-Margot,27 on the north side of Hispaniola. There they 
remained for three months to reoonnoiter the situation, meanwhile 
recruiting another forty or fifty men from among the bucaniers. Le 
Vasseur then visited the English commander (presumably President 
James)2® and the two pretended to good relations. On the last day 
of August,2® however, on the pretext that the English had abused his
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countrymen and had previously confiscated one of de Poincy’s barques 
without warrant, Le Vasseur surprised their settlement and took 
prisoner their chief. Bewildered by this sudden turn of events, the 
English fled while Le Vasseur. against their return, immediately set 
to barricading the place. Seeing their opponents, few as they were, 
so determinedly entrenched and ready to defend their ground, the 
English removed to Hispaniola. A few days later they returned, and 
in a last attempt to recoup their loss, besieged the settlement for 
ten days, but to no avail. Le Vasseur then set forth his terms 
before the English commander: depart fully within twenty-four hours, 
or no quarter would be given to any who remained. Packing what 
belongings they could, off they sailed in a barque bound for
Providence Island, leaving Le Vasseur in full possession of the
desolate little island and three small oannon left behind by the 
English (De Poincy, in Vaissifcre 1909, 375-78; Du Tertre 1667, tom. 
1, 169-71; Charlevoix 1733, tom.3, 14-15; Haring 1910, 63-64; Newton 
1914, 282; Crouse 1940, 86-87).
Le Vasseur wasted no time employing his skills as a military 
engineer to fortify the island. The Spaniards, he resolved, would 
have no chance to uproot him as they had the English five years 
earlier. Ingeniously, he transformed the rooky heights of the
island into an inviolable stronghold30 with several cannon 
commanding the harbor. Upon the loftiest and most inaccessible
point of the citadel he fashioned his personal “ colombier," or 
dovecote, from which he could personally espy any approach to the 
settlement (Lepers 1925, 18-19). The boucaaiers and pirates were
most impressed with his exploit and, now that the port was secure.
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called at Tortuga in ever greater numbers. Le Vasseur reserved for 
himself, of course, a handsome share of their profits.31 The 
Spaniards, to be sure, became increasingly irritated about the 
resurrection of the little buccaneers’ nest; and in 1643 a new 
punitive force, this time composed of six ships and about six 
hundred troops, sailed from Santo Domingo determined to destroy it 
yet again. All confidence, Le Vasseur allowed their fleet to clear 
the mouth of the harbor and approach well within range of the fort 
before giving the order to fire. The first salvo sank one of the 
principal vessels on the spot, and the other ships removed downshore 
to a safer anchorage near Cayone,33 some miles away from the guns. 
There they landed the company of six hundred and prepared to storm 
the fortress by land, but never reached it. An ambush set by Le 
Vasseur's men snared over a hundred of them, and the rest fled back 
to the ships, departing the next day for Santo Domingo (Du Tertre 
1667, tom.l, 172; Charlevoix 1733, tom.3, 16-17; Lepers 1925, 19).
Le Vasseur appears to have started out, at least, as a very 
capable administrator and ruled over Tortuga for another nine years 
without further molestation from Spain or any other nation.
Nominally, of course, he maintained custody of the island as an 
agent of Governor-General de Poinoy, in the name of his Catholic 
Majesty. In practice, however, he consolidated his power by
courting rovers and adventurers of all nations, and conferred
special privileges upon Protestants, especially Huguenots like 
himself. As the port prospered, Le Vasseur accumulated great
personal wealth, but his authoritarian and maverick polioies 
engendered considerable jealosy and opposition, both internally and
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from higher authorities abroad. If we are to credit the reports of
the Jesuit chroniclers, who likely harbored little sympathy for the
heretic, Le Vasseur's behavior lapsed from despotic to despicable.
He began by persecuting Catholics in the settlement, first by
prohibiting public demonstration of their faith and then by burning
their chapel and expelling their priests.33 He also imposed
excessive taxes on hides brought to Tortuga by the bouoaaiers, and,
according to Du Tertre, instituted much worse praotioes:
He became so severe as to punish the least transgressions of 
his people with a large contraption of iron.3* in which he 
made them insert their heads, feet, and hands: & this
agonizing machine was always lowered so that a man became 
entirely bent, putting him in incredible pain. He had named 
this device L'Enfer, and his fort, where he maintained the 
prison, Le Purgatoire (Du Tertre 1667, tom.l, 173— author's 
translation).
Neither did Le Vasseur make any effort to endear himself to his 
superior on St. Christopher. Soon after Le Vasseur's victory over 
the Spaniards, de Poincy began to fear that he himself would face 
serious implication were this man overtly to proclaim an independent 
Huguenot colony on Tortuga. The Governor-General decided he must 
lure his former associate away from his lair so that he could be
replaced. To this end he dispatched his own nephew. Monsieur de
Lonvilliers, ostensibly to congratulate Le Vasseur on his recent 
successes and to request his immediate return to St. Christopher,
where de Poincy urgently required his assistance for establishing
yet another stronghold on Hispaniola. Le Vasseur, undaunted by this 
obvious ruse, received his visitor with all due honors but insisted 
that duty compelled him to oversee the island's defenses against the 
likely return of the Spaniards. Sensing his true design had been
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discerned, Lonvilliers thought best to return to St. Christopher 
empty handed, but still in one piece. The contempt with which 
Tortuga‘a strongman regarded his superiors only grew with time. At 
one point he ridiculed de Poincy's demand for a great silver statue 
of the Virgin Mary, appropriated by his men from a Spanish prize. 
Protestants, de Poincy had reminded him, could have no use for such 
a statue. Catholics, Le Vasseur replied ceremoniously, were far too 
spiritual to attach themselves to material objects, but he himself 
derived certain satisfaction from Our Lady's silver (174; Charlevoix 
1733, tom. 3, 20-21).
Le Vasseur so alienated those around him that a reprisal from 
one side or another was inevitable. De Poincy remained insulted and 
enraged, especially since a reallotment of the French West Indies 
between 1647 and 1649 had transferred nominal title of Tortuga to 
the Knights of Malta, of which he himself was a representative 
(Roberts 1942, 46). With the arrival at St. Christopher in 1652 of 
a heavily armed royal frigate, commanded by de Fontenay— a Chevalier 
of his own order— de Poincy recognized an opportunity to rectify his 
past mistake. If de Fontenay would lead an expedition to remove the 
heretic, the governor-general proposed to award him governorship of 
Tortuga, half the land, and a tax of fifty pounds of tobacco per 
inhabitant. In addition, de Poincy and the knight would split the 
fabulous hoard that Le Vasseur had accumulated after twelve years of 
skimming from the buccaneers. Fontenay accepted these terms with 
enthusiasm, and secret preparations to unseat the despotic Huguenot 
began in earnest. Under the pretext of launching a raid against the 
Spaniards, which he actually accomplished with great success at
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Cartagena, he was to sail with his men to Port a l'Ecu, about ten 
miles across the channel from Tortuga, on the north coast of 
Hispaniola. There he would rendezvous with forces led by Monsieur 
de Treval, a nephew of de Poincy who would join in the attack (Du 
Tertre 1667, tom.l. 176-77, 591-92; Crouse 1940, 90-91).
While de Poincy was executing these plans to oust Le Vasseur, 
domestic turmoil was also coming to a boil on Tortuga. Le Vasseur, 
like many of his buccaneers, lacked direct blood desoendents and had 
arranged, perhaps in keeping with the coutume de la c o t e for two 
of his favorite captains, Tibaut and Martin, to become his heirs.
This matelotage A trois eventually bred discord when Le Vasseur 
began helping himself to the favors of Tibaut's mistress, and the 
enraged adoptee plotted with his oo-inheritor to murder Le Vasseur. 
Killing their benefactor would only hasten their joint inheritance, 
or so they reasoned, and the French king and Coapagaie would 
certainly pardon— perhaps even reward them— for restoring the colony 
from the clutches of such an undesirable. Le Vasseur, oblivious to 
the converging forces destined to destroy him, descended from his 
eyrie for a routine inspection of the magazine, where a small group 
of conspirators, led by Tibaut and Martin, lay in wait. A discharge 
of muskets, followed by thrusts from 6p6e and poinard, finally laid 
low the tyrant of Tortuga.36 His treacherous heirs assumed 
possession of the dovecote and all the goods he had collected there 
(Du Tertre 1667, tom.l, 174-75).
When word of the assassination37 crossed the channel, de 
Fontenay and Treval left no time to waste, weighing anchor at once 
to seize an opportunity from this moment of chaos. They expected to
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meet full resistance, and unlike the Spaniards before, were not 
surprised to find their ships fired upon as they entered the harbor. 
These too were constrained to land at Cayone, where they disgorged 
five hundred soldiers with no resistance from the habitants. The 
assassins, it turned out, oould garner no support from the colonists 
and capitulated under two conditions: that they not be prosecuted 
for killing Le Vasseur and that they be allowed to retain their 
property in peace. The Chevalier de Fontenay accepted these terms 
and took possession of the fortress and island without bloodshed 
(177-78).
De Fontenay wa6 the first to assume the official title of . 
Gouverneur pour le Roi de la Tortue & Cote Saint Domingue. Under 
his energetic administration, commerce and Catholicism were fully 
restored, settlers were attracted, additional defense works were 
constructed, and the colony grew. By 1653, according to a Spanish 
account, Tortuga was home to approximately 700 French, 200 Negroes, 
and 250 Indians, including wives and children (Haring 1910, 82,
82n). Like his predecessors, the Chevalier continued to encourage 
piratical excursions against the Spaniards and soon enlisted his 
younger brother. Monsieur Hotman, to assist him in such enterprises. 
The shipping of Santo Domingo and Cartagena, in particular, 
sustained such intolerable losses from Tortuga's buccaneers that the 
colonial Spanish authorities resolved once again to uproot them. In 
November of 1653, Don Gabriel Boxas de Valle-Figueroa was selected 
to lead an armed flotilla of five warships and several smaller 
craft, with a force of 180 well-trained soldiers poised for the 
assault. Bad luck attended their departure, for the ships were
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January of 1654, only the Capitana and the Almirante reached
Tortuga. En route they had captured two buccaneer vessels, but a 
third had escaped to warn the colony of the impending attack.
Upon approaching the main harbor the Spanish ships were
greeted, according to the established pattern, with heavy 
bombardment from the fort. Cayone, to the leeward, served onoe
again as anchorage for the intruding forces and as a landing for
their troops (82-83; Crouse 1940, 93). The Chevalier sent his
brother and about fifty men to intercept their advance, but the
Spanish marines were too numerous and effectively covered by their 
ships' ordnance. Hotman's men withdrew first to a nearby hill from 
vhioh they oould maintain fire, but were eventually obliged to
retreat to the safety of the fort. For three uneventful days Don 
Gabriel laid siege below, determining how best to assail this 
unassailable citadel. The stone bastions abutted directly against a 
steep rocky rise which itself appeared unsurmountable. But, as Don 
Gabriel was about to prove, against sufficient ingenuity and
manpower no fortress is absolutely 6ecrure. Availing himself of 
several resident slaves, he compelled these to scale the mountain 
during the night with eight-or-so cannon barrels attached to their 
backs on makeshift frames. At dawn, a Spanish cannon ball directed 
at the French governor’s residence informed him that the enemy had 
succeeded in mounting a small battery right over his head. The 
Spaniards proceeded to blow the once-proud ’dovecote' to 
smithereens, but de Fontenay, undaunted, removed to the terrace 
below. There he commanded his men to construct a breastwork of
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earth and timber to withstand the onslaught from above. This they 
accomplished during the night and to good effect, but the following 
day the Spaniards simply moved their battery to a different summit 
and renewed their bombardment from a fresh, unobstructed angle. 
Once again. Monsieur Hotman charged the enemy position with fifty 
men, but in the end his assault proved ineffectual. The siege and 
fighting continued, in all, for nine days. Both sides were wearing 
thin (Haring 1910 82-83; Crouse 1940, 93-94).
De Fontenay, it appears, stood ready to defend at all oost6, 
but his charges, who had grown weary of "eating rotten biscuits that 
stank of rats' urine," pressed him to surrender (Le Golif 1954, 28). 
After violently rebuking these petitioners, some of whom had begun 
collaborating with the enemy,®8 the Chevalier offered to capitulate 
given full honors of war. Don Gabriel graciously complied. The 
French were allowed to evacuate the island in two ships, and the 
Spaniards proceeded to raze the settlement. Once having installed a 
garrison of 150 men to keep the island out of buccaneer hands, Don 
Gabriel sailed back to Santo Domingo with Monsieur Hotman as 
hostage. Upon his release several months later, the brother 
rejoined the Chevalier at Port Margot, where de Fontenay enlisted 
the aid of a Dutch trader in an ill-fated attempt to regain Tortuga. 
After a lengthy siege and several unsuccessful engagements with the 
Spanish garrison, he withdrew, sailed for France, and died shortly 
thereafter (Haring 1910, 83-84, 113).
The Spaniards were not long to possess the rocky isle, for in 
1655 all available hands were needed to meet the attack of Admiral 
Penn and General Venables. Initiating his 'Western Design' in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
214
December of the previous year, Oliver Cromvell had dispatched these 
two in command of a formidable fleet and landing force to secure for 
England a significant foothold in the West Indies. Hispaniola was 
their primary target, but after two unsuccessful attempts against 
the city of Santo Domingo, the English had to content themselves 
with capturing poorly defended Jamaica (85-87).
The signifioanoe of this expedition, as far ae it concerned 
Tortuga, was threefold. Most immediately, it prompted the President 
of San Domingo to recall the Spanish garrison from Tortuga to help 
succour the capital. The soldiers were instructed to destroy the 
fort, bury the ordnance, and proceed to his defense at Santo 
Domingo. Before abandoning the smaller island, however, the captain 
of the garrison posted a proclamation, both in Spanish and marginal 
English, forbidding further settlement of Tortuga by any nation 
whatsoever (113-14).^ In addition, the English conquest of Jamaica 
eventually extended the buccaneer network with the establishment of 
Port Royal as a second major pirate base in the Antilles. The 
buccaneers, deprived of their port at Tortuga, faced continual 
harassment on Hispaniola from the Spanish Cinquaotaine.*** Many of 
them, particularly English rovers, assisted their countrymen in 
holding Jamaica and ohose to remain there. It waB from this time 
that the rival pirate strongholds served increasingly toward 
respective national interests, Tortuga for the French, and Port 
Royal for the English (Charlevoix 1733, tom.3, 34; Kemp and Lloyd 
1960, 8-9). Before that, however, Tortuga was to experience yet 
another change in governance, and that too resulted directly from 
the Jamaican conquest.
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The Spaniards, according to the proclamation they left behind, 
fully evacuated Tortuga by August of 1656. Later that year an 
English adventurer, Elias Watts,** arrived from Jamaica and secured 
from William Brayne, the new Commissioner of that island, authority 
to re-settle Tortuga. He began with just his family and about a 
dozen other colonists, erecting a small battery of four guns upon 
the ruins of the old French fort. Soon an additional 150 colonists 
reinforced the settlement, and Tortuga once again grew as a haven 
for French and English buccaneers. By 1659, enough rovers had 
mustered to launch a substantial attack against the Spaniards. 
Their target was the prosperous town of Santiago, located about 
thirty miles inland from Puerto Plata on the north coast of 
Hispaniola.
A force of nearly 400 buccaneers, mostly French and under the 
leadership of a French captain, requisitioned a frigate from Nantes 
and embarked for Puerto Plata under a commission from Watts. Like 
his predecessors, the English governor looked to a share in the 
booty, and he gladly authorized the expedition under the pretext of 
avenging the former Spanish capture and execution of a few French 
sailors from Tortuga. In sharp contrast to the sacredness of the 
season, the buccaneers landed at Puerto Plata on Palm Sunday and 
began their march through the forest, reaching the environs of 
Santiago by evening on Holy Wednesday. Before the break of dawn 
they surprised the town, killing about thirty of the inhabitants and 
setting ransom for the life of the terrified governor at 60,000 
pieces of eight. The first installment was paid at once in leather 
and hides, with the balance to be paid in silver. According to
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their usual fashion, the buccaneers proceeded to loot the town’s 
church and households for valuables while expecting the unfortunate 
townsfolk to raise enough silver for the ransom. Employing their 
typical response, the Spaniards used this time to organize a 
resistance against the invaders. Before long, over a thousand 
Spanish inhabitants from the surrounding countryside had assembled 
to out off the buooaneers’ retreat; but the latter, always excellent 
marksmen, finally shot their way through and recovered their boats 
after threatening to kill all hostages. When the remainder of the 
promised ransom failed to materialize, the buccaneers released their 
prisoners and returned to Tortuga, where each man received 300 
crowns as his share (Haring 1910, 114-15; Crouse 1943, 122-25).
Though the government of Tortuga, as an appendage of Jamaica, 
fell again nominally under English control, the strength of the 
colony clearly remained with its French contingent, and the French 
were keenly aware of their loss. As early as 1656, a former
habitant under Le Vasseur and de Fontenay had secured a commission 
from Louis XIV to regain Tortuga for Franoe. Seeing hi6 design 
thwarted by Watte and his English commission, this influential
adventurer, whose full appellation was J6r6mie Deschamps de Moussao 
et du Rausset, traveled to England late in 1659 and convinced the 
Council of State to make him governor instead. In 1660 reached 
Jamaica with thirty French followers and an authorization for the
new Jamaican commissioner, Edward D'Oyley, to grant him a oonoession
to rule Tortuga for England (though according to the French Jesuits, 
du Rausset's authority was to extend only to the French habitants). 
Upon learning of his imminent displacement, Watts made no effort to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
protest, but concentrated on packing up his belongings and sailed 
off with his family to try his luck in New England. Du Rausset thus 
assumed the reins of government on Tortuga without incident and soon 
issued letters of marque to privateers, whose exoesses apparently 
caused D'Oyley some alarm. In response to certain protests from his 
Jamaican superior, du Rausset retorted that he held a French 
commission and thereupon struck the English colors, proclaiming the 
island for France. Poor health eventually compelled du Rausset to 
transfer control of Tortuga to his deputy and nephew, Fr6d6ric 
Deschamps de la Place, while he retired from the island42 and 
D'Oyley reassessed the situation from Jamaica (Charlevoix 1733, 
tom. 3, 36-38; VaissiAre 1909, 10; Haring 1910, 116; Crouse 1943,
125-26).
Not all the English colonists of Tortuga proved as ready as 
Watts to relinquish command of the island to a Frenchman. One such 
malcontent was James Arundell, an exiled Royalist colonel who had 
co-founded the English settlement with Watts and later married that 
governor's daughter. Arundell found no trouble obtaining D'Oyley's 
consent to lead an expedition against Tortuga and bring the renegade 
Frenchman to trial. Early in 1662, Arundell landed during the night 
with thirty men and attempted to surprise du Rausset's nephew, but 
the coup failed. De la Place easily captured the small party and 
simply ordered Arundell to return to Jamaica. Captured en route by 
Spaniards, the vanquished Englishman was later executed on Cuba 
(Haring 1910, 117; Crouse 1943, 126).
England’s newly restored Charles II initially discouraged his 
Jamaican subjects from privateering against the Spaniards, but the
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buccaneers always found a warm reception at Tortuga, and this, 
according to a contemporary document, proved most inexpedient for 
Jamaica:
There are twenty privateers of all nations under the 
protection of Jamaica, which being now debarred from taking 
in their prizes there, will from Tortudos [Tortuga] take 
French and Portugal commissions or none at all, and will 
hinder all trade to and from Jamaica and obstruct Spanish 
ships from going there to buy negroes. In fine, if Tortudos 
be not reduced to the obedience of the Governor of Jamaica, 
it will cause the ruin thereof and the harboring of rogues 
and pirates who make it their living, by which means the 
inhabitants of Jamaica will desert the country. This may be 
prevented by demanding Tortudos with two of the King's ships 
from Jamaica, which may very easily be done, as there are 
but 150 Frenchmen and one fort with four guns, and it is 
certain if demanded the island will be delivered {Calendar 
of State Papers. America & West Indies. 1661-68, No.817 in 
Crouse 1943, 127).
After Arundell's failure, the Jamaican authorities sponsored a few
ill-coordinated attempts to regain the island. As late as 1664, a
Captain Abraham Langford, in particular, continued to seek backing
from the Crown to seize Tortuga and install himself as governor, but
none of these efforts ever came to fruition (Calendar of State
Papers, America & West Indies. 1661-68, Nos. 817-21 in Haring 1910,
117-19,).
For the remainder of its colonial status, Tortuga was to rest 
firmly under French control; but with the formation of the French 
West India Company and the subsequent inclusion of Tortuga within 
its charter, the nature of that control would gradually change. Du 
Rausset's declining health had brought him home to France, but 
officially he still held title to Tortuga and was reluctant to sell 
his rights to the new Company. Imprisonment in the Bastille altered 
his perspective, and in November of 1664 he relinquished his
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interest in the colony to the French Compagnie des Indes 
Occidentales for 15,000 livres (Vaissî re 1909, lln, 12n; Haring 
1910, 117).
To govern their new acquisition the company's directors
selected an energetic adventurer, one who had already involved 
himself with various colonizing schemes in the Antilles (perhaps 
with greater enthusiasm than success) and who had first-hand
experience with the buccaneers. His name was Bertrand d'Ogeron de 
la Bou&re, and he proved an excellent choice for the post. Like Le 
Vasseur, he established himself first at Port Margot, and like de 
Fontenay, he held dominion, by a commission issued in 1665, over 
Tortuga and the French-occupied coast of Hispaniola. At this time 
Tortuga, with 250 inhabitants, served as the capital, while about 
150 colonists occupied Port Margot and 120 resided at L6ogane 
(Crouse 1943, 128-29).
The bouoanisrs of Hispaniola received d'Ogeron with pronounced 
wariness, for they were enjoying a lucrative trade with the Dutch 
and made it clear that they had no interest in any interruption of 
it by the new French company. At first d'Ogeron took no issue with
them, but proceeded across the channel to secure the allegiance of
Tortuga, where du Rausset's nephew, de la Place, transferred control 
of the colony without incident. With Tortuga apparently steadfast, 
he continued over to the budding ports of Petit-Goave and L6ogane, 
in the Gil-de-Sac of Hispaniola (Haring 1910, 123-24). He then 
focused on subjugating the willful boucaniers of the north coast. 
That summer, in a letter to Colbert, the Crown's financial 
orchestrator, he wrote:
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Seven or eight hundred Frenchmen are living along the shores 
of this Spanish island in inaccessible places surrounded by 
mountains, or huge rocks, or the sea and go abroad 
everywhere in little canoes. They live three or four or six 
or ten together, more or less separated one group from the 
other by distances of two or three or six or eight leagues 
wherever they find suitable plaoes, and live like savages 
without recognizing any authority, without a leader of their 
own, and they commit a thousand robberies. They have stolen 
several Dutch and English ships which has caused us much 
trouble; they live on the meat of wild boars and cattle, and 
grow a little tobacco which they trade for arms, munitions, 
and supplies. Thus it will be necessary for His Majesty to 
give an order which would compel these men to leave the 
Spanish island. They should be ordered under the pain of 
death to settle in Tortuga which they would do without doubt 
if it were fortified (translated in Crouse 1943, 130 from 
Vaissifere 1909, 18-19).
D’Ogeron's mission was by no means an easy one. The sheer 
number of buccaneers roving the Caribbean by this date was itself 
staggering; contemporary accounts estimated their combined manpower 
as 1500 to 2000 strong, with at least twenty-two ships working out 
of Tortuga and Jamaica.43 Their ranks filled readily with outcasts 
from Europe: professional soldiers caught between conflicts,
religious and political refugees, speculators from the upper classes 
impoverished by wars and poor investments, as well as an assortment 
of transported criminals, escaped bond-servants, and vagabonds. All 
turned to forceful acquisition of Spanish riches in the New World as 
the panacea for their misfortunes (calendar of State Papers, America 
& West Indies. 1661-68, Nos. 744, 812 in Haring 1910, 124). These 
diverse Brethren of the Coast demonstrated a surprising level of 
internal cohesion.44 and poorly defended colonial governments had 
great need of their military cooperation. D’Ogeron (like his 
Jamaican counterpart) therefore had to maintain their support while 
somehow bending their will to comply with the mercantile policies of
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the French West India Company. What was needed, he recognized, was 
a policy which promoted greater attachment of the buccaneers to the 
colonial soil, and by extension, to the French national interest. 
Without actually discouraging their plundering ways (for he 
benefited from these himself), he sought to entice them into 
colonial dependence using various measures. He encouraged the 
Compagnie to loan funds to prospective settlers and supplemented 
these with extremely liberal advances from his own pocket. He
purchased two ships for marketing the colony’s goods in exchange for 
merchandise from France and brought in yearly, also at his own
expense, three hundred settlers, many of them indentured servants.45 
In addition, he arranged for the Compagnie to send wives to sell to 
the buccaneer-colonists in an ultimate measure to bind them with 
"chains from France.”4® At the beginning of d'Ogerons's term as 
governor, there were only about 500 regular colonists in Tortuga and 
Frenoh-held portions of Hispaniola. By 1669 that number had
increased to 1500, and within another two years to over 2000. 
Around the Ciil-de-Sac alone were by that time over 1200 French
habitants, while only a hundred or so of the boucanieis continued 
the traditional hunting way of life in those parts (Vaissi6re 1909, 
19; Crouse 1943, 133-34).47
Throughout his tenure as governor, d’Ogeron continued to 
consolidate and expand his control over the colony, but in 1670 he 
faced an outburst of serious opposition. The previous year he had 
returned to France to obtain more colonists and to persuade the 
Compignie to extend its operations to the Bahamas, where the French 
could more easily strangle Spanish shipping on its homeward voyage
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through the Straits of Florida (and at the same time gain a 
competitive edge over the troublesome English). His plan went 
unheeded, and upon his return he learned of an uprising at L6ogane 
against the French company's mercantile policies. Behind it were 
two Dutch entrepreneurs selling goods in direct opposition to the 
governor's directives, at prioes much lower than French merchants 
could offer. Despite d'Ogeron's efforts to suppress it, the 
rebellion spread to Petit-Goave, and eventually the mutineers 
anchored in Tortuga itself to demand tribute. Before matters could 
deteriorate further, help arrived by order of the King in the form 
of the frigate Aurore, commanded by Louis Gabaret, lately of 
Grenada. Tortuga was quickly secured, and afterwards the rebellious 
settlements in the Cbl-de-Sao. Gabaret had orders to destroy any 
Dutch shipping encountered in the vicinity, and both d'Ogeron’s 
authority and exclusive trade with France were restored. The 
Governor wisely ensured a general amnesty for the rebels, but took 
caution from the incident to request garrisons for Tortuga and 
Petit-Goave. In 1675, after ten years of governorship, declining 
health pressed him to return to France, where he died a short while 
later (Crouse 1943, 141-45).
P&re Charlevoix described Bertram d'Ogeron as father— not just 
governor— of the French colony of Saint Domingue which comprised 
Tortuga and western Hispaniola (1733, tom.3, 76). D'Ogeron's
achievements, especially given the belligerent times and place in 
which he governed, were truly remarkable. Though he controlled the 
rovers in commercial matters and even converted many a boucanier and 
flibustier into habitants, he had no desire to curtail their
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piratical impulses against the Spaniards. Indeed, if Tortuga ever
experienced a 'Golden Age' of piracy, it occurred under his 
auspices. It was during d'Ogeron's governorship that Exquemelin and 
the supposed Le Golif arrived to enter the 'sweet trade', and from 
their experienoes and aoquaintanoes they chronicled the exploits of 
history's most notorious buccaneers.
Buccaneers in the Heyday of Tortuga
According to Exquemelin’s account, the apical figure in 
Tortuga's long line of buccaneers was a Frenchman named Pierre, 
appended with le Grand because of his immensely successful exploit 
against the Spaniards. The adventures of this pirate are semi­
legendary, but because his story is really illustrative of tactics 
still used by buccaneers in the latter seventeenth century, I quote 
Exquemelin's narrative:
The first buccaneer of Tortuga was a certain Pierre le 
Grand of Dieppe, who, in the year 1602,48 with one boat and 
a crew of twenty-eight, captured the vice-admiral of the 
Spanish fleet off Cape Tiburon, in the west of Hispaniola.
This was in the days when the Spaniards had still not 
discovered the Channel of Bahama, and went to sea by way of 
the Caicos.
According to the journal of a reliable person, this was 
how the ship was taken. The buccaneer had been at sea a 
considerable time, without encountering any prey. Food was 
short, and his vessel was in such bad shape as to be hardly 
seaworthy. He then caught sight of this ship, which had 
strayed from the rest of the fleet, and steered towards her 
to find out what she was. When they were so close she could 
not escape, le Grand resolved to board her, judging the 
flagship would be unprepared for an attack. The crew agreed 
to obey their chief, saying the Spanish ship had no better 
chance than they to succeed in the encounter. They all swore
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an oath of loyal endeavor. Le Grand ordered the surgeon to 
bore a hole in the bottom of his barque, and they prepared 
to board the enemy.
It was nearly dark when they came alongside. Noiselessly 
they clambered on deck, with no other weapons than a pistol 
and a cutlass each. They encountered no resistance, and made 
for the cabin, where the captain and some others were 
playing cards. Instantly a pistol was clapped to his breast, 
and he was compelled to surrender the ship. Meanwhile, 
others had gone to the gun room and seized the arms. Some 
Spaniards who tried to prevent them were shot dead.
That very day the captain had been warned that the 
vessel on the horizon was a pirate and might do them harm. 
Contemptuously the captain had replied he would not fear a 
vessel that was his equal, much less a small boat such as 
that— yet, through his negligence, his ship was 
ignominiously captured (1972, 56-57).
Unlike many of his successors, who would likely have outfitted the
larger Spanish vessel to pursue even greater plunder, le Grand
proceeded to conjure up a commission to justify his purchase (never
mind if it was ex post facto) and sailed his prize to France, where
he sold it and very sensibly retired (57, Bradley 1928).
Whether or not it was, as Exquemelin claimed, one man's 
bravado which inspired droves of hunters and planters to take to sea 
in search of instant wealth, the story certainly provides a worthy 
traditional beginning for an exciting chapter of history. The early 
buccaneers launched their sorties against the Spaniard in the 
Indian-style dugout canoes which in more peaceful times had 
transported boucanned meat and hides from Hispaniola to Tortuga. 
Their first targets may have been small Spanish trading barques off 
Cape Alvarez on the north side of Hispaniola, laden not with gold 
and silver, but rather with hides and tobacco bound for Havana. 
After sailing their prizes back to Tortuga, where they could 
exchange their cargoes for arms, ammunition, and provisions, the 
buccaneers fitted out the larger vessels for expeditions farther
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abroad. Striking at Campeche and elsewhere in the Gulf of Mexico, 
they returned with cargoes of silver (57).
One intrepid captain, Pierre Francois of Dunkirk, finding no 
prey in the sea lane between Maraoaibo and Campeche, resolved to 
attack with his barque and crew of twenty-six at the pearl fisheries 
near the mouth of the Rio de la Hacha. To that place from Cartagena 
came yearly about a dozen barques under the protection of a 24-gun 
warship. Although Francois and his buccaneers succeeded in taking 
the flagship, with a cargo of pearls valued at 100,000 pieces of 
eight, they were soon afterwards captured by the Spanish man-of-war 
(62-64).
As W. Adolphe Roberts once asserted, "All the great buccaneer 
captains passed through the school of Tortuga" (1969, 139). Some of 
the famous chieftans described by Exquemelin worked mainly out of 
Jamaica; but they must have called often enough at Tortuga for men 
and supplies or, whenever official policy at their home port was 
activated against them, to obtain commissions and sell their booty. 
Among these was the unfortunate Bartolom6 el Portugu6s, whom 
Exquemelin reported to have seen die in squalor after a checkered 
career of raiding the Spaniards at Campeche and other places (1972, 
64-66). And there was the Dutchman, Roche Brasiliano, whose orew Le 
Golif claimed to have joined in Hispaniola (Le Golif, 1954, 32), and 
who also lay frequently in the road to Campeche, "his usual place 
for marauding" (Exquemelin 1972, 68). Lewis Scot (or Scott),
according to Exquemelin, was the first buccaneer to extend his 
piratical depredations to land assaults by taking the town of 
Campeche;^ overland maneuvers against Granada and Panama became
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common under the likes of John Davis, Edward Mansvelt, Henry Morgan, 
and others (69-70).
One curiously motivated buccaneer was a Frenchman from 
Languedoc, the Sieur de Montbars, more sanguinarily known as ‘The 
Exterminator' . Montbars' zeal grew not from the usual lust for 
Spanish gold, but from an intense hatred of the Spaniards 
themselves. In France he had read of their cruelties toward the 
Indians in the work of Bartolom6 de las Casa6,®® and their excesses 
during the Holy Inquisition only added to his rage. Unlike most of 
those who drifted into the Brotherhood of the Coast, Montbars 
arrived at Tortuga with money in his pocket and a mission for 
vengeance. The buccaneers, he had determined, provided the most 
efficient vehicle for punishing the Spaniards, and they accepted him 
as captain unreservedly. His policy of killing and torturing as 
many Spaniards as possible became legendary, and it is said that his 
passion for revenge was so consuming that he even declined the 
customary captain's share of plunder, leaving it to his men as 
further reward. A maverick even among buccaneers, he eventually 
headquartered his own band on the tiny island of St. Barth6lemy 
(Charlevoix 1733, tom.3, 69-70; Roberts 1942, 48-49).
It is difficult to ascertain the degree to which history has 
sensationalized the bloodthirstiness of the buccaneers. Examination 
of extant journals (mostly dating from the 1680s) would indicate 
that many of their actions conformed to the usual exigencies of 
warfare and business. They appear to have killed their Spanish 
opponents not entirely without discrimination, but usually in the 
course of battle or because they could not afford to take prisoners.
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who might escape and warn their compatriots or consume already
scarce provisions. Often it proved more expedient and lucrative to
take prisoners for information or ransom, and these were generally
released after they had served their purpose. Occasionally,
buocaneer captains demonstrated a certain degree of respect toward
their foes, or even turned a deal with them on the side. It
probably is safe to assume that while pursuing riches the buccaneers
devoted most of their time and energies to the immediate demands of
profit and survival. Nevertheless, the motive for revenge ran deep
on both sides, and oases of intense sadism, unjustifiable under any
argument, were recorded not only by Exquemelin, but also in
contemporary documents, such as the complaint written in 1669 from
John Style to the English Secretary of State:
It is a common thing among privateers... to cut a man in
pieces, first some flesh, then a hand, an arm, a leg,
sometimes tying a cord about his head, and with a stick 
twisting it until the eyes shoot out, which is called
"woolding". Before taking Porto Bello.. .a woman there wa6 
set bare upon a baking stone, and roasted, because she did 
not confess of money which she had only in their conceit; 
this [an informant] heard some confess with boasting, and
one that was sick confess with sorrow (C.S.P., America &
West Indies, 1669, 74, no. 138, quoted by Jack Beeching in 
the introduction to Exquemelin 1972, lOn).
No buccaneer in history exceeded the vicious inhumanity of
Jean-David Nau. Like many of his piratical brethren, Nau oame first 
to the West Indies as an indentured laborer, for whom the usual term 
of service (if one survived it) was three years. After completing 
his obligation, he fell in for a time with the hunters of Hispaniola 
before joining a crew of the buccaneers. Born at Les Sables
d'Olonne in France, he assumed the nom de guerre of L’Olonnais 
and took to his new profession with unprecedented vengeance. After
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proving his courage and resourcefulness on two or three voyages with 
the buccaneers, he was rewarded, wrote Exquemelin, with command of 
his own ship by M. de la Place, then still governor of Tortuga.
With this vessel L'Olonnais plundered far and wide, enlarging 
his reputation for brutality against the Spaniards until he 
shipwrecked off the coast of Campeche, where most of his crew was 
killed or captured (1972, 73). By stealth and by guile, he managed 
to escape in a stolen oanoe and made his way back to Tortuga, while 
the Spaniards deceived themselves into believing he was dead. 
Through some gimmickry he soon procured a small ship at that 
stronghold and set forth at once with twenty men to plunder a small 
trading center, called de los Cayos, on the north ooast of Cuba. 
There he met with little success, but rumors of his 'resurrection' 
alarmed the Spanish governor in Havana enough to send a warship with 
ten guns and ninety soldiers to investigate. Working from two 
canoes, however, L'Olonnais and his crew managed to surprise and 
board their would-be executioners, whereupon the pirate chieftan 
methodically decapitated all but one of the Spaniards as they 
emerged from below deck. One he 6aved as a messenger for the 
governor in Havana, sending a promise of similar treatment for any 
Spaniard he should capture in the future. Armed with the larger 
vessel, he then set off ‘on the account'. In the Gulf of Venezuela 
he captured a merchant ship bound with a oargo of money and 
merchandise to buy oacao at Maracaibo. With this pretty prize in 
tow he arrived "amid great rejoicing" at Tortuga and set to planning 
a much more ambitious venture (74-75).
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Figure 10: Jean-David Nau, alias L ’Olonnais—  
Tortuga's Most Nefarious Buccaneer
(First engraved for the original Dutch edition of Exquemelin 
in 1678, reprinted in the 1972 translation)
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Hap 14: Exquemelin*a Chart of naracaibo and Gibraltar (1686)
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Peace rarely visited the Indies, but periodic outbreaks of 
official wars in Europe always brought renewed vigor (and fresh 
commissions) to the buooaneering profession. So the announcement of 
yet another conflict between France and Spain, in May of 1667, 
coincided quite nioely with Jean-David Nau’s grandiose design— to 
launch a mass assault against Maracaibo (Crouse 1943, 136).52
Exquemelin left a detailed geography of this prosperous trading 
center and its physical environs "so the reader may have a better 
understanding of the events whioh follow" (1972, 79— see also Map 
14).
Situated on the coast of Venezuela, Maracaibo occupied the 
western shore of a narrow strait connecting the sizeable freshwater 
Lake of Maracaibo, to the south, with the saltwater Gulf of 
Venezuela (known among the buccaneers as Maracaibo Bay), a direct 
outlet to the Caribbean. The seaward entrance to the strait was 
guarded by two small islands. To the west lay the Isla de las 
Palomas (Island of the Pigeone), on whioh a fortress commanded 
access to the strait; and to the east stood the Isla de la Vigia, so 
named because of its watchtower on a high hill from which sentinels 
maintained vigil day and night. The strait itself could be spanned 
with a shot from an eight pounder; moreover, sandbars oomplioated 
its navigability such that ships were obligated to pass quite near 
the fort. This configuration of land, water, and fortifications 
would appear to have been unbreachable, though Maracaibo had in fact 
been plundered already by buccaneers under William Jackson in 
1642.33 Nevertheless, the Fuerta de la Barra contained a battery of 
sixteen guns surrounded by extensive earthworks, and L'Olonnais'
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intention of sacking the place required courage, manpover, and 
enough potential payback to warrant the risk. Of the last there was 
little doubt. Maracaibo, then harboring a population of nearly four 
thousand, presented "a very handsome city with fine-looking houses 
along the waterfront... four monasteries, a hospital and a great 
parish church" (77). The region's major commodities of hides, 
tallow, oacao, sugar, and tobaooo were supported by rich haciendas 
and plantations around a village called Gibraltar, situated across
the lake from Maracaibo with some 1500 inhabitants. Farther inland,
across the rugged Cordillera de M6rida, commerce extended via pack- 
mules to the town of M6rida (77-79).
Over a few months, L'Olonnais had assembled 660 men and eight 
ships, though the largest vessel, that of the commander, boasted 
only ten guns. The assault troops were to be led by Michel le 
Basque, an experienced buccaneer captain lured out of retirement on 
Tortuga to partake in the vast plunder promised by the expedition. 
Nau's lieutenant was an old comrade, Antony du Puis. The fleet 
sailed from Tortuga with d'Ogeron's blessing late in April of 1667, 
calling first at Bayaha, on the north coast of Hispaniola, to 
provision and increase the ranks with boucaniers. Steering eastward 
the pirates met with an armed merchantman bound from Puerto Pioo for
New Spain, whereupon L'Olonnais directed the rest of the fleet to
continue toward Saona, on the southeast side of Hispaniola, while he 
gave chase. After a three-hour battle, the pirate overtook the 
Spaniard of sixteen guns and was delighted to discover a cargo of
120.000 pounds of caoao, plus jewels and ready money to the tune of
50.000 pieces of eight. This ship he sent to unload at Tortuga,
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with instructions to rejoin him immediately afterwards at the 
rendezvous. At Saona the fleet took another Spanish ship. This one 
carried the payroll for the garrison at Santo Domingo, amounting to
12,000 pieces of eight, as well as eight cannon, muskets, fuses, and 
7000 pounds of gunpowder. While L'Olonnais awaited his prize ship 
from Tortuga, more buccaneers joined the expedition. Upon the 
vessel's return he assumed command, and the fleet— extremely well 
armed, manned, provisioned, and motivated— set sail at last for 
Maracaibo (76-77).
The buccaneers knew they must first reduce the fort, so they 
landed a league away and after three hours of combat managed to 
capture it. The remainder of the day they spent tending their 
wounded, burying their dead, and destroying the fort, taking care to 
spike the guns and burn the carriages to ensure a safe retreat. The 
Spaniards at Maracaibo, meanwhile forewarned of the invasion by 
those who had esoaped from the fort, prepared to evacuate the oity 
with as many valuables as they oould carry. Some took to their 
boats and made for Gibraltar, while others loaded mules and slipped 
away to the hills. When the buccaneers arrived the next day, full 
of fire and ready for battle, they found the city completely 
deserted. Of food, wine, livestock, and comfortable lodging they 
found plenty enough. After so long and austere a voyage, such 
pleasantries afforded welcome diversion for a full fortnight, while 
squads of buccaneers ranged into the country to track down fugitive 
citizens. The first expedition brought back twenty prisoners— men, 
women, and children— and 20,000 pieces of eight. Some of the 
captives were put to the rack to wrench from them the hiding places
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of their goods arid their fellows. When torture produced nothing, 
L’Olonnais hacked one of the unfortunates to pieces with his 
cutlass. Confessions from the miserable prisoners were now quick in 
coming, but their compatriots, leaving nothing to trust, had found 
new refuges. The buccaneers found their predicament as utterly 
futile but could not depart with so little to show for their pains. 
So they resolved to take Gibraltar and, if necessary, march on to 
M6rida (79-81).
Informed of their intentions, the governor of M6rida, a 
veteran colonel from the battlefields of Flanders, prepared to meet 
them. With 400 soldiers he entered Gibraltar, where he increased 
his militia with 400 from among the citizenry. Next he fortified 
the shore with gabions, or earth-filled wicker drums, and mounted a 
battery of twenty oannon together with a redoubt of eight guns. As 
a final precaution he blockaded the main road from the harbor, 
leaving only the hinterland swamps unguarded. The buccaneers, upon 
sailing into view of the battery, realized they were in for a good 
fight. Their number at this point was only 380 able men, but greed 
overcame any trepidations and L'Olonnais spurred them on, 
alternating promises of great glory and riches with threats of 
mortal retribution for any display of cowardice. Compelled to 
approach through the swamps, the buccaneers hacked their way through 
the brush, dodging a rain of fire maintained by the besieged 
Spaniards. The pirates eventually reached solid ground, only to be 
welcomed with grapeshot fired from six cannon. Though they managed 
to repel a Spanish sortie from the earthworks, they were unable to 
breach the gabions. L’Olonnais therefore ordered his men to feign a
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retreat to draw out the enemy. When nearly 200 Spaniards rushed 
out in pursuit, the buccaneers turned about, devastated them, and 
clambered over their corpses to seize the battery, slaying every man 
they could reach. When they took possession of the village, the 
pirates imprisoned all the remaining inhabitants in the great ohuroh 
and retired to lick their wounds. The next day, or so Exquemelin 
claimed, the victors counted over 500 Spanish dead but only forty of 
their own. Most of those wounded, about thirty in number, quickly 
succumbed to fever and gangrene. The pirates spent another two 
weeks in Gibraltar— looting, raping, and torturing their prisoners 
in the hope of extracting more hidden valuables. Eventually they 
managed to extort another 10,000 pieces of eight by threatening to 
burn every house in the village, and with this and other plunder 
they had obtained, including several slaves, they were content to 
quit the place.
On the way out they swung by Maracaibo and 6ent word to its 
beleaguered citizens that they would refrain from burning their town 
in exchange for 30,000 pieces of eight. The Spaniards finally 
conceded 20,000 pesos and 500 cattle on condition that the 
buccaneers cease their maraudings and depart as soon as the animals 
were butchered. The pirates seemed glad enough to comply, but after 
only three days, to the complete dismay of the Spaniards, they 
returned. It was not, however, more plunder which they sought, but 
a Spanish pilot to guide their biggest and most recent prize over 
the sandbar. The exasperated townsfolk immediately provided one, 
anxious to be rid of the marauders once and for all (81-85). 
L'Olonnais, it was true, would never return. But in 1669, just two
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years later, one of his captains would pilot in Henry Morgan to sack 
the town and environs in much the same manner and with as much or 
more brutality (120-36). Yet again, in 1678, the Frenchman 
Grammont, commissioned by d'Ogeron's successor, would terrorize the 
unfortunate citizens of Maracaibo (Charlevoix 1733, tom.3.,159-61).
On the voyage home, L’Olonnais' fleet stopped at the lie a 
Vache, so named for the wild cattle whioh a few boucaniers still 
hunted there, and a common rendezvous for pirates on the southwest 
side of Hispaniola. Here, according to their custom, they divided 
the spoil, altogether reckoned at 260,000 pieces of eight.®* A 
month later they docked at Tortuga to squander their gains. 
Shipments of wine and brandy had just arrived from France, and 
liquor ran freely until rapid depletion shot the price of a single 
flagon up to four pieces of eight. A few buccaneers gambled away 
their entire fortunes within three days. D'Ogeron himself contrived 
to purchase the stolen cacao for a mere twentieth of its market 
value, and with eager encouragement from the tavern-keepers and 
prostitutes, the buccaneers soon found themselves debt-ridden, 
sober, and sorely in need of another voyage (Exquemelin 1972, 85).
L’Olonnais set his sights next on Lake Nicaragua and its most 
prosperous town, Granada. He found no trouble raising a force of 
700 buccaneers, for his successes were well renowned. Moreover, 
John Davis of Jamaica had already demonstrated the wealth to be 
gained by such a ploy when he suprised Granada in 1665, probably in 
command of French buccaneers from Tortuga.®® Seven hundred men and 
a fleet of six ships, including the huge prize which had complicated 
their withdrawal from Maracaibo and which L’Olonnais now commanded.
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made their rendezvous at Bayaha to stock with boucannea meat for the 
voyage. From the experience of Davis, the buccaneers knew they 
would have to ascend the Rio San Juan (Desaguadero) in canoes, for 
their ships required too much draft. These smaller craft they 
proposed to steal from turtle-fishers at Matamana56 on the south 
side of Cuba, and after acquiring them, the buccaneers sailed for 
Cape Gracias a Dios. In the midst of a prolonged calm, they drifted 
with the prevailing currents into the Gulf of Honduras, where they 
pillaged their way, harassing Indians and Spaniards alike, from the 
Rio AguAn®7 to Puerto Caballos.58
There they looted the Spanish warehouses, took a merohant ship 
of twenty-four guns, and tortured prisoners for information about 
the town of San Pedro (modern San Pedro Sula), some thirty miles 
inland. After thus convincing two Spanish prisoners to serve as 
guides, and leaving his lieutenant, Moise van Wijn,*̂  to 6eoure the 
port with the balance of the troops, L'Olonnais proceeded toward San 
Pedro with three hundred men. Their march was beset by three 
ambuscades, which so infuriated L'Olonnais that he reportedly 
“ripped open one of the prisoners with his cutlass, tore the living 
heart out of his body, gnawed at it, and then hurled it in the face 
of one of the others, saying, 'Show me another way or I will do the 
same to you'" (86-88). Eventually the buccaneers pushed their way 
through to the town, whioh they found heavily barricaded and 
surrounded by thickets of prickly-pear cactus, but again they 
managed to force their way. Strangely enough, the townspeople were 
granted, in compliance with their conditions for surrender, two 
hours to relocate some of their belongings, though most of these had
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already been removed to safety. The buccaneers, in taking 
possession of the city, found nothing more than some leather bags of 
indigo for their trouble. So. after engaging a few days in "their 
usual atrocities," they gathered what they could and headed back for 
the coast (89).
Van Wijn's men meanwhile had learned from some Indian captives 
that a well-laden ship was soon expected from Spain, so the pirates 
removed their vessels to the Bay Islands60 to make ready for the 
encounter. There they fished for turtles and careened their boats, 
and afterwards, while awaiting the Spaniard, cruised along the coast 
of Yucatan to collect ambergris and steal more canoes from the 
Indians. By the time they caught up with the ship and boarded her, 
the Spaniards had already managed to unload most the cargo, and the 
disheartened buccaneers fell into discord. Some returned to Tortuga 
under Van Wijn, while others, led by Pierre le Picard, set off for 
Veragua on the Isthmus of Panama, where they found little worth 
plundering.
Equipped with his most recent prize of forty-two guns and a 
crew of three hundred men, L'Olonnais proceeded on his original 
design to raid the Rio San Juan. En route, however, he shipwrecked 
on a reef near the Pearl Cays,6* not far from the Miskito Shore.
During the five months it took to construct a longboat from the 
timbers of the wrecked Spanish prize, the hungry buccaneers did 
something most uncharacteristic: they cultivated the soil to grow 
beans and maize. The finished longboat, even if supplemented by 
their remaining canoes, could accommodate only half the men, and 
these drew lots to see who should set off for the San Juan to
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procure more boats. Those who won the draw soon lost their luck at 
the mouth of that river, where most were killed by Spaniards and 
Indians. L’Olonnais, mangaging to escape in the longboat with a few 
of his men. set sail for Cartagena in the hope of capturing a larger 
vessel, but he never made it. Captured by Indians on the coast of 
Darien, the fierce buccaneer was himself "hacked to pieces and 
roasted limb by limb," or so claimed Exquemelin (89-96).
Two other buccaneers held the distinction, as admirals, of 
uniting the Brethren of the Coast on a massive scale, even if only 
for temporary campaigns. The deeds of Henry Morgan, most famous of 
all the buccaneers,®^ and Edward Mansvelt, his mentor and 
predecessor, rightly pertain more to the story of Tortuga's English- 
held competitor, Port Royal, from which they obtained their 
commissions and launched their attacks. Our concern with them here 
extends only as far as their exploits affected operations from 
Tortuga. Mansvelt, we can be sure, already "an old buccaneer" by 
the time he made his base on Jamaica (98), may have frequented 
Tortuga in his younger days and certainly maintained connections 
there until his death. Of his early career we have little 
information. Some historians have called him a Dutchman, as 
Exquemelin*s spelling of his name would indicate, but he assuredly 
sailed for the English. Considering both his age and strong 
interest in Providence Island, it is quite possible that, like his 
Dutch brother-in-arms Blauvelt (Bluefields), he began his career 
with the English Puritans under the auspices of the Providence 
C o m p a n y . He may thereby have cultivated an early acquaintance 
with the buccaneers of 'Association*. After the Spanish takeover of
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Providence Island in 1641. what better haven could the pirate have 
found than that of Tortuga, recently fortified by Le Vasseur? In 
any event, we know that he was sailing for the English by 1663,64 
and he may have taken up quarters in Jamaica soon after its conquest 
by Penn and Venables.
Exquemelin claimed that Mansvelt ravaged as far as the South 
Sea (69), and he may well have done so, but the former's narrative 
conoerning both Mansvelt and Morgan has been proven inaccurate on 
several counts by modern historians.65 In 1665, the same year that 
d'Ogeron assumed the governorship of Tortuga, a large fleet of 
buccaneers66 assembled off Jamaica with the objective of raiding the 
Spaniards in Cuba. Mansvelt had emerged as their admiral, but the 
pirates were of mixed nationalities, no doubt including several 
French and others from Tortuga.6̂  England at this time was at war 
with the Dutch and soon expected opposition from France. So while 
d'Ogeron on Tortuga was issuing Portuguese commissions against the 
Spaniards (France and Spain were officially at peace for the 
moment), to lure as many buccaneers as possible back to his side, 
Governor Modyford of Jamaica was desperately urging them to abandon 
their Cuban design and sail instead under his letters against the 
Dutch at Curapao (Cruik6hank 1935, 60-64). In possession of both 
commissions, the buccaneers proceeded to raid the Spaniards at 
Sancti Spiritus, forty-two miles in from the southern coast of Cuba. 
There they demanded ransom for their prisoners in the form of 300 
cattle, and when the Spaniards pointed out that their commission was 
only valid against the Dutch, the buccaneers quickly produced 
d'Ogeron's Portuguese letters instead (Earle 1981, 14).
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In January of 1666, an emissary from Hodyford again approached 
the fleet to make good with the commission against Curacao, and to 
this Mansvelt finally agreed. The buccaneers weighed anchor for the 
Dutch stronghold amid much grumbling, for the orews had no mind to 
attack any but Spanish targets. A few ships dropped off on their 
own account to cruise against the Spaniards with their Portuguese 
commissions, and Mansvelt soon found himself pitted against strong 
winds, dwindling supplies, and a rising mutiny. The buccaneer 
admiral, weighing the preservation of his own authority against 
compliance with Modyford‘ s directive, suddenly gave the order to 
turn about, and the fleet skimmed with the wind toward Booa del Tora 
on the coast of Panama. From there they assaulted Costa Rica, 
meaning to march on Cartago, but when badly beaten at Turrialba they 
had to abandon that design. Rather than sail home with no purchase 
whatsoever, Mansvelt then resolved to seize the island of Santa 
Catalina, known by its former Puritan masters as Providence Island.
In May of 1666, the old buccaneer succeeded not only in taking 
the island, but about 70,000 pieces-of-eight worth of booty as well. 
The English pirates would gladly have defiled the church, but their 
French companions safeguarded the priest and sacred images from such 
destructive impulses, intending themselves to appropriate the Holy 
Scriptures for their Catholic church at Tortuga (14-23).68 Though 
he faced no actual reprisal from Modyford for his uncondoned seizure 
of Spanish property, Mansvelt perceived from Jamaica no promise of 
any future commissions against the Spaniards. So, like many of his 
cohorts who were similarly disappointed, he removed to Tortuga where 
he could expect to cruise against his traditional foes with the full
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blessing of d’Ogeron. In 1667, however, the Spaniards finally 
captured Mansvelt, and at Havana summarily executed him (24, 59,
Haring 1910, 137n).
With the departure of so many privateers, Modyford found his
colony virtually devoid of naval protection, a situation so
desperate that the Jamaican Council resolved, regardless of the
Crown’s official stance, to woo the buccaneers back with extremely
liberal letters of marque against the Spaniards (Cruikshank 1935,
61-62; Earle 1981, 25, 51). Later, in defense of his action,
Modyford described the result in a letter to Lord Arlington:
Had it not been for that seasonable action, I could not have 
kept my place against the French buccaneers, who would have 
ruined all the seaside plantations at least, whereas I now 
draw from them mainly, and lately David Marteen, the best 
man of Tortuga, that has two frigates at sea, has promised 
to bring in both (Calendar of State Papers, America & West 
Indies, No. 1264, quoted by Haring 1910, 131-32).
The privateers indeed returned, and the young Welshman, Henry
Morgan, inherited the admiralty. Santa Catalina, held for some
months after Mansvelt's departure by only fifty-one buccaneers, bad
been swiftly recaptured by the Spaniards (Earle 1981, 27-39); but in
a few years it would return to pirate clutches. In the meantime,
under the able leadership of Morgan, the buccaneers were anything
but idle.
In 1668 the pirate fleet assembled in the South Cays,69 like 
the adjacent Isle of Pines a familiar rendezvous for buccaneers on 
the south side of Cuba. French buccaneers from Tortuga and 
Hispaniola joined with Jamaica men to create a fighting force of 
seven hundred pirates in twelve ships, all commanded by Admiral 
Morgan. Their objective became Puerto Principe (modern-day
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Camaguey), an interior trading depot for cattle and hides and, of 
Cuban cities at the time, second only to Havana in wealth. It had 
never before been plundered (Cruikshank 1935, 83). After landing 
his assault troops in the bay of Ana Maria, Morgan marched across 
forty miles of rough terrain to take the city. Aside from other 
booty, which amounted to only 50,000 pieces of eight, the pirates 
absconded with 1000 head of cattle; these were slaughtered to 
provision the fleet for a more lucrative voyage against the Main 
(Exquemelin 1972, 105-10; Cruikshank 1935, 84-85). At Cape Gracias 
a Dios, however, a disagreement broke out between the French and the 
English. While the former returned to Tortuga, Morgan proceeded 
with the rest of the fleet on his most daring exploit yet— the raid 
of Porto Bello (Earle 1981, 61-62).
Though the French buccaneers from Tortuga declined to partake 
in that campaign, news of Morgan's astounding success at Porto Bello 
soon reached them. After the Jamaican privateers had applied their 
usual methods to extort as muoh loot a6 possible from the 
unfortunate Spanish citizenry, Morgan managed to ransom the city for
100,000 pieces of eight in gold and silver (89). Exquemelin claimed 
that the grand take from this expedition totalled 215,000 pieces of 
eight (1972, 116). So it was that, late in 1668, when word spread 
of a new privateering voyage being planned by the admiral, French 
buccaneers from Tortuga and Hispaniola flocked to rendezvous with 
him at the lie A Vache. Altogether the fleet boasted eleven ships, 
including the powerful Oxford frigate, and nearly a thousand men. 
The original plan was to seize Cartagena, the most heavily defended 
but richest city on the Spanish Main, but the unexpected shattered
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that ambitious design when an apparently accidental explosion 
destroyed the Oxford, killing about two hundred of its crew. The 
buccaneers, considerably reduced in both man- and firepower, had to 
choose a lesser target. It was then that a former comrade of 
L'Olonnais suggested Maracaibo, which the buccaneers proceeded to 
pillage and narrowly escape from in 1669 (Haring 1910, 155-58; Earle 
1981, 107-29).
The last and most celebrated of Morgan's campaigns lay ahead, 
and buccaneers from Tortuga were to play a large and crucial role in 
it. Morgan received a fresh commission from Modyford as "Admiral 
and Commander-in-chief of the privateers in July of 1670 
(Cruikshank 1935, 137-41). Word circulated throughout the buccaneer 
community that another expedition was afoot under the invincible 
Henry Morgan, and five or six hundred Frenchman from Tortuga and 
Hispaniola were expected to join (143). The Admiral set sail from 
Port Royal in mid-August, calling first at Bluefields Bay,**® a 
privateering outpost on the west end of Jamaica. The final 
rendezvous, once again, was to be the lie h Vache, but Morgan's 
fleet stood first for Tortuga to augment with 6hips, recruits, and 
provisions. D'Ogeron, we recall, was at this moment in something of 
a difficult spot. Peace with Spain prevented him from granting 
French commissions for the time being, and the little revolt spawned 
in Leogane against the restrictive policies of the French West India 
Company was fueling discontent. Hundreds of eager French buccaneers 
were consequently prepared to join Morgan's forces and afterwards 
retire to Jamaica (148, 155).
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Morgan reached the sheltered anchorage between the lie A Vache 
and Hispaniola in mid-September. Several ships had already 
assembled there, but many more were expected; and as this was the 
season for hurricanes, the buccaneers bided their time by hunting 
tor meat on the larger island. Morgan also used this interim to 
send his vice-admiral, Edward Collier, on a preliminary raid of the 
Spanish Main to procure foodstuffs and prisoners for interrogation. 
Collier selected Rio de la Hacha and returned with maize, meat, 
thirty-eight prisoners— and a prize— La Gallardina, formerly a 
Tortuga privateer whioh had been captured by the Spaniards and used 
to raid the English at Jamaica. This ship Morgan graciously 
restored to French command as an auspicious gesture of good omen and 
goodwill (Earle 1981, 160-62, 177).
A severe storm temporarily grounded most of the fleet in
October, and while Morgan’s men re-floated the ships and made
repairs, new recruits continually appeared at the lie A Vaohe.
Especially welcomed was a Dutchman, Lawrence Prinoe, freshly
returned from sacking Granada on the Rio San Juan (162-64). By
December, the fleet could boast thirty-six ships and about 2000 men-
-over a quarter of them French— the largest assemblage of buccaneers
whioh Spanish America had ever witnessed.^ Of the magnitude of
this force, historian Peter Earle offered a noteworthy speculation:
Suoh figures mean that Morgan had been able to get together 
under one single command nearly every English and French 
privateer in the West Indies— a remarkable tribute to his 
leadership and reputation. The Governors of Jamaica normally 
reckoned that there were between 1200 and 1500 privateers 
based on the island, while the Governor of Tortuga reported 
in 1671 that there were about a thousand privateers 
(flibustiers) and a hundred hunting buccaneers {boucaniers)
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in Tortuga and Hispaniola,^  so that something like eighty 
per cent of the available manpower had flocked to Morgan’s 
flag at Isla Vaca (1981, 180).
All was now ready for a major invasion against the Spaniards, 
and rumor of imminent peace between the Spanish and English colonies 
meant the buccaneers needed to act soon. But first they had to 
agree on a target worthy of their strength. Santiago de Cuba? Vera 
Cruz in Mexico? Cartagena? or Panama? All were considered, but it 
was Panama— rich, ripe, and never threatened since Drake's attempt—  
which got the vote (176, 181-82). The Panama campaign would require 
a long and arduous journey across the Isthmus, but the buccaneers 
were now experienced in such undertakings. First, however, a few 
preliminaries demanded their attention. Providence Island (or Santa 
Catalina), previously won by Morgan's predecessor but recaptured 
soon after by the Spaniards, lay within easy reach on their way to 
the Main. With such a powerful fleet, Morgan could easily return 
that strategic island to the English realm while at the same time 
procuring Spanish informants and a secure base for the present 
expedition (and possibly future ones). After a half-hearted 
skirmish on Christmas Day, the island changed hands without 
bloodshed (Exquemelin 1972, 145-49: Earle 1981. 183-85).73
Now the only major obstacle between the buccaneers and opulent 
Panama was the fortress, San Lorenzo, guarding the mouth of the Rio 
Chagres on the north shore of the Isthmus. For the task of reducing 
this castillo, Morgan sent but three ships and 470 men under the 
able command of Joseph Bradley. In the fierce battle which 
followed. Bradley performed bravely, sustaining numerous wounds 
which eventually killed him. Here the French contingent
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distinguished themselves by leading the decisive charge which 
breached the fortress (Earle 1981, 187-93).
Morgan arrived at the Rio Chagres with the main body of the 
fleet in January of 1671. Their ascent in small boats and canoes 
upriver, the incident at Venta de Cruoes, their final attack on 
PanamA— which was thoroughly pillaged and burned— have provided the 
focus for more books on piracy than any other buccaneer campaign. 
Accounts of the booty from this venture, and the degree of 
unfairness with which Morgan divided it, remain to this day a 
subject of controversy. By Morgan's own report the plunder amounted 
to 30,000 pounds sterling, or 120,000 pieces of eight (MS BL Add. 
11268, f. 78); but the fleet's surgeon, Richard Browne, indicated 
over double that take at 70,000 pounds (in Cruikshank 1935, 196). 
In any event, upon dividing the loot among so many buccaneers, the 
value of an individual share must have seemed paltry indeed after so 
long and trying a campaign. Distrust and disappointment in Morgan 
became widespread among the pirates, especially the Frenohmen from 
Tortuga (Exquemelin 1972, 172-73;74 Earle 1981, 244). Upon their 
return to San Lorenzo, the buccaneers dispersed. Morgan hurried 
back to Port Royal, but few of his brothers-in-arms followed. 
Exquemelin's party ranged for awhile along the Miskito Shore, mostly 
scavenging for food and careening the boats (Exquemelin 1972, 174- 
88). For those addicted to the buccaneering way of life, Jamaica 
could no longer authorize a safe haven.
The Treaty of Madrid, signed the previous year and at last 
publicized in Port Royal, promised peaoe in the Indies. While 
Morgan himself settled into the respectability of planting and
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politics, most of his former cohorts sought fortune and refuge 
elsewhere.75 Many took their profession to ’Campeachy" and 
Mosquitia; some returned to Tortuga, where buccaneering endured for 
yet a few years after Port Royal officially closed its gates to 
rovers. Such turns of legality, at least for the time being, served 
only to inconvenience the pirates: as Exquemelin remarked, "If one 
port is forbidden them, then they sail to another, for this part of 
the world is full of fair harbors, where the buccaneers can find all 
they need to maintain their ships, and food in abundance" (1972, 
188).
Eclipse of the Buccaneer Bastion: Tortuga after d'Ogeron
Piracy and privateering by no means disappeared from Tortuga 
with the passing of d’Ogeron in 1675, but the importance of the 
island as a buccaneering base— and even more so as a colony— was 
rapidly declining. As a consequence of d’Ogeron’6 efforts, the 
French had leapt from Tortuga’s tiny springboard— to employ 
Whittlesey’s analogy—  to occupy the larger and more productive land 
mass of western Hispaniola. Fully cognizant of the power to be 
realized from this expansion, Colbert advised Louis XIV to abolish 
the Compagnia des Indus Occidentales and proclaim direct ownership 
of the colonies for the Crown of France. D’Ogeron had already begun 
transferring the reins of his office across the Tortuga Channel to 
the bustling settlement of Port-de-Paix (Roberts 1942, 69-70). This 
was the first place seized on the main island after the French had
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secured Tortuga (Labat 1970, 149), and Governor Jacques de Pouancey, 
nephew and successor of d'Ogeron, maintained his seat of government 
there at the expense of Tortuga's settlement. In 1676, de Pouancey 
found the tiny island on the verge of complete abandonment by its 
habitants, whom he oould not persuade to stay. Total exodus was 
unwise, he pointed out, especially when Tortuga remained the only 
sufficiently fortified port in the entire colony (Charlevoix 1733, 
tom. 3, 151). De Pouancey and his successor, de Cussy, mindful of
the strategic role whioh the island had once played (and oould
conceivably play again), made certain efforts to repopulate Tortuga, 
but to no avail. For colonial planters, the soil of Hispaniola was 
far too productive for them to bother with Tortuga (Barskett 1972,
86; Brown 1972, 62. 74).
Port-de-Paix itself was destroyed in 1689 by combined English 
and Spanish forces, and after its reduction there seems to have been 
eome plan by the French to re-fortify Tortuga. But Jean-Baptiste du 
Casse, the governor of Saint-Domingue after 1691 and himself an 
accomplished privateer, first evacuated Tortuga's only remaining 
inhabitants, then something under a hundred in number (Roberts 1942, 
82; Charlevoix 1733, tom.4, 14). Pfcre Labat, always an afficionado 
of the flibustiers and buccaneer lore, described the consequences he 
observed on his voyage through the Tortuga Channel ten years later:
The island of Tortuga was entirely deserted, all the 
settlers having long ago come over to San Domingo. I wished 
very much to go over and see the ruins of the 'Fort de la 
Roche’, but no one is allowed to go there on any pretext 
whatever, lest the animals, which have been left there to 
multiply and are intended to feed the workmen when they 
repair the fort, might be destroyed (1970, 150).
The fort, it seems, never was rebuilt.
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The historian Roberts was quick to assert that from the advent 
of de Pouancey’s administration "it is wrong to think of the French 
settlements as being dependent on Tortuga, or to regard them as 
piratical enterprises" (1942, 70). Nevertheless, the fact that the 
majority of planters and other habitants apparently abandoned 
Tortuga soon after the departure of d'Ogeron does not mean that the 
island ceased to provide a haven for buccaneers. France had 
officially renewed warfare against Spain late in 1674, and a flurry 
of commissions had once more drawn privateers to these coasts from 
all quarters of the Caribbean. In 1677, several English buccaneers, 
including Captains Barnes and Coxon, sailed in league with French 
privateers to sack and ransom Santa Marta on the Main (Haring 1910, 
219-20). Governor de Pouanoey, in a memorandum dated that same
year, estimated that over a thousand buooaneers still roamed the 
area:
Their manner of living is most peculiar. They only descend 
upon the Spaniards and cruise for means to come eat and 
drink at Petit-Goave and Tortuga; and they never leave from 
there as long as there is wine— or they have money or
merchandise or credit with whioh to buy it (quoted in
VaissiAre 1909, 20— author's translation).
A fleet of 600 buccaneers, de Pouancey noted, had at this time 
assembled under the Marquis de Maintenon, and from their base on 
Tortuga they raided the Spanish settlements of Margarita and 
Trinidad in 1678 (Charlevoix 1733, tom.3, 161; Haring 1910, 222). 
That same year, the Sieur de Franquesnay led buccaneers from Tortuga 
on an ill-fated voyage against Santiago de Cuba; but other raiding 
parties found much greater success at Puerto Principe, San Tome on 
the Rio Orinoco, and Trujillo in Honduras (Charlevoix 1733, tom.3,
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159, Haring 1910, 222). Also in 1678, the Comte d‘Estr6es, Vice- 
Admiral of the French Fleet in the West Indies, swung by with royal 
authorization for de Pouancey to supplement his fleet with 1200 
buccaneers for a campaign against the Dutch at Curagao. The 
expedition met with disaster when the majority of the fleet wrecked 
on coral reefs off the Islas de Aves, not far from the intended 
target.
D‘Estr6es returned with the survivors of his squadron to 
France, while de Pouancey ordered a party of buccaneers under the 
Sieur de Grammont to remain at the Islas de Aves and salvage what 
they could from the wrecks (Haring 1910, 220-21). Evidently this 
proved no onerous task, for numerous casks of wine, brandy, and 
other provisions washed ashore quite whole. A few years later, 
buccaneer veterans of the expedition would remark to William Dampier 
(then a relative newcomer to their fraternity) that "if they had 
gone to JajuaJoa with 30 1. a Man in their Pockets, they could not 
have enjoyed themselves more" (Dampier 1927, 44). After the
buccaneers had fully refreshed themselves at Aves, de Grammont led 
700 of them on yet another sacking of Maracaibo and Gibraltar. 
Though only twenty of his men were lost in these engagements, the 
booty did not stretch far among so many surviving pirates 
(Charlevoix 1733, tom.3, 159-61). It was indeed a busy year for 
the buccaneers of Tortuga and Saint-Domingue.
The years 1678 to 1685 may have been, as Newton suggested, 
"the great age of buccaneers under French patronage" (1933, 323), 
but Tortuga no longer served as their principal base. Along with 
Port-de-Paix, several other ports in western Hispaniola blossomed
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
while Tortuga withered. On the north coast, Le Cap^  afforded an
excellent harbor, while around the Cul-de-Sac, L6ogane— and Petit-
Goave in particular— attracted more and more buccaneers. Havens and
settlements were extending along the south coast, and the pirates
reserved a "private port" at Aux Cayes behind the Isle A Vache,
still a favorite refuge (Roberts 1942, 70). At their rendezvous at
Boca del Toro in 1679, the French buccaneer Bournano and the
celebrated English raiders of the South Sea (Coxon, Sharp, et al.)
brought their commissions from Petit-Goave— not Tortuga (MSS Cox
1682, BL Sloane 49. f.l and NMM GOS/4, f.l; Ringrose 1987, 298-99).
Dampier, who participated in the first leg of that trans-isthmian
venture, reflected in a journal entry of 1682 on the fate of the
former pirate capital:
of Tortugas by Hispaniola, whioh was called formerly French 
Tortugras ; tho‘ not having heard any mention of that Name a 
great while, I am apt to think it is swallowed up in that of 
Petit-Guavres, the chief Garrison the French have in those 
Parts (1927, 47).
Truly, any further historical account of the buccaneers would
remove us from Tortuga, its importance as a regional pirate base now
eclipsed by its younger siblings on Hispaniola. Saint- Domingue
would launch major raids against the Spaniards for years to come,
but the celebrated adventures of de Grammont, Van Horn, Laurens de
Graff, and du Casse pertain to the intrigues of Petit-Goave and
other places. Still, we can be sure that an occasional buccaneer—
seeking food, water, salt, refuge, or simply an outlet for his
curiosity— continued to call now and again at old Tortuga.*̂
The historical span of Tortuga's career as a major pirate base
lasted approximately fifty years. Its initial settlement by the
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boucaniers by 1629 marks very nearly the midpoint of the entire 
period, at least reckoned by the present study, over which piracy 
flourished in Spanish America. Thus it may be argued that Tortuga’s 
emergence as a pirate stronghold posed a historical fulcrum, but
such a distinction oould transcend mere chronology to embody a more
substantive, qualitative transition in the very nature of the
region’s piracy. The buccaneers spawned by Tortuga constituted a 
truly hybrid race of pirates, not only by their mixed nationality, 
but also by their evolving motives and operational tactics. 
Buccaneering was the oreole legacy of the European corsairs. It 
perpetuated, albeit to a lesser degree, their nationalistic and even 
religious impulses. Like the privateers of that previous century, 
the early buccaneers frequently carried commissions or tacit 
approval from European governments, at least as interpreted by the 
colonial authorities. Moreover, Spain’s American empire remained 
their prinoipal target, leastwise until its fountain of riches began 
to run dry.
In the last two decades of the seventeenth century, the
buccaneers faced increasing prosecution as common pirates from their 
former hosts and benefactors. Only the hopelessly addicted clung to 
the profession, rebounding by the turn of the century in a brief 
flourish of utterly ruthless, desperate freebooting. Hence, the
buccaneers from Tortuga represented a turning point in the very 
character of New World piracy. From yet another perspective Tortuga 
occupied the pivotal position in the region's piracy; 
geographically, we can see that it provided an optimum base for 
launching attacks to every corner of the Spanish American core. So,
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having reviewed Tortuga's prominent role in the history of the 
buccaneers, let us next consider the geographic elements which 
shaped its emergence as a pirate bastion.
Geography of a Pirate Stronghold
Tortuga was by no means the only pirate stronghold in Spanish 
America. It may have been the first, but it certainly was not the 
last. It may have been the most enduring, but in the shadow of 
fabulous Port Royal it remains all but forgotten. It was, however, 
arguably the most critical pirate base in the history of the region, 
and its assumption to such ignoble prominence owed not entirely to 
historical accident. True, by the early seventeenth century a base 
of that order was bound to emerge somewhere, but numerous geographic 
influences made Tortuga the most logical, if not the only possible 
locational choice. Reestablishing the past geography of Tortuga 
will help us understand how it became an archetypal pirate 
stronghold, and in so doing we will recall and reinforce many of the 
ideas set forth by Mainwaring, Semple, and Whittlesey. In part 
because of its insular and diminuitive nature, but more in an effort 
not to confuse the reader, I have so far referred to Tortuga in its 
historical role as a rather vague and homogeneous entity. In 
reality, however, even such a small island was and is geographically 
complex. Parts of it have remained virtually unsettled even to this 
day. It is therefore perhaps misleading, though traditional and 
convenient, to subsume the entire island by discussing Tortuga as a
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pirate stronghold; the reader deserves a more detailed geographical 
inventory. The following section concludes our study of Tortuga by 
reconstructing its site, considering both natural and man-made 
physical features; its former cultural landscape; its regional 
situation, reflecting both it6 piratical origins and strategic 
operations; and at least a glimmer of its distinctive bygone aura—  
that wonderfully elusive spatial quality whioh geographers call a 
sense of place.
Dipping within a hair of the twentieth parallel, Tortuga caps 
the north coast of western Hispaniola, or modern Haiti. Elongated 
from east to west, and tapered at these directional extremes, the 
island measures nearly 25 miles from end to end, with a maximum 
width of less than 5 miles. Tortuga curls ever so faintly toward 
its mother Hispaniola such that its bowed northern back endures the 
brunt of the Northeast Trades, while its barely concave southern 
coast enjoys the nurturing waters of the narrow Tortuga Channel. 
Columbus, we recall, did not name the island for its shape; 
nevertheless, viewed from sea level, Tortuga's profile can in fact 
resemble the shell of a giant green sea turtle. The buccaneers 
certainly thought so (Exquemelin 1972, 24), and indeed a
seventeenth-century profile of the island supports the notion (see 
Figure 11). A formidable ridge transects the island, reaching a 
maximum elevation of about 1520 feet. Consistent exposure of this 
interior upland to the Northeast Trade Winds produces a slight rain 
shadow, with over sixty inches a year in the east diminishing to 
between twenty and forty in the west. Though Tortuga's climate 
remains continuously warm and moist, its peak rainy period from
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September to December coincides with the region’s hurricane season 
(Centre d’Etudes de G6ographie Tropicale 1985).
According to P£re Charlevoix, the rugged escarpments of 
Tortuga's north coast, inaccessible even to canoes, prompted the 
first French inhabitants to name that shore the Cote de Fer (1733, 
tom.3, 9).̂ ® This physical barrier net only discouraged settlement 
of that zone, but also simplified the island's defense. I have 
found only one mention of an attempt to attack Tortuga from the 
windward side, and the veracity of that account is highly suspect.̂ ® 
In any event, the tight defense which rendered Tortuga such a 
successful pirate stronghold stemmed largely from the natural 
restriction of approach to the leeward side only.
The south coast, particularly the eastern portion of it,
presented the best site for human exploitation, and that was where
the principal buccaneer communities flourished. Protected from the
winds and rough sea, this quarter still offered plenty of fresh
water. It was also the closest to Hispaniola, in many ways
Tortuga's sustaining hinterland, for here the Tortuga Channel
narrows to less than five miles in width. The most important
feature to recommend this stretch of the leeward coast, of course,
was its natural harbor, or what the seventeenth-oentury mariner
preferred to call its 'Road'. A contemporaneous chart from The
English Pilot (Map 15) bears out observations published just a
decade earlier by the pirate Exquemelin:
People live only on the south side, and here there is but 
one harbour which ships can enter... This is reasonably good 
and unimpeded by a reef; there are two channels to sail in 
by. Ships of seventy guns can enter, and the harbour has a 
very clear sandy bottom (1972, 24).

















Thus appeureth the Eland ‘Xortugasp v/hen it beareth E. S. E. from you.
Figure 11: Profile of Tortuga— Resembling a Great Sea Turtle
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Map 16: Tortuga's Harbor from Fisher & Thornton's English Pilot (1689)
(Reprinted 1967)
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Yes, the road was commodious enough for pirates and their 
prizes, provided they knew their way in, but for those less familiar 
with its soundings— like Fuenmayor and his Spanish fleet in 1635— it 
oould prove very treacherous indeed. The preferred, eastern-most 
channel oould sustain a draft of four to five fathom (i.e. up to 
thirty feet); its harbor, known simply as Fade among the French 
buccaneers, lay closest to Basse Terre, the main port settlement 
where storehouses and other dockyard facilities sprang up. After Le 
Vasseur mounted cannon atop the Fort de la Foohe to oommand the 
primary roadstead, invading ships found themselves obliged to anchor 
farther west, out of range, in the shallower approach near the 
planter's settlement of Cayone. Such was the strategy imposed on 
the unsuccessful Spanish attempt in 1643, again on de Fontenay's 
descent in 1652, and yet again on Don Gabriel de Valle Figueroa's 
attack two years later.
Considering its controversial, even pivotal role in West 
Indian history, surprisingly few maps or descriptions of Tortuga 
from the time of the buccaneers have been found. Du Tertre's short 
"Description de l'Isle de la Tortue," included in the second volume 
of his 1667 history of the Antilles, appears to be the first 
published geographical account of the island. In researching it, he 
maintained he could find no one who had yet described it; much of 
his information was given him by the Hotmans, family of the 
Chevalier de Fontenay (1667, tom.2, 30-31). Du Tertre's depiction 
is brief, general, and not entirely accurate. In it, he described 
the island's dimensions, its port, and its useful proximity to 
Hispaniola. He mentioned the productivity of its soil and the
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abundance of fresh vater as being most favorable to the cultivation
of gooa-quality tobacco and sugar cane (the Chevalaer. he claimed, 
before his untimely removal by the Spaniards, even considered
building a water-powered sugar mill). But from a piratical 
perspective, the Abb6 's most interesting geographical relation, 
most of which had appeared previously in the first volume, was his 
detailed description of Tortuga's renowned fortress. To that topic 
we will return shortly.
Probably the best early description of Tortuga, both in terms
of its physical setting and cultural landscape, was penned by none
other than Alexandre Exquemelin: pirate, surgeon, historian, and— as
vaunt-courier of my next chapter I now may tenably add— geographer.
Exquemelin is best remembered for his colorful relation of
personalities and events, but he was at least as avid (and probably
far more accurate) in his description of places. His assessment of
Tortuga's harbor has already been cited, but he was impressed as
well by the island's landforms, flora, and fauna:
Although extremely rocky, it is covered with large trees, 
which grow where no soil can be seen, with their roots lying 
naked on the rocks...®*
As for the vegetation, some excellent timber grows on 
Tortuga, including fustic [a yellow dyewood] and red, white 
and yellow sandalwood. The inhabitants call the yellow sort 
boas de chandclle, or candlewood, because it will burn as 
bright as a candle, and serves for making torches with which 
to go fishing at night. Another tree which grows here is the 
lignum sanctum — known in these parts as pox-wood. There 
are many of the trees which provide gummi elemi,^ and also 
radix chinae or China-root,®4 but this is not so good as the 
East Indian variety; it is very white and soft, and is eaten 
by the wild pigs.
As well as timber, much sought after for building ships 
and houses, aloes and many other medicinal herbs and shrubs 
grow here. All sorts of fruits and plants are found, similar 
to those on the Caribbean Islands. They include manioc,
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sweet potatoes, yams, melons and water-melons, guavas,
bananas and plantains, pineapples, cashew-nuts, and many
others which I will not weary the reader by listing. There 
is also an abundance of palm trees, from which wine is made, 
and the leaves are used for covering the houses (1972, 24- 
25).
No doubt Exquemelin's professional interest as ship's surgeon 
compelled him to take such detailed notice of Tortuga's plants, 
particularly those with medicinal properties. The abundant variety 
of dyewood, we have seen, played a crucial economic role in the 
early efforts to colonize the island, attracting not only the
covetous attention of the English Providence Company, but also
competition from interlopers of various nationalities, many of whom 
doubtlessly were or became buccaneers. Although Exquemelin informed 
us that buccaneers provisioned their voyages with nothing but meat 
(58), one can expect that ashore they welcomed the change of diet 
afforded by the variety of crops and fruits he ennumerated.85 Palm 
trees were essential for the buccaneers' construction of boucans and 
ajoupas, and the woodier trees provided raw materials for 
manufacturing their boats and naval stores. With equal alacrity, 
Exquemelin described the beasts, fowl, and sea creatures which made 
Tortuga their home, lending particular attention to the gustatory 
merits of each. Here it is worth noting that Tortuga's wild pigs, 
which with feral cattle comprised the traditional mainstay of the 
boucaniers, were protected from huntsmen by official decree: 
"hunting them with dogs is forbidden lest they be exterminated, as 
the island is so small. Should enemies attack, the people could then 
retire to the woods and live by hunting" (25). This strategic and 
conservational policy, possibly initiated by d'Ogeron, was retained 
by Governor du Casse long after the island was abandoned.
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Also from Exquemelin, as veil as Pere Charlevoix, vho had the 
benefit of sixty-five years to refine and enlarge upon the work of 
Du Tertre, we can sketch a pretty good idea of the contemporary 
cultural division of Tortuga's landscape. The island's ecumene 
included six or seven communities, and these were depicted on the 
earliest large-scale map of Tortuga which I have yet located (Map 
16— published in 1688).86 Probably the oldest and most important 
settlement, by virtue of its access to the fade, was Basse Terre. 
Here the major port facilities were established, including the 
warehouse in which Le Vasseur was supposedly assassinated. Basse 
Terre (literally, 'low land'), remaining so-named today, may have 
provided facilities for careening, though the nearby north shore of 
Hispaniola seems to have been at least as popular for that 
purpose.87 West of Basse Terre and the Rads, but within access of a 
secondary anchorage, stood the town of Cayone (titled similarly 
today). This is where the principal habitants — tobacco planters 
for the most part— built their houses and the church, probably the 
nicest dwellings on the island. But the very first plantations, or 
so Exquemelin informed us, were established in the district known 
simply as la Montagne. Overlooking Basse Terre and the Pade, this 
rocky, interior upland supported effective fortification and a 
lookout (or Vigie) to protect the the buccaneer community. It was 
here, near the modern administrative center of Palmiste, that Le 
Vasseur built the redoubtable Fort do la Poohe and kept strict watch 
over the colony from his personal colombier. La Montagne must also 
have afforded the most pleasant climate— cooler, fresher, less 
troubled by insects and disease than the lowland settlements— not
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
265
surprisingly becoming the site of the Governor's residence. A road 
connected Basse Terre with la Montagne, and it is probable that the 
same route formed part of the rough network which presently
interoonneots Basse Terre, Palmi6te and Mentrie beyond. A couple of
newer plantation settlements had emerged by d'Ogeron's day on the 
western end of the leeward coast. These were called le Ringot and 
le Milplantage (or Middle Plantation), both highly commended by 
Exquemelin for their rich tobacco. Charlevoix, writing several 
years after the buccaneer, mentioned two other settlements. One, 
near the island's eastern extremity, occupied la Pointe au Macon, 
near modern Tete Lign6. The other, located dear round the eastern 
point at Cap Sterre, evidently failed for lack of available sweet 
water (1733, tom.3, 9-10). The forbidding Cote de Fer remains 
practically unsettled to this day, though near the middle of the 
north coast, a place called on modern maps Anse de Tr6sor (Treasure 
Cove) certainly piques the imagination of the pirate-minded.
Of any cultural landmarks which the buccaneers managed to 
impress upon Tortuga, their fortification of its harbor
unequivocally signaled the island's transformation from a mere 
rovers' retreat and boucanier depot— to a true pirate stronghold. 
Owing primarily to the ambitious undertaking of the engineer Le
Vasseur, Tortuga's defense works expanded from a small battery of a 
few guns to the oelebrated, massive, nearly impregnable Fort de la 
Roche. For approximately fourteen years, until the brilliant 
maneuvers of Don Gabriel de Valle-Figueroa utterly reduced it in 
1654, the fort stood aloof and unassailed on the very doorstep of 
Spain's most illustrious colony. In spite of its eventual
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destruction, this mountain bastion provided the buccaneer settlement 
a crucial period of unmolested growth and stability, enough to prove 
the strategic value of Tortuga so that the French reacquired and re­
fortified it. Du Tertre, given particulars and a sketch (Figure 12) 
by Monsieur Hotman,®® provided a detailed description of Le 
Vasseur's construction and choice of location:
He selected the most advantageous site on the island to 
place his fort, five or six [hundred] paces from the sea; it 
was a rock platform, around which he built uniform terraces, 
easily capable of holding three or four hundred men. From 
the middle of the platform arose a massive rock, thirty feet 
high and sheer on all sides. He had several steps carved 
into the rock itself, but these ascended only halfway; one 
had to climb the rest with an iron ladder, which could be 
pulled up to the summit, where Le Vasseur ensconced himself. 
There was a vent, like a chimney pipe, by which one could 
descend with a rope to the terrace. At the foot of this rock 
sprang a fountain of fresh water, wider than an arm, which 
never dried up or ceased flowing. He had built upon this 
rock a handsome residence for himself and a magazine for the 
gunpowder. On the platform he also had mounted cannon and 
several other pieces of ordnance to defend the harbor
entrance, and omitted nothing that a good engineer could do 
to make this fortress impregnable (1667, tom.l, 171—
author's translation).
Exquemelin's later description of the pirate citadel®® closely
corroborated that given by the Abb4. He added that the single
approach to the fort was so narrow as to accommodate only two men
abreast, and that a later governor, presumably de Fontenay, "had all
the trees around the fort out down in order to get a clearer view of
the enemy" (1972, 26-27).
In terms of firepower, a Spanish source indicated that by 1653 
the platform held fourteen cannon, and mounted on the rook above 
were forty-six cannon, many of them bronze; but Haring insisted that 
these amounts must have been greatly overstated (1910, 82n). Le
Vasseur certainly helped himself to whatever ordnance was left
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behind by the Englishman James, and Du Tertre said this consisted of 
one small cast piece and two forged ones, which the French had to 
pull from the sand (1667, tom.l, 171).90 Exquemelin mentioned two 
guns mounted at the Governor's 'dovecote' (1972, 26); but over a 
twelve-year reign, Le Vasseur no doubt augmented the island's 
defenses whenever possible with ordnance brought in from Spanish 
prizes. The Chevalier de Fontenay arrived at Tortuga, as Du Tertre 
informed us, in a frigate of twenty-two guns, and it is conceivable 
that after taking possession of the island, he transferred some of 
these to the fort. He certainly added two freestone bastions which 
abutted the mountain and shielded the main platform (Du Tertre 1667, 
tom.l, 178). So it is possible that by 1653 Tortuga's ordnance 
approached the numbers reckoned in the Spanish account, but pirates 
and Spaniards alike habitually exaggerated their opposition.
In any event, when the Spanish garrison left behind by Valle- 
Figueroa evacuated Tortuga to meet the threat from Penn and Venables 
in 1655, the men had orders to raze whatever bulwarks remained and 
bury the ordnance. Elias Watts had to begin amidst the ruins with a 
battery of just four guns when he arrived in 1656. Du Rausset, de 
la Place— and especially d'-Ogeron— may have done something to 
restore Tortuga's battered fort; but even if it remained for a time 
the foremost stronghold in the French Antilles, it probably never 
regained its former puissanoe. A secondary fort, the Fort Neuf or 
La Tour which appears on the 1688 map of Tortuga, was erected closer 
to the coast, near Cayone. As this coastal vicinity had repeatedly 
provided an alternative anchorage for those invading foroes 
compelled to withdraw from Basse Terre by the Fort de la Foohe,
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raising an auxiliary bastion there made eminent sense. Roberts 
credited d’Ogeron with the construction of La Tour (1942, 61), and 
it may well have been the result of that governor's plan, mentioned 
by Charlevoix, to improve the island’s defense works (1733, vol.3, 
82). With the final abandonment of Tortuga, plans to rejuvenate the 
Port de la Roche were entertained even into du Casse's 
administration, but these never reached fruition. Tortuga’s premier 
fortress slowly succumbed to the elements, just as its once proud 
reputation as a pirate stronghold gradually faded away.
I am unaware of any organized efforts to excavate or 
archeologically examine the ruins of the Fort de la Roche or any 
other relics of buccaneer life on Tortuga. Though I have not yet 
had the opportunity to do so myself, a few modern authors have 
visited the island, but they have reported very little. In 1923, 
the indefatiguable A. Hyatt Verrill published an entertaining 
account of his cruise aboard the Vigilant, which brought him, "in 
the wake of the buccaneers, to drop anchor in Tortuga’s harbor. 
Other than commenting on the island’s sparse population, its port 
"scarcely worthy the name of town,” and its mountainous, wooded 
appearance, he mentioned nothing beyond the "impenetrable jungle"; 
but he did include an interesting photograph of the island’6 rooky 
profile (216-18). In 1980, a physician and scholar of piracy92. Dr. 
Rayner Thrower, having been "privileged to imagine...on the spot 
what conditions must have been like nearly three hundred years 
before," reported that "little remains from those busy bygone days. 
Along the coast relics such as old guns are occasionally visible 
through the clear water, while inland overgrown ruins provide
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tattered memorials to the past" (137-38). Finally, in 1985, in the
"Afterword" to the historical novel Caribbee, popular writer Thomas
Hoover claimed that, as part of his research:
On Tortuga, this writer chopped his way through the jungle 
and located the site of Le Vasseur* s Forte de la Roche and 
’dovecote.' A bit of digging uncovered some stonework of the 
fort's outer wall, but all that remained of the ‘dovecote* 
was a single plaster step, almost three and a half centuries 
old. once part of its lower staircase and now lodged in the 
gnarled root of a Banyan tree’0 growing against the huge 
rock atop which it was built (395-96).
He added that much of his information about Tortuga and its
fortification was given him by the island's Christian Brothers (Les
Frdres des Ecoles chretiennes) and an archeologist named Daniel
Koski-Karell, who provided "some vital research" on the Fort de la
Foche (396). However, he mentioned no actual site investigations,
and I have found no reference of any by Koski-Karell or anyone else.
Tortuga’s strategic location is discernable from the foregoing 
discussion of the island’s piratical history. Nevertheless, a 
geographical analysis must address Tortuga’s situation specifically 
in terms of access to operative capital (i.e. manpower, provisions, 
ammunition, and naval stores) and relative proximity to Spanish 
targets. If Tortuga was an enfant terrible, Hispaniola was
certainly its nurturing and conspiratorial mother, and the
interdependency between the two islands cannot be overemphasized. 
Pena Battle identified several facets of their geographical 
relationship that ultimately resulted in Tortuga’s piratical 
ascendency (1951, 122). First of all was the Spaniards’ failure or 
inability to settle and thereby tenably defend the smaller Antilles, 
such as Tortuga, as well as the entire northwest region of
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Hispaniola. That policy, whether or not forced upon them by 
strained resources, left a sufficient opening for interlopers and 
pirates to slither into the very heart of their empire. Second was 
the immediate proximity of Tortuga to Hispaniola's vast reservoir of 
resources and refuges. The rapidity and ease with which the first 
buccaneers could assemble on Tortuga or disperse across the channel 
into multiple hidden recesses, whether to live off the land or flee 
from Spanish opposition, meant that the Spaniards oould interrupt 
Tortuga's settlement, but they could never fully eradicate it or the 
foreign presence it served. By contrast, the remoteness of 
Tortuga's earliest piratical sibling. Providence Island, made that 
lone base far more vulnerable to more definitive Spanish reprisal. 
Of course Hispaniola's abundance of feral cattle and pigs provided 
the very raison d'Stre of the bouoaniers who settled Tortuga. As 
these ruffians from Hispaniola turned pirate, they brought to 
Tortuga their craft (for preserved meat remained their essential 
provision), their marksmanship, and their peculiar social order. 
Finally, and perhaps of utmost importance, was Tortuga's strategic 
situation with respect to transatlantic and inter-Caribbean 
commerce. Initially, the favorable position at the crossroads of 
Dutch, French, and English interloping provided a seed of settlement 
on Hispaniola which eventually bore fruit on Tortuga. Later, this 
same traffic provided the market for hides and bouoanned meat. Of 
course the ultimate prey of the buccaneers, the Spaniards, depended 
on these same oceanic lanes, of which Tortuga commanded more 
vulnerable bottlenecks than any other pirate base.
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Map 17 Illustrates Tortuga's hold over maritime choke points, 
particularly the Old Bahama Channel, the Caicos Passage, the 
Windward Passage, and the Mona Passage. Map 17 also demonstrates 
Tortuga’s relative centrality with respect to the many Spanish 
coastal targets discussed in the history above, as well as other 
pirate lairs. Before the establishment of Port Royal, Tortuga 
served as a central rallying point for buccaneers throughout the 
core region, from the Windward Islands to the Miskito Coast. Even 
after the Jamaican base assumed supremacy, Tortuga’s gravitational 
pull remained strong enough to keep the region’s leading pirate 
rendezvous nearest its own longitude, at the lie £ Vache. 
Considering Tortuga’s strategic situation, it is not surprising that 
its history forms the heart of the buooaneers’ saga.
As Rayner Thrower observed, "Considering it6 importance for so 
long it is remarkable that so little is known about what Tortuga was 
like in its heyday, and what went on there” (1980, 137).
Reconstruction of Tortuga’s past geography remains incomplete 
without conveying some feeling for the daily fabric of life there. 
Hopefully, a certain sense of place has already aoorued from the 
foregoing historical and geographical portrayal. Extant records, 
particularly the accounts of Exquemelin and the Jesuits, relay many 
interesting details of buccaneer and colonial life; but even these 
colorful authors concerned themselves mostly with places, dates, 
momentous events, and luminary personalities. Of the less 
climactic, sustainable tenor of living which must have characterized 
Tortuga, we should like to know more. History tends to relate the 
extraordinary. Geography, at least by my training, distinguishes
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itself (much like its anthropological sibling) with greater 
attention to the ordinary. Of Port Royal. Jamaica, thanks to 
archeological recoveries and a substantial body of surviving 
documents, we have a pretty good idea of the daily life which 
underlay its piratical intrigues: the names of its streets and
taverns, the kinds of merchandise available in its stores, the types 
of glassware, pipes, and toilet articles used by its citizens (see 
Link 1960; Marx 1968/1973; Pawson and Buisseret 1975). Of
seventeenth-century Tortuga, so far we have comparatively few
details. One account, the memoirs of the professed buccaneer Le 
Golif (alias Borgnefesse), contains several evocative descriptions 
of his shore life on Tortuga: carousing at a favorite inn, drolly 
named the Bat qua p&tep* battling the heat, cockroaches, and
mosquitoes which threatened to foil his wedding night; and many 
other amusing narratives (1954). Were the authenticity of these 
memoirs unquestionable, I could cite them further without 
reservation.
In way of summary, let us briefly evaluate Tortuga's
qualifications as a pirate stronghold in light of the definitive 
features suggested by Mainwaring, Semple, and Whittlesey. Like the 
Mediterranean triumverate of Mainwaring*s day— Algiers, Tunis, and 
Tripoli— Tortuga offered its pirates a heavily fortified citadel; a 
protective harbor; a pool of experienced combatants; access to 
lucrative sea lanes; a market for exchanging ammunition, provisions, 
and plundered goods; and various recreational attractions. As an 
established regional power, it supported their piracies with at 
least the cloak of legitimacy. In the early days of Saint-Domingue,
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Tortuga served as a provincial capital; moreover, its letters of 
marque, whether issued on behalf of England. France, or even 
Portugal, extended legal justification to widespread depredations 
against the Spaniards. In return, the pirate fleets of both Tortuga 
and Jamaica supplied an experienced, motivated naval presence for 
the poorly defended, nascent colonies of France and England, not 
just against the Spaniards, but against each other in event of war 
between the mother countries. Like Cilicia, the Mediterranean 
pirate "acropolis" identified by Semple, Tortuga was naturally 
equipped for its illicit trade. Plentiful timber facilitated 
nautical construction. A mountainous interior provided lookout 
stations and an impregnable coastal fortress. And while, especially 
in the early days, nearby Hispaniola guaranteed a safe refuge 
whenever the need arose, the relative remoteness of Tortuga from 
more legitimate colonial authorities, such as de Poincy and D'Oyley, 
allowed its waywardness to grow unfettered. Finally, as a prime 
example of Whittlesey’s “island springboard” analogy, Tortuga 
provided a crucial nucleus for French expansion to western 
Hispaniola. In its initial phase, the tiny rooky outlier was easily 
conquered by interloping forces. Once fortified, it secured French 
interests across the narrow Tortuga Channel and their eventual 
colonization of Saint-Domingue.
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Notes
1 To borrow Semple's term for Cilicia (1916, 143).
2 The quote from Pefia Battle which introduces this chapter
translates as: "Before Tortuga, neither buccaneering nor freebooting 
existed— or could exist" (1951, 123).
3 As part of French-speaking Haiti, the island's official modern
name is lie de la Tortue. In most English-language sources, however, 
the original Spanish Tortuga is used. The buccaneers, according to 
Exquemelin’s account, attributed the Spaniards' name for the island 
to its resemblance, in profile, to a great sea turtle (1972, 24).
4 Pena Battle's argument reminds one of Whittlesey's "islands as
springboards" concept (see Chapter 1):
Como la guerra contra el Imperio espafiol fu6 guerra 
maritima y costanera, guerra de periferia, 'desde la costa 
hasta treinta leguas tierra adentro', el dominio de las 
pequefias islas del Caribe resultd ser elemento estratdgico 
de primer orden para las naciones confabuladas contra 
Espafia. Estas islas sirvieron de escabel al rdgimen de las 
incursiones contra el Continente y de madrigueras para 
interceptar el trinsito interoceAnico de las flotas y 
armadas que comunicaban a la metrdpoli con sus posesiones 
(Pena Battle 1951, 107).
5 Columbus' short-lived garrison of 1492, La Navidad, was
established near Cap-Haitien, just 40 miles away from Tortuga
(Deagan 1987). His first colony, the ill-fated town of La Isabella, 
was located one hundred miles away on the north coast of Hispaniola. 
Five of the fifteen towns established by the Spaniards on Hispaniola 
in the sixteenth century were located on the western half of the 
island, but none of these survived into the next century (James 
1969. 271).
6 The earliest of these was the Abbd Du Tertre, who lived among them 
in the mid-seventeenth century and published a history of the 
Antilles in 1667. The detailed account of Pdre Labat, who sailed 
for the West Indies in 1693 and seems to have harbored a particular
fascination for the buccaneers, was first published in 1743. The
notes of the Reverend Pdre Lepers were penned around 1715 and formed 
the basis for the history later published by his Jesuit colleague, 
Charlevoix.
7 For Labat‘s precise description, see note 12 below.
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8 At the time of the Spanish Conquest, the Greater Antilles were 
populated by Arawak Indians, with the Taino sub-group occupying 
Hispaniola. These had been preceded in western Haiti by the Ciboney 
Indians, a primitive hunting-and-gathering people. The lesser 
Antilles had been invaded and settled by Carib Indians. 
Reconstructed figures for the pre-Columbian Indian population of the 
Antilles vary widely. Estimates for Hispaniola alone have ranged 
from hundreds of thousands to three million (West and Augelli 1976, 
59-60)
 ̂The word boucan described not only the smoking apparatus, but also 
the preserved meat and the camp or station where it was cured.
10 Boucanned beef, according to Burney, was often prepared without 
salt (1891, 48).
11 Such dried meat is still popular in the Caribbean and elsewhere. 
The term for it among English speakers is ‘jerked meat', as in ‘beef 
jerky'— a corruption, according to Kemp and Lloyd, of the Spanish- 
American char qua (1960, 2).
Exquemelin, who hunted with the boucaniers of Tortuga and 
Hispaniola, had described a very similar procedure and structure:
[E]ach man flays the animals he has caught and removes the 
flesh from the bones. The meat is cut into strips about six 
feet long, sometimes more, sometimes less. The cut meat is 
strewn with ground salt and left in salt three or four 
hours. Then it is hung on sticks and beams in a hut near by.
They light a fire under it and smoke the meat until it is 
sufficiently dry and hard, then pack it away (1972, 49).
Following Du Tertre's description, however, most modern authors have 
described it simply as a green-wood grill: "The buccaneers...are so 
called from the word boucan , which is a sort of wooden grid-iron, 
made of several sticks placed upon four forks, upon which the 
boucaniers broil their hogs, sometimes quite whole" (quoted by 
Newton 1933, 169-70; of. Burney 1891, 48; and Haring 1910, 66). In 
fact the term boucan has been used to describe both the slow smoking 
technique for preserving dry meat strips, and the charcoal-broiling 
of whole hogs, presumably to a more palatable consistency, for more 
immediate consumption. P6re Labat also left a detailed description 
of the latter. It seems that even before the close of the 
seventeenth century (his entry is dated 1698, from Martinique), it 
had become fashionable among colonials to imitate the buccaneers by 
dining al fresco, on pig boucanned whole, under the canopy of the 
rainforest:
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A cocbon boucan is held in the forest. On these
occasions everyone must pretend to be buccaneers... So I had 
killed a pig...and had a place cleared in the woods... Here 
I had a large ajoupa built. An ajoupa is a hut made of light 
poles covered with balisier and cachibou leaves to keep out 
the rain.
. . .To make the boucan four forked sticks, about four 
feet long and as thick as your arm, are driven into the 
ground to form an oblong structure about four feet long by 
three feet wide. Crosspieces of wood are placed in the forks 
of these posts. On these one arranges the grill, which is 
also made of sticks, and all this contraption is well tied 
together with lianes. The pig is placed on this bed on its
back, the belly wide open and...filled with lime-juice and
plenty of salt and crushed pimento.
While everyone was hard at work doing these things the 
slaves set fire to a big heap of wood which they had cut the 
day before. When the wood was reduced to charcoal the slaves 
put it under the pig, using the bark of trees to carry the 
embers, for it is against all the rules to use any metal 
instruments, such as shovels, or tongs, or plates, dishes, 
spoons or forks. Even tablecloths are forbidden as they are 
too much at variance with buccaneer simplicity (1970, 52-
54).
The structural resemblance of a raised grill in a thatched smoking 
shed, or boucan, to a type of West-Indian raised bed or dwelling, 
called a barbacoa, probably led to the derivation of "barbecue" to 
mean grilling meat over charcoal.
13 Exquemelin wrote of developments by the late 1660s. It is 
uncertain when the first female prostitutes, or women of any 
occupation, for that matter, appeared on Tortuga. Of course wherever 
sailors congregated, the venereal trade was sure to appear before 
long. Mainwaring mentioned that British pirates who ran the 
Mediterranean circuit most frequently touched at certain spots along 
the Spanish coast because these offered, in addition to the usual 
piratical requisites, "a good store of English, Scottish, and Irish 
wenches which resort unto them, and these are strong attractors to 
draw the common sort of them thither" (1922, 39-40).
The case of the buccaneers at Tortuga was somewhat different. 
Women must have been entirely absent or extremely scarce in the 
earliest days, especially among the isolated hunters. Le Golif, who
like many of the buccaneers began his career as a hunter on
Hispaniola (c. 1660), described his companion as "the hairiest man I 
have ever been near in my life, a filthy person who stank worse than
a dung-soiled ass. And when I say near him, I do not speak
figuratively, since I had to submit to the habits and customs of 
these men, who have no women at all within their reach" (1954, 31).
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Later he remarked, in defense of pirates who practiced that "vice 
very common among the men of fortune. .. that they first came to it 
because at that time there was only one woman among the filibusters, 
who voyaged with Joseph le Malouin, whose strumpet she was..." (54).
Homosexuality in fact appears to have been an integral factor 
in the coutume de la cote; and although buccaneers demonstrated no 
particular aversion to sexual relations with women, it is certainly 
conceivable that they viewed the presence of females as an 
undesirable source of discord. Fuller and Leslie-Melville went so 
far as to suggest that the buccaneer order was in fact based on a 
hatred of women, owing from a fear of disloyalty and disaster 
brought about by that sex (1935, 72). Such superstitions were indeed 
prevalent among the buccaneers: upon rounding Cape Horn in mid- 
February, 1684, the buccaneer Ambrose Cowley reflected, "we chusing 
of Valentines, and discoursing of the Intrigues of Women, there 
arose a prodigious Storm. ..so that we concluded the discoursing of 
Women at Sea was very unlucky" (1699, 7). Cowley's ship,
incidentally had been renamed Batchelor's Delight, possibly to 
commememorate the purchase of sixty young Negro girls as diversion
for the crew (Kemp and Lloyd 1960, 85). Freebooters of the early
eighteenth century, however, to maintain ship's discipline reputedly 
went so far as to execute anyone "bringing on board 'a Boy or a 
Woman' or for meddling with a 'prudent Woman' on a prize ship" 
(Rediker 1987, 265-66).
Lepers described the buccaneer custom of dividing into pairs, 
or jnatelots, who agreed in the absence of wife or children for one 
to inherit the belongings of the other. This practice applied to 
hunters and pirates alike. (Haring 1910, 69; cf. Exquemelin 1972,
44; Charlevoix 1733, tom. 3, 55, 67). The matelotage may have evolved
in part as an expression of homosexual tendencies, but not always, 
as Le Golif informed us, for the matelots had "to share everything, 
including the favors of madame if one of them happen [ed] to marry" 
(1954, 92-93). Homosexual relations, in any event, were still
ostensibly considered criminal, for a buccaneer crew in 1681 clapped 
in irons one of their captians, Edward Cook, "upon the Accusation of 
a Servant of his, of the same Name, that the former had several 
Times acted the Sodomite with him" (Sharp 1729, 73). B.R.Burg has 
composed an entire volume on Sodomy and the Pirate Tradition (1984).
Returning to Tortuga's female population, it is probable that, 
after the Indians, the first women of any significant number there 
were Negro slaves. After the Spanish invasion of 1635, the 
Providence Company seized all of the Negroes on Tortuga who had 
belonged to Governor Hilton and sent these, along with some Negro 
women, to Providence Island. Newton wrote that this was "one of the 
earliest mentions of women negroes as servants in an English colony 
[and]...that they were regarded as a novelty" (1914, 213, 213n).
Thriving brothels had apparently cropped up on Tortuga by the time 
Le Golif and Exquemelin arrived there. At the bidding of Bertram 
d'Ogeron, who undertook the governorship of Tortuga in 1665 and 
whose administration fostered the island's most notorious
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buccaneers, the first shipload of fifty French women docked at the 
colony. He had requested these so-called "chaines de France" in an 
effort to civilize the free-spirited buccaneers to whom they were 
sold as wives. The background of these women is not certain, many of 
them had probably been prostitutes in France (Charlevoix 1733, 
tom.3, 83; Vaissifcre 1909, 21-22; Le Golif 1954, 87-93; Crouse 1943, 
132- 33).
14 W.A. Roberts wrote that the Spanish made their first attacks 
against the hunters of Hispaniola in 1620, but offered no support 
for that date (1942, 43). Gosse, in his introduction to Labat 
(1970, x), contended it was the Spaniards' slaughter of the wild 
herds which forced the hunters back to sea: "By upsetting the
Hispaniola beehive it was soon apparent that they had disturbed and 
set at large a swarm of very angry and dangerous insects."
By Exquemelin's account, planters had begun cultivating tobacco 
on Tortuga by 1598, but his dates are highly questionable. Sugar, 
he claimed, had also been attempted, but sufficient means could not 
be gathered to provide a refinery (1972, 49). Lepers gave no
indication of planting before 1632, but he did mention the Dutch as 
the first to encourage tobacco plantations on the island (1925, 11). 
Known as habitants, the planters distinguished themselves from the 
boucaniers (hunters) and flibustiers, but engaged in vigorous trade 
with them. Some of them, no doubt lured by booty and adventure, 
forsook plowing for plunder and joined the pirates (Exquemelin 1972, 
44, 49, 57).
^  The origins and meanings of buccaneer, fiibustier, etc. are 
explained in Chapter 1.
17 Haring, with reference to French archival material, gave both 
dates (1910, 58). Newton mentioned the attack as having occurred 
early in 1631 (1933, 171) It must have happened before Anthony 
Hilton's arrival from Nevis, and his petition for support is known 
to have reached England by May of 1631 (Newton 1914, 104). 
Charlevoix's entries skip from 1630 to 1632 (1733, tom.3, 10).
18 It is difficult to give an exact date for the transformation of 
Tortuga into a pirate base. Undoubtedly it was a gradual 
development. According to Newton, "Tortuga had been a rendezvous for 
the rovers of all nations, at any rate since the time of Drake" 
(1914, 12). Certainly the French corsairs, Francois le Clerc and 
Jacques de Sore, passed in its vicinity on their way to raid Cuba in 
1554 and 1555 (Ashdown 1979, 10). An English pirate, according to 
Brown, was captured by the Spaniards at Tortuga in 1611 (Newton 
1914, 191n). James asserted that by 1625 "it had become one of the 
chief pirate strongholds of the Antilles," but offered no support 
for that date (1969, 271). Lucas reckoned it had become their
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headquarters by 1627 (1905, 55). Newton (1933) referred to it by the 
raid of 1631 as “this new nest of robbers," but also stated, rather 
blandly, that "(a) year or so before 1630 the hunters had
established something of a rough place of settlement on Tortuga, 
where there grew up a systematic victualling trade between them and 
the rovers" (171). Charlevoix, in his description of events there 
in 1632, called the possessors of the harbor ' fJihusdertf’— pirates, 
he emphasized, in no uncertain terms (1733, tom. 3, 8-10). We do 
know that under Governor Hilton (1631—34) rovers were favorably 
received at Tortuga, and at that time at least one Spanish prize, 
taken by the English Hunter, was equipped as a pirate warship, 
making regular raids from Tortuga (Newton 1914, 153). Gosse put
forward various dates in his writings, but suggested in The History 
of Piracy that it was not until 1640 "that the true buccaneer came 
to stay and flourish there" (1946, 144). He was referring to the
arrival of Le Vasseur, who initiated formidable defense works on the
island. Indeed, his impregnable fortification of Tortuga after 1640 
may validate the earliest designation of the island as a true pirate 
stronghold.
^  John Hilton, storekeeper and chief gunner of Nevis, recalled 
meeting under a flag of truce with Toledo, whom he found "a most 
noble & courteous gentleman," to settle terms of surrender:
[He] told vs he did not delight in bloudsheed, soe wee would 
yeilde his masters interest to him, which wee had vsurped. Sc 
noe man should wronge vs or take ye life of any. And if wee 
wanted Shipping to transport our men he would furnish us,
giving hostages for ye returne of ye said Shipping (in
Harlow 1925, 11).
John Hilton was brother to the Anthony Hilton who had settled Nevis 
as first governor in 1628 and later attempted to set up Tortuga as 
an English colony.
20 The original boundaries of the Providence Company's charter
extended from 10 to 20 degrees north latitude and from 290 to 310 
degrees west longitude. Tortuga drops just a few minutes north of
20 degrees, and the enlarged grant of 1631 pushed the northern limit 
to 24 degrees (Haring 1910, 59n, Newton 1914, 105).
21 Wormeley was later tried for cowardice and stripped of his
governorship, rather an empty procedure considering he had already 
begun a new life of relative prosperity in Virginia, where he 
remained somewhat influential (Crouse 1940, 83; Newton 1914, 193).
22 According to a Dutch shipmaster who had called at the colony 
late in 1634, there were at that time only 150 regular inhabitants 
(Newton 1914, 192).
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23 According to Charlevoix, in 1638 the Spanish government at Santo 
Domingo sent a corps of 500 lancers to oust the growing number of 
hunters from Hispaniola. Because they patrolled in groups of fifty, 
they became known as the " Cinquantaine." These troops continued to 
harass the boucaniers for the duration of hostilities between Spain 
and France (Charlevoix 1733, tom.3, 13); Exquemelin described his 
cohorts' encounters with such patrols in his account of Hispaniola 
(1972, 47-48). For that same year, but just prior to this
development, Charlevoix, following Du Tertre, mentioned a Spanish 
naval attack on Tortuga, but here Newton has shown their error in 
chronology; they must have been referring to Fuenmayor's raid of 
1635 (Charlevoix 1733, tom.3, 12; Newton 1914, 192n).
24 Newton (1914, 272-74) and Gosse (1924, 50) suggested that these 
pirates named Bluefields were one and the same. In his collection 
of privateering documents, however, Jameson pointed out that there 
were in fact two Blauvelts, father and son, who sailed for the 
Providence Island Company during thi6 period. Captain Willem 
Albertsen Blauvelt, presumably son of Albertus (whom Newton called 
Abraham), operated out of New Amsterdam in the 1640s and captured a 
Spanish barque near Tabasco in 1649 (Jameson 1923, 9-14). 
Winzerling stated that "William Albert Blauvelt" and "Abraham 
Blauvelt" were brothers (1946, 35).
25 Also spelled Levasseur.
^  In an appendix to the first volume of the Nistoire Generals das 
Antilles (1667, 588-90), Du Tertre published the articles agreed
upon between de Poincy and Le Vasseur for the founding of a new 
French colony at Tortuga. The first, which gave de Poincy good 
reason to be defensive, guaranteed "Liberty de conscience 6gale aux 
deux Religions." Further articles spelled out the rates and 
procedures for levying duties and the division of profits derived 
thereof (one tenth to the king, the rest divided equally between the 
company and the officers— of the latter share Vasseur was to receive 
two thirds and de Poincy one). Also provided for was the 
construction of necessary defense works and other buildings, and the 
dispensation of logwood, saltpeter, or any other commodity of value 
that might be extracted from the island.
^  Du Tertre rendered this as Port & Margot (1667, tom.l, 170) and 
Charlevoix as Port Margot, seven leagues to the windward of Tortuga 
(1733, tom. 3, 14). There is a Port-Margot situated a few miles 
upriver on the north Haitian coast, about 22 miles southeast of 
Tortuga. Reckoning three miles for a league, this could have been 
the place of Le Vasseur's first landing. De Poincy, however, simply 
referred to the “islet Margot" (to which Le Vasseur gave the name
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"Reffuge"), estimating it to be only five leagues from Tortuga and 
half a league from Hispaniola.
23 De Poincy and Du Tertre gave no name, referring only to a 
"capitaine anglois" or "Commandant Anglois", respectively (Vaissiere 
1909, 375; Du Tertre 1667, tom.l, 170). Charlevoix repeatedly
referred to the English leader of that time as "Willis" (1733, 
tom.3, 13-15). Various authors, as noted in Chapter 2, have
connected this man with the Willis (or Wallace) supposed to have 
colonized Belize. The claim, though feasible enough, appears purely 
speculative and undocumented. VaissiAre (1909, 8) wondered if
Charlevoix might have meant Samuel Filby, the planter from St. 
Christopher who had settled in Tortuga; but according to Newton's 
findings, Filby had died in the summer of 1634 (1914, 192). Newton 
conjectured instead that James' first name may have been William, of 
which Charlevoix might have made Willis (281n).
29 Du Tertre and historians after him placed Vasseur's attack in 
August of 1640 until Crouse challenged that date for two reasons. 
First, the articles referred to in note 26 above (which were 
appended to the JZistoire because Du Tertre received them after his 
book went to press) were not signed by de Poincy and le Vasseur 
until November of 1641. Crouse argued that le Vasseur would never 
have undertaken the expedition before the articles had been duly 
signed and sealed. Moreover, he pointed to documentary evidence in 
the Calendar of State Papers, (America & West Indies 1574-1660, 316) 
which might indicate that James was still in possession of Tortuga 
in December of 1640 (Crouse 1940, 86, 86n). Charlevoix described 
these events under an entry for 1641 (1733, tom.3, 14-15). However, 
by the account of de Poincy himself, in a letter to Cardinal 
Richlieu dated 15 November 1640 (published as an appendix in 
VaissiAre 1909, 375-77), Le Vasseur had attacked Tortuga on the last 
day of August that same year after fir6t establishing himself at 
Margot. It is probably best to rely on de Poincy's contemporary 
version, which was probably seen by Du Tertre.
3* The detailed construction of Le Vasseur‘s fortress is described 
in the last section of this chapter.
31 Duty rates and distribution are ennumerated in note 26 above.
32 Also Cayonne, Cayenne, Kayenne, or Cayona.
33 Including a Capucin father by the name of Marc, who had been 
compelled to repair to Tortuga's harbor during a storm (Du Tertre 
1667, tom.l, 173)
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34 Charlevoix later envisioned this torture apparatus as a "cage" of 
iron (1733, tom.3, 19), but Du Tertre's earlier description sounds 
more like a vicious set of metal stocks.
^  That part of the 'custom o f  the coast' known as m*t»Jotagr& is 
described in note 13 above.
36 At this point. Father Du Tertre's narrative really stretches the 
bounds of credibility. His complete version of the assassination 
follows:
M. le Vasseur, completely unaware of this conspiracy, 
descended from his rock fortress to his fine magazine, where 
the two parricides, accompanied by 7 or 8 others, had neatly 
planned to stage their assault. Three or four of these 
traitors, upon perceiving the reflection of Sieur le Vasseur 
in the window, discharged 3 or 4 blasts from their muskets 
into the mirrored image, thinking to shoot the man himself. 
Thereupon Tibaut entered the magazine, and seeing that le 
Vasseur remained completely unharmed, fired at him with a 
shot from his musket. Only slightly wounded by the blast, he 
ran toward his Negro, who carried his 6p6e, but he was 
pursued so closely by Tibaut that he had no time to reach 
it, and was compelled to turn and parry with his arm a 
thrust from his attacker's poinard. Recognizing him, he 
exclaimed, as Caesar to Brutus of old, “So it is you, 
Tibaut, who kills me." Then, seeing himself pierced by both 
6p6e and poinard at once, he cried out "Ha! Enough! Bring me 
a priest; I wish to die Catholic"— and fell dead upon 
uttering these words. (1667, tom.l, 174-75— author's 
translation).
Charlevoix retained most of this version, with some modification, 
but accused Father Du Tertre of changing the very last part for 
dramatic effect. Why, he argued, aside from the fact that such an 
abrupt conversion was completely out of character, would Le Vasseur 
have called for a priest, so that he could die Catholic, when he 
knew full well he had driven all the priests from the island? (1733, 
tom.3, 22-23).
37 Roberts speculated that Fontenay may well have "intrigued with 
the malcontents against Le Vasseur, much as the latter had 
previously conspired" (1942, 46), but there is no evidence for this. 
The fact that the fort's cannon fired on his vessel would seem to 
indicate otherwise.
33 Du Tertre related how one of the habitants, one Noel Bedel, 
insisted that the governor sue for terms with the Spaniards. 
Enraged by this display of cowardice, de Fontenay promptly shot the
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unfortunate Bedel in the head. Although he had cowed the mutinous 
settlers for the moment, one of them fired at the governor's brother 
and then slipped away in the night to consort with the enemy (1667, 
tom.l, 183-84). Le Golif also mentioned this Bedel, and a more 
cunning agitator named Pi6douille, who rekindled the mutiny and 
conspired with the Spaniards, remaining with them after the French 
departed (1954, 28-29).
39 A copy of the English version survived in manuscript form and was 
later printed. Haring (1910, 113n, 114n) quoted this as follows:
The Captane and Sarginge Mager Don Baltearsor Calderon 
and Spenoso, Nopte to the President that is now in the sity 
of Santo-domingo, and Captane of the gones of the sitye, and 
Governor and Lord Mare of this Island, and stranch of this 
Lland of Tortogo, and Chefe Comander of all for the Khinge 
of Spaine.
Yoo must understand that all pepell what soever that 
shall com to this Hand of the Khinge of Spaine Catholok 
wich is name is Don Pilep the Ostere the forth of this name 
that with his harmes he hath put of Feleminge and French men 
and Englesh with lefee heare from the yeare of 1630 tell the 
yeare of thurty fouer and tell the yeare of fifte fouer in 
wich the Kinge of Spane uesenge all curtyse and given good 
quartell to all that was upon this Hand, after that came 
and with oute Pecepet upon this lland knowinge that the 
Kinge of Spane had planted upon it and fortified in the name 
of thye Kinge came the forth time the 15th of Augost the 
last yeare French and Fleminges to govern this lland the 
same Governeore that was heare befor his name was Themeleon 
hot man De founttana gentleman of the ourder of Guresalem 
for to take this lland put if fources by se and land and 
forsed us to beate him oute of this place with a greate dale 
of shame, and be cauess yoo shall take notes that wee have 
puelld doune the Casill and carid all the gonenes and have 
puelld doune all the houes and have lefte no thinge, the 
same Captane and Sargint-mager in the name of the Kinge wich 
God blesh hath given yoo notiss that what souer nason souer 
that shall com to live upon this lland that thare shall not 
a man mother or children cape of the sorde, thare fore I 
give notiss to all pepell that they shall have a care with 
out anye more notis for this is the order of the Kinge and 
with out fall you will not want yooer Pamente and this is 
the furst and second and thorde time, and this whe leave 
heare for them that comes hear to take notis, that when wee 
com upon you, you shall not pleate that you dod not know is 
riten the 25 of August 1656.
Baltesar Calderon Por Mandado de Senor Gouor.
y Espinosa Pedro Franco de riva deney xasuss.
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^  Squads of Spanish lancers who ranged Hispaniola an groups of 
fifty to detroy the buccaneer huntsmen and their quarry (see note 23 
above).
41 Rendered by Du Tertre as "EliazoOard" (1667, tom.3, 127).
42 Haring, quoting English manuscript material, wrote that du 
Rausset first removed to Santa Cruz (1910, 117). Charlevoix 
maintained that he crossed over to the Cul-de-Sac of Hispaniola for 
a change of air (1733, tom. 3, 36-38). In any event, du Rausset 
ultimately returned to France, and Tortuga remained in his nephew’s 
hands until the arrival of a new governor (Bertram d'Ogeron).
43 According to a manuscript listing of 1663 (printed in Pawson and 
Buisseret 1975, Appendix 2) there were twenty-two ships of mixed 
English, French, and Dutch buccaneer crews:
Ad Account of the private Ships of ffarr belongiDg 
to Jamaica and Turtudos [Tortuga] in 1663 
(B.M. Add.MSS. 11410, fo. 10)
Men Guns
Sr. Thos. Wettstone, Comdr. of a Spanish Prize 60 7
Capt. Smart, Comdr. of the Griffon frigott 100 14
Capt. Guy, Comdr. of the James, frigott 90 14
Capt. James, Comdr. of the American frigott 70 6
Capt. Cooper, his frigott 80 10
Capt. Morris, Comdr. of a [brigantine] 60 7
Capt. Brenningham his frigott 70 6
Capt. Mansfield’s [brigantine] 60 4
Capt. Goody, a Pincke 60 6
Capt. Blewfield, belonging to Cape Grace Deos 
living amongst the Indians, a Barke (being 
manned with English, Dutch and Indians) 50 3
Capt. Hardue, a Frig. Spanish Prize 40
11 Ships These 740 men are English, Dutch &
French with many more. .7-4.0 B1
There are 4 more belonging to the Island of 
Jamaica which I cannot give an accompt of.
Of Forraigners
Men Guns
Capt. Senolve, a Dutchman having 3 small ships 
full of men from Jamaica which have transported 
themselves to the River 100 12
(which have left the island)
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Shipps belonging to Turtudos having 
the Govrs. Commissions
Capt. Davis, a Dutch ship & Portugall Comdr. 40 6
A Flyeboate belonging to the Governor of
Turtudos, the Captns. name I know not 80 9
(All French)
Capt. Buckell, a French frigott 70 8
Capt. Clostree, a French Commission
(most Frenchmen) 68 9
358 44
The grand total for this listing would be 22 ships, 1198 men, and 
137 guns. Blewfield (or Blauvelt), whom we found working for the 
Providence Company years before, was actually Dutch, but like 
Mansfield (Mansvelt), sailed for the English. This list only 
includes the larger privateering vessels. With the addition of 
smaller operators we can surmise a much larger pool of buccaneers.
44 The custom of macelotage described in note 13 above was just one 
of many cultural traits which served to bind buccaneer society. In 
its entirety, the coutume de la cdte could be thought of as an 
elaborate code of 'honor among thieves'. At the core of the 
buccaneers' modus operand! was a written contract, or chasse par tie. 
mutually agreed upon before every voyage by all of the participants. 
First to be deducted from the spoil were capital expenses for the 
expedition— generally 200 pieces of eight to each hunter for 
supplying provisions, 100 to 150 pieces of eight to the carpenter 
for fitting out and repairing the ship, and 200 to 250 pieces of 
eight to the surgeon for medical supplies. Another provision in the 
initial adjustment was a curious scale of disability compensation 
insurance for the wounded, payable in pieces of eight or slaves as 
follows:
lost member pieces of eight (or) slaves
right arm ...  6C0 6
left arm  500 5
right leg ...  500 5
left leg  400 4
one eye ...  100 1
one finger  100 1
The remaining plunder was to be equally divided among the crew 
so that each buccaneer received one full share, exceptions being 
made for the captain, who received two for his own part (and up to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
287
five or more if he owned the ship), and the boys, who received only 
half a share each. The share of any buccaneer killed in action was 
to be added to that of his miteJot. All plunder had to be 
contributed toward common disbursement, and each pirate simply swore 
on the Bible to hold nothing back (though after the raid on Panama, 
Morgan violated this customary procedure by forcing an ignominious 
search of all hands, including himself). Perpetual banishment from 
the ranks of the Brethren of the Coast was the least penalty for 
anyone caught breaking this trust.
Though no doubt paramount in their minds, fair division of 
plunder did not in itself define the buccaneer social code. Loyalty 
and generosity were expected between Brethren, and when feuds did 
occur these had to be settled honorably, by the duel. Any buccaneer 
found to have killed one of his fellows by treachery was set against
a tree and shot dead by a comrade of his own choosing. The above
procedures described typical buccaneer society on Tortuga in the 
mid-seventeenth century, as explained by Exquemelin (1972, 58-60;
85), but the Custom of the Coast extended to Jamaica and throughout 
the West Indies. Similar tenets in Morgan’s articles of association 
were mentioned by Earle (1981, 66-67, 181), and Labat described a
nearly identical chasse partie among the flibustiers of Martinique 
and other French possessions (1970, 36-37; of. Charlevoix 1733,
tom.3, 68-69). Display of bravery constituted another key element 
in the buccaneer code. Those who performed most daringly and 
capably against the Spaniards could expect reward in the form extra 
plunder or increased authority— including captaincy. In the early 
days of buccaneering, especially, the captain was frequently chosen 
from the ranks. Aside from an extra share or so of booty, he could 
expect no special treatment and was obliged to inspire courage by 
example. As long as his men accepted him as leader, he could rely 
on them to maintain order and discipline; but even into the latter 
seventeenth century it was common for disgruntled crewmen to either 
abandon their captain or elect a new one (Earle 1981, 66-67; Haring 
1910, 73). The British historian Peter Earle touted buccaneer
society as "the most democratic institution in the world of the 
seventeenth century" (1981, 66). Fuller and Leslie-Melville
described the piratical lifestyle which evolved on Tortuga as 
essentially communistic (1935, 73). In any event, despite their 
deserved reputation for fierce independence, the grens de la cote 
demonstrated a remarkable degree of social cohesion and mutual 
cooperation.
45 The indentured laborer, or bond-servant. often suffered cruel 
usage from the habitants and boucanier-huntcts; many, like 
Exquemelin and Le Golif, actually ran off to join the pirates. 
According to Exquemelin,
the planters admit they must take greater care of a Negro
slave than a white bondsman, because the Negro is in their
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service for life, while the white man is theirs only for a 
period... A certain young man of good family...became sc
desperate he ran off into the forest, where he starved to
death. I myself found his body, half eaten by the dogs.
No less memorable is the case of the planter whose
bondsman ran off to the woods through ill-treatment, but was 
fetched back again. His master tied him to a tree, beat him 
till the blood gushed down his back, then smeared his flesh 
with a sauce made of lemon juice, salt and red pepper. He 
was left in this state, tied to the tree, for twenty-four 
hours. Then the master came back and struck him again, until 
he died under the blows (1972, 53-54).
48 Or so he phrased it, according to Charlevoix. See note 13 above 
for a fuller discussion of the event.
47 Exquemelin, who arrived in Tortuga a year after d'Ogeron took 
office, remarked of the hunters on Hispaniola that, while once 
numbering five or six hundred, they were now reduced to less than 
three hundred. He attributed their thinning numbers to the scarcity 
of cattle, rather than any efforts of the governor to resettle them 
(1972, 45).
48 Exquemelin's dates are generally unreliable. This one, though 
possible, seems too early. In the more popular English translation 
of 1684, which derives from an earlier Spanish translation, no date 
is given. I have quoted from the only direct English translation of
the original text, but have not cross-checked this date with the
Dutch publication of 1678. Goslinga (1971, 266) mentioned a Pierre 
le Grand, "a professional soldier who had distinguished himself in 
Brazil" as having played a prominent role in the Dutch conquest of 
Curagao in 1634, but other than the coincidence of name I have found 
no evidence for any connection.
49 Von Winning (1950) stated that Scot's Campeche maneuver occurred 
on July 10, 1678, but Burns claimed it took place in 1663, the same 
year that a Captian Barnard took the fort of San Thome on the 
Orinoco River. (1954, 318). John Davis pillaged Granada, and
possibly even farther, in 1665 (see note 55 below). Already, 
however, we noted an earlier land maneuver by French buccaneers in 
1659, during Elias Watt's governorship of Tortuga, against the
Spaniards at Santiago in Hispaniola. Dampier mentioned a still 
earlier overland attack by French and English buccaneers, around 
1654, against Nueva Segovia via the Rio Coco. He claimed to have 
known several of the buccaneers who had participated in that 
expedition (1927, 95).
In 1552 this Spanish soldier-turned-priest published his
Brevjslm Felaaion de la Destruccidn de las Indlas, in which he
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
claimed that 15 million Indians had perished at the hands of the 
Spaniards. The book was translated into Dutch. French, English, 
Italian, and Latin, and served to fuel the hatred of Spain by her 
European rivals in what became known as the greatly exaggerated 
'Black Legend' (West and Augelli 1976, 66-67).
51 Colorful sobriquets or roms de guerre were common among 
boucaniers and flibustlers alike. These signified not mere 
daredevil flamboyancy, but a deeper statement about the 
nonconformity of the buccaneers to the norms of larger society. 
According to the French Jesuits, the buccaneers felt entitled to 
their “bizarre assemblage " of antisocial behavior by their rite of 
passage across the Tropic of Cancer. The traditional sailors' 
baptism at that line had marked the beginning a new life in the New 
World, and the buccaneers considered themselves freed of all 
previous contracts and associations— including their family names. 
One may never have learned the given name of a buccaneer unless he 
took a wife and signed it to a marriage contract (Charlevoix 1733, 
tom.3, 56-57; cf. Exquemelin 1972. 21-23 for a description of the 
maritime baptismal ceremony). Some of the more outlandish nicknames 
were described by the supposed buccaneer Louis Le Golif. His own 
sobriquet of ' Bergnefesse '— literally denoting 'one buttock' or 
'half-ass'— owed to a posterior wound inflicted by a Spanish cannon 
at Granada. Borgnefesse took great pains to point out that the ball 
had first passed between his legs before ricocheting from a rock, 
assuring the reader that he "never showed anything but [his] face to 
the enemy" (1954, 35).
52 Exquemelin did not supply a date for the expedition, but both 
Crouse (1943, 136) and Haring (1910, 156) dated Nau's attack on
Maracaibo in 1667, shortly before the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle.
53 Captain William Jackson is known to have taken the city in 1642 
on the same voyage in which he took Trujillo in Honduras and 
Santiago de la Vega in Jamaica (Haring 1910, 50). Exquemelin 
mentioned that Maracaibo had fallen to buccaneers ten or twelve 
years before L'Olonnais' assault, but he was probably referring to 
Jackson's raid.
On this point there is some discrepancy between the English 
versions of Exquemelin's work. In the first English translation of 
1684, which had been rendered from a Spanish translation of the 
original Dutch, the buccaneers counted 260,000 pieces of eight "in 
ready money," to which they added shares of silk, plate, and jewels 
(1987, 99-100). The modern English translation, given directly from 
the Dutch by Alexis Brown, describes their reckoning of the booty as 
follows:
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They calculated they had 260,000 pieces of eight in ready 
money, wrought silver and jewels. The silverware was 
weighed, being reckoned as ten pieces of eight to the pound; 
they assessed the jewels at various prices, having no exact 
knowledge of such things. Apart from this, there were at
least 100 pieces of eight for every man in linen and silk
goods, as well as other trifles (1972, 85).
Pieces of eight, "silver Spanish coins worth eight reales that were 
often cut into pieces to make small change," provided the standard
equivalent for estimating the value of plunder (Botting 1978, 26,
pictured on p. 27). Rayner Thrower's chapter on the various types 
of booty acquired by pirates provides even more interesting details 
about this legendary coin:
In the early days of the New World there is frequent 
mention of pieces of eight. A piece of eight was a silver 
coin worth at that time about 25 p. (British pence, or 1/4 
pound sterling], but much more today. It got its name 
because it was an eight-reales piece (half a Spanish peseta) 
which had an '8' on one side and an ’R’ on the other. 
Twelve-and-a-half pieces of eight was the value of a 
dubloon, a gold coin naturally more sought-after. The modern 
sign $ is derived from the f sign used by pirates to signify 
the eight-reales coin, which itself may be regarded as the 
forerunner of the existing dollar monetary system. This 
provides a further example of how ruffians left their mark 
on world history (1980, 66).
To lend some idea of the relative worth of such booty, historian 
Peter Earle pointed out that in the world of the seventeenth-century 
buccaneer, an average worker was fortunate if he earned 15 pounds—  
or 60 pieces of eight— in a full year (1981, 23). David Mitchell 
estimated in 1975 that a piece of eight would be equivalent by 
modern standards to about £2.50-£3, or $6-$7 (1976, 22n).
55 Exquemelin described the Davis venture in some detail, mentioning 
plunder exceeding 40,000 pieces of eight, but gave no date (1972, 
69-70). Gerhard cited a Spanish source which dated an attack by 
“Juan Davis" against Granada, Le6n, and Realejo in June of 1665 
(1960, 137-38, 138n). This was the first time Granada had been 
plundered since its founding a century and a half before (Williams 
1976, 51), and if Davis indeed reached Realejo, on the Pacific coast 
of Nicaragua, it was one of the earliest buccaneer incursions to the 
South Sea. Cruikshank showed that Davis fitted out his ship and 
crew with Frenchmen from Tortuga (see note 43 above), and it is not 
inconceivable that L’Olonnais was among these, for he certainly 
emulated Davis' tactics. A contemporary English account describes 
apparently the same sacking of Granada in connection with Captains
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Jackman, John Morris, and Henry Morgan, as the grand finale to their 
Central American campaign. According to this deposition, delivered 
by those captains in November of 1665 to Governor Modyford in 
Jamaica, some of the buccaneers returned with Captain Martin, a 
Dutchman, to Tortuga (C.S.P.. America & West Indies, No. 1142,i 
reproduced in Cruikshank 1935, 57-58).
^  The Gulf of BatabanO, separating Cuba from the Isle of Pines 
(Isla de Juventud).
57 Rendered Rio Xagua by Exquemelin (1972, 86). Here, in search of 
food, which they found in the form of maize and livestock, the 
buccaneers raided the abodes of the Indians.
Or Puerto Cavallo, the site of modern Puerto CortOs, just north 
of San Pedro Sula.
Exquemelin also spelled his name Moise van Klijn. Roberts (1942, 
63) referred to him as Moise Vauclin, probably after a French 
translation of Exquemelin.
60 Although these islands were not mentioned by name, Exquemelin 
wrote “the buccaneers crossed over to some islands on the other side 
of the Gulf in order to careen their ships and seek fresh food 
supplies" (1972, 89). Davidson identified these as the Bay Islands, 
a popular resort for pirates, which offered the best rendezvous for 
careening in the area (1974, 40, 52-53).
Though Exquemelin mentioned the Islas Perlas by name, the two 
islands he described may well have been the Corn Islands.
62 His name survives among the general public, at least in
connection with a popular brand of spiced rum.
63 See, for example, Gosse (1924, 203), Hamshere (1972, 81), and
Roberts (1942, 62). Gosse claimed that Mansvelt was a Dutchman born
on Curacao, but that island was not conquered by the Netherlands 
until 1634 and, given the buccaneer's advanced years, the assertion 
remains dubious; Gosse's avowal was probably based on Masefield's 
speculation to the same effect (1922, 106). Kemp and Lloyd referred 
to Edward Mansfield "whom Esquemeling calls a 'Scot' of the name cf 
Mansvelt" (1960, 14), but I have found no 6uoh designation in the 
editions of Exquemelin available to me. Burney simply stated, "Of 
what country Mansvelt was a native does not appear" (1891, 64). A 
Mansfield is mentioned as having taken part in William Jackson's 
cruise of 1642-45 (Harlow, ed. [Jackson] 1923, 4); Jackson certainly 
had connections with Providence Island's buccaneers as well as Dutch 
privateers from Curacao.
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^  Both his name and Blauvelt's appear on a roster of English 
privateers from Jamaica and Tortuga as of that date— see note 4 3 
above.
65 The best accounts of Mansvelt and Morgan, fully supported from a 
variety of contemporary documents, both Spanish and English, were 
put forth by historians Cruikshank (1935) and Earle (1981).
66 Exquemelin (1972, 98) noted that the fleet "consisted of fifteen 
vessels, with 500 men, including Walloons and Frenchmen, on board." 
He also claimed that Mansvelt chose young Henry Morgan, at this time 
aged 30, to be his vice-admiral. Morgan had indeed just returned to 
Jamaica from successful buccaneering raids with Captains Jackman and 
Morris in Campeche and Central America, but, according to 
Cruikshank, there is no credible documentation of his having sailed 
as a privateer during the next two years (1935, 66).
67 According to Cruikshank, "Mansfield's followers are said to have 
numbered six hundred men of several nationalities, speaking 
different languages, as among them, besides many English, there were 
Flemings, French, Genoese, Greeks, Levantines, Portuguese, Indians, 
and negroes. Chief among his officers were named John Davis, Joseph 
Bradley, and the Frenchman, Jean Le Maire” (1935, 67).
^  The coincidence of ruthless piracy with religious piety is always 
a little baffling. For Protestant corsairs, from Elizabethans to 
Puritans, Lutherans and Huguenots, anti-Catholicism obviously 
intensified aggressive motives against the Spaniards. The tendency 
to mix depredation with devotion among the Catholic French 
buccaneers, v iiC piTOf essed the very faith as their Spanish victims, 
seems much more incongruous. But in his journal, P6re Labat 
described many such instances among the fJjJbustjersot the Antilles:
St. Pierre [Martinique], 6th March 1694. We were busy all 
this morning confessing a crew of filibusters who had 
arrived at Les Mouillages with two prizes... The Mass of the 
Virgin was celebrated with all solemnity, and I blessed 
three large loaves which were presented by the captain and 
his officers, who arrived at the church accompanied by the 
drums and trumpets of their corvette. At the beginning of 
Mass the corvette fired a salute with all her cannons. At 
the Elevation of the Holy Sacrament she fired another salvo, 
at the Benediction a third, and finally a fourth when we 
sang the Te Deum after Mass. All the filibusters contributed 
30 sols to the sacristy, and did so with much piety and 
modesty. This may surprise people in Europe where 
filibusters are not credited with possessing much piety, but 
as a matter of fact they generally give a portion of their
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good fortunes to the churches. If church ornaments or church 
linen happen to be in the prizes they capture, the 
filibusters always present them to their parish church 
(1970, 36).
More commonly quoted is Labat's story of the pirate Captain Daniel. 
After a raid for provisions, this brigand requisitioned the local 
cure to say Mass aboard his barque. This service was likewise 
punctuated with cannon fire— with an even more bizarre twist:
One of the pirates adopted an offensive attitude during the 
Elevation, and on being rebuked by the captain, he replied 
insolently with a horrible oath. Daniel promptly drew his 
pistol and shot him through the head and swore by God that 
he would do the same to anyone else who showed disrespect to 
the ’Sainte Sacrifice* (222).
Of course, not all buccaneers were especially religious, and as many 
stories expose their impiety as do their strange devotion.
69 A string of tiny islets, or cays, subtends the south coast of 
Cuba from the Isle of Pines to Cape Cruz. The westernmost group is 
known as the Archipi6lago de los Canarreos, the easternmost as the 
Jardines de la Reina. William Jackson had also rendezvoused and 
careened in these cays in 1644.
• Named, as was Bluefields in Nicaragua, after the Dutch pirate- 
explorer Blauvelt (Newton 1914, 274; Floyd 1967, 19).
71 The roster for Morgan's fleet has been published in the Calendar 
of State Papers [America & West Indies, No. 704, i), and was
reprinted by Cruikshank as an appendix to his work. By this 
official account there were 38 ships (eight of them French) and 1846 
men (520 of them French), though Earle has suggested the buccaneers 
must have exceeded 2000 in number (1981, 180). The list of eight 
French ships belonging to Hispaniola and Tortuga (from Cruikshank 
1935, 422) is as follows:
French Ships
S h ip s ’ Names Commanders1 Names Tuns Guns Men
St. Catherine Captain Tribetor 100 14 110
Galllardena Gascoone 80 10 80
St. John Diego 80 10 80
St. Peter Pearse Hantol 80 10 90
Le DlaJble Volant Desnangla 40 6 50
Le Serfe sloop Joseph 25 2 40
Le Lyon sloop Charles 30 3 40
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le St. Marie " John Linaux _2Sl _i
465 59 520
72 D'Ogeron's count of 100 boucaniers referred only to the environs 
of the Ciil-de-Sac of Hispaniola. The estimate of 1000 flibustiers 
was actually stated some years later by d’Ogeron's nephew and 
successor, de Pouancey (VaissiAre 1909, 19-20).
72 According to Exquemelin, only a mock battle ensued, by request of 
the Spaniards, as a measure to preserve their reputation (1972, 146- 
47)
74 Exquemelin1 s less-than-flattering description of Morgan’s 
personal role in the sacking of Panama has been attributed by some 
historians as "sour grapes1 with respect to the division of spoil. 
The buccaneer-author did unjustly accuse Morgan of setting fire to 
Panama, a deed which the Spaniards themselves accomplished, and his 
avowal of Morgan's cruel usage of the Panamanian women and other 
prisoners is also questionable on the basis of Browne's testimony 
(see Cruikshank 1935, 196).
In an effort to appease the Spanish Court, King Charles II had 
both Modyford and Morgan arrested and brought to England. Both were 
soon released, and Morgan eventually returned to Jamaica as Deputy 
Governor, later becoming Lieutenant Governor of the island. He was 
also knighted for his service. As a government official, Morgan was 
constrained to suppress piracy, but apparently he maintained 
unofficial connections with practitioners of his former trade. 
Governor Lord Vaughan accused his lieutenant of recommending 
outlawed buccaneers to the French governor of Tortuga and retaining 
a personal interest in their purchases (Cruikshank 1935, 237).
7̂  Cap Francois, or modern Cap-Haitien.
77 Raveneau de Lussan, the French buccaneer who published a journal 
of his isthmian crossing and depredations against the Spaniards in 
Pacific waters, certainly indicated as much. A party of French and 
English pirates, he recounted, stopped at Tortuga in 1682 to raid a 
Dutch vessel lading salt there. De Lussan himself, sailing under 
Laurens de Graff from Petit-Goave in December of 1684, anchored 
briefly off Tortuga to take on water (1930, 41, 69).
79 Meaning ‘Coast of Iron1.
79 Louis Le Golif, supposedly a buccaneer who arrived at Tortuga 
under d’Ogeron's administration, described a surprise assault from 
the north coast, but that account appears erroneous on multiple 
counts. The story, nevertheless, was as follows. Le Golif, the
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reader may recall, decribed a long-time habitant by the name of 
Pi6douille, who, like the more unfortunate Bedel mentioned by Du 
Tertre, treacherously worked against the Chevalier de Fontenay’s
defense of Tortuga against the Spanish attack of 1654. After the
French capitulation and withdrawal, it seems this Piedouille
remained in good graces with the Spaniards. However, some years
later, or so claimed Le Golif:
Monsieur du Rossey, at the head of more than five hundred 
boucaniers and filibusters, returned to retake Tortuga from 
the Spaniards. Monsieur Pi6douille, who was never slow in 
turning his coat, betrayed the latter, even as he had 
betrayed the French. He appeared to be the most enraged of 
all against the enemy. It was he who guided the 
adventurers who landed on the reputedly inaccessible 
north coast and made them cross the vhole island, 
through forests and over mountains, so as to 
surprise the Spaniards from the side whence they 
expected no one (1954, 29-30 [emphasis added]).
Le Golif was referring to the arrival of du Rausset in 1660. But du 
Rausset, we know, came with the consent of England at the head of 
only thirty Frenchmen to wrest the island not from the Spaniards, 
but from the Englishman Elias Watts. The questionable authenticity 
of Le Golif's memoirs is considered in Burg's bibliographic essay 
(1984). The French Jesuits, who provided the account substantially 
accepted by historians, never mentioned any attack from the north 
coast (Charlevoix 1733, tom.3, 36-38). Considering the narrow width 
of the island and the relatively low elevation of its mountain 
spine, it is a little surprising if no such attempt was ever made, 
unless of course the Cote de Fer was truly inaccessible to craft of 
that day. Exquemelin, in a seemingly confused relation of de 
Fontenay's defense against Valle-Figueroa's attack of 1654, 
mentioned that a combined force of boucaniers and flibustiers 
rallied to the Chevalier 's aid, climbed the north face of the 
island's mountain, and overtook the Spanish battery from the rear. 
He did not, however, specify the location of their supposed 
clandestine landing (1972, 27).
Literally, the French equivalent of 'road' in the nautical sense.
81 For those geologically inclined, the Atlas d'Haiti provides a 
much more scientific description of these "rooks": Tortuga's north
face consists mainly of Quaternary limestone reefs superimposed in 
terraces. Metamorphic green schists and marbles predominate in the 
southwest portion of the island, while calc-silicates (skarns) 
compose much of the southeastern quarter (Centre d’Etudes de 
Geographie Tropicale et University de Bordeaux 1985).
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82 More commonly called lignum vitae, an extremely durable, tropical 
American wood of the genus Guaiacum. G. sanctum would have been 
particularly suitable for making nautical equipment such as pulley 
blocks. The translator of the first English edition of Exquemelin, 
besides clarifying the identity of this tree, interjected another 
interesting use for it:
Here also grows lignum sanctum, by others called guaiacum, 
the virtues of which are very well known, more especially 
unto them who observe not the sixth Commandment and are 
given to all manner of impure copulations, physicians 
drawing from hence, under several compositions, the greatest 
antidote for all venereal diseases, as also for cold and 
vicious humours (1987, 15).
83 Gum elemi, a resinous excretion from various trees, was used to 
manufacture perfumes, ointments, and varnish.
84 Like sarsaparilla, China root described a tuber belonging to 
various species of the genus Smilax, once supposed to soothe gout 
and purify the blood (cf. Exquemelin 1987, 31n).
85 Exquemelin described in detail the local techniques for 
cultivating and preparing these crops (1972, 50-51).
86 In view of its former military importance, it is very surprising 
that few early maps of Tortuga, at least of any appreciable scale, 
seem to have survived. In fact, aside from the anonymous engraving 
published in the 1688 French translation of Exquemelin, and the 
harbor chart and profiles which appeared in The English Pilot of 
Fisher and Thornton in 1689, I have found no other detailed maps—  
published or manuscript— even remotely contemporary with Tortuga’s 
buccaneers.
With the aid of Rear-Admiral Ritchie, formerly the British 
Naval Hydrographer and an avid map collector, Rayner Thrower located 
a map of Tortuga which he reproduced in his 1980 volume, The Pirate 
Picture (Illustration 10 in that volume— see also his discussion on 
p. 137). Though he claimed this map dated from 1650, no date 
appears on the portion he reproduced, and he offered no further 
details about its source. This map, save for a few acutely minor 
variations, is virtually identical to the engraving in Exquemelin 
(1688), and there are good reasons to question its compilation, at 
any rate, before 1665. Above all, the depiction of la Tour or le 
Fort neuf, near Cayone, if indeed that structure was built under 
d’Ogeron's administration (a point discussed further in this study), 
would necessarily postdate the cartography after 1665. The map is 
clearly French, but Du Tertre certainly had no knowledge of it as 
late as 1667. Moreover, the prominent depiction of Cap Sterre and 
la Pointe au Macon— two settlements mentioned by Charlevoix but not
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by Exquemelin— may suggest compilation even after the buccaneer's 
original Dutch edition appeared in 1678. In any event, both maps 
represent essentially one and the same compilation. The map's 
dimensions appear quite accurate. By its own scale, Tortuga 
measures 7.5 leagues across and about 2 leagues wide; and given 
three miles to the league, these measurements are very close to the 
actual distances already described (25 miles by 5 miles). The 
harbor, however, is indented much more than modern maps indicate.
Surely other seventeenth-century maps must exist, probably in 
manuscript form, and these may eventually be uncovered from the 
French, Haitian, or Spanish-colonial archives. Modern large-scale 
coverage of Tortuga is obtainable enough. A detailed survey was 
performed by the ship Eagle in 1905/1906, and a 1:200,000 scale map 
was produced by the Institut Haitien de Statistique (Joseph Charles, 
cartographer) in 1953. Topographic coverage at the 1:50,000 scale 
of Tortuga and the adjacent coast of Hispaniola, unfortunately 
divided among four sheets, is available from the Haitian Institut de 
Goodesie et Cartographie (Series E732, Sheets 5675 I, 5675 IV, 5676 
II. and 5676 III). Of particular interest on modern maps are place 
names which evoke the island's buooaneering past. In addition to 
Basse Terre and Cayonne (or Cayenne), there is Boucan Guepes on the 
south coast. The drier western tip, alternately labeled Pointe 
0u6st or Pointe Saline, may have been of particular interest to the 
seventeenth-century Dutch salt collectors; de Lussan mentioned these 
as still coming annually to Tortuga for salt as late as 1682 (1930, 
69). In his short work about piracy in the Gulf of Mexico, Santiago 
Cruz (1962, 120) published a sketch-map of Tortuga, evidently
derived from a modern chart and labeled toward the western end, at 
the terminus of the path which leads from the port to Palmiste and 
past Mentrie, with the intriguing word Tesoro. . .
A place just east of Port de Paix, almost directly across the 
Tortuga Channel from Cayenne, is still known as Car6nage. 
Exquemelin mentioned that when meat was required to provision a 
voyage, the buccaneers often combined hunting with ship repairs: 
"Some of them go with the hunter to help smoke and salt the flesh, 
while others stay on board to get the vessel shipshape— careening 
and greasing and doing all that is necessary" (1972, 58).
Hispaniola offered many suitable hideaways, such as Port-Margot, 
where meat for the voyage and tallow for waterproofing the hulls 
were quite plentiful. The local tidal pattern of the Tortuga 
Channel was most convenient for careening, and such maintenance 
doubtlessly occurred regularly on both sides of it (Thrower 1980. 
136).
88 Du Tertre did not specify whether the sketch *‘ que Monsieur Hotmn 
a pris la peine de le tracer luy-mesme " was drawn by the father or 
the brother of de Fontenay. The latter, of course, had on Tortuga 
attempted to hold the fort with the Chevalier and would have been
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personally acquainted with its construction; but Du Tertre mentioned 
that he owed his information about the island’s dimensions to 
"Monsieur Mottnan, pere du Chevalier de Fontenay" (1667. tom 2, 31)
89 Exquemelin, who arrived on Tortuga more than a decade after Le 
Vasseur's fortress had been mostly damaged or destroyed, provided a 
very similar description:
On arrival, this governor had a fortress built on a 
rock, where it could protect the port from enemy ships.
This fort is most difficult of access; it can be approached 
from one side only, by a way so narrow that no more than two 
people can enter at the same time. In the middle of the rock 
is a cave which serves as storehouse for ammunition, and on 
top is a suitable site for raising a battery. The governor 
had a house built at the fort, and mounted two guns there, 
reached by climbing a ladder, which could be pulled up 
behind. Inside the fort is a spring of sweet water, fit to 
supply a thousand people daily— a supply which cannot be cut 
off, for it gushes out of the rocks. All around the fort are 
plantations, which are very rich in tobacco and other crops 
(1972, 26).
Judging from the island’s geology (see note 81 above), the Fort de 
la JRoche was likely hewn from calcic material— either limestone or 
metamorphic skarn— which would account for the cave described by 
Exquemelin and Du Tertre.
98 Labat pointed out that the site of the small English battery had 
been no better that its mountings, and that the location of Le 
Vasseur’s fort afforded much better command (1925, 18-19).
91 A. Hyatt Verrill’s In the ffake of the Buccaneers (1923), though 
not a documented scholarly work, is delightful reading and one of 
the few field-based attempts I know of to reconstruct piracy 
geographically. If the title of my own work owes even in part to 
that author’s literary sense, I gratefully acknowledge my debt.
92 Enthusiastic pirate studies by physicians such as Dr. Philip 
Gosse and Dr. Rayner Thrower reflect a certain poetic justice. The 
ship’s surgeon was an indispensable member of the pirate crew, and 
probably the best educated. Consequently, much of our present 
knowledge of pirate life owes to the literate accounts of 
chirurgeons — as the buccaneers called their doctors— particularly 
the chronicles of Exquemelin, Lionel Wafer, and Richard Browne. D. 
McDonald published an informative expose about pirate-physicians in 
his article, "Surgeons to the Buccaneers: The Doctor as Pirate" 
(1956).
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93 The banyan or Bo Tree (Fj c u s  bemrhaJensj's) is indigenous to 
India. As a sacred symbol of Buddhism, it has diffused as far as 
Japan and China, but it not likely that this particular species 
would be found in the jungles of Tortuga. Mr. Hoover probably
witnessed a similar species of Fj c u s .
9* Meaning 'The Farting Rat'.
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Chapter 4
PIRATES AMD EXPLORATION IN THE NEW WORLD
He left a Corsair's name to other times. 
Linked with one virtue, and a thousand crimes.
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In the foregoing chapters, wherever it proved feasible and 
illustrative, I allowed pirates to tell their own stories about 
places and events they witnessed against the broad new horizons of 
Spanish America. We followed them to lands and seas never before 
seen by their own countrymen, occasionally to areas hitherto unknown 
even to the Spaniard. We excerpted from their journals vivid 
descriptions of exotic locales, even a few maps, but we have only 
scratched away at the vast store of geographical knowledge contained 
therein. When the average person thinks about pirates in connection 
with cartography, a wonderful vision appears. It is, of course, a 
grimy, ragged parchment crudely sketched with prominent landmarks 
and a bold X indicating precisely the location of buried treasure.
Likewise most people, were they to imagine the contents of a
pirate's journal, would conjure up something akin to the entry
reputedly from Blackboard's log (but more likely drawn from the
fertile imagination of Daniel Defoe):
Such a day, rum all out:— Our company somewhat sober:— A 
damn'd confusion amongst us!— Rogues a-plotting:— Great talk 
of separation— so I looked sharp for a prize:— Such a day 
took one, with a great deal of liquor on board, so kept the 
company hot, damned hot; then all things went well again 
(Johnson [Defoe?J 1962, 33).
The true nature of the pirates' geographical contribution is
regrettably less sensational. Its actual value, however, has proved
far greater and far more enduring than any fabled treasure on
tattered charts which may be buried deep in the public psyche.
It should require no great leap of imagination to view pirates
not merely as thieves and cutthroats— though these they certainly
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were— but also as prime agents in the processes of discovery,
exploration, and the advancement of geographical knowledge. I am by 
no means the first to make this observation. Several years ago, in 
her article about piracy's imprint on the Caribbean, Nell Clarke 
remarked that “privateers and pirates...though they turned this body 
of water into a veritable Spanish cockpit, at the same time
discovered lands, developed the art of seamanship, and added greatly 
to the world's knowledge of natural history and geography" (1922, 
147). I would take that idea one step farther and contend, in 
short, that pirates were geographers. Never, at least to my 
knowledge, did they apply that label to themselves; nor did any of
their contemporaries so describe them, but in those days that title
was not so common as it is now.
I do not mean to suggest, of course, that all pirates were 
geographers, for most of them were illiterate, skilled neither in 
navigation nor cartography, and uninterested in conveying their 
experiences to posterity. Among this sort one can only imagine what 
fantastic tales of foreign lands and peoples lavishly unfolded 
between gulps of rum and brandy, never leaving the confines of a 
dimly lit public house. Geographers, by contrast, describe the 
earth for all to see, with maps and written accounts the only proof 
of their endeavors. Though pirates may have participated one and 
all in the exploration of the Amerioa6, among their unpolished ranks 
only a few possessed the abilities and the inclination to record 
their discoveries. Shining preeminently amidst even this elite 
corps wa6 William Dampier. Hi6 portrait in the National Gallery of 
London (Figure 13) bears the ephitet, "Pirate and Hydrographer."
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Figure 13: William Dampier— “Pirate and Hydrogapher“
(Painting by Thomas Murray in London's National Portrait Gallery)
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Dampier was much more than that. Nothing escaped his 
unquenchable curiosity, and during his long career he meticulously 
recorded the innumerable species of flora and fauna, the customs of 
aboriginal peoples, the variation of winds and currents and, of 
course, the coastlines of every place he encountered. Natural 
scientist, perhaps, would have best described him in his own day 
(Lloyd 1966, 14), but his writings are by no means limited to 
natural occurrences. Only one title is sufficiently broad to 
encompass his accomplishments, and Dampier, I suspect, would be very 
pleased to be remembered as a geographer.1 But we jump too far 
ahead, for the geographical contributions of the pirates began long 
before the rise of buccaneers.
Discovery is the initial and most invigorating aspect of 
geography, and Clinton Edwards (1985) has raised some pertinent 
questions about the nature of this process. I say process because, 
as Edwards pointed out, people are prone to think of discovery in 
terms of a discrete historical event. It is not. Expounding on the 
ideas of Norman Thrower and Raleigh Skelton, Edwards contended we 
might derive greater meaning from any given discovery by 
conceptualizing it rather in a series of qualitative phases. 
Successive individuals are likely to visit a place before its 
location and attributes are fully appreciated by a larger public. 
Hence for any given location there have been "accidental" or “lost" 
or "ephemeral" discoveries, never recognized as "official" in 
history books and tourist brochures. Depending on the consequences 
of a discovery— whether or not, for example, it resulted in conquest 
and/or colonization— one might further classify it as either
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"effective” or “ineffective." The mapping of a new place with 
enough precision that others can recover it on subsequent 
expeditions is perhaps the most critical step in discovery, but the 
entire process remains a gradual one of increasing geographical 
awareness.
The very notion of discovery within the tradition of Western 
scholarship is of course entirely Eurocentric. Many of us steeped 
in this perspective perhaps fail, even subconsciously, to attach 
sufficient status to a place before its discovery by Europeans. We 
furthermore tend to speak of 'European Contact' or 'European 
Discovery' as though these actions manifested the unified will and 
efforts of a single entity. Of course they did not, and it is for 
this reason that pirates played such a crucial role in the 
development of American discovery. New lands and waterways charted 
by Spain were jealously guarded state secrets of the highest order. 
In this respect the discoveries of the Spaniards, remarkable though 
they were, represented only a limited stage in the ongoing and 
multifaceted diffusion of geographical knowledge.
Pirates, as the vanguard of Spain’s oolonial rivals, became 
the leading agents for subsequent phases of discovery and 
exploration in the New World. Sometimes they earned their findings 
through agonizing voyages and long periods of deprivation. 
Sometimes, truer to their profession, they chanced to steal 
information directly from the Spaniards in the form of charts, 
rutters, and experienced pilots. When we think of pirate booty, we 
generally think in terms of gemstones, gold, and pieces of eight. 
Such treasures were nothing compared to the geographical
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intelligence which the pirates and their colonial patrons wrested 
from the proprietors of the New World. This precious knowledge—  
these discoveries— represented the ultimate source of Spanish wealth 
and power. That was the greatest plunder, and that was the real 
undoing of Spanish America.
Appearing within fifty years of Columbus' famous voyage, the 
corsairs who launched the challenge to Spain's monopolistic claim in 
fact collaborated with the Spaniards in an exciting chapter of 
exploration. Francis Drake, undisputed champion of sixteenth- 
century piracy, likewise achieved within that profession the 
greatest fame as navigator and disooveror. Drake in the Golden
Hind, we recall, was the first to repeat Magellan's 
circumnavigational feat. He was, moreover, the first commander of 
any nationality to complete the circuit in one continuous voyage; 
the geographical awareness effected by this and his other 
expeditions is no less a credit to his name. The cartographic 
flurry generated by Drake has been well documented by Mary Keeler 
(1978) and especially Helen Wallis (1984), but we should begin with 
particular homage to one of his early associates. If John Hawkins 
was Drake's piratical mentor, then Guillame le Testu might well 
have fostered the aroh-pirate's attention to oartographio detail.
Le Testu was the French corsair with whom Drake joined forces 
before capturing the Panamanian treasure train in 1573. A native of 
Le Havre, he was also one of the most accomplished hydrographers of 
his day, contributing greatly to the Arques (or Dieppe) School of 
portolan-ohart making which flourished in the mid-sixteenth 
century.2 In his manuscript atlas, the "Cosmographie Universelle"
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(1556-57), he produced seven world maps, each on a different 
projection, and we may be sure he prepared detailed notes and 
profiles as he cruised off Nombre de Dios sixteen years later 
(Tooley 1949, 38; Andrews 1967, 38; Wallis 184, 125). Le Testu was 
wounded, captured, and beheaded in that campaign and Drake's 
acquaintance with him was consequently brief; but one can easily 
imagine the two corsair chieftans huddled over the old Huguenot's 
charts and profiles in a cramped and musty ship's cabin. On 
subsequent voyages we know that Drake diligently painted views and 
profiles of the forbidden coasts he plundered. We also know that he 
kept a journal to record discoveries during his circumnavigation, 
and this he presented to Queen Elizabeth upon his return, along with 
“a very large map" to show "everything that had happened during the 
three years" (Bernardino de Mendoza [1580], translated by Wallis 
1984, 121). His chart, placed in honor beside the world map of 
Sebastian Cabot in the royal gallery at Whitehall, was apparently 
consumed by the fire which devastated that palace in 1698.
Its geographical influence, however, resurfaced in many 
contemporary compilations, including Francis Fletcher's sketches,3 
the Drake-Mellon map, and the world map of Nicola van Sype (circa 
1583)— "veuee et oorige par le diot Siegneur draok"* (all reproduced 
in Wallis 1984). The journal, sadly, was also lost to posterity 
though we have some idea of its contents. One of Drake's prisoners, 
the Portuguese pilot Nufio de Silva, testified that “Francis Drake 
kept a book in which he entered his navigation and in which he 
delineated birds, trees and sea-lions. He is adept at painting and 
has with him...a relation [John Drake]...who is a great painter." A
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Spanish prisoner, Francisco de ZArate, nervously added: "He also
carries painters who paint for him pictures of the coast in its 
exact colours. This I was most grieved to see, for each thing is so 
naturally depicted that no one who guides himself aooording to these 
paintings can possibly go astray" (both quoted in Willis 1984, 123). 
Drake extracted much of hie geographical information directly from 
Spanish pilots and sea oharts captured in a prize off the Isla del 
Cafio. This purloined knowledge encouraged him to oross the Pacific. 
During the celebrated West Indies raid of 1585-86, he employed the 
sevioes of Baptista Boazio as cartographer and possibly as 
translator for negotiations with the Spaniards.  ̂ Boazio*s famous 
maps of that expedition include a general chart showing the fleet’s 
route and more detailed plans depicting the sieges of Santo Domingo, 
Cartagena, and San Augustin. These latter were published with 
Walter Bigges’ Suimarie and True Discourse of Sir Francis Drake's 
West Indian Voyage, first in Latin and Frenoh (1588), and the 
following year in English (Keeler 1978, 71-80).6
Finally, for the fateful voyage of 1595-96, Drake again took 
pains to engage a painter for recording the precise hydrography of 
the expedition, and that manuscript survives in the Frenoh 
Biblioth&que Nationale. For reasons of security, and unfortunately 
for Drake, most of his contributions to geography were suppressed 
during his oim lifetime by the Elizabethan oourt. His greatest 
discovery in Spanish America was that Tierra del Fuego constituted 
not a part of Terra Australis, but rather an archipelago separated 
from that supposed southernmost continent by an ooeanio portal muoh 
wider than the Strait of Magellan. Though Drake himself never
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ventured through it, the broad passage he observed south of Cape 
Horn now bears his name (Wallis 1984, 122-57).
If indeed the most significant act of discovery is charting a 
place so that others may find it, the consummate reward must be to 
leave one’s name to mark the spot. Drake’s was not the only 
patronymic buoy strewn along the pirates' wake. Already we have 
steered past several others: Bluefield6 (Nicaragua) and Bluefields 
Bay (Jamaica), Watling Island (in the Bahamas), Coxon's Hole (in the 
Bay Islands), Clipperton Island, the Is la Alejandro Selkirk (of the 
Juan FernAndez group), Jol's Hole (in Belize’s Turneffe)— perhaps 
even Belize itself (from Willis?). To this list of piratical place 
names we should add Raokham Cay (off Port Royal), Butler’s Keys 
(near Cape Gracias a Dios), La Sound’s Key (in the San Bias group), 
Yallahs Bay and Yallahs Point (Jamaica), Prince Rupert's Bay 
(Dominica), and no doubt dozens of others.7
Toponyms, like discoveries, have not always proved 
"effective,” and pirates’ journals are replete with long-ignored, 
’ephemeral” topographic memorials to themselves. The reader may 
recall such attempts to create a Sharp’s Isle of Gorgona, a Drake's 
Isle of La Plata, or a Cavendish’s Bay opposite the Isla del Cafio.® 
A comprehensive gazetteer of piratical tributes would pose a 
complicated and interesting agenda for further research, but that is 
not my intention here. This cursory roster at least suggests the 
extent to which pirates participated in the discoveries of the New 
World. One notices something else from this short list: most of the 
places on it recall the name6 of seventeenth-century buccaneers. 
Perhaps that should not surprise us, for unlike the corsairs who
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preceded them or the freebooters who came after, these pirates alone 
attached themselves to the lands they wrested from the Spaniards. 
Because their stake in the region's geography was likewise greater, 
the 'Brethren of the Coast' probably derived heightened satisfaotion 
from mapping their adopted habitat.
Maps of the Buccaneers3
To my knowledge, the earliest surviving maps by a buccaneer 
are those of Alexandre Olivier Exquemelin.10 Probably a Frenchman 
by birth,11 Exquemelin (Esquemeling or Oexmelin) arrived at Tortuga 
in 1666, became a surgeon to the buccaneers, and later wrote about 
their exploits and the lands they visited.12 His Buccaneers of 
America, including charts of Panama (Map 18) and Maracaibo (Map 14). 
first appeared as a Dutch publication in 1678 but within eight years 
was translated into German, Spanish, English, and French.13 The 
tremendous impact of this work in its own day, not just as a 
thrilling narrative of piracy but also as a geographical key to an 
exotic New World, was underscored quite succinctly by F. Muller, an 
expert on Dutch Americana: "no other book of that time...experienced 
a popularity similar to that of the 'Buccaniers of America'" (quoted 
in Sabin 1875. vol.6, 310). Exquemelin*s map of Panama reproduced 
here (Map 18) accompanied the first French translation in 1686. In 
reverse of earlier editions.14 this engraving is oriented with north 
at the top, and the South Sea, or Pacific Ocean, at the bottom.
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Map 20: Sharp's Voyage Round South America (1680-82) 
from the 1685 Edition of Exquemelin*s 
Buoani&ra of Amorioa
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Hap 21: William Hack's Original Manuscript Chart of 
Sharp's Voyage Round South America (1682)
(BL Add.5414.16)
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Map 24: Sharp's South American Route in a Corrected 
Manuscript Version (1686) by William Hack
(BL SI.44)
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On Exquemelin*s map the assaults committed by Henry Morgan's 
buccaneers— the sacking of Porto Bello, the reduction of the Castle 
of San Lorenzo, the subsequent traverse via the Rio Chagre and Venta 
Cruz to loot the city of Panama— are all clearly indicated with 
ships, battle formations, and dotted lines.
In 1680, a decade after Morgan's Panamanian venture, a new 
force of buccaneers under the command of John Coxon, Bartholomew 
Sharp, and others mustered on the Darien coast, preparing to emulate 
Morgan's success. Their landing was later depicted by a London- 
based copyist and cartographer, William Hack, on a manuscript chart 
of 1686 (Map 19). After crossing the Isthmus with Cuna Indian 
guides and raiding the mining depot of Santa Maria en route, the 
marauders reached the South Sea in April of 1681.*® Among the rank 
and file was Basil Ringrose, whose detailed journal has left us the 
best record of the expedition. The manuscript version (circa 1682) 
contains several original maps and i6 housed in the British Library 
as Sloane MS 3820. It wa6 followed with a more elaborate manuscript 
copy by William Hack, who also borrowed several of Ringrose* s 
charts to illustrate the journal of Bartholomew Sharp. In 1685 
Ringrose's chronicle was published as an appendage to the first 
English translation of Exquemelin. This printed version includes 
several maps and profiles quite faithful to the manuscript originals 
as well as an unsigned map of South and Central America which shows, 
albeit somewhat inaccurately, where Sharp and his buccaneers ranged 
up and down the Pacific seaboard in Spanish prizes before rounding 
Cape Horn (Map 20). No such map appears in Ringrose's manuscript, 
but a remarkably similar one— containing like coastlines, labeling,
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and even the same erroneous extension of Sharp's route to Valdivia—  
had been produced by William Hack in 1682 and may well have provided 
the source (Map 21).18
The appearance of Sharp and his companions in the South Sea
signaled the first English intrusion into those waters since the
raids of Drake and Cavendish a century before, and Ringrose 
carefully recorded their discoveries. Depicting their movements in 
the Bay of Panama, Hack's copy of the Ringrose manuscript shows the
track of canoes used to capture prizes sizeable enough to permit
further roving (Map 22). One of many Spanish settlements then 
raided was Serena on the Chilean coast, and Ringrose hastily 
prepared a sketch of the town before his boorish cohorts burned it 
the ground. Hack prepared a more ornate copy to accompany Sharp's 
journal (Map 23) and likewise borrowed Ringrose's outline of Juan 
Fernandez, the remote island where Sharp's gang twice repaired to 
careen, fetch water, and hunt wild goats (Map 8).*8 It bears 
repeating that while these and other maps are sometimes attributed 
to Sharp because of their inclusion by Hack in his journal, the 
original compiler and draftsman was Basil Ringrose. To my 
knowledge, if he made any at all, not a single map by Sharp 
survives
Even if Sharp was no cartographer, he was a first-rate 
mariner. Sharp's expedition, more accurately depicted by Hack in 
1684 (Map 24), added an exciting chapter to the annals of 
exploration; his able navigation guided the first Englishmen around 
Cape Horn in an impressive voyage which encompassed the whole of 
South America. As a buccaneering venture it proved considerably
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less successful. Booty was minimal; casualties were high; and the 
cruise was plagued by hunger, sickness, four changes in command, and 
desertion by three sizeable contingents of malcontents. The last of 
these, returning across Panama on foot, included two remarkable 
buccaneers, Lionel Wafer and William Dampier.
Wafer's fascinating account of his life among the Darien 
natives,21 with whom he remained several months owing to an injury, 
was published in 1699. In addition to valuable information about 
the Cuna Indians who befriended him, it included a detailed map of 
Panama. Although occasionally attributed to Wafer, the map was 
actually the work of his brother-in-arms, William Dampier,22 and the 
latter's South Sea rovings with Sharp's crew and his overland 
retreat along the Rio Congo are indicated on the chart with a dotted 
line. Once across the Isthmus, Dampier engaged in a series of 
eventful voyages by which he circumnavigated the world and returned 
to his native England. There he published in 1697 the landmark 
narrative of his travels which contained, among other compilations, 
his ohart "of the Isthmus of Darien and the Bay of Panama" (Map 
25) Dampier was an extraordinary man, the only buccaneer better 
known for his contributions to science than for his crimes against 
the Spaniard.2* In the preface to his Netr Voyage Pound the World he 
took pains to introduce the work as a geographical treatise rather 
than a record of buccaneer exploits:
As for the Actions of the Company among whom I made the 
greatest part of this Voyage, a Thread of which I have
carried thro' it, ’tis not to divert the Reader... that I
mention them, much less that I take any pleasure in relating
them: but for method's sake, and for the Reader's
satisfaction; who could not so well acquiesce in my
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Description of Places, &c. without knowing the particular
Traverses I made among them (1927, 3).
Dampier, of course, had more practical reasons for distancing 
himself as much as possible from his piratical brethren, but one 
senses in his writings a true distaste for their methods and an 
overriding desire to see the world. In the course of his long 
career at sea, he circumnavigated the globe three times and led the 
first English expedition to Australia. All the while he maintained 
a detailed journal, kept safe from the elements in a bamboo tube 
stoppered with wax, in which he described the plants, animals, 
people, and places he encountered. The immense success of his first 
book prompted Dampier to publish a record of his previous 
adventures.
First appearing in 1699, Dampier* s Voyages and Discoveries 
included an entertaining description of earlier sojourns among the 
buccaneer-woodsmen of "Campeachy" and a map, engraved by Herman 
Moll, of their haunts along the Laguna de TArminos (Map 10). 
Dampier, fascinated by all natural phenomena, held particular 
interest as a mariner in the variation of winds. His treatise on 
the subject, A Discourse of Trade-Winds?* contains a pair of 
oharts, also engraved by Moll, which demonstrate with fair accuracy 
the prevailing wind patterns over the Atlantic and Pacific tropics.
His innovative Paoifio chart (Map 26) depicted wind belts never 
before revealed on paper, even by the great Edmund Hailey. Probably 
the only thematic maps ever devised by a pirate, Dampier’s wind 
charts indicate surface wind directions with line shading and 
arrows, even illustrating the seasonal reversal of the Asian 
monsoons (Shipman 1962, 8-12).
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Not all of the information generated by pirates contributed 
positively to geographical knowledge. Among Dampier’s associates 
was another circumnavigator, William Ambrose Cowley, whose early 
description of the Falkland Islands, taken from a buccaneering 
voyage round Cape Horn in 1684, resulted in a cartographic error 
perpetuated for over a century. Cowley’s draft of the islands 
provided the baeis for a chart made in 1687 by William Hack (Map 
27). To his credit, Cowley in the manuscript copy of his journal 
only underestimated the latitude of the islands. He correctly 
identified them, however, as the Sebald de Weerts (i.e. the 
Falklands), already visited by previous explorers.®® Nevertheless, 
an ambitious William Hack, eager to attract influential patrons, 
advertised the islands as a new and separate discovery named after 
no less a personage than famed diarist Samuel Pepys, then Secretary 
of the Admiralty. On the 1687 manuscript world map by which Hack 
illustrated Cowley's circumnavigation, ’Pepyses Island" appears in 
prominent gold leaf at about 47 degrees, while the "Sibble de 
Waards” occupy approximately the correct position of the Falklands 
(Map 28). Hack’s deception received much wider circulation after 
1699 from his published edition of both maps with Cowley’s 
journal.Pepys' Island remained thus depicted on various 
Admiralty charts even into the early nineteenth century, and ships 
of the English Navy were still searohing for it as late as 1764.®®
William Hack has been mentioned repeatedly in connection with 
the maps and journals of the buccaneers. His working acquaintance 
with such notorious figures as Cowley, Ringrose, and Sharp, ooupled 
with his self-styled title of ’Captain’.®® have promoted conjecture
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as to whether Hack himself may have sailed as a buccaneer. In 
Tooley's Dictionary of Mapmakers, he is labeled as "Seaman, pirate, 
and ohartmaker;"3® but evidence uncovered by Thomas Smith (1978) and 
Tony Campbell (1973) suggests otherwise. Smith discovered that 
William Hack, together with suoh well known chart makers as Nioholas 
Comberford and John Thornton, formed part of a distinctive master- 
apprentice network within London’s Worshipful Company of Drapers. 
These cartographers, having no livery company of their own, 
practiced and transmitted their craft within the Drapers’ Company 
for over a century. Their work is therefore sufficiently related to 
qualify as a unique school of cartography, known as the Thames 
School (because of their waterfront locations) or Drapers’ School 
(because of their patron company) 31 In 1671, William Hack entered 
an apprenticeship under Andrew Welch for a minimum term of nine 
years. This indenture likely precluded any possibility of leading a 
piratical career before setting up shop for himself (Campbell 1973, 
87-88). More likely, the location of Hack's shop near the New 
Stairs in Wapping, long a resort of London's pirates, occasioned his 
professional association with the buccaneers.
Hack's charts display several characteristics of the Thames or 
Drapers' School.33 Drawn on paper or vellum with brightly colored 
inks and gold-leaf highlights, they are embellished with ornate 
compass roses and cartouches. A few, including his world chart 
depicting Cowley's voyage, were mounted in the early Thames-School 
tradition upon folding wooden panels for safe storage.33 Some of 
his works, suoh as the 1682 map of Jamaica dedicated to "His 
Honoured and Obliged Friend Capt. Bartholomew Sharpe" (Map 29),
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display individualistic traits which noticeably diverge from Thames- 
School conventions. These include the use of a projectionless 
square grid in lieu of rhumb lines, and quarter rather than full 
compass roses (Campbell 1973, 94). Most of Hack's charts are 
dominated by various shades of red, yellow, and green, with blaok or 
red lettering.
Regardless of how William Hack became acquainted with the 
buccaneers, he was the "minor and less respectable... successor of 
Richard Hakluyt" who brought the records of exploration contained in 
their maps and journals to the attention of the English aristocracy 
and, ultimately, to the public (Lynam 1953, 102; cf. Crone and
Skelton 1946). In 1662, when Sharp returned from the South Sea 
facing charges of piracy in England, he carried with him 
cartographic booty that secured his pardon from the Crown. It was 
the Spanish manuscript sea atlas, or derrotero, which his crew had 
seized from a prize vessel off the coast of modern Ecuador, and 
which contained numerous detailed charts and navigational 
instructions for the Pacific coasts and harbors from the Gulf of 
California to Cape Horn.3* Drake, we know, had confiscated a 
similar trophy over a century before, but even if it had not been 
lost its contents would have been terribly outdated. Morgan also 
captured a derrotero at Panama in 1671, but its whereabouts soon 
became o b s c u r e d .33 Sharp engaged the services of Hack and a 
translator, Philip Dassigny,36 to copy the derrotero and prepare an 
English rendition for Charles II. That copy, in the British 
Library, Hack prefaced on Sharp's behalf with an ornate and colorful 
dedication to the King (Figure 14).3?
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Figure 14: Dedication to the King's Copy of the South Sea 
Wagoner Captured by Bartholomew Sharp
(Manuscript by William Hack, BL 7,Tab.123)
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Hap 33: Aoapuloo— Detail froi an Anonymous Spanish Sea Atlas
(BL SI.239— undated manuscript)

















Bap 34: Chart of Acapulco Derived from Spanish Sources—  




Hack proceeded to draft thirteen copies of the stolen 
derrotero until at least 1698, and these he dedicated and sold to 
members of the aristocracyComparing views of Acapulco from 
these and other manuscripts illustrates not only the progression of 
Hack's style, but also possible connections between his works and 
other South Sea wagoners. The original derrotero captured by Sharp 
is generally believed to be item HM918 housed by the Huntington 
Library in California ([Adams] 1967, 45; Skelton 1960, 202-3). A 
copy in Spanish with English translations, undated and unsigned but 
presumably prepared as a preliminary draft by Hack and Dassigny, 
resides in the Harleian collection of the British Library. Its last 
page indicates that the original Spanish compilation was Surveyed in 
1669 and completed at PanamA. The chart of Acapulco contained 
therein depicts the port settlement, the fortifications, and the 
passage by which the galleons arrived from Manila (Map 30). In the 
copy presented on Sharp's behalf to Charles II in 1682, a like view 
of Acapulco is embellished with gold leaf and an elaborate compass 
rose (Map 31). It exhibits colors more typical of Hack's work, as 
does a more fully shaded copy of 1684, also in the British Library 
(Map 32).
Other South Sea wagoners containing similar sets of charts may 
bear some relation to the Hack atlases, or at least derive from the 
same Spanish survey of 1669. Of these, the undated and unsigned 
Sloane MS 239 (Map 33) in the British Library was believed by Joyce 
(who made no mention of the Huntington manuscript) to be the 
original derrotero confiscated by Sharp (Joyce 1934, xxiv n). 
Another, deposited in Britain's Public Record Office at Kew (C.O.
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325/45), was certainly possessed by Captain Charles Swan on the
voyage of the Cygnet, for it bears his signature and various
notations in his hand (Map 34) . This is a crude, tattered, and
hastily prepared coasting pilot, mostly in Spanish, in which the
copyist (possibly Swan himself) referred to, but did not name, at
least two separate Spanish sources.*® As Swan had commanded a
vessel in Henry Morgan's fleet and was fluent in Spanish (Great
Britain, Public Record Office 1974, 683; Cruikshank 1935), he may
conceivably have had access to the charts captured by Morgan in
1671. Moreover, because Basil Ringrose sailed as his supercargo in
the ill-fated voyage of the Cygnet (from whioh neither man
returned). Swan may well have seen Sharp's derrotero or a derivative
thereof. Ringrose is known to have drafted a separate copy of the
Spanish atlas -which is maintained by the National Maritime Museum at
Greenwich, a facsimile edition of whioh is currently being published
by Derek Howse and Norman J.W. Thrower (1991).**
For security reasons publication of the purloined derrotero
was initially forbidden by the English government. William Dick, a
buccaneer veteran of Sharp's expedition, explained:
In...the Rosario, we took also a great book full of sea- 
charts and maps, containing a very accurate and exact 
description of all the ports, soundings, creeks, rivers, 
capes, and coasts belonging to the South Sea, and all the 
navigations usually performed by the Spaniards in that
ocean  It has been since translated into English, as I
hear, by His Majesty's order, and copy of the translation, 
made by a Jew [Dassigny], I have seen at Wapping; but withal 
the printing thereof is severely prohibited, lest other 
nations should get into those seas and make use thereof, 
whioh is wished may be reserved only for England against its 
due time (1987, 278).
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Nevertheless, largely because of Hack's industrious hand-copying, 
the information obtained by Sharp and others did circulate among the 
influential elite and undoubtedly contributed to a vigorous national 
policy of whioh the South Sea Company was one noteworthy product 
(Lynam 1 9 5 3 ) . The first published version of these Paoifio coasts 
that I have found appeared in 1712 with Captain Edward Cooke's 
printed journal of his circumnavigation. That privateering voyage 
of the Duke and Duchess (1708-11) was commanded by Woodes Rogers, 
who likewise published a narrative. Cooke's printed maps of sea 
coasts "from the Port of Acapulco, to the Streights of Magellan" 
were “translated and oopy'd from the Spanish Manuscript Coasting- 
Pilots" (1712, 109).
William Dampier was the only connection between the 
expeditions of Sharp, Swan, and Rogers (under whom he served as 
pilot for the South Seas). He also kept company with "his ingenious 
friend Mr. Ringrose" until that buccaneer was killed on the coast of 
Mexico in 1686 (Dampier 1927, 89). Dampier therefore must have had 
access to one or more of the derroteros mentioned above and may have 
been the sustaining force which finally enabled their information to 
become public.43 Like the discoveries of Francis Drake, certain 
maps and findings of the buccaneers (purloined or second-hand though 
they may have been) enjoyed limited circulation or recognition in 
their own day. Thus we might add another category to Edwards' 
classification scheme: secret discoveries suppressed for reasons of 
political intrigue.
Unlike corsairs and buccaneers, the eighteenth-century 
freebooters who brought piracy in Spanish America to a dazzling
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finish had no care for the colonial concerns or commercial health of 
their respective motherlands. By the same token these pirates made 
little effort to extend the geographical horizons of their 
countrymen. Consequently I have found neither journals nor maps in 
the wake of these ruffians to enlarge upon our study of Spanish 
America; their crimes apparently left nothing but spectacle for 
posterity to ponder. ’Captain Johnson’, their chief historian, 
prefaced his aooount of their exploits with the following:
It must be observed that our speculative mathematicians 
and geographers who are, no doubt, men of the greatest 
learning, seldom travel farther than their own closets for 
their knowledge, and are therefore unqualified to give us a 
good description of countries. It is for this reason that 
all of our maps and atlases are so monstrously faulty, for 
these gentlemen are obliged to take their accounts from the 
reports of illiterate men. It must be noted also that when 
the masters of ships make discoveries this way, they are not 
fond of communicating them. A man’s knowing this or that 
coast better than others recommends him in his business and 
makes him more useful, and he’ 11 no more discover it than a 
tradesman will the mystery of his trade (Johnson [Defoe?]
1926, xi).
Johnson (or Defoe) may well have described the pirates of his own 
day but not, as we have witnessed, certain geographers— in all but 
name— who sailed among the buccaneers. Comparing the achievements 
of William Dampier to the short and bloody career of Blackbeard only 
vindicates Bolitho’s admonition in Twelve Against the Gods. "It is 
when pirates count their booty that they become mere 
thieves.
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Notes
* Here as well I cannot take first credit. In a short review of 
Clennell Wilkinson's life of William Dampier, W.C.D. Dampier-Wetham 
introduced the biographer's subject as "William Dampier, Geographer" 
(1929, 478). He offered, however, no support for that appellation. 
Because of his broad range of interests and observations, William 
Dampier has been a favorite posthumous conscript for various 
disciplines; thus we have been given “Dampier: Pirate and
Naturalist" (Matthews 1952), "William Dampier: Buccaneer and
Planter" (Bennett 1964); William Dampier: Seaman-Scientist (Shipman 
1962); and Captain William Dampier: Buccaneer-Author (Bonner, 1934).
 ̂Headers may refer to Hampden (1972) for a sample of le Testu's 
work depicting the West Indies in 1555. His chart of the Strait of 
Magellan appears in Putman (1983), and one of southern Africa has 
been reproduced in Williams (1975).
3 Fletcher was the chaplain on Drake's oircumnavigatory voyage whose 
journal was finally published by Drake's nephew as The World 
Encompassed by Sir Francis Drake in 1628.
* This map's inscription translates as "seen and corrected by the 
said Sir Drake" (Nuttall 1914, facing lvi).
3 Keeler was the first to demonstrate conclusively that Boazio 
accompanied Drake on the voyage as a page to Christopher Carleill. 
She further pointed out that the cartographer's linguistic
capabilities would have proved equally valuable (1978, 72).
6 Bigges was a the captain-lieutenant of Carleill's company. He was 
killed in the battle of Cartagena, but his journal was completed by 
a Lieutenant Crofts. In addition there exists an anonymous 
manuscript account of the voyage, the 'Primrose Journal' in the
British Museum (see British Library 1977, 106-7).
^ Most of the pirates thus remembered are introduced in Chapter 2. 
La Sound (or Lessone) was a French buccaneer who explored the 
Panamanian isthmus and participated in Coxon's Porto Bello raid in 
1679-80 (Joyce, ed. [Wafer] 1934, xvii n and 39). Captain Yallahs 
(or Yellowes) was a Dutch buccaneer operating out of Jamaica and 
Tortuga (Haring 1910, 201). After 1671, Yallahs hired himself out 
to the Spanish Governor of Campeche to hunt down his former comrades 
and prevent them from cutting logwood in the Laguna de T6rminos
(Burdon 1931, 52-55). Prince Rupert, though certainly the most
blueblooded-pirate of Spanish America, was also a rank amateur who 
found no success there (Gosse 1924, 271; Mitchell 1976, 123).
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® As indicated in Chapter 2 (note 21) that bay has since been named 
in honor of Cavendish's predecessor. Sir Francis Drake.
9 This section has been revised from a paper, "Maps of the 
Buccaneers," delivered by the author at the Annual Meeting of the 
Association of American Geographers in Baltimore (March 20, 1989).
My own research has concentrated on British archival holdings. 
It is entirely possible that earlier maps of buccaneers will be 
found among French, Dutch, or West Indian manuscript collections.
The French version of his name is Oexmelin, pronounced 
eks'muh-lan' (silent n). Exquemelin was long thought to have been a 
Netherlander or Fleming primarily because his book was first 
published in Dutch. Most modern authorities concur, however, that 
he was, as the editor of the first French translation (1686) 
asserted, a Frenchman from Harfleur (or possibly Honfleur— see Gosse 
1946, 146n). For biographical details, which are sketchy but
complex, consult Gosse (1924, 125), Kemp and Lloyd (1960, 11-13), 
Great Britain, National Maritime Museum (1972, 51), and Beeching (in 
Exquemelin 1972, 16-18).
12 Exquemelin*s observations of Tortuga and its buccaneers are noted 
in Chapter 3.
13 Only two copies of the 1678 Dutch edition are known to exist; one 
is housed in the British Library, the other in the Huntington 
Library. For complete bibliographic descriptions of the earliest 
editions and translations, see Sabin (1875, 309-18). Another useful 
listing appears in the National Maritime Museum Catalogue of the 
Library, Volume four: Piracy and Privateering (Great Britain, 
National Maritime Museum 1972, 51-60).
The earliest editions of Exquemelin* s Panama map have been 
described in detail by Kapp (1971b). For a modern edition of the 
1686 French version see Exquemelin (1967).
The expedition was well documented by the pirates themselves, and 
some of their journals are preserved in the British Library. For a 
complete listing of primary sources, both manuscript and printed, 
see Lloyd (1956, 301). The most complete and accessible printed 
version is that by Ringrose (1685 or numerous modern editions, e.g. 
1987). Good secondary accounts have been synthesized by Burney 
(1891), Masefield (1922), and Kemp and Lloyd (1960).
16 This is the undated Sloane MS 48 in the British Library. In this 
version, probably the one used to prepare the printed edition of
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1685, copyist William Hack made several minor changes to enhance the 
image of Captain Sharp.
^  Hack made numerous copies of Sharp's journal, including Sloane 
MSS 46.a. and 46.b. in the British Library.
18 Sharp's crew never sailed to Valdivia (Baldivia). The identical 
cartographic error both on Hack's 1682 manuscript map and the 
anonymous printed version of 1685 strongly suggests a connection 
between the two, but these may have derived from another, common
source.
18 Successive maroonings there and the connection to Defoe's 
Fobinson Crusoe are discussed in Chapter 2.
20 Tooley (1979, 579) attributed to Sharp a 1682 manuscript atlas of 
the South Sea (7.Tab.123. in the British Library), but this is the 
royal copy made by Hack from a captured Spanish derrotero.
Masefield (in Dampier 1906, 536) also credited Sharp with compiling
later copies of this atlas (e.g. BL SI.44, the cover of which is
embossed with "Sharp's South Sea Wagoner.") These two works were 
dedicated to King Charles II on Sharp's behalf, hence the confusion. 
These were nevertheless, like the manuscript copies of Sharp's 
journal, the handiwork of William Hack.
21 A modern edition of Wafer's New Voyage & Description of the 
Isthmus of America was prepared by L.E.E. Joyce as part of the 
Hakluyt Society Second Series (1934).
22 Both Kapp (1971b, 16) and Tooley (1985, 111) credited Wafer with 
Dampier‘s map of Panama.
23 In his preface to A Ifer Voyage Found the World, Dampier compared 
this map to the one published by his old comrade, Basil Ringrose:
...there is in the Map of the American Isthmus, a new Scheme of the 
adjoining Bay of Panama and its Islands, which to some may seem 
superfluous after that whioh Mr. Ringrose hath published in the 
History of the Buccaneers; and which he offers as an exact Draught. 
I must needs disagree with him in that, and doubt not but this which 
I here publish will be found more agreeable to that Bay, by one who 
shall have the opportunity to examine it; for it is a contraction of 
a larger Map which I took from several Stations in the Bay it self 
(1927, 5).
24 There are several biographies of Dampier. The concise one used 
here is by Christopher Lloyd (1966). Modern editions of Dampier's
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voyages and maps (1906 and 1927) also include valuable supplementary 
information.
28 The Discourse of Trade-ffinds was first published in 1699 as part 
of Voyages and Discoveries.
28 The European discoverers of the Falklands are discussed briefly 
in Chapter 2. For a better account of the early discoveries and 
cartography of the Falkland Islands, see Birtles (1983). The 
British Library contains two manuscript copies of Cowley's journal 
(SI. 54 and 1050), in whioh ho recounted his sighting of the "Sibble 
D'wards" at 47 degrees, 40 minutes South. The true latitude of the 
Falklands is 51 degrees, 45 minutes.
^  Therein Hack truncated the latitude given by Cowley to an even 47 
degrees, again omitting Cowley's reference to the "Sibble D'wards."
28 John Byron attempted to find Pepys Island during his 
circumnavigation of 1764-1766 (Crone and Skelton 1946, 77).
28 The only place I have seen Hack refer to himself as "Captain" is 
on the title page of A Collection of Original Voyages (1699).
3® Tooley (1979, 274) was not alone in reaching this conclusion; 
given the known facts at the time, it was an understandable 
supposition. Edward Lynam made a similar claim (1953).
31 Campbell advocated naming this group the Drapers' School because 
of the central role of the Company in perpetuating its style (1973, 
98-99). Smith promoted the title of Thames School, originally 
suggested by Jeannette Black, because of the river's functional role 
in the school's development. He further pointed out that the 
school's cartographic style antedated the formation of any 
aporenticeship network within the Drapers' Company (Smith 1978, 55- 
59).
32 Diagnostic characteristics of the school have been described by 
Campbell (1973, 81-82) and Smith (1978, 46).
33 Hack produced at least four charts on wooden panels, including 
his 1682 MS (BL Add.5414.26) of Sharp's Voyage (Smith 1978, 77).
34 The first mention in print of the derrotero captured by Sharp 
appeared with a short account of the voyage, signed "W.D.," in 
Crooke's 1685 edition of Bucaniers of America (see also 1987). W.D. 
was identified by Lloyd as William Dick, a participant in Sharp's 
Voyage (1956, 295).
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35 Morgan's captured derrotero is mentioned three times in the 
Calendar of State Papers of Great Britain's Public Record Office 
(1889, 7:247, 315, 388). Given the place and date of capture
(Panama, 1671), it may have been drawn from the same source as 
Sharp’s derrotero , which was evidently compiled from a survey 
completed at Panama in 1669 (as indicated in the British Library's 
Harl.4034, presumably the first manuscript copy of the atlas
prepared by Hack).
36 Little is known about the career of Hack's translator, Philip 
Dassigny. William Dick identified him as a Jev living in Wapping as 
of 1682 (1987, 278). He was of course fluent in Spanish, and the 
spelling of his name makes me wonder if he may have been of French 
background. His name was bestowed upon one of the Galapagos Islands 
in the charts produced by Cowley and Hack (see Hack's 1699 printed 
version or his 1687 manuscript in the British Library). If Dassigny 
was a companion of Cowley's during the 1684 voyage of the Bachelor's 
Delight, he may well have engaged himself as a practicing buccaneer. 
More likely, however, Hack decided to honor his associate with a 
toponymic insertion of his own accord. It is certain, however, that 
Dassigny was residing in the Indies as of 1687. His full signature
appears with others on a document of that date, reproduced by
Hamshere from an unspecified holding in the Public Record Office. 
That testimonial certifies, of all things, that "Rum made in Jamaica 
is prefferr'd before Brandy brought hither from England" (in 
Hamshere 1972, 96). In the French colonies, at any rate, Jews and 
Huguenots alike were not particularly welcome, though many found 
ready employment among the flibustiers. Port Royal had a thriving 
Jewish enclave whose synagogue was destroyed in the earthquake of 
1692. Dassigny may have perished there. One would like to know 
more about the translator's doubtlessly fascinating career— one 
possibly seasoned (unlike that of "Captain" Hack) with true 
piratical adventures.
39 The dedication is of particular interest because it illustrates 
the navigational instruments of the period: the Davis* quadrant
(upper left) and cross-staff (upper right). For an explanation of 
their uses, see Rogers (1894, 28-29).
33 The most complete listing and description of Hack's South Sea 
atlases has been provided by Adams (1967). Although he listed 
fourteen such works, one of these MSS (BL SI.47) contains no maps, 
only the written sailing directions.
39 One entry, headed “Monies lent by: Cha: Swann," includes mention 
of two ounces of gold loaned to "Cap. Haris" (MS Swan 1685, f.3). 
Swan must therefore have been using this atlas during the voyage of 
the Cygnet when he took up company with Peter Harris. In addition,
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explicit reference to "ye Shipp Signit" appears on a fragmentary 
folio (f.4).
40 At the bottom of f£.64'-65 there is a notation to that effect: 
"The following Land one ye other Side is ye Same wfĉ this beneath 
but drane forth of An other Spanyards boook."
41 This is manuscript P. 32 in the National Maritime Museum,
Greenwich. Ringrose's atlas was the subject of a Master's thesis 
prepared in 1981 by Tony Cimolino for the Geography Department of 
the University of California, Los Angeles. As of this writing, 
Howse and Thrower's facsimile edition was still in press.
42 Swan's sea atlas was in fact annotated with a description of the
South Sea Company's charter (PRO C.0.325/45, f.2).
43 This, I must stress, is simply conjecture on my part. The 
sequence of information brokering is always difficult to pin down, 
especially when attempting to link these various sea atlases. 
William Hack also played a prominent connective role, and one must 
remember the invaluable contributions of Sir Hans Sloane, the 
colonial physician who collected and donated so much of the pirate 
lore preserved under his name in the manuscript collection of the 
British Library. Moreover, it is certainly conceivable that Cooke 
and Rogers acquired yet another Spanish derrotero with their capture 
of the Manila galleon in 1709. It would seem likely, however, that 
Dampier took an active part at least somewhere along the line. 
Cooke certainly borrowed liberally enough from geograpahic data 
generated by the previous voyages and publications of Sharp, 
Dampier, and Funnell.
44 Quoted from William Bolitho's "Introduction" to Twelve Against 
the Gods, first published in 1929.
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Chapter 5
REFLECTIONS IN THE WAKE
Pirates may sake cheap pennyworths of 
their pillage 
And purchase friends and give to courtesans. 
Still reveling like lords till all be gone; 
While as the silly owner of the goods Weeps over them and wrings his hapless hands.
— William Shakespeare 
II Henry VI 
(Aot i so.l)
346
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Reconstructing the Stage
In the second chapter the reader entered the "Battle Beyond 
the Line" with a theatrical metaphor. The Pope and the statesmen of 
Europe became stage manager and choreographers. The Spanish 
colonials were accorded— for the sake of plot and argument— first 
and rightful occupancy of the set. Perhaps in that respect they 
performed as traaic heroes, undermined ultimately by their own 
hubris. The main actors in the play were French, English, and Dutch 
pirates— rendered antagonists only by definition of their crime. 
They, too, succumbed in the end to a fatal flaw. It occurs to me 
now that the analogy to dramatic spectacle applies as well in the 
larger oontext of historical and geographical research.
Reconstituting the past is of necessity an integrative and 
collaborative production. The historian is concerned mainly with 
recovering the plot, the precise sequence of actions, perhaps even a 
shred of dialogue long unspoken. The biographer attempts to revive 
the characters, their personalities, their motives The geographer 
strives to reconstruct the stage itself, not just the configuration 
of the boards and the mechanics of the set, but the arrangement of 
props which influence the players' movements and the selection of 
scenery which lends their performance a vital dimension of place.
When all is said and done the audience will most likely 
remember the characters, their mannerisms and deeds, maybe a few of 
their choice lines. Only rarely do the contours of the stage, the 
colors of the backdrop, or the choreography of the proceedings make 
a conscious and lasting impression on the viewer. Without these.
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however, the delivery would be vapid and two-dimensional, a mere 
recitation of events. By the same token our study of Spanish 
American geography, as spectacular a setting as man and nature could 
provide, would remain a hollow diorama were it not enriched with the 
lives and histories of the pirates and their Spanish prey. Like a 
set designer I have concentrated on one aspect of a complex 
undertaking.
Although the chorologioal development of piracy in Spanish 
America has been my overriding concern, I have endeavored to portray 
these spatial elements with sufficient contextual references to 
historical personalities and events. Given the breadth of the stage 
and the duration of the performance, I have had to generalize both 
plot and characters far more than might a historian or a biographer. 
For this reason, before accentuating any geographical denouement 
revealed by this study, I would first redress certain misconceptions 
which it may have encouraged regarding the players and their 
actions.
To focus our inquiry I have emphasized the Spaniards' enmity 
with the English, French, and Dutch. In the broadest sense that 
hostility was in fact sustained throughout the period examined, but 
not with diplomatic or military consistency and not without 
overtures and concessions to peaceful coexistence and trade. At 
times Spain's aggressions were channeled toward only one or two of 
her competitors while an alliance was maintained with a third. Even 
when war or its practical equivalent persisted, however, responses 
in Europe did not always correspond to those in the Americas. 
Gilbert Joseph has warned against assuming "a monolithic Spanish
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position" even within the jurisdiction of the colonies, and his 
caveat is a sensible one (1974, 12). I have also portrayed the 
Spaniards principally as victims, and I fear that by lionizing the 
pirates' exploits I may have miscast their Spanish adversaries as 
passive or inept. Nothing oould be farther from the truth. Paul 
Hoffman's analysis (1980) has ably demonstrated that the Spaniards 
answered the aggressions of the sixteenth-century corsairs with 
vigorous and rational defensive policies. Their position was 
ultimately indefensible, and it is only a credit to their courage 
and stamina that they were able to retain as much of their wealth 
and territory for as long as they did. By the same token, while 
lumping the assaults of the French, English, and Dutch rovers in one 
piratical bag, I have downplayed the antagonisms which certainly 
existed between these ingressing powers. Joint deployments and 
mixed crews were indeed a trademark of the buccaneers, and Spain 
usually fell out as their common enemy, but warfare and piracy 
frequently punctuated alliances between fellov contenders as well. 
In short, the chameleonic mesh of European warfare and diplomacy, 
especially as transfigured by the Americas, was far more complex 
than the scope of the present inquiry might suggest.
Finally, despite the overwhelming attention in the annals of 
piracy to the initiatives and consequences of European involvement, 
I am convinced more than ever that aboriginal Americans and African 
descendants (slaves, freemen, and oiaarrones) played far more 
significant roles in the struggle for Spanish America than the ‘bit 
parts' accorded them by history. Of their contributions as 
oombattants and transmitters of vital geographical intelligence we
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should like to know more. With these thoughts in mind, let us
review the geographic consequences of a line drawn in 1494.
Legacy of the Line
One might wonder to what extent Pope Alexander VI contemplated 
the possible consequences of the Treaty of Tordesillas. Little did 
he know, of course, what lay beyond the line which awarded one 
nation from an all-Catholic Europe legitimate hegemony over most of 
the western hemisphere. Were he, however, to have condoned that 
decision given full knowledge of the geographic configurations and 
attributes of the Americas, coupled with the piratical experience of 
his native Mediterranean, could he have predicted any of the
developments whioh we have seen enacted? Spatially, at least,
Mediterranean and Spanish American piracy responded to a similar set 
of fairly restrictive geographic criteria. The configuration of
lands and seas overlain with the exigencies of sail-borne commerce 
left few strategic alternatives. Like their mercantile quarry, 
pirates positioned their bases and movements with respect to choke 
points, promontories, prevailing winds and currents, food and water 
supplies, stands of lumber, port facilities, and markets. Their
operations were further channeled by seasonal constraints. Certain 
coasts, because of their convoluted shore lines or rugged interiors, 
were particularly suitable for piratical settlement and retreat.
Spanish America was not the Mediterranean, however. Its 
isthmian physiography alone dictated a unique brand of piracy. What
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
351
had been a cultural corridor for aboriginal Americans posed only a 
sea barrier to maritime-oriented Europeans. For the Spaniards the 
Central American land bridge was both a blessing and a curse. It 
was a blessing because it prevented sea rovers from wreaking greater 
havoc than they did in the South Sea. Drake and Cavendish 
circumvented the problem by plying the Strait of Magellan, but that 
feat was not repeated with frequency or enthusiasm. Oxenham 
succeeded in crossing Panama only to be captured and executed for 
his accomplishment. Not until the latter seventeenth century did 
buccaneers perfect overland maneuvers across Nicaragua and the 
Darien. PanamA held out until 1671 and Acapulco never did fall to 
the torch. Moreover, though the buccaneers raided South Sea coasts 
from Cape Horn to California, they never established a permanent 
base in the Pacific.
Central America was by the same token a bane to Spanish 
merchants who needed to transport goods and treasure across it. Two 
major traverses presented themselves: the Rio San Juan and the
cross-Panama track. Both routes proved highly vulnerable, creating 
strategic choke points worse than any maritime bottleneck; and the 
pirates took full advantage of the Spaniards' predicament. Of 
course other features distinguished Spanish American piracy from its 
Old World antecedent. Here was a completely fresh social milieu of 
continuing exploration, conquest, and colonial intrigue. The 
resultant pattern of piracy and Spanish retaliation owed as much to 
the capriciousness of political will and historical accident as it 
did to predictable geographic influences.
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By 1536 piracy had become a fact of life in Spanish America. 
The first corsairs were French, soon followed by the English and the 
Dutch. The Greater Antilles, as the Spaniards* first treasure 
houses in the New World, bore the brunt of initial attacks. Havana, 
last American port of call for homebound caravels and galleons, 
suffered greatly during these early years. As the Spaniards 
fortified San Juan, Santo Domingo, and Havana, they also expanded 
ever deeper into the continental interior. Their oommeroial foous 
likewise moved southward and westward to the Main and the Gulf, and 
the corsairs followed on their heels to increasingly lucrative yet 
poorly defended hunting grounds. Drake and Cavendish extended the 
arena to the South Sea, bringing the hitherto unmolested Peruvian 
and Manila trade into the fray. By the end of the oorsair century 
most of the important Caribbean targets had been thoroughly 
initiated; of the six Middle American entrepots only Vera Cruz, 
PanamA, and Acapulco escaped relatively unscathed. Still, Spanish 
America remained unblemished by permanent rival colonies.
The buooaneers of the seventeenth century brought many 
changes, yet more similarities than differences persisted between 
these pirates and their oorsair forerunners. Their methods were not 
particularly new. Like their predecessors they relied on small 
boats to ply the shallows and to land their assaults beyond the 
range of enemy guns. Though they put new cities to plunder and to 
flame, they really only consummated the piratical designs already 
established by the corsairs. Even their much feted overland 
maneuvers, culminating with Morgan's coup de grace at Panama, had 
been presaged by the likes of Drake and Oxenham. Many of the
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buccaneers, again emulating the Elizabethan sea dogs, even fueled 
their lust for Spanish gold with a good measure of patriotism and 
anti-Catholio zeal. What separated the buocaneers from the corsairs 
was not the change of centuries; nor was it their military tactics, 
religious motives, political affiliations, 'democratic' lifestyle, 
or even their near-legendary past as hunters in the forests and 
savannas of Hispaniola. In part it was a subtle combination of all 
these things, but mostly it was a simple fact of geography. The 
buccaneer was a true frontiersman, the first American pirate. 
Though he may not have been born in the Hew World, he belonged to 
it. He washed himself of European identity when he crossed the 
Tropic of Cancer, determined to live off the land and whatever goods 
he could plunder. Buccaneers were the harbingers of French, 
English, and Dutch colonialism; by building strongholds in the midst 
of Spain's American empire they informed their reluctant Spanish 
hosts that they intended to stay.
More than symbolizing the entrenchment of piraoy in the 
region, these bases upset the entire geopolitical equation there and 
significantly enhanced the strategic options of the buocaneers. 
Previously, corsairs had operated pretty much within the same 
spatial and seasonal constraints as their Spanish prey. Their 
general raiding circuit essentially shadowed the convoy routes 
established by the Spaniards. The Indies-based buocaneers, by 
contrast, were much freer to strike when and where they pleased from 
centralized strongholds in the very heart of Spanish America. Thus 
the pattern of piraoy shifted from oirouitous pillaging to radial 
attack. Moreover, the buccaneers likewise assumed the best position
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for continual harassment of inter-colonial shipping. Leather, 
maize, cassava, wine, cacao, cochineal, lumber, and equally mundane- 
but-useful cargoes were their usual payback, not gold bullion or 
pieces of eight.
Tortuga, the tiny, near-forgotten JsJa iniitaJ, was arguably 
the first and most strategic of the pirate strongholds. It 
facilitated and shaped the transition of the hunting bouoaaier into 
the roving buocaneer. In its fitful youth it furthered the 
interests of all three piratical nations— English, French, and 
Dutch. Its seasoned buccaneers manned the boats of Port Royal, and 
in its prime Tortuga enabled French colonial expansion to greater 
SaiDt-Damngue. Spatially, it is worth noting that three other 
great privateering strongholds— Curacao, Port Royal, and Petit- 
Goave— lay within five degrees longitude of Tortuga. Only 
Providence Island, historically Tortuga’s bold-but-reokless 
piratical twin, flourisned briefly on the margin of the westward 
frontier. It is no coincidence that Tortuga, Curacao, and Jamaica 
ascended from buocaneer lairs to become colonial capitals for their 
respective governments. These were Whittlesey's insular 
springboards, and a6 such Jamaica proved most successful of them 
all.
The buccaneers who secured them were, like all pirates, 
supremely motivated by self-prof. .t. The advancement of colonial 
life, in which few of them held much personal stake, only served to 
fill their pockets. When their benefactors consolidated sufficient 
power and territory on their own, the buccaneers had outlived their 
usefulness. Those who could not conform to the new colonial
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establishment— and they were many— either removed to the outer 
frontier, perhaps trying their hand at the logwood trade, or struck 
out on their own account as freebooters.
With the eclipse of the buccaneer strongholds, and with them 
colonial approbation of piraoy, the pattern of freebooting dissolved 
from centralized assaults to peripheral forays, removing largely 
from Spanish American waters altogether. The picaroons who ushered 
in the eighteenth century knew they were doomed to a short and 
brutal reign of the seas; those skulls and skeletons fluttering 
above their mizzenmasts uncannily prefigured their own heads and 
corpses dangling from bowsprits and yardarms in the short years to 
come. Save for a few corrupt governors and conniving merchants, the 
whole world was their enemy; and the freebooters lashed out against 
the whole world. Spanish America had been their nursery, and for a 
time New Providence served as their den, but their hunting grounds 
extended from North America to Guinea, from Madagascar to the Red 
Sea. These were true sea rovers; afforded neither protection nor 
plunder from the land, any safe harbor served them shelter until 
they were hunted down to extinction.
Pirates of the kind we have studied no longer inhabit Spanish 
America, and scarce evidence remains on the landscape to betray 
their former abodes. Some of their haunts were habitual refuges of 
passing convenience; others were settlements of more permanent 
intent. Supplying just the immediate material and taotioal needs of 
raiders were small, remote, desolate island groups ranging from the 
Bahamas to Juan FernAndez. These places served merely as 
refreshment and supply outposts, oar&nages, hideouts, and bases of
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attack. Consequently they invited only short, sporadic visits and 
little proof of suoh clandestine operations survives today. 
Stretching along the Middle American coast from Bluefields to 
Campeche were the logwood and smuggling encampments of the 
buccaneers. Chronic rather than permanent describes the piratical
infestation of these coasts. Here again the decline both of piracy
and logwood bequeathed few conspicuous mementos of a malfeasant 
past. Of course the British cultural inheritance remains strong in 
Mosquitia and especially Belize, but the extent actually 
attributable to piracy will perhaps never be known. For many years 
pirate fortresses irrefutably proclaimed the territorial footholds 
carved out by the buccaneers, but even these were destroyed or 
subsumed by legitimate colonial powers long ago. Because the 
pirates left so few tangibles in their own wake, one must turn to 
the colonial legacies of their sovereign sponsors and Spanish 
victims for a lasting souvenir of their imprint on the land.
With his landmark study. The European Nations in the Nest 
Indies (1933), A.P. Newton published a most revealing map. It 
depicts the oiroum-Caribbean as of 1680 with "Coasts and places in
effective Spanish occupation in Red...and places in the effective
occupation of other nations in Black." It is a portrait of Spanish 
America dismantled, the fruition of inroads spearheaded by pirates 
for nearly a century and a half. The results of these ingressions 
persist in the cultural and political boundaries of the Caribbean 
realm today. Likewise does the relict Hispanic landscape betray a 
piratical menace long since destroyed. The ramparts of Cartagena, 
San Juan, Havana, Campeche, and San Juan de Ultia stand in mute
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testament to less secure times; other settlements owe their very 
locations to the depredations of oorsairs and buccaneers. San 
German in southwest Puerto Rioo was one of the first recipients of 
the pirates' toroh. Its re-establishment inland echoed the age-old 
coastal response noted by Semple in her study of the Mediterranean; 
likewise, the twin cities of Quito-Guayaquil and Lima-Callao 
reflected the interior capitals/forward ports of ancient Greece and 
Rome (Andrews 1978, 65; Hoffman 1980, 56; Semple 1916, 136-37).
After Drake's pillaging, Nombre de Dios was abandoned in favor of 
Porto Bello. Modern Panama City rises a few miles west of the 
burned-out, overgrown ruins of original PanamA— Henry Morgan's 
contribution to the changing face of colonial Spanish America. 
These developments, visible enough on the map and on the land, 
admittedly betoken a shameful legacy of human folly and greed.
Another, equally tangible geographical consequence presents a
nobler aspect of piracy, though hardly a redemptive one. It is the
lasting contribution of pirates toward the understanding and
description of the New World. As adventurers, corsairs and
buccaneers could not help but participate in the processes of
discovery and exploration. Geographical enquiry was, as Dampier
explained, part and paroel of their belligerent trade:
Privateers have an account of most Towns within 20 Leagues 
of the Sea, on all the Coast from Trinidado down to La Vera 
Cruz; ...For they make it their Business to examine all 
Prisoners that fall into their Hands, concerning the 
Country, Town, or City that they belong to; ...how many 
Families? whether most Spaniards? or whether the major part 
are not Copper-colour'd, as Mulattoes. Mustesoes, or 
Indians? whether rich, and what their Riches do consist in? 
and what their ohiefest Manufactures? if fortified, how many 
great Guns, and what number of small Arms? whether it is 
possible to come undescrib'd on them? How many Look-outs or
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Centinels...and how the Look-outs are placed? Whether 
possible to avoid the Look-outs, or take them? If any River 
or Creek comes near it, or where the best Landing; with 
innumerable other such Questions, which their Curiosities 
led them to demand (1927, 28).
That a select few— the likes of Drake, Exquemelin, Ringrose, Cowley,
Wafer, and Dampier— took pains to record these and even more
valuable observations for posterity is a credit to their abilities
and vision. Maps, journals, and the knowledge these generated were
the only real treasures bequeathed by the pirates, though these
would seem scant recompense for sanguinary heroism and ignominious
defeat, for the thousands of atrocities committed ’beyond the line’.
Because Spain's claim to the greater part of the New World was
simply untenable, the pirates who took advantage of it were likewise
doomed to a pivotal but finite career. Nevertheless, the romance of
the struggle still invokes conjecture of the kind penned by ’Captain
Johnson’ at the end of the era:
Rome, the Mistress of the World, was no more at first than a 
refuge for thieves and outlaws; and if the progress of our 
Pirates had been equal to their beginning, and had they all 
united and settled in some of those islands, they might by 
this time have been honoured with the name of a 
commonwealth, and no power in those parts of the world oould 
have been able to dispute it with them (Johnson [Defoe?]
1962, 21).
To the vanquished Spaniard, of course, it must have seemed that they 
were indeed piratas who ultimately accomplished exactly that.




BL British Library, London, England
Tab. indicates MSS. from the Map Library
MSS. in the Manuscripts Students’ Room:
Add. Additional Manuscripts 
Eg. Egerton Manuscripts 
Harl. Harley Manuscripts 
S1. Sloane Manuscripts
Stowe Stowe Manuscripts
NMM National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, England
PRO Public Record Office, Kew, England
tGl Arcbivo General de Indies, Seville, Spain
(MSS headed by collection number if author unknown)
AGI Guatemala 44-July 1643. "Testimo. de la entrada y robo Del 
enemigo en trux por el Mes de Jullio de 1643." 1644.
BL Add.5027.A.f.3. "Planta Del Puerto; Ciu:d y Castillos de S. 
Phelipe de Puertovelo. 17th century.
BL Add.5415.G. 11. “Planta Del Puerto; Ciu:d y Castillos de S. 
Phelipe de Puertovelo." Copy of above MS.
BL Add. 15,494.Mo.22. Map of Port Royal, Jamaica. 17th century.
BL Eg. 2395. Miscellaneous official papers relating to English 
settlements in America, including:
ff.481-82. Depositions taken before Thomas Lynch from John Coxon 
and others, concerning logwood cutting in Yucatan. 1672.
f.571. Report of the trial and execution of Browne, a privateer, 
in Jamaica. 1677.
359
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
360
BL Eg. 3340.££.110-13. Proceedings of the Council of Jamaica, 
under Sir Thomas Modyford, regarding the commission of Henry 
Morgan as admiral of the privateers, c.1671.
BL SI.239. "A book of originall Draughts of the Coast of the South 
Sea from Aoapuloo to the Streights of Magellan in Spanish, or a 
Spanish South Sea Waggoner.* 17th century.
BL SI.793 (or 894). "A Briefe journall... of the most Remarkable 
Passages Observed in... the Westerne Indies or Continent of 
America" [voyages of William Jackson]. [1642].
BL SI.2292. Sailing directions for Spanish America. 17th century.
BL SI.2752. ff.29-71. "Ann acoumpt of our Intended Voyage from 
Janaco with a party of shipps, departing from the afore said 
Island to Poartavell..." [and] "The Journall of our Intended 
Voyage... over the land into the South Seas..." An aooount of John 
Coxon, Bartholomew Sharp, and others. [1679-82].
Butler, Hathaniel. BL SI.758 (ff. 143-75). "A Dairy from February 
10th 1639 of my personall employments.” [1639].
Carlisle, Charles. NMM GOS/7. Journal of Charles Carlisle aboard 
the H.M.S. Francis. 1683.
 .NMM GQS/8. Narrative of Charles Carlisle’s burning of the
Trompeuse. 1683.
Cowley, William Abrose. BL SI.54. "The Voyage of William Ambrosia 
Cowley, Marriner from ye Capes of Virginia" A copy of SI. 1050. 
[1683-86].
 . BL SI.1050. Journal of his circumnavigation. [1683-86].
Cox, John. BL SI.49. "John Cox his Travills over the Land into the 
So. Seas; from thence Round the South parte of america to Berbados 
and Antegoe." [1680-82].
 .NMM GQS/4. "John Cox his travills over the Land Into ye South
Seas..." Duplicate of above MS. [1680-82].
Dampier, William. BL SI.3236. "The Adventures of William Dampier 
with others who Left Cap:n Sherpe in the South Seas... Mr. De la 
Wafers observations...[and] William Dampiers Second voage into the 
South Seas with Captain Cooke." [1681-91].
Dickinson, J. BL Stowe 747.f. 10. Letter to Captain Pickerin 
concerning the 1692 earthquake at Port Royal, Jamaica. 1692.
Grammont, Sieur de. BL SI.2724.f .218. Copy of a letter of marque 
issued to Laurens de Grafe by the Sieur de Grammont. [1680].
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
361
Hack, Killian (copyist, editor, cartographer, and/or illustrator)
BL Add.5027.A. Miscellaneous collection of maps, views, and plans, 
including:
f.7. "A description of the Bays of Sta Martha & Guara." (Unsigned 
map by William Hack]. Late 17th century.
f.8. "The Harbour of St Jago upon the Island of Cuba." [Unsigned 
map by William Hack]. Late 17th century.
BL Add.5414. Miscellaneous collection of maps, including:
No.4. "Island of Jamaica." 1682
No.5. "A; Chart; Describeing; Port; Royal" [Jamaica]. 1683.
No.6. “Description of all the Navigable Parts of the World that is 
yet Discovered" depicting the circumnavigation of William Cowley. 
1687.
No.25. "Description of Jamaica Island & the Caribies." a.1682.
No.26. Map of South America, showing Bartholomew Sharp's route. 
1682.
No.27. "A Description of the Islands of Gallappagos" based on the 
observations of William Cowley. 1687.
BL Add.5415. Miscellaneous collection of maps, including:
G.9. "Part of the Indian Empire in America." 1686.
G.14. Chart of Ireland in the Bermudas by William Hack. 1684.
BL Add.17,940.B. “A description of Mr Seoretarie Pepyo his Island" 
based on the observations of William Cowley. 1687.
BL Harl.4034. Copy of a Spanish derrotero originally completed in 
1669 at Panama, [attributed by the Library to William Hack]. Late 
17th century.
BL 7.Tab.123.(formerly K.Mar.VIII.15.). "Wagoner of the Great South 
Sea." 1682.
BL 7.Tab.127.(formerly K.Mar.VII.3.). "A Description of Coasts 
Islands &c. in the North Sea of America." c.1690.
BL SI.44. "Description of the South Sea" A South Sea waggoner. 1684.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
362
BL SI.45. An atlas shoving the Pacific coast from Acapulco to 
California, with the Galapagos, "Pepy'ses Island" and parts of the 
West Indies. 1687.
BL S1.46.a.(ff.1-138). "A Journall kept by Capt. Bartholomew Sharp 
of Passages in goeing over land to the South Seas" illustrated 
with drawings and maps by William Hack. [1680-82].
BL SI.46.a.(f.139). "A description of the streights of Magellan Anno 
1669 per Capt. John Wood" appended to above MS. [1669].
BL S1.46.b. Another copy of Sloane 46.a. Sharp’s and Wood's 
journals, illustrated by Hack.
BL SI.47. Sailing directions as an appendix to Hack's South Sea 
waggoner, c.1683.
BL SI.48. “Journall into ye South Sea by Baz:l Ringrose" transcribed 
and illustrated by William Hack from Sloane 3820. [1680-82].
NMM P.33. "A Wagoner of the South Sea" by William Hack. 1685.
[Heath]. BL Harl.6922.f. 19. "An Account of ye Earthquake at Port 
Royal in Jamaica" by Reverend Heath. 1692.
Lynch, Thomas. BL Harl.3361.ff.37-53. "A brief Survey of Jamaica." 
1660.
 . NMM GQS/5. Letter detailing his activities to supress
pirates. 1682.
 . NMM GOS/6. Relation of Van Horne’s attack. 1683.
Morgan, Henry.
BL Add. 11268, f. 78. Account of the sacking of Panama. 1671.
BL SI.2724. f.l. A proclamation against interlopers, witnessed by 
Sir Henry Morgan, 1681.
BL SI.2724.f.30. Letter to the Earl of Carlisle concerning Jamaican 
affairs. 1680.
BL SI.2724.f.236. Letter to the Privy Council of England regarding 
French and English privateers, including de Grafe and Coxon. 1680.
Ringrose, Basil. BL SI.48. "Journall into ye South Sea by Baz:l 
Ringrose” transcribed and illustrated by William Hack from 
SI.3820. [1680-82].
 . BL SI. 3820. "A Journall into the South Sea by Basil
Ringrose" [1680-82].
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
363
 . NMM P.32. Waggoner of the South Sea by Basil Ringrose.
c.1683.
Sharp, Bartholomew. BL SI. 46. a. (ff. 1-138). "A Journall kept by
Capt. Bartholomew Sharp of Passages in goeing over land to the 
South Seas’* illustrated with drawings and maps by William Hack. 
[1680-82].
 . BL S1.46.b. Copy of above MS. illustrated by Hack.
Strong, John. BL Harl.5101. "The Journall of our intended voyage 
from England to the South Seas in the good Ship called the 
Welfare." A copy of SI.3295.
 . BL SI.3295. "The Journall of our Intended voyage from
England to the South Seas in the good ship called the Wellfare..." 
[1689-91].
Swan, Charles. PRO C.0.325/45. A South Sea waggoner of Captain 
Charles Swann, c.1685.
Wood, John. BL SI.46.a. (f .139). "A description of the streights of 
Magellan Anno 1669 per Capt. John Wood" [1669].
 . BL S1.46.b. Copy of above MS, illustrated by Hack.
_____ . BL SI.3833. Journal of his voyage through the Straits of
Magellan aboard the Sweepstakes. [1669-1670].
Printed Sources
[Adams, Thomas R.] "Maps and Charts" and "William Hack's 
Manuscript Atlases of ‘The Great South Sea of America.”' In Annual 
Report: 1966 of the John Carter Brown Library, pp. 21-28; 45-52. 
Providence, Rhode Island: The John Carter Brown Library, 1967.
Adams, Thomas R. “The Map Treasures of the John Carter Brown 
Library." The Map Collector no. 16 (1981): 7-8.
Albury, Paul. The Story of the Bahamas. London: Macmillan
Education Ltd., 1975.
Alig, Wallace B. “Rogue's Gallery of Famous Pirates." Americas 
(OAS) 9 (1957) -.14-18.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
364
Alsedo y Herrera, D. Dionisio. Piraterias y Agresiones de Jos 
IngJeses y de otros Pueblos de Europe ea la America Espanola desde 
el Siglo XVI al XVIII. Edited by Justo Zaragosa. Madrid: Imprenta
de Manuel G. Herndndez, 1883.
American Geographical Society. Catalogue of Maps or Sispaaio 
America. Volume 1: Mexico. Central America. West ladies. New York: 
American Geographical Society, 1930.
Anderson, Thomas D. Geopolitics of the Caribbean.. Hew York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1984.
Andrews, Kenneth R.
Drake's Voyages: A Re-assessment of Their Place in Elizabethan 
Maritime Expansion. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967.
Elizabethan Privateering: English Privateering during the Spanish 
War. 1585-1603. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press,
1964.
English Privateering Voyages to the West Indies: 1588-1595. Hakluyt
Society Second Series, no. 111. Cambridge, England: Hakluyt
Society, 1959.
The Last Voyage of Drake & Markins. Hakluyt Society Second Series, 
no. 142. Cambridge: Hakluyt Society, 1972.
The Spanish Caribbean: Trade and Plunder 1530-1630. New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1978.
Ashdown, Peter. Caribbean History in Maps. London and New York: 
Longman Caribbean Ltd., 1979.
Ayres, Philip, ed. The Voyages and Adventures of Capt. Barth. 
Sharp and Others, in the South Sea... London: P.A. Esq., 1684.
Bancroft, Hubert Hove. History of Central America. 3 vols. 1886- 
87. Reprint. In The Works of Hubert Hove Bancroft, vols. 6-8. New 
York: McGraw Hill Book Company. Arno Press, n.d.
Barber, Peter. "The Manuscript Legacy: Maps in the Department of 
Manuscripts. " The Map Collector no. 28 (1984): 18-24.
Barbour, Yiolet F. "Privateers and Pirates of the West Indies." 
American Historical Pevier 16 (1911): 529-66.
Barnsley, Henry. "A Draught of the Island Rattan in the Bay of 
Honduras." 1742.
[Barnsley, Henry]. "Map of the Island of Rattan 1742."
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
365
Barratt, P.J.H. Grand Bahama. Newton Abbot, Devon, England: David 
& Charles, 1972,
Barskett, James. History of the Island of St. Domingo. 1818. 
Reprint. London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1972.
Bennett, J.H. "William Dampier: Buccaneer and Planter." History 
Today 14 (1964).469-77.
Bernal Ruiz, Maria del Pilar. La Toma del Puerto de Guayaquil en 
1687. Seville: Publicaciones de la Escuela de Estudios Hispano- 
Amerioanos de Sevilla, 1979.
Besson, Maurioe. Les "Frdres de la Coste,: Flibvstiers 8
Corsaires. Paris: Editions Duchartre & van Buggenhoudt, 1928.
 . The Soovrge of the Indies: Bvcoaneers, Corsairs, &
Filibvsters. Translated by Everard Thornton. London: George
Routledge & Sons Ltd., 1929.
Bierce, Ambrose. The Devil's Dictionary. New York and Cleveland: 
The World Publishing Co., 1942.
[Bigges, Valter] Sir Frances Drakes' West Indian Voyage. [1589] 
The English Experience, no. 128. New York: Theatrum Orbis Terrarum 
Ltd. Da Capo Press, 1969.
Birtles, Terry G. "Early Charts of the Falklands: Part 1, Passing 
Contacts." Cartography 13 (1983):35-48.
Black, Clinton Y. Fort JRoyal: A History and Guide. Jamaica: 
Bolivar Press, 1970.
Blcme, Richard. A Description of the Island of Jamaica. London: I. 
Milbourn, 1672.
Bonner, William Ha 11am. Captain William Dampier: Buccaneer-
Author. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1934.
Botting, Douglas. The Pirates. Alexandria, Virginia: Time-Life 
Books, 1978.
Boyson, Y.F. The Falkland Islands. Oxford: Oxford University
Press. The Clarendon Press, 1924.
Bradley, Willie Vinter. "Peter the Great— a Pirate of Tortuga." 
United States Naval Institute Proceedings 54 (1928) :481-83.
Bridenbaugh, Carl and Roberta. No Peace Beyond the Line: The 
English in the Caribbean 1624-1690. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1972.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
366
Brown, Jonathan. The History and Present Condition of St. Domingo. 
1837. Reprint. London: Frank Cass, 1972.
Buokholtz, Billy William. "Historical Geography of English 
Incursions in the Western Caribbean During the Seventeenth 
Century." Master’s thesis, Louisiana State University, 1987.
Burdon, John Alder, ed. Archives of British Honduras. Vol. 1. 
London: Sifton Praed & Co. Ltd., 1931.
Burg, Barry Richard. "Legitimacy and Authority: A Case Study of 
Pirate Commanders in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries." 
The American Neptune 37 (1977): 40-49.
 . Sodomy and the Pirate Tradition: English Sea Povers in the
Seventeenth-Century Caribbean. New York: New York University
Press, 1984.
Burney, James. History of the Buccaneers of America. London: Swan 
Sonnenschein & Co., 1891.
Burns, Alan. History of the British Nest Indies. London: George 
Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1954.
Caiger, Stephen L. British Honduras Past and Present. London: 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1951.
Campbell, Tony. "The Drapers’ Company and its School of
Seventeenth Century Chart-Makers." In My Head is a Map. Edited by 
Helen Wallis and Sarah Tyaoke. London: Francis Edwards. Carta
Press, 1973.
 . Early Maps. New York: Abbeville Press, 1981.
Carr, H. Gresham. "Pirate Flags.” The Mariner's Mirror 29
(1943):131-34.
Centre d*Etudes de Geographie Tropicale (CNRS). Atlas
d Haiti. 1985.
Chari evoix, Pierre-Francois-Xavier de. Histoire de 1 ‘Isle
Espagnole ou de S. Dooingue. 4 vols. Amsterdam: Francois
L'Honore', 1733.
Clarke, Hell Ray. "The Haunts of the Caribbean Corsairs.”
National Geographic 41 (1922): 147-87.
Cookburn, John. The Unfortunate Englishmen: Or, a Faithful
Narrative of the Distresses and Adventures of John Cockburn, and 
Five Other English Mariners... Leith, Great Britain: Wm. Reid b
Co.. 1817.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
367
Cooke, Edvard. A Voyage to the South Sea and Bound the World, 
Perform’d in the years 1708, 1709, 1710 and 1711 by the Ships Duke 
and Dutchess of Bristol... London: B. Lintot & R. Gosling, 1712.
Corbett, Julian S. Drake and the Tudor Navy. 2 vols. New York:
Longmans, Green, and Co., 1898.
 . Sir Francis Drake. London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1925.
Costa Rioa. Fundaoion de Parques Haoionales, et al. "Mapa de 
los Parques de Costa Rica." 1986.
Covley, William A. Capt. Corley's Voyage Bound the Globe. In A 
Collection of Original Voyages. Edited by William Hack. London: 
Printed for James Knapton, 1699. Reprinted for James and John
Knapton, 1729.
Craig, Alan K. "Logvood as a Factor in the Settlement of British 
Honduras." Caribbean Studies 9 (1969):53-62.
Craton, Michael. A History of the Bahamas. London: Collins, 1962.
Crone, G.R., and Raleigh Ashlin Skelton. “English Collections
of Voyages and Travels: 1625-1846.” In Bicbard Hakluyt & His 
Successors. Edited by Edvard Lynam. Hakluyt Society Second Series, 
no.93. London: Hakluyt Society, 1946.
Crone, G.R., and A. Kendall. The Voyages of Discovery. Nev York: 
G.P. Putnam*8 Sons, 1970.
Crouse, Mellis M. French Pioneers in the West Indies 1624-1664. 
Nev York: Morningside Heights. Columbia University Press, 1940.
 . The French Struggle for the West Indies 1665-1713. Nev York:
Morningside Heights. Columbia University Press, 1943.
Cruikshank, E.A. The Life of Sir Henry Morgan. Toronto: The
Macmillan Company of Canada Ltd., 1935.
Cundall, Frank. The Governors of Jamaica in the Seventeenth 
Century. London: The West India Committee, 1936.
 . Historic Jamaica. London: The West India Committee, 1915.
Dahlgren, E.W. "Were the Havaiian Islands Visited by the Spaniards 
before their Discovery by Captain Cook in 1778?" Acta 
Cartographical1 (1975): 27-248.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
368
Dampier, WiIlian
A Discourse of Trade-vinds. Breezes. Storms. Seasons of the fear. 
Tides and Currents of the Torrid Zone Throughout the World... In A 
Collection of Voyages. Vol. 2. London: James and John Knapton, 
1729.
A Nev Voyage Bound the World. 7 th ed. In A Collection of Voyages.
Vol. 1. London: James and John Knapton, 1729.
A Nev Voyage Found the World. Edited by N.M. Penzer. London: 
Argonaut Press, 1927.
A Supplement to the Voyage Bound the World: Describing the Countries 
of Tonquin, Achin, Malacca. Sc... In A Collection of Voyages. Vol. 
2. London: James and John Knapton, 1729.
Tvo Voyages to Campeachy... In A Collection of Voyages. Vol. 2.
London: James and John Knapton, 1729.
The Voyages of Captain William Dampier. 2 vols. Edited by John 
Masefield. London: E. Grant Riohards, 1906.
A Voyage to Nev-Holland. Sc. in the Tear 1699. In A Collection of 
Voyages. Vol. 3. London: James and John Knapton, 1729.
Dampier-Wetham, V.C.D. "William Dampier, Geographer." The 
Geographical Journal 74 (1929):478-80.
Davidson, William Van. Historical Geography of the Bay Islands. 
Honduras: Anglo-Hispanic Conflict in the Western Caribbean. 
Birmingham, Alabama: Southern Univeristy Press, 1974.
Deagan, Kathleen A. “Columbus' Lost Colony." National Geographic 
172 (1987):672-75.
De Sola, Ralph. Worldvide What S Where: Geographic Glossary S 
Traveller's Guide. Santa Barbara and Oxford: Clio Books, 1975.
Diooionario de la Lengua EspaSola. Vigesima Edicidn. Madrid: 
Real Academia Espafiola, 1984.
[Diok, William]. A Brief Account of Captain Sharp and Other His 
Companions; Their Voyage from Jamaica unto the Province of Darien 
and South Sea... Given by One of the Buccaneers Who Was Present at 
Those Transactions. In The Buccaneers of America. Edited by 
William Svan Stallybrass. Nev York: Dorset Press, 1987.
Dobson, Harda. A History of Belize. London: Longman Group Ltd., 
1973.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
369
Donkin, R.A. "Spanish Red: An Ethnogeographical Study of Cochineal 
and the Opuntia Cactu3." Transactions of the American 
Philosophical Society. Vol. 67, Part 5, 1977.
Dozier, Craig L. Nicaragua's Mosquito Shore. University, Alabama: 
University of Alabama Press, 1985.
Dutertre, Jean-Baptiste. Histoire G6n6rale des Antilles Habitue 
par les Francois. 2 vols. Paris: Thomas Jolly, 1667.
Earle, Peter. The Sack of Panama. London: Jill Norman & Hobhouse 
Ltd., 1981.
East, W. Gordon. The Geography Behind History. London: Nelson,
1965.
Edvards, Clinton R. “The Discoveries of Mexico and the Meaning of 
Discovery." Terrae Incognitae 17 (1985):61-67.
Exqneaclin, Alexandre Olivier [Oexmelin or John Esquemeling].
Bucaniers of America: Or, a True Account of the Most Remarkable 
Assaults Committed of Late Tears upon the Coasts of the Nest 
Indies, by the Bucaniers of Jeuoaioa and Tortuga, both English and 
French. 1st and 2nd eds. London: Printed for William Crooke, 1684- 
1685.
The Buccaneers of America. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1951.
The Buccaneers of America. Edited by William Stallybrass. London: 
George Routledge & Sons, 1924.
The Buccaneers of America. Edited by William Stallybrass. New York: 
Dorset Press, 1987.
The Buccaneers of America. Translated from the Dutch original by
Alexis Brown. Middlesex, England: Penguin Books Ltd., 1969.
The Buccaneers of America. Translated from the Dutch original by
Alexis Brown. London: The Folio Society, 1972.
De Americaensche Zee-Roovers Behelsende een Pertinent Verhael van 
alle de Roverye en Onmenselycke Vreetheeden die de Engelsche en 
Franse Roovers Tegens de Spanyaerden in America Gepleeght Hebben. 
Amsterdam: Jan ten Hoorn, 1678.
Histoire des Avanturiers gui se sort Signalez dans les Indes, 
Contenant ce qu'ils ont Fait de Plus Remarquable dupuis Vingt 
Anne’es... Paris: Jacques le Febvre, 1686 and 1688.
Histoire des Aventuriers, Flibustiers, et Boucaniers. Paris: 
Librairie Commerciale & Artistique, 1967.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
370
Fisher, William, and John Thornton. The English Pilot, The 
Fourth Book. 1689. Theatrum Orbis Terrarum Series of Atlases in 
Facsimile, 4th series, vol. 1. Amsterdam: Theatrum Orbis Terrarum 
Ltd., 1967.
Floyd, Troy S. The Anglo-Spanish Struggle £or Mosquitia. 
Albuquerque: University of Nev Mexico Press, 1967.
Fuller, Basil, and Robert Leslie-Melville. Pirate Harbours and 
Their Secrets. London: Stanley Paul & Co. Ltd., 1935.
Funnell, William. A Voyage Round the World. Being an Account of 
Capt. William Dampier's Expedition into the South Seas in the Ship 
St. George. In A Collection of Voyages. Vol. 4. London: James and 
John Knapton, 1729.
Gage, Thomas. The English American: A New Survey of the West 
Indies, 1648. Edited by A.P. Nevton. London: George Routledge & 
Sons. Ltd., 1928.
Garcia Hontero, Eduardo. El Cddigo de los Piratas. 2 vols. Lima, 
1952.
Gehrig, Giarles T., and J.A.Sohiltkamp, eds. New Netherlands 
Documents Volume XVII: Curacao Papers 1640-1665. Interlaken, Nev 
York: Heart of the Lakes Publishing, 1987.
George, H.B. The Relations of Geography and History. Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1907.
Gerhard, Peter. Pirates on the West Coast of New Spain, 1575-1742. 
Glendale, California: The Arthur H. Clark Co., 1960.
Glasoook, Melvin Bruoe. “Three English Raiding Voyages to the 
West Coast of South America and Spanish Defenses Betveen 1707 and 
1742." Master's thesis, Louisiana State University, 1964.
Goslinga, Cornelius Ch. The Dutch in the Caribbean and in the
Guianas, 1680-1791. Assen, The Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1985.
 . The Dutch in the Caribbean and on the Wild Coast, 1580-1680.
Assen, The Netherlands: Van Goroum & Co., 1971.
 . A Short History of the Netherlands Antilles and Surinam. The
Hague/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979.
Gosse, Philip.
The History of Piracy. Nev York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1946.
My Pirate Library. London: Dulan & Co. Ltd., 1926.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
371
"Piracy." The Mariner 's Mirror 36 (1950):337-49.
"Piracy and Buccaneering." Collier's Encyclopedia. 1981.
The Pirate's Who's Mho. Boston: Charles E. Lauriat Co., 1924.
Grand Laroasse de la langue franchise. Paris: Librairie
Larousse, 1973.
Great Britain. British Museum [British Library]. The British 
Museum Catalogue of Printed Maps and Atlases. Photolithographic 
edition to 1964. London: The Trustees of the British Museum, 1967.
_____ . Sir Francis Drake: An Exhibition to Commemorate Francis
Drake's Voyage around the World 1577-1580. London: British Museum 
Publications Ltd., 1977.
Great Britain. National Maritime Museum. Piracy and 
Privateering. National Maritime Mureum Catalog of the Library, 
vol. 4. London: HMSO, 1972.
Great Britain. Public Record Office. Calendar of State Papers, 
Colonial Series, 1574-1660. Vol. 1. London, 1860.
_____ . Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and the
West Indies, 1661-1721. Vols. 5-32. London, 1880-1933.
_____ . Maps and Plans in the Public Record Office (Vol. 2): America
and the West Indies. Edited by P.A. Penfold. London: HMSO, 1974.
Gregg, A.R. British Honduras. London: HMSO, 1968.
Hack [Haeke], William, ed. A Collection of Original Voyages. 
London: Printed for James Knapton, 1699a.
_____."A Draft of the Golden Islands with Part of ye Isthmus of
Darien..." London: sold by Robt. Morden, 1699b.
Haiti. Institut de G6odesie et Cartographie. 1:50,000 map coverage 
of the lie de la Tortue and the north coast of Haiti. Series E732, 
Sheets 5675 I, 5675 IV, 5676 II, 5676 III.
Haiti. Institut Haitien de Statistique. 1:200,000 map of the lie de 
la Tortue and the north coast of Haiti. Joseph J. Charles, 
cartographer, 1953.
Hampden, John, ed. Francis Drake: Privateer. University, Alabama: 
University of Alabama Press, 1972.
Hamshere, Cyril. The British in the Caribbean. London: Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, 1972.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
372
 . "Henry Morgan and the Buccaneers." His tori' Todav 16
(1966):406—14.
Haring, Clarence H. The Buccaneers in the West Indies in the IVJI 
Century. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1910.
 . Trade and Navigation Between Spain and the Indies in the
Time of the Hapsburgs. Harvard Economic Studies, no. 19. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1918.
Harlow, Vincent T., ed. Colonising Expeditions to the West Indies 
and Guiana, 1623-1667. Hakluyt Society Second Series, no. 56. 
London: Hakluyt Society, 1925.
 . The Voyages of Captain William Jackson (1642-1645). Camden
Miscellany vol. 13/ Camden Society vol. 34. London: Offices of the 
[Camden] Society, 1923.
Hart, Francis Rnssell, Admirals of the Caribbean. Boston and New 
York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1935.
Hartog, J. Curacao: From Colonial Dependence to Autonomy. Aruba: De 
Wit Inc., 1968.
Hartshorne, Richard. The Nature of Geography. Association of 
American Geographers, 1949. Reprinted with corrections, 1961.
[Heath, Reverend] "A Full Account of the Late Dreadful Earthquake 
at Port Royal in Jamaica; Written in Two Letters from the Minister 
of that Place. *' Broadside. 1692.
Hill, Richard. The Picaroons. 1869. Reprint. Freeport, New York: 
Books for Libraries Press, 1971.
Hoffman, Paul E. The Spanish Crown and the Defense of the 
Caribbean 1535-1585. Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State
University Press, 1980.
Hoover, Thomas. Caribbee. New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc. 
1985.
Horvioh, Robert H. and Lyon, Jonathan. A Belizean Bain Forest 
Community. Gays Mills, Wisconsin: Orang-utan Press, 1990.
Hovarth, David. The Golden Isthmus. London: Collins, 1966.
Hovse, Derek, and Michael Sanderson. The Sea Chart. Newton 
Abbot, England: David & Charles, 1973.
Hovse, Derek, and Horman J. Thrower, eds. A Buccaneer's Atlas: 
Basil Ringrose's South Sea Waggoner. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1991 (in press).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
373
Hussey, Roland D. "Spanish Reaction to Foreign Aggression in the
Caribbean to About 1680." The Hispanic American Historical Review 
9 (1929):286-302.
Interesting Tracts, Relating to the Island of Jamaica,
Consisting of Ciirious State-Papers, Councils of War, Letters, 
Petitions, Narratives, &c. Sc. St. Jago de la Vega, Jamaica: 
Printed by Levis, Lunan and Jones, 1800.
"lie de la Tortue." Map of the H e  de la Tortue and the north 
coast of Haiti, from a survey made by the ship Eagle, 1905-06.
Jaeger, GArard A. Les Aventuriers de la Her. Lausanne: Editions Le 
Front Litteraire. 1983.
James, Preston. Latin America. 4th ed. Indianapolis: The Odyssey 
Press. The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1969.
Janes, Preston and Geoffrey Hart in. All Possible Worlds: A 
History of Geographical Ideas. Nev York: John Wiley & Sons, 1972 
and 1981.
Jameson, John Franklin, ed. Privateering and Piracy in the 
Colonial Period: Illustrative Documents. Nev York: Macmillan,
1923.
Johnson, Charles [Daniel Defoe?] A General History of the 
Robberies and Hurders of the Host Notorious Pirates from Their 
First Rise and Settlement in the Island of Providence to the 
Present Year. London: George Routleledge & Sons, Ltd., 1926.
 . Lives of the Host Notorious Pirates. Edited by Christopher
Lloyd. London: The Folio Society, 1962.
Jones, Chester Lloyd. Guatemala: Past and Present. Minneapolis: 
The University of Minnesota Press, 1940.
Jones, Clarence F. "Geographical Background of the Colonial Period 
in Caribbean America." In Colonial Hispanic America. Edited by 
Curtis A. Wilgus. Nev York: Russell & Russell, Inc., 1963.
Joseph, Gilbert M. "British Loggers and Spanish Governors: The 
Logvood Trade and its Settlements in the Yucatan Peninsula." 
Caribbean Studies 14 (1974): 7-37; 15 (1976) :43-52.
 . "John Coxon and the Role of Buccaneering in the Settlement
of the Yucatan Colonial Frontier." Terrae Incognitae 12 (1980):65- 
84.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
374
Joyce, L.E.E., ed. Wafer's Description of the Isthmus of Panama. 
Hakluyt Society Second Series, no. 73. Oxford: Hakluyt Society, 
1934.
Ju&rez Moreno, Juan. Corsarios y Piratas en Veracruz y Campeche. 
Seville: Escuela de Estudlos Hispano-Amerioanos de Sevilla, 1972.
Judge, Joseph. "Where Columbus Found the Nev World." National 
Geographic 170 (1986):566-72.
Kapp, Kit S.
The Early Maps of Colombia up to 1850. Map Collectors' Series, vol. 
8, no. 77. London: Map Collectors' Circle, 1971.
The Early Maps of Panama up to 1865. Map Collectors’ Series, vol. 8, 
no. 73. London: Map Collectors' Circle, 1971.
The Printed Maps of Jamaica up to 1825. Map Collectors' Series, vol. 
5, no. 42. London: Map Collectors' Circle, 1968.
The Printed Maps of Central America up to 1860. Map Collectors' 
Series, nos. 103 and 106. London: Map Collectors’ Circle, 1974- 
1975.
Karraker, Cyrus H. Piracy Was a Business. Rindge, Nev Hampshire: 
Richard R. Smith Publisher, Inc., 1953.
Keeler, Mary Frear. "The Boazio Maps of 1585-86." Terrae 
Incognitae 10 (1978):71-80.
  ed. Sir Francis Drake’s West Indian Voyage 1585-86. Hakluyt
Society Second Series, no. 148. London: Hakluyt Society. 1981.
Kemp, Peter, and Christopher Lloyd. The Brethren of the Coast. 
London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1960.
La bat, Jean-Baptiste. The Memoirs of Pdre labat. Translated and 
edited by John Eaden. Introduction by Philip Gosse. London: Frank 
Cass & Co. Ltd., 1970.
_____ . Noveau Voyage aux Idea de l'Aaerique. La Haye: P. Huooon,
1724.
La Tillestreux, Arnold Edourd Elyard de. Les Flibustiers aux 
Antilles. Paris: Champion, 1930.
Lee, Robert E. Blackboard the Pirate: A Peappraisal of His Life 
and Times. Winston-Salem: John F. Blair, Publisher, 1974.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
375
Lefroy. J.H. Memorials of the Discovery and Early Settlement of 
the Bermudas or Somers Islands: 1515-1685. 2 Vols. Bermuda:
Bermuda Historical Society. Bermuda National Trust, 1981.
Le Golif, Louis AdhAmar Timothee. Cahiers de Louis Adhemar 
Timothde Le Golif dit Bourgnefesse, Capitaine de la Flibuste. 
Edited by G. Alaux and A. t’Serstevens. Paris: Bernard Grasset, 
1952.
 . The Memoirs of a Buccaneer. Edited by G. Alaux and A.
t’Serstevens. Translated by Malcolm Barnes. London: George Allen & 
Unwin Ltd., 1954.
Lepers, Jean-Baptiste. La Tragique Histoire des Flibustiers: 
Histoire de Saint-Domingue et de 1 ’Isle de la Tortue, Fepaires des 
Flibustiers. Pc.ris: Les Editions G. Cr6s et Cie., 1925.
Link, Marion C.'Layton. "Exploring the Drowned City of Port Royal." 
The National Geographic Magazine 117 (1960): 151-83.
Lloyd, Christopher. "Bartholomew Sharp, Buccaneer." The Mariner's 
Mirror 42 (1955):291-301.
_____. William Dampier. London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1966.
Lombardi, Cathryn L. and John V. Lombardi. Latin American 
History: A Teaching Atlas. Conference on Latin American History 
and the University of Wisconsin Press, 1983.
[Long, Charles Edvard] "Memoir of Sir Henry Morgan, Knt. Lieut.-
Governor of Jamaica, Commonly Called the ’Buccaneer’." The
Gentlemen's Magazine (Feb.-Mar. 1832):128-31; 231-35.
Long Edvard. The History of Jamaica. 1774. Reprint. London: Frank 
Cass & Co. Ltd., 1970.
Loosley, Allyn C. "The Puerto Bello Fairs.” The Hispanic American 
Historical Review 13 (1933):314-35.
Lucas, C.P. A Historical Geography of the British Colonies: Volume 
II (the West Indies). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905.
Lynam, Edvard. "Early Days in Bermuda and the Bahamas." The
Geographical Magazine 21 (1948):201—7; 241-4 8.
 . "William Hack and the South Sea Buccaneers.” In The
Mapmaker’s Art: Essays on the History of Maps. London: The
Batchworth Press, 1953.
 . "A Treasure Map." Imago Mundi 2 (1937):*0.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
376
[Lynch, Thomas] "Captain Van Horn's Taking of la Vera Cruz." In 
The Voyages and Adventures of Capt. Barth. Sharp and Others, in 
the South Sea.. . London: Philip Ayres, 1684.
Lyon, Eugene. "Track of the Manila Galleons." National Geographic 
178 (1990):5-37.
M.M., et al. Port Poyal and its Barbour. Jamaica: Aston W.
Gardener & Co., 1893.
McDonald, D. "Surgeons to the Buccaneers: The Doctor as Pirate." 
History Today 6 (1956): 198-206.
McDowell, Bart. "Cartagena Nights." National Geographic 175 
(1989):494-509.
HaoLeish, Fleming, and Martin L. Krieger. The Privateers: A 
Raiding Voyage to the Great South Sea. New York: Random House, 
Inc.. 1962.
MacLeod, Murdo J. Spanish Central America: A Socioeconomic History 
1520-1720. Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California 
Press, 1984.
Mainvaring, Henry. “Of the Beginnings, Practices, and Suppression 
of Pirates." In The Life and Works of Sir Henry Mainvaring. vol. 
2. Publications of the Navy Records Society, vol. 56. London: Navy 
Records Society, 1922.
Mallook, A. “Dampier's 'Discourse of the Winds' and the
Distribution of Wind on the Earth's Surface." Nature 110 
(122):478-80.
Marx, Robert. Pirate Port: The Story of the Sunken City of Port 
Royal. London: Pelham Books Ltd., 1968.
 . Port Royal Rediscovered. London: New English Library. Times
Mirror, 1973.
Masefield, John E. On the Spanish Main. London: Methuen & Co.Ltd.,
1922.
Matthews, L. Harrison. “Dampier: Pirate and Naturalist." Nature 
170 (1952):408-9.
Means, Philip Ainsworth. The Spanish Main: Focus of Envy, 1492- 
1700. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1935.
Merrill, Gordon C. The Historical Geography of St. Kitts and 
Nevis, the West Indies. Mexico: Instituto Panamericano de
Geografia e Historia, 1958.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
377
Mitchell, David. Pirates. London: Thames and Hudson Ltd., 1976.
Mitchell, J.B. Historical Geography. London: English Universities 
Press Limited, St. Paul’s House, 1954.
Moore, John Robert. "Defoe, Stevenson, and the Pirates." ELH: A 
Journal of English Literary History 10 (1943): 35-60.
Mota, Franoisoo. Piratas en el Caribe. Havana: Casa de las
Americas, 1984.
National Geographic Society. "Central America." Map supplement. 
National Geographic 169 (1986):466A.
 . "West Indies." Map supplement. National Geographic 172
(1987):644A.
Nev ton, Arthur Peroival. The Colonising Activities of the English 
Puritans: The Last Phase of the Elizabethan Struggle vith Spain. 
Hew Haven: Yale University Press, 1914.
 . The European Nations in the West Indies: 1493-1688. London:
Adam & Charles Black, 1933.
Norton, William. Historical Analysis in Geography. London and New 
York: Longman, 1984.
Nuttall, Zelia, ed. Nev Light on Drake: A Collection of Documents 
Relating to his Voyage of Circumnavigation 1577-1580. Hakluyt 
Society Second Series, no. 34. London: Hakluyt Society, 1914.
Oldmixon, John. The History of the Isle of Providence. Nassau: The 
Providence Press, 1966.
Oxford English Dictionary. Oxford: Oxford University Press at 
the Clarendon Press, 1961.
Parsons, James J. "English Speaking Settlement of the Western
Caribbean." Yearbook of the Association of Pacific Coast 
Geographers 16 (1954):3-16.
_____. The Green Turtle and Han. Gainesville : University of Florida
Press, 1962.
 . San Andres y Providencia: Una Geografia Historia de las
Islas Colombianas del Mar Caribe Occidental. Translated by Maroo
F. Archbold Britton. Berkeley: University of California. BogotA: 
Publicaoiones del Banco de la Republioa, 1964.
Pavson, Michael, and David Buisseret. Port Royal, Jamaica. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
378
Pefia Battle, Manuel Arturo. La Isla de la Tortuga: Plaza de 
Armas, Pefugio y Seninario de los Enemigos de EspaBa en India s. 
Madrid: Ediciones Cultura Hispanica, 1951.
Perez Valenzuela, Pedro. Historias de Piratas: Los Aventureros 
del Mar en la America Central. Guatemala City: Tipografia
Nacional, 1936.
Peterson. Mendel L. The fbnnrl of Gold. Boston: Little, Brown, & 
Co., 1975.
Pointis, Jean Bernard Dea jeans, Baron de. Ifonsieur de Pointi 's 
Expedition to Cartagena Being a Particular Belation... English'd 
from the Original.. .London: S. Crouch, Richard Mount, S. Buckley 
and A. Feltham, 1699.
Pope, Dudley. The Buccaneer King: The Biography of Sir Henry 
Morgan, 1635-1688. New York: Dodd, Mead, & Co., 1977.
The Present State of Jamaica... to Which is Added an Exact 
Account of Sir Hen. Morgan's Voyage to, and Famous Siege and 
Taking of Panama from the Spaniards. London: Printed by Fr. Clark 
for Thomas Malthus, 1683.
Pringle, Patrick. Jolly Roger. New York: W.W Norton and Co., 
Inc.. 1953.
Putman, Robert. Early Sea Charts. New York: Abbeville Press, 
1983.
Q.W. "Piracy." Encyclopaedia Britannica. 1967.
Uuaritch, Bernard. Description of a Mappemonde by Juan Vespucci 
and of a Buccaneer's Atlas by William Hack. Pamphlet. London: 
Bernard Quaritch, 1914.
Rankin, Hugh F. The Golden Age of Piracy. Williamsburg, Virginia: 
Colonial Williamsburg. Inc., 1969.
Raweneau de Lussan. Journal du Voyage Fait A la Her de Sud, avec 
les Flibustiers de l'Amerique en 1684 & Annies Suivantes. Paris: 
Jean Baptiste Coignard, 1689.
 . Ravenneau de Lussan: Buccaneer of the Spanish Main and Early
French Filibuster of the Pacific. Edited and translated by 
Marguerite Eyer Wilbur. Cleveland, Ohio: The Arthur H. Clark Co., 
1930.
Rediker, Marcus. Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: 
Merchant Seamen, Pirates, and the Anglo-American Maritime World, 
1700-1750. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
379
 . "Life Under the Jolly Roger." The Wilson Quarterly 12
(1988):154-66.
Richards, Stanley. Black Bart. Llandybie, Great Britain: 
Christopher Davies, Publishers Ltd., 1966.
Ringrose, Basil. The Dangerous Voyage and Bold Attempts of Captain 
Bartholomew Sharp and Others Performed Upon the Coasts of the 
South Sea for the Space of Two Tears. In The Buccaneers of 
America. Edited by William Swan Stallybrass. New York: Dorset
Press, 1987.
 . A Buccaneer's Atlas: Basil Ringrose's South Sea Waggoner.
Edited by Derek Howse and Norman J. Thrower. Berkeley: University 
of California Press. 1991 (in press).
Ritchie, Robert C. Captain Kidd and the War Against the Pjrates. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1986.
 . "Pirates: Myths and Realities." The James Ford Bell
Lectures, no. 23. St. Paul: University of Minnesota. The
Associates of the James Ford Bell Library, 1986.
Roberts, Walter Adolphe.
The Caribbean: The Story of Our Sea of Destiny. New York: Negro 
Universities Press, 1969.
The French in the West Indies. Indianapolis and New York: The Bobbs- 
Merrill Company, 1942.
Havana: The Portrait of a City. New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1953.
Sir Henry Morgan: Buccaneer and Governor. London: Hamish Hamilton, 
Publisher, 1952.
Rockwell, Ford A. "Pirate." Encyclopedia Americana. 1986.
Rodvay, James. The West Indies and the Spanish Main. London: T. 
Fisher Unwin, 1896.
Rogers, B.M.H. "Dampier"s Voyage of 1703." The Mariner's Mirror 10 
(1924):366-81.
Rogers, Woodes. A Cruising Voyage Round the World. Edited by G.E. 
Manwaring. London: Cassell and Co. Ltd., 1928.
_____ . life Aboard a British Privateer in the Time of Queen Anne.
Edited by Robert C. Leslie. 1894. Reprint. London: Diploma Press, 
Ltd.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
380
Rowland, Donald. "Spanish Occupation of the Island of Old 
Providence, or Santa Catalina, 1641-1670." The Hispanic American 
HistoricaJ Review 15 (1935): 298-312.
Sabin, Joseph. Bibliotheca Americana: A Dictionary of Books
Delating to America. Nev York: J. Sabin & Sons, 1875.
Santiago Cruz, Franoisoo. Los Piratas del Golfo de Mexico. 
Mexico: Editorial Jus, 5.A., 1962.
Sauer, Carl 0. "Foreword to Historical Geography." Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers 31 (1941):1-24.
 . "Middle America as a Culture Historical Location." In
Readings in Cultural Geography. Edited with introductions and 
translations by Philip L. Wagner and Marvin W. Mikesell. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1962.
Semple, Ellen Churchill. "Pirate Coasts of the Mediterranean 
Sea." The Geographical Review 2 (1916): 134-51.
Severin, Timothy. The Golden Antilles. London: Hamish Hamilton, 
1970.
Sharp, Bartholomew. Captain Sharp’s Journey over the Isthmus of 
Darien, and Expedition into the South Seas, Written by Himself. In 
A Collection of Original Voyages. Edited by William Hack. London: 
Printed for James Knapton, 1699.
_____. Capt. Sharp's Journey over the Isthmus of Darien, and
Expedition into the South Seas. In A Collection of Voyages. Vol. 
4. London: James and John Knapton, 1729.
Shelwooke, George. A Voyage Round the World. Edited by W.G. 
Perrin. London: Cassell and Co. Ltd., 1928.
Shipman, Joseph C. William Dampier: Seaman-Scientist. University 
of Kansas Publications, Library Series, no.15. Lawrence: The
University of Kansas Libraries, 1962.
Skelton, Raleigh Ashlin. Explorers' Maps: Chapters in the
Cartographic Record of Geographical Discovery. London: Rout ledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1960.
 . "King George Ill’s Maritime Collection." British Museum
Quarterly 18 (1953):63-64.
Sloane, Hans. A Voyage to the Islands Madera, Barbados, Nieves, S. 
Christophers and Jamaica. 2 vols. London: Printed for Hans Sloane, 
1707-1725.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
381
Smith, Thomas R. “Manuscript and Printed Sea Charts in 
Seventeenth-Century London: The Case of the Thames School." In The 
Compleat Plattmaker. Edited by Norman J.W. Thrower. Berkeley/Los 
Angeles/London: University of California Press, 1978.
Southey, Thomas. Chronological History of the West Indies, vols. 
1-2. London: Longman, Pees, Orme, Brown, and Green, 1827.
Speed, John. A Prospect of the Host Famous Parts of the World, 
1627. Theatrum Orbis Terrarum Series of Atlases in Facsimile, 3rd 
series, vol. 6. Amsterdam: Theatrum Orbis Terrarum Ltd., 1966.
Speer, Joseph Smith. The West-Indian Pilot. London: sold by S. 
Hooper, 1766, 1771, and 1772.
Stommel, Henry. Lost Islands: The Story of Islands that Have 
Vanished from Nautical Charts. Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia Press, 1984.
Thornton, A.P. “The English at Campeachy, 1670-82.“ The Jamaican
Historical Pevier 2 (1953):27-38.
Thrower, Norman J.V., ed. The Compleat Plattmaker. Berkeley/Los 
Angeles/London: University of California Press, 1978.
_____ , ed. Sir Francis Drake and the Famous Voyage, 1577-i580:
Essays Commemorating the Quadricentennial of Drake's 
Circumnavigation of the Earth. Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: 
Univeristy of California Press, 1984.
Thrower, Rayner. The Pirate Picture. London: Phillimore & Co.
Ltd.. 1980.
Tooley, Ronald Vere. Maps and Map-Makers. London and New York: 
B.T. Batsford, Ltd., 1949.
 . Tooley's Dictionary of Mapmakers. New York: Alan R. Liss,
Inc., 1979. Supplement, 1985.
 . Some Portraits of Geographers and Other Persons Associated
rith Maps. London: The Map Collectors' Circle, 1975.
“A True and Perfect Relation of that Host Sad and Terrible 
Earthquake, at Port Royal in Jamaica, tfhioh Happened on 
Tuesday the 7th of June, 1692. “ Broadside. London: R. Smith,
G. Croom, and William Miller, 1692.
“The True Relation of Admiral Henry Morgans Expedition 
Against the Spaniards in the Vest-Indies, in the Tear 
1670.“ In The Voyages and Adventures of Capt. Barth. Sharp and 
Others, in the South Sea. London: Philip Ayres. 1684.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
382
Yai.88i.6re, Pierre de. Saint-Damingue. Paris: Librairie
Academique. Perrin et Cie., Librairies-Editeurs, 1909.
Velasquez, Rolando. "La Historia y el Mar: Bucaneros, Piratas, 
Filibusteros: su Diferenciaci6n y Transiciones." Culture (San
Salvador) no. 11 (1956):7-12.
Verrill, Alpheus Hyatt. Cl/M: Past and Present. New York: Dodd, 
Mead and Co., 1920.
 .In the Wake of Buccaneers. New York and London: The Century
Co., 1923.
 . The Real Story of the Pirate. New York: D. Appleton & Co.,
1923.
Vallis, Helen. "The Cartography of Drake's Voyage." In Sir Francis 
Drake and Famous Voyage, 1577-1580: Essays Commemorating the
Ouadricentennial of Drake's Circumnavigation of the Earth. Edited 
by Norman J.W.Thrower. Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of 
California Press, 1984.
Yon Winning, Jean Bassford. "Forgotten Bastions Along the 
Spanish Main: Campeche." The Americas: A Quarterly Review of
Inter-American Cultural History 6 (1950):415-30.
Wafer, Lionel. Wafer’s Description of the Isthmus of Panama.
Edited by L.E.E. Joyce. Hakluyt Society Second Series, no. 73. 
Oxford: Hakluyt Society, 1934.
Watson, Jack B. The West Indian Heritage: A History of the West 
Indies. London: John Murray, 1979.
W.D. [William Dick]. A Brief Account of Captain Sharp and Other 
His Companions; Their Voyage from Jamaica unto the Province of 
Darien and South Sea... Given by One of the Buccaneers Who Was 
Present at Those Transactions. In The Buccaneers of America. 
Edited by William Swan Stallybrass. New York: Dorset Press, 1987.
Webster's Third Hew International Dictionary of the English 
Language. Springfield, Massachussetts: G.& C. Merriam Co.. 1981.
West, Robert C., and John P. Augelli. Middle America: Its 
Lands and Peoples. 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentioe- 
Hall. Inc.. 1976.
Westergaard, Waldenar. The Danish West Indies Under Company Rule 
(1671-1764). New York: The Macmillan Co., 1917.
Whittlesey, Derwent. The Earth and the State. New York: Henry 
Holt and Co.. 1939.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
383
Wilgus, A. Curtis, ed. Colonial Hispanic America. New York: 
Russell & Russell, Inc., 1963.
_____. Historical Atlas of Latin America. New York: Cooper Square
Publishers, Inc., 1969.
Wilkinson, Henry C. Bermuda in the Old Empire. London: Oxford 
University Press, 1950.
 .The Adventurers of Bermuda. London: Oxford University Press,
1958.
Williams. Eric, ed. Documents of West Indian History, 1492-1655. 
Vol. 1. Port-of-Spain, Trinidad: PNM Publishing Co. Ltd., 1963.
Williams, Max Harrison. Gateway through Central America: A
History of the San Juan River-Lake Nicaragua Waterway, 1502-1921. 
La Paz: Empresa Editora "Urquizo LTDA", 1976.
Williams, Neville. Captains Outrageous: Seven Centuries of Piracy. 
London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1961.
 . The Sea Dogs: Privateers, Plunder and Piracy in the
Elizabethan Age. New York: Macmillan, 1975.
Wilson, Arthur M. “The Logwood Trade in the Seventeenth and 
Eighteenth Centuries." In Essays in the History of Modern Europe. 
Edited by Donald C. McKay. New York and London: Harper & Brothers 
Publishers, 1936.
Winston, Alexander. No Purchase, No Pay: Privateers and Pirates 
1665-1715. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1969.
Winzerling, E.O. The Beginning of British Honduras: 1506-1765. New 
York: The North River Press, 1946.
Wise, Donald A. A Descriptive List of Treasure Maps and Charts in 
the Library of Congress. Washington, D.C.: Geography and Map 
Division, Library of Congress, 1973.
Woodbury, George. The Great Days of Piracy in the West Indies. New 
York: Norton, 1951.
Wright, Irene A.
Documents Concerning English Voyages to the Spanish Main, 1569-1580. 
Hakluyt Society Second Series, no. 71. London: Hakluyt Society, 
1932.
The Early History of Cuba, 1492-1586. Now York: Octagon Books, 1970.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
384
Further English Voyages to Spanish America, 1583-1594. Hakluyt 
Society Second Series, no. 99. London: Hakluyt Society, 1951.
Spanish Documents Concerning English Voyages to the Caribbean, 1527- 
1568. Hakluyt Society Second Series, no. 62. London: Hakluyt
Society, 1929.
"The Spanish Version of Sir Anthony Shirley’s Raid of Jamaica, 
1597. " The Hispanic American Historical Eevier 5 (1922): 227-48.
Zapatero, Juan Manuel. Historia de las Fortificaciones de 
Cartagena de Indias. Madrid: Ediciones Cultura Hispanica del
Centro Iberoamericano de Cooperacion. Ministerio de Asuntos 
Exteriores, 1979.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
VITA
The son of Ralph and Virginia Galvin, Peter Reppert Galvin was 
born in the port city of Seattle on December 7, 1958. When he was 
six months old, his family brought him to the Midwest, where he 
spent his youth amid the cornfields of Indiana. Desperately seeking 
a way back to sea, he enrolled after high school in an academy for 
the Merchant Marine, but quickly resigned. After various studies at 
Butler, Indiana, and Purdue Universities, he committed to a major in 
agriculture, graduating in 1980 ‘With Highest Distinction' from 
Purdue University with a Baohelor of Science in International 
Agriculture. Peace Corps service subsequently brought him to West 
Africa, where he taught surveying and soil science at the Regional 
College of Agriculture in Bambili, Cameroon. Upon returning to the 
United States he studied geography and history at Indiana University 
and in 1983 moved back to Seattle for graduate work in geography at 
the University of Washington. There he met his present wife, 
Lucinda Woodward. He studied cartography under Professor John 
Sherman and Soviet agriculture under Professor W.A.Douglas Jaokson, 
receiving a Master of Arts in Geography from the University of 
Washington in 1985. Afterwards he accepted an Alumni Federation 
Fellowship at Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, to pursue 
doctoral studies in the Department of Geography and Anthropology. 
Under Professor William V. Davidson he emphasized Latin American 
historical geography, with a minor in anthropology overseen by 
Professor Miles Richardson. Mr. Galvin currently teaches geography 
at St. Norbert College in De Pere, Wisconsin.
385
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.




Date of Examination: 
September 9, 1991
Peter R. Galvin 
Geography
THE PIRATES' WAKE: A GEOGRAPHY OF PIRACY AND PIRATES AS GEOGRAPHERS IN COLONIAL SPANISH AMERICA, 1536-1718
Approved:
Major Professor and Chairman
Dean of the Graduate School
EXAMINING COMMITTEE:
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
